recognizing one of the elements of resisting arrest was the defendant's knowledge that the officer was effecting an arrest
How later courts described this case
- recognizing one of the elements of resisting arrest was the defendant's knowledge that the officer was effecting an arrest
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3866-17T3
LEONARD BEST, Administrator
of the ESTATE OF LUIS
CANDELARIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF NEWARK, NEWARK
POLICE CHIEF DARNELL HENRY,
NEWARK DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
SAFETY ANTHONY AMBROSE,
and NEWARK POLICE SERGEANT
THOMAS RUANE,
Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________
Argued April 1, 2019 – Decided July 11, 2019
Before Judges Messano, Fasciale and Rose.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-9051-12.
M. Anthony Barsimanto argued the cause for appellant
(The Maglione Firm PC, attorneys; M. Anthony
Barsimanto, on the briefs).
Gary Scott Lipshutz, Assistant Corporation Counsel,
argued the cause for respondents (Kenyatta K. Stewart,
Corporation Counsel, attorney; Kenyatta K. Stewart
and Gary Scott Lipshutz, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
On December 17, 2010, Newark Police Sergeant Thomas Ruane shot and
seriously injured Luis Candelaria. It is undisputed that at the time Candelaria
had a TEC-9 pistol concealed in the waistband of his pants. A grand jury
indicted Candelaria, who subsequently pled guilty to second-degree unlawful
possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), fourth-degree possession of a
defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d), and third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A.
2C:29-2(a)(3).
Candelaria provided the following factual basis under oath at his guilty
plea allocution:
Q. I direct your attention to December 17, 2010. On
that day were you in the City of Newark?
A. Yes.
Q. Specifically, were you in . . . the [Seth Boyden]
Complex?
A. Yes.
Q. [D]id you have in your possession a . . . handgun?
A. Yes.
A-3866-17T3
2
....
Q. And you kn[e]w it was illegal to have not only a gun
without a permit but also a defaced weapon . . . ?
A. Yes.
Q. And on that date were you approached by an
officer?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he tell you to stop and identify himself?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you . . . at that point resist him arresting
you?
A. Yes.
The judge sentenced Candelaria to a five-year term of imprisonment with a
three-year period of parole ineligibility.
Candelaria filed a complaint asserting various common law causes of
action against defendants City of Newark, its police director and police chief,
and Ruane, as well as a claim that defendants violated the New Jersey Civil
Rights Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. Candelaria was deposed while the suit
was pending but was subsequently murdered "in an incident" described only as
"unrelated to the claims asserted."
A-3866-17T3
3
Plaintiff Leonard Best, administrator of Candelaria's estate, substituted
into the litigation. During discovery, plaintiff served a subpoena duces tecum
on the Northern Regional Medical Examiner (ME) for autopsy reports related to
two civilian shooting deaths in 2003 and 2005 involving Ruane, and another
subpoena on defendants, requesting the complete internal affairs (IA)
investigation files related to those shootings and other complaints against Ruane
alleging use of excessive force. Defendants successfully moved to quash both
subpoenas. The judge found the information sought from the ME was "not
relevant" in quashing the first subpoena, and, in quashing the second, held that
by producing redacted versions of the IA files, defendants "satisfied [their]
discovery obligations."
Defendants moved for summary judgment. After considering oral
argument, the judge granted defendants' motion on several grounds. He
determined that our decision in Bustamante v. Borough of Paramus, 413 N.J.
Super. 276, 295 (App. Div. 2010), precluded any claim that Ruane used
excessive force because "a favorable outcome in the civil action would be
inconsistent with the admissions [Candelaria] made by pleading guilty."
Second, he concluded Ruane's conduct was objectively reasonable because the
struggle took place in a "very dangerous place[,] . . . at night." Candelaria
A-3866-17T3
4
admitted he was told "to stop" and "admit[ted] that he resisted arrest." As a
result, under the circumstances presented, the judge concluded Ruane was
entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, because there was no constitutional
violation, the remaining municipal defendants could not be liable pursuant to
Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
The judge entered the April 13, 2018 order granting summary judgment as to all
defendants on all claims and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiff now appeals that order, as well as the interlocutory orders
quashing his discovery subpoenas.
I.
We limit our review of the grant of summary judgment to the record before
the motion judge. See Ji v. Palmer, 333 N.J. Super. 451, 463-64 (App. Div.
2000). We address this issue first because it is dispositive of the appeal, and
focus our attention, as plaintiff does, on the divergent descriptions of what
occurred according to the two critical participants, Candelaria and Ruane.
In addition to the transcript of defendant's guilty plea, the motion judge
had before him a transcript of Candelaria's deposition, in which he admitted
obtaining the loaded handgun at a friend's house earlier in the evening of
December 17, 2010. Candelaria tucked the gun in the waistband of his pants
A-3866-17T3
5
when he left, explaining he placed the handle to the right so he could remove
the gun with "one fluid motion" if necessary. Candelaria admitted seeing Ruane,
who was in full uniform, talking to someone in the housing complex as
Candelaria walked toward his girlfriend's apartment. According to Candelaria,
he anticipated Ruane would "probably . . . do a stop or a search or whatever "
and thought he "could creep past and get inside the building."
Candelaria testified that Ruane grabbed him from behind as he walked
past. Candelaria said his "reaction was to try to get [him] off of me." He
unsuccessfully tried to throw Ruane "off [his] shoulder," after which Ruane spun
him around and shot him. The entire incident took only seconds.
Contrary to his plea allocution, Candelaria testified that Ruane said
nothing before firing the shot. Additionally, in written answers to
interrogatories that were part of the motion record, Candelaria acknowledged
that Ruane "felt a bulge in my pants," before spinning Candelaria around.
Ruane's deposition testimony, predictably, provided a different account.
He was dispatched to assist another police unit in the housing complex, which
he described as "so violent . . . with shootings and homicides." Ruane was
speaking to an individual when Candelaria approached. This individual said to
A-3866-17T3
6
Candelaria, "get the f*** out of here," which Ruane said was the person's
attempt to "stall . . . and confuse" Ruane so Candelaria could "get away."
Ruane noticed a "skinny barrel in [Candelaria's] pant leg" as he
approached, with his arm "guarding [that] side," and his other arm "swinging"
freely. Ruane put his arms around Candelaria as he passed, and confirmed the
object was a gun. Ruane yelled, "stop, police" and informed Candelaria he was
"under arrest." Candelaria, however, tried to reach for the weapon, and the two
struggled for control of it before falling to the ground. Ruane was on his knees,
underneath Candelaria, when he fired a shot believing Candelaria was about to
pull the weapon from his waist.
II.
"An appellate court reviews a summary judgment decision by the same
standard that governs the motion judge's determination." Caraballo v. City of
Jersey City Police Dep't, 237 N.J. 255, 264 (2019) (citing RSI Bank v.
Providence Mut. Fire. Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018)).
Under that standard, summary judgment is appropriate
when, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact challenged and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of
law."
A-3866-17T3
7
[Ibid. (quoting RSI Bank, 234 N.J. at 472) (in turn
quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).]
Our review is de novo. Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (citing Mem'l Props., LLC v.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 210 N.J. 512, 524 (2012)). Therefore, the trial court's legal
analysis is not entitled to any deference. The Palisades At Fort Lee Condo. Ass'n
v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 230 N.J. 427, 442 (2017) (citing Manalapan Realty,
LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Plaintiff contends summary judgment was improper because "testimonial
accounts" of Ruane's actions "varied," and therefore whether Ruane's conduct
was reasonable or otherwise entitled to qualified immunity presented a genuine
dispute that foreclosed summary judgment. He also argues that the judge
misinterpreted our holding in Bustamante, and Candelaria's guilty plea did not
bar the claims asserted in the complaint.
"The [CRA] was adopted in 2004 'for the broad purpose of assuring a state
law cause of action for violations of state and federal constitutional rights and
to fill any gaps in state statutory anti-discrimination protection.'" Ramos v.
Flowers, 429 N.J. Super. 13, 21 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Owens v. Feigin, 194
N.J. 607, 611 (2008)). The CRA is analogous to its federal counterpart, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, Filgueras v. Newark Public Schools, 426 N.J. Super. 449, 468
A-3866-17T3
8
(App. Div. 2012), and "[t]he interpretation given to parallel provisions of [§]
1983 may provide guidance in construing our [CRA]." Tumpson v. Farina, 218
N.J. 450, 474 (2014).
Here, the specific constitutional right at issue is the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from excessive force, and we analyze such claims under the
Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). "[T]he substantive question in excessive force cases
'is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent
or motivation.'" Velazquez v. City of Camden, 447 N.J. Super. 224, 241 (App.
Div. 2016) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).
Whether the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable "requires careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)). "The calculus of reasonableness must
embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
A-3866-17T3
9
evolving -- about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation."
Id. at 396-97.
"The affirmative defense of qualified immunity protects government
officials from personal liability for discretionary actions taken in the course of
their public responsibilities, 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.'" Brown v. State, 230 N.J. 84, 97-98 (2017) (quoting Morillo v.
Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2015)). The defense applies to suits brought under
the CRA. Id. at 98.
"This state's qualified immunity doctrine tracks the federal standard,
shielding from liability all public officials except those who are 'plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Ibid. (quoting Morillo,
222 N.J. at 118). "To ascertain whether a governmental official . . . is entitled
to qualified immunity requires inquiries into whether: (1) the facts, '[t]aken in
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury[] . . . show the officer's
conduct violated a constitutional right'; and (2) that constitutional 'right was
clearly established' at the time that defendant acted." Ibid. (alterations in
original) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
A-3866-17T3
10
"A government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at
the time of the challenged conduct, '[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official understands that what he is doing violates that
right.'" Radiation Data, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 456 N.J. Super. 550,
559 (App. Div. 2018) (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). "[T]he clearly established law must be
'particularized' to the facts of the case. Otherwise, '[p]laintiffs would be able to
convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually unqualified
liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.'" White v.
Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639). "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining
whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier,
533 U.S. at 202 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)).
Generally, whether qualified immunity shields an officer's conduct is a
question of law. Brown, 230 N.J. at 98. However,
[a]n exception to that rule arises when the case involves
disputed issues of fact. In such a circumstance, the case
may be submitted to the jury to determine "the who-
what-when-where-why type of historical fact issues,"
after which the trial judge may incorporate those
A-3866-17T3
11
findings in determining whether qualified immunity
applies.
[Id. at 99 (citing Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336,
359 (2000)).]
As we understand the argument, plaintiff contends the judge was required
to accept Candelaria's deposition version of events, i.e., that Ruane, without
having felt the weapon in Candelaria's waist and without announcing his
intention to arrest him, grabbed Candelaria and shot him when he resisted. As
plaintiff contends in his brief, "the point-blank gunshot to the stomach was not
justified."
However, this ignores prior statements Candelaria certified or made under
oath and which were in the motion record. In his interrogatory answers,
Candelaria admitted that Ruane's hand felt the "bulge in [his] pants" before the
shot was fired. In his guilty plea allocution, Candelaria admitted under oath that
Ruane approached him, ordered him to stop and announced he was under arrest
before Candelaria resisted that arrest.
We need not consider whether the judge's application of Bustamante was
correct under the circumstances of this case. The statements Candelaria made
when he pled guilty are fully admissible in a civil trial. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(22).
Accepting Candelaria's deposition version of events, he was not guilty of
A-3866-17T3
12
resisting arrest, see, e.g., State v. Simms, 369 N.J. Super. 466, 470 (App. Div.
2004) (recognizing one of the elements of resisting arrest was the defendant's
knowledge that the officer was effecting an arrest), however, the Court has
recognized that a defendant cannot enter a plea of guilty in this state while
maintaining his innocence. State v. Taccetta, 200 N.J. 183, 195-96 (2009).
Moreover, "[a]t the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a 'genuine' dispute
as to those facts." Alfano v. Schaud, 429 N.J. Super. 469, 474 (App. Div. 2013)
(citing Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 343 N.J. Super. 504, 510 (App. Div. 2001), rev'd
on other grounds, 172 N.J. 185 (2002)). "[W]e are not required to accept, as
competent evidence, a purely self-serving certification by plaintiff that directly
contradicts his prior representations in an effort to create an issue of fact, which
his previous testimony had eliminated." Shelcusky, 343 N.J. Super. at 510.
Moreover, even were we to assume Candelaria's deposition version of
events were true, summary judgment was still appropriate because he failed to
rebut defendants' assertion of qualified immunity. In an undisputedly violent,
high-crime area, Candelaria admittedly secured a loaded handgun in his
waistband and walked from his friend's house into a public area to go to his
girlfriend's apartment. He positioned the gun to easily draw it and use it as
A-3866-17T3
13
necessary. He admittedly saw Ruane in full uniform and suspected Ruane would
stop and frisk him, so he tried to "creep past." Candelaria reacted to Ruane's
first physical contact by attempting to throw the officer over his shoulder.
Under the two-prong qualified immunity analysis, the first step requires
us to determine whether Ruane's actions were unconstitutional, i.e., whether
they were objectively unreasonable under the totality of these circumstances.
Brown, 230 N.J. at 98. While it is unreasonable for an officer to "seize an
unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead[,] . . . [w]here the officer
has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical
harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to
prevent escape by using deadly force." Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
Plaintiff seems to imply that because Candelaria never threatened Ruane
with the gun, the officer's actions were objectively unreasonable. However, this
ignores well-recognized constitutional principles that permit both an
investigatory stop and "a pat-down of a person's body" if, based on specific and
articulable facts, the officer possesses "a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity." State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460, 472-73 (2017).
As to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the Supreme
Court itself has recognized that "Graham [and] Garner . . . lay out excessive-
A-3866-17T3
14
force principles at only a general level." White, 137 S. Ct. at 552. In order to
rebut the assertion of qualified immunity, plaintiff was required to show Ruane
violated a "constitutional 'right [that] was clearly established' at the time that
[Ruane] acted." Brown, 230 N.J. at 98. In order to stave off summary judgment,
a plaintiff must "identify a case where an officer acting under similar
circumstances as Officer [Ruane] was held to have violated the Fourth
Amendment." White, 137 S. Ct. at 552.
Plaintiff urges us to accept Bennett ex rel. Estate of Bennett v. Murphy,
120 F. App'x 914 (3d Cir. 2005), as such a case, claiming it placed Ruane on
notice that an officer is not permitted to use deadly force on a suspect simply
because the suspect is armed. However, the facts in that case are substantially
different. The court there concluded that the plaintiff, who was suicidal and
surrounded by armed troopers, posed no threat to police or others when shot by
a trooper who was more than eighty yards away and while the plaintiff held the
gun to his own head. Id. at 916.
The Third Circuit also rejected the officer's claim as to the second prong
of the qualified immunity doctrine, that is, that he did not violate some clearly
established constitutional right. Id. at 917. The court rejected the District
Court's reliance on factually inapposite "cases [that] involved armed suspects as
A-3866-17T3
15
to whom, although they never pointed their weapons at police, the courts
concluded that the police reasonably believed the suspects presented an
immediate threat and that the use of deadly force was therefore justified." Ibid.
Obviously, even if we were to credit the truth of Candelaria's deposition
testimony, those are exactly the factual circumstances presented here. In short,
the motion judge properly concluded that Ruane was entitled to qualified
immunity and properly granted summary judgment.
It follows that the judge properly dismissed plaintiff's CRA claim
asserting the municipal defendants were liable based upon an unlawful
departmental custom of deliberate indifference in the IA process. "If a person
has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer,
the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of
constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point." City of Los Angeles
v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Moreover, it is "well-settled that if there is
no [constitutional] violation in the first place, there can be no derivative
municipal claim." Mulholland v. Gov't Cty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 238 n.15
(3d. Cir. 2013).
We affirm the order granting defendants summary judgment.
A-3866-17T3
16
III.
Our review of a trial court's discovery order is limited, and we will defer
to the rulings "absent an abuse of discretion or a judge's misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law." Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare
Servs., Inc., 230 N.J. 73, 79-80 (2017). "A motion for summary judgment is not
premature merely because discovery has not been completed, unless plaintiff is
able to 'demonstrate with some degree of particularity the likelihood that further
discovery will supply the missing elements of the cause of action.'" Badiali v.
N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2015) (quoting Wellington v. Estate of
Wellington, 359 N.J. Super. 484, 496 (App. Div. 2003)).
Here, plaintiff contends the information in the ME files may have
contradicted Ruane's version of those prior shootings and supported his claim
that the municipal defendants' IA function was so inept as to demonstrate
deliberately indifference to citizens' complaints of excessive force or to the
proper discipline of Newark's officers. Plaintiff contends those portions of
Ruane's IA files that were not supplied might demonstrate the actual
investigations, which concluded Ruane's use of force was justified, were
inadequate and demonstrative of the city's deliberate indifference.
A-3866-17T3
17
We may agree that the judge took an overly restrictive view of the
potential relevancy of the discovery sought by plaintiff. Nevertheless, in light
of our previous discussion, we cannot conclude the lack of this material would
have otherwise affected the outcome of defendants' summary judgment motion.
Affirmed.
A-3866-17T3
18