The opinion
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
April 20, 2005
No. 04-15055 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00916-CV-A-N
ROBERT GRIFFIN,
ANNETTE GRIFFIN, as Individuals and
next friends and Administrators of the
Estate of Brandy Hobson, deceased,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
TROY STATE UNIVERSITY, an entity
organized under the laws of the State of Alabama, et al.,
Defendants,
EDWARD RICHARDSON,
DOUGLAS HAWKINS,
GERALD O. DIAL,
JOHN D. HARRISON,
ALLEN E. OWEN, III, et al., all as individuals,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(April 20, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Griffin and Annette Griffin, as next friends and Administrators of the
Estate of Brandy Hobson, appeal the district court’s dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claims, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), against twelve defendants, in their
individual capacities.1 The Griffins filed this claim after their 17-year-old daughter,
Brandy Hobson, a Troy State University (“TSU”) student, was murdered in her on-
campus dormitory during her first semester at the school. The Griffins alleged that
by requiring students under the age of 19 to live on campus, TSU assumed a duty to
provide adequate security for its students. The Griffins asserted that by virtue of the
on-campus living requirement, Defendants formed a “special relationship” with their
daughter and, thereafter, were deliberately indifferent to inadequate security and
1
The district court previously dismissed the claims against these defendants, Troy State
University (“TSU”), and the Trustees of the TSU Board, in their official capacities. That order is
not at issue here.
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control issues on the TSU campus. The Griffins alleged violations of Brandy’s Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights, all in violation of § 1983.
The district court dismissed the complaint after finding the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity. On appeal, the Griffins argue this decision was wrong
because TSU’s requirement that certain students, such as Brandy Hobson, live on
campus created a “special relationship,” giving rise to a duty, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, to protect those students from harm by third parties. Based on our
thorough review of the record and careful consideration of the parties’ briefs, we find
no reversible error and affirm.
“We review the district court’s grant of qualified immunity de novo to the
extent the appeal concerns pure issues of law, including whether the underlying law
governing official conduct was clearly established.” Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d
1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1418 (11th Cir.
1997). “We resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiff, and then
determine the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity under that version of the facts.” Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1084
(11th Cir. 2003); Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002).
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued
in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established
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statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Lee, 284 F.3d at 1193 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The purpose
of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary
duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from
suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal
law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Because qualified
immunity is a defense not only from liability, but also from suit, it is ‘important for
a court to ascertain the validity of a qualified immunity defense as early in the lawsuit
as possible.’” Id. (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359,
1370 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted)).
In order to receive qualified immunity, a public official “must first prove that
he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly
wrongful acts occurred.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, there is no contention that the Defendants were not acting within their
discretionary duties so we proceed to the next step at which the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to prove that qualified immunity is not warranted. Id. The Supreme Court
has articulated a two-prong test to aid in this analysis. See Vinyard v. Wilson, 311
F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002). First, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the
party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a
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constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed.
2d 272 (2001). Second, if a constitutional right “would have been violated under the
plaintiff's version of the facts, ‘the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right
was clearly established.’” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1347 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at
201, 121 S. Ct. 2151). It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish both prongs of the
foregoing test to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. See Holloman ex real. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252,
1264 (11th Cir. 2004) (“If the plaintiff prevails on both prongs of this test, then the
defendant is unable to obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.”)
Here, the district court applied the two-part Saucier test and concluded that
qualified immunity applied. On the first prong, the district court found no
constitutional violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
because the Supreme Court has held that substantive due process does not require a
State to protect its citizens’ life, liberty, or property against invasion by private actors.
See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195, 109
S. Ct. 998 (1989) (holding “nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself
requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against
invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power
to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security”). The
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district court also found that the “special relationship” exception to DeShaney did not
apply because Brandy Hobson voluntarily attended TSU and the on-campus housing
requirement did not place Hobson in a custodial relationship. Finally, the district
court concluded that the Griffins had not alleged conduct that rose to the level of
arbitrary or conscious-shocking in the constitutional sense. See Waddell v. Hendry
Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1306 (to establish a substantive due process violation
in a non-custodial situation, plaintiff must show “deliberate indifference to an
extremely great risk of serious injury to someone in Plaintiffs’ position” (citing
McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 326 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that
Plaintiff was required to demonstrate that “the defendant state official at a minimum
acted with deliberate indifference toward the plaintiff”); Nix v. Franklin County
School Dist., 311 F.3d 1373, 1376 (11th Cir. 2002) (concluding that deliberate
indifference was insufficient to constitute a due-process violation in a non-custodial
school setting)).
We agree with the district court’s thorough analysis of the first Saucier prong
and its conclusion that, on this record, the Griffins have not satisfied their burden to
show that the Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right.
Moreover, even if the Griffins met the first prong, they have not challenged the
district court’s decision on the second prong. The district court held that even if the
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Griffins’s substantive due process claim satisfied Saucier’s first prong, the Griffins
could not show the law on their substantive due-process claim was clearly
established.
As the district court concluded, the Defendants’ conduct would rise to the level
of a substantive due process violation “only if the act can be characterized as arbitrary
or conscience shocking in a constitutional sense.” Waddell v. Hendry County
Sheriff's Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261
(1992)). “‘[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in
the constitutional sense.’” Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
118 S. Ct. 1708, 1716, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998)(quotation and citation omitted)).
Moreover, “[d]eterminations of what is egregious conduct must not be made in the
glow of hindsight; decisions made by a government actor must be egregious--that is,
shock the conscience--at the time the government actor made the decision.” Waddell,
329 F.3d at 1305 (emphasis in original). As we have noted, on appeal, the Griffins
do not argue that they have met this standard, nor do they challenge the district
court’s conclusion on the issue. Again, it is their burden to satisfy both prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis. Based on the Griffins’ failure to challenge the second
prong, we affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity. Moreover, even if
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we were to reach the second prong, we conclude, as we did at the first step, that the
district court thoroughly considered and rejected every argument raised in this appeal.
We find no error in its qualified-immunity analysis. Accordingly, we affirm the entry
of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
AFFIRMED.
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