The opinion
J-S28016-19
2019 PA Super 242
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KATRICE K. ST. ROSE :
:
Appellant : No. 1270 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 24, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-21-CR-0003747-2016
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2019
Katrice K. St. Rose appeals from the judgment of sentence following her
jury trial conviction for obtaining public welfare funds by misrepresentation
(“welfare fraud”), 62 P.S. § 481(a). St. Rose argues the trial court erred in
instructing the jury as to the elements of the crime. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following factual history:
On December 17, 2012, [St. Rose] had a face-to-face
appointment with a county benefits eligibility specialist in
order to apply for childcare assistance. At that time, she
received information on her rights and responsibilities. The
information included notification concerning her duty to
report changes in her circumstances. The specialist
emphasized that this duty obligated [St. Rose] to report,
among other things, any changes in her hours of
employment or employment status. On January 2, 2013,
[St. Rose’s] childcare assistance was terminated because
her status changed to unemployed.
In September of 2013, [St. Rose] began working at
MedStaffers as a Home Health Aide [“HHA”]. Her new
employment allowed her to reapply for childcare assistance,
which she did via a phone interview with the benefits
____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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eligibility specialist. Again, [St. Rose] was notified of her
duty to report any changes in her employment. As part of
the yearly benefits renewal process, the eligibility specialist
contacted [St. Rose] to update her benefits application on
January 2, 2014. During that recertification call, the
specialist reviewed the questions on the application. She
specifically asked [St. Rose] if the employment information
was correct. [St. Rose] confirmed that she was still working
at MedStaffers as an HHA. She also confirmed the daycare
provider that she was using for her childcare. As a result of
the information, the specialist found that [St. Rose] still
qualified for childcare assistance.
[St. Rose] continued to receive the childcare assistance for
her MedStaffers job until she filed to reopen her cash
benefits through the County Assistance Office around June
of 2014. At that time, the eligibility specialist realized that
[St. Rose] was no longer working for her reported employer.
When the specialist looked into [St. Rose’s] employment
records at MedStaffers, she learned that [St. Rose] had
been terminated from her position with the company on
October 25, 2013, months prior to the 2014 recertification.
At trial, the eligibility specialist testified about the benefits
application process and her experiences with [St. Rose’s]
case. The human resources director from MedStaffers also
testified and confirmed that [St. Rose] had been terminated
from her employment on October 25, 2013. Additionally, the
operator of the daycare that cared for [St. Rose’s] children
testified that [St. Rose] continued to use the daycare after
October 25, 2013. He provided the daycare’s invoices for
[St. Rose’s] three children from October 2013 through June
2014. He also testified that he had an independent
recollection of [St. Rose’s] children being at the daycare
during that time.
Trial Court Opinion, filed Nov. 13, 2018, at 1-3 (footnotes and citations to
record omitted).
St. Rose requested the following instruction as to the elements of
welfare fraud:
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The defendant has been charged with welfare fraud. To find
the defendant guilty of this offense, you must find that the
following elements have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt:
First, that the defendant made a false statement or
misrepresentation [or withheld information][1],
Second, that the information provided [or withheld] was
material to that agency’s determination in approving or
disapproving a person for public assistance;
and
Third, that the defendant did so willfully — that is, knowingly
and with the intent to defraud the public assistance agency.
Defendant’s Proposed Jury Instructions, filed Mar. 22, 2018, at Exh. A.
The trial court denied the request and issued the following instruction:
In order to find the Defendant guilty of this offense, the
Commonwealth must prove the following three elements
beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that she made a false
statement or withheld information. Second, the false
statement provided or information withheld was material to
the agency’s determination in approving or disapproving a
person for public assistance. Three, the Defendant provided
the false information or withheld the information willfully;
i.e., she knew it was false at the time she made it or she
knew the information withheld was material to the agency’s
determination of her eligibility for public assistance.
N.T., 3/22/18, at 118-119.
The jury found St. Rose guilty of welfare fraud. In July 2018, the trial
court sentenced St. Rose to five years’ probation. St. Rose filed a timely Notice
of Appeal.
____________________________________________
1 The bracketed words were handwritten on the proposed instruction.
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St. Rose raises the following issue: “Did the instruction given by the trial
court to the jury regarding the charge of welfare fraud, 62 P.S. § 481,
inaccurately state the law such that it was prejudicial to the outcome of trial?”
St. Rose’s Br. at 5.
We review a challenge to a trial court’s decision as to jury instructions
for an abuse of discretion or error of law. Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985
A.2d 783, 798-99 (Pa. 2009). “[Our] key inquiry is whether the instruction on
a particular issue adequately, accurately and clearly presents the law to the
jury, and is sufficient to guide the jury in its deliberations.” Commonwealth
v. Cannavo, 199 A.3d 1282, 1286 (Pa.Super. 2018) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 766 A.2d 874, 878 (Pa.Super. 2001))
(alteration in original).
Welfare fraud is defined as:
(a) Any person who, either prior to, or at the time of, or
subsequent to the application for assistance, by means of a
wilfully false statement or misrepresentation, or by
impersonation or by wilfully failing to disclose a material fact
regarding eligibility or other fraudulent means, secures, or
attempts to secure, or aids or abets or attempts to aid or
abet any person in securing assistance, or Federal food
stamps, commits a crime which shall be graded as provided
in subsection (b).
62 P.S. § 481(a). Under this statute, a person is guilty of welfare fraud if, (1)
before, during, or after applying for assistance, (2) the person makes a
willfully false statement or misrepresentation, uses impersonation, willfully
fails to disclose a material fact regarding eligibility, or uses other fraudulent
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means, and (3) the person secures or attempts to secure assistance, or aids,
abets, or attempts to aid or abet any person in securing assistance.
The Human Services Code does not define “willfully.” The Crimes Code
defines “willfulness” as: “A requirement that an offense be committed willfully
is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of
the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears.” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 302(g). “Knowingly” is defined as:
(2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material
element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
such a result.
Id. at § 302(b)(2).
St. Rose contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury by
defining “willfully in a way that obscured the mens rea requirement that a
defendant act with the object of committing a fraud.” St. Rose’s Br. at 14. She
maintains the trial court failed to require that the jury find St. Rose willfully
used fraudulent means to secure or attempt to secure assistance. St. Rose
analogizes the welfare fraud statute to other statutes, such as insurance fraud
and worker’s compensation fraud, claiming that, similar to the other fraud
statutes, the welfare fraud statute requires an intent to defraud. She
concludes that the “jury should have been instructed that the Commonwealth
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must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [St. Rose] act[ed] willfully with
the intent to defraud the government.” Id. at 18.
St. Rose relies on two separate statutes—the insurance fraud statute
and the worker’s compensation fraud statute—arguing that because the
standard instructions for crimes committed under those statutes state that the
jury must find the defendant had an intent to defraud, a jury must also find
the defendant had an intent to defraud to find a defendant guilty of welfare
fraud.
The statute defining insurance fraud provides, in part:
A person commits an offense if the person does any of the
following:
(1) Knowingly and with the intent to defraud a State or
local government agency files, presents or causes to be filed
with or presented to the government agency a document
that contains false, incomplete or misleading information
concerning any fact or thing material to the agency’s
determination in approving or disapproving a motor vehicle
insurance rate filing, a motor vehicle insurance transaction
or other motor vehicle insurance action which is required or
filed in response to an agency’s request.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4117(a)(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Worker’s
Compensation Statute provides that a person commits insurance fraud, in
part, as follows:
A person, including, but not limited to, the employer, the
employe, the health care provider, the attorney, the insurer,
the State Workmen's Insurance Fund and self-insureds,
commits an offense if the person does any of the following:
(1) Knowingly and with the intent to defraud a State or
local government agency files, presents or causes to be filed
with or presented to the government agency a document
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that contains false, incomplete or misleading information
concerning any fact or thing material to the agency’s
determination in approving or disapproving a workers’
compensation insurance rate filing, a workers’
compensation transaction or other workers' compensation
insurance action which is required or filed in response to an
agency’s request.
77 P.S. § 1039.2(1) (emphasis added). The Standard Jury Instruction for both
insurance fraud and worker’s compensation fraud include that the
Commonwealth must prove that “the defendant did so knowingly and with
intent to defraud.” Pa. SSJI (Crim) §§ 15.4117A, 15.4117B. For example, the
standard instruction for insurance fraud includes:
First, that the defendant presented or caused to be
presented to a state or local government agency any
document that contained false, incomplete, or misleading
information;
Second, that the information provided was material to that
agency’s determination in approving or disapproving a
motor vehicle insurance rate filing, a motor vehicle
insurance transaction, or other motor vehicle insurance
action that is required or filed in response to an agency’s
request. Material information means information the agency
would regularly rely on in making its official determinations
or findings;
Third, that the defendant did so knowingly and with the
intent to defraud.
Pa. SSJI (Crim) § 15.4117(a)(1).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury as
to the elements for welfare fraud. As required under the statute, the trial court
instructed the jury that, to convict St. Rose, the jury had to conclude that the
Commonwealth had established beyond a reasonable doubt that St. Rose
made a false statement or withheld information; that the false statement
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provided or information withheld was material to the agency’s decision to
approve or disapprove a request for public assistance; and that St. Rose
“provided the false statement or withheld information willfully,” that is, “she
knew it was false at the time that she made it or she knew the information
withheld was material to the agency’s determination of her eligibility for public
assistance.” N.T., 3/22/18, at 118-19.; 62 P.S. § 481(a).
Unlike the statutes cited by St. Rose as statutes analogous to the welfare
fraud statute, the welfare fraud statute does not include in the text of the
statute that, to be convicted, a defendant had to act with an “intent to
defraud.” Rather, to sustain a conviction, the statute requires that (1) before,
during, or after applying for assistance, (2) the person make a false statement
or misrepresentation, use impersonation, willfully fail to disclose a material
fact regarding eligibility, or use other fraudulent means, and (3) the person
secure or attempt to secure assistance or aid, abet, or attempt to aid or abet
any person in securing assistance. See 62 P.S. § 481(a). Here, the trial court
accurately conveyed these requirements. It required that the jury find that
the defendant made a false statement or failed to disclose information, that
the false statement or withheld information was material, and that the
defendant acted willfully, that is, knew the information was false or knew that
the information withheld was material to the agency’s determination as to
eligibility for benefits.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/14/2019
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