A.D. Brown v. A. Dreibelbis, Esq.

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alton D. Brown, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 426 M.D. 2018

: Submitted: March 22, 2019

Amy Dreibelbis, Esquire, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: August 7, 2019

Presently before the Court are the Preliminary Objections (POs) filed by

Amy Dreibelbis, Esquire, Prothonotary of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

(Prothonotary) to Alton D. Brown’s (Petitioner) pro se Petition for Review

(Petition) in this Court’s original jurisdiction. In his Petition, Petitioner challenges

Prothonotary’s actions in dismissing two of his Petitions for Allowance of Appeal

(PAAs) for failure to perfect the appeals in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure 3115, Pa.R.A.P. 3115.1 In her POs, Prothonotary argues that

1

Rule 3115 provides in relevant part:

The prothonotary shall list for general call at the first session held after September

1 of each year all matters which appear to be inactive for an unreasonable period

of time and shall give notice thereof to the parties . . . . If no action is taken or no

(Footnote continued on next page…)

she is protected from Petitioner’s claims by sovereign, quasi-judicial, and qualified

immunity, and the relief Petitioner seeks is improper and contrary to the law. For

the reasons that follow, we sustain the POs and dismiss the Petition, with

prejudice.

Initially, when considering POs, “we accept as true all well-pleaded material

allegations in the [P]etition . . . , as well as all inferences reasonably deduced

therefrom.” Saxberg v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 42 A.3d 1210, 1211 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2012). Further, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. Warren v. Ridge, 762 A.2d 1126, 1129 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).

We will sustain POs only if it “appear[s] with certainty that the law will not permit

recovery, and any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain them.” Saxberg,

42 A.3d at 1212.

Petitioner alleges as follows in his Petition. Petitioner is incarcerated at the

State Correctional Institution at Fayette (SCI-Fayette). Petitioner filed a PAA for

Commonwealth v. Brown (Pa., No. 205 M.T. 2018), on May 16, 2018, by handing

the PAA to a corrections officer. Petitioner filed a second PAA in the matter of

Commonwealth v. Brown (Pa., No. 206 M.T. 2018), on May 17, 2018, by hand

delivery to a corrections officer for purpose of placing it in a prison mailbox.2

(Petition ¶¶ 5, 6.) Prothonotary returned the PAAs to Petitioner on May 21, 2018,

_____________________________

(continued…)

written objection is docketed in the matter prior to commencement of the general

call, the prothonotary shall strike the matter from the list and enter an order as of

course marking the matter “Terminated . . . .”

Pa.R.A.P. 3115.

2

Petitioner avers that Prothonotary issued orders on April 27, 2018, for the respective

cases, notifying Petitioner that he was required to file his PAAs by May 17, 2018.

2

and notified him that the PAAs were “dismissed ‘for failure to perfect’ in

accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 3115.” (Petition ¶ 7.) Petitioner then submitted

Applications for Reconsideration of the orders and attached cash slips as evidence

that the appeals were timely submitted in accordance with the prison mailbox rule

under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 121, Pa.R.A.P. 121.3 In his

Applications for Reconsideration, Petitioner also requested that Prothonotary

provide him with copies of the envelopes in which he sent the PAAs. He did not

receive these copies.

Petitioner further avers that his cash slips, which can be verified by the

mailroom at SCI-Fayette, demonstrate that the PAAs were timely filed. The

Prothonotary was without authority to reject the PAAs under Rule 3115, as that

rule relates to inactive matters; thus, Prothonotary acted contrary to customary

practice for inmate litigation. Prothonotary’s actions in not providing the postmark

on the envelopes, “deviat[ing] from normal practice” for pro se prisoners, and

rejecting the PAAs “were motivated by the desire to both silence and punish

Petitioner because of his attacks and exposure of the illegal criminal justice

system.” (Petition ¶ 16.) Under Rules 121 and 1112 of the Pennsylvania Rules of

3

Rule 121 provides in relevant part:

A pro se filing submitted by a prisoner incarcerated in a correctional facility is

deemed filed as of the date it is delivered to the prison authorities for purposes of

mailing or placed in the institutional mailbox, as evidenced by a properly

executed prisoner cash slip or other reasonably verifiable evidence of the date that

the prisoner deposited the pro se filing with the prison authorities.

Pa.R.A.P. 121.

3

Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 121, 1112,4 the Prothonotary has a duty to file

Petitioner’s PAAs and his Applications for Reconsideration. Petitioner has a

constitutional right of access to the courts to redress his grievances, which

implicates his due process rights. (Petition ¶¶ 18, 21-23.) Petitioner has no

remedy other than mandamus to compel Prothonotary to file his PAAs and

Applications for Reconsideration and Petitioner has suffered irreparable harm.

Petitioner asks this Court to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction

enjoining Prothonotary from “sabotaging Petitioner’s prosecution of the underlying

matters in the Supreme Court”; seeks a declaratory judgment that Prothonotary

violated his constitutional rights; and requests damages, costs, and any other relief

deemed just and appropriate by the Court. (Petition, Wherefore Clause.)

Prothonotary filed the instant POs, asserting that Petitioner’s claims are

barred because Prothonotary is entitled to sovereign immunity, quasi-judicial

immunity, and qualified immunity; and Petitioner’s requested relief of injunctive

relief, declaratory relief, and money damages are contrary to law. Petitioner filed

an Answer to the POs denying these assertions.

In support of the POs, Prothonotary argues5 that Petitioner’s claims against

her cannot succeed because she is protected by quasi-judicial and qualified

immunity. Because her job duties are integral to the judiciary, Prothonotary argues

that she “act[s] as an extension of the [Supreme] Court,” and is a quasi-judicial

official who should receive immunity. (Prothonotary’s Memorandum at 4.)

According to Prothonotary, Petitioner’s allegations in the Petition arise from

4

Rule 1112 governs appeals by allowance to the Supreme Court and provides the filing

procedures regarding dates of mailing, receipt, fees, and filing of petitions for allowance of

appeal with Prothonotary. Pa.R.A.P. 1112.

5

We have rearranged Prothonotary’s arguments for ease of discussion.

4

Prothonotary’s functions and duties, which are integral to the judicial process, such

as filing and maintaining pleadings. It is necessary to extend quasi-judicial

immunity to court personnel, such as herself, Prothonotary argues, because it

precludes dissatisfied litigants from expressing their frustration at clerks and court

staff. Additionally, Prothonotary argues that qualified immunity is intended to

protect public officials from interference with their job duties arising from threats

of liability; thus, it should apply here.

Prothonotary also argues that she is protected by the Sovereign Immunity

Act6 from Petitioner’s claims because Petitioner is suing Prothonotary in her

official capacity as a state agent of a government entity – the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court. Section 102 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 102, defines the

Commonwealth government to include the Courts, Prothonotary asserts, and

therefore courts and their employees are “arms of the state.” (Prothonotary’s

Memorandum at 3.) Prothonotary further contends that none of the statutory

exceptions to sovereign immunity are applicable here and the defense has not been

waived; thus, Petitioner has not stated a claim.

Finally, Prothonotary asserts that Petitioner’s request for relief is improper.

Prothonotary contends that if this Court granted Petitioner the relief that he seeks,

it would be interfering with the hierarchy of the Pennsylvania court system by

instructing the Supreme Court on how to manage its cases. Prothonotary further

argues that “Petitioner does not seek declaratory relief in the true legal sense,” as it

is set forth in the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7531-7541, and that

an actual controversy does not exist such that declaratory relief is proper.

(Prothonotary’s Memorandum at 7.)

6

42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8521-8527.

5

Petitioner responds7 that Prothonotary’s assertion of sovereign immunity is

frivolous and constitutes an admission of wrongdoing. Petitioner further argues

that public officials sued in their public capacity for injunctive and declaratory

relief, as is the case here, are not entitled to sovereign immunity. Prothonotary’s

actions of which Petitioner complains were not taken at the direction of the

Supreme Court, Petitioner asserts, and therefore Prothonotary is not entitled to

absolute immunity. Moreover, because Petitioner has filed his Petition against

Prothonotary in her official capacity and because Petitioner seeks injunctive relief,

qualified immunity does not apply. Petitioner contends that Prothonotary was

without discretion regarding her duty to file his PAAs; thus, he has stated a claim

for mandamus to compel Prothonotary to perform her mandatory duty. If

Petitioner can prove that Prothonotary did not perform her required duty under the

law as he has averred, he contends that he is entitled under Section 8303 of the

Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8303,8 to the damages he seeks. Also with regard to

the propriety of the relief he seeks, Petitioner asserts that he does not seek relief

from the Supreme Court but rather from Prothonotary for her specific obligations

under Rules 3112 and 3305 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,

7

After Prothonotary filed the memorandum of law in support of POs, this Court, by order

dated September 11, 2018, ordered Petitioner to file a brief in opposition on or before October 4,

2018. Petitioner then filed two applications for extension of time to file the brief in opposition,

both of which were granted by this Court, extending the deadline to December 5, 2018.

Petitioner sent this Court two more applications for extension of time to file his brief, both dated

December 5, 2018, and filed his brief on December 10, 2018. This Court granted the most recent

applications for extension of time to file briefs by order dated December 18, 2018. Accordingly,

we shall regard Petitioner’s brief as timely filed.

8

Section 8303 provides that “[a] person who is adjudged in an action in the nature of

mandamus to have failed or refused without lawful justification to perform a duty required by

law shall be liable in damages to the person aggrieved by such failure or refusal.” 42 Pa. C.S. §

8303.

6

Pa.R.A.P. 3112, 3305,9 to perform the duties of prothonotary and dispose of

administrative motions, respectively. If this Court does not provide Petitioner with

the injunctive relief he seeks, he asserts he will be barred from access to the courts.

Finally, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to declaratory relief, as he seeks to

determine the validity of a public official’s acts, and an actual controversy in

which he has a substantial present interest exists.

We begin with Prothonotary’s assertion that Petitioner’s claims against her

are barred because she is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. “In order to

determine whether an individual is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, we must

first examine the nature of the actions complained of to ascertain whether they

were performed within the quasi-judicial adjudicatory function.” Pollina v.

Dishong, 98 A.3d 613, 621 (Pa. Super. 2014). Petitioner avers that Prothonotary

denied him access to the courts when she issued the orders notifying him that the

PAAs were “dismissed ‘for failure to perfect’ in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 3115.”

(Petition ¶ 7.) Rule 3115 requires the Prothonotary give notice to litigants whose

cases have been inactive for an unreasonable period of time and mark those matters

terminated if the parties do not take action in response to the notice. We must

determine whether Prothonotary’s actions in dismissing a matter under Rule 3115

are that which are typically considered quasi-judicial.

Pennsylvania courts and federal courts have recognized the quasi-judicial

immunity of prothonotaries, court administrators, and court staff for actions taken

9

Rule 3112 establishes the office of prothonotary for each appellate court and authorizes

the prothonotaries to perform the duties vested in them by law. Pa.R.A.P. 3112. Rule 3305

provides that the prothonotary of the Supreme Court “is authorized to dispose of motions relating

to the preparation, printing and filing of appendix and briefs and those motions generally relating

to calendar control, along with the authority to recommend the appropriate sanction for the

violation of any applicable rule or order.” Pa.R.A.P. 3305.

7

pursuant to court orders and at the direction of judges. As this Court recognized in

Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), a court administrator has

quasi-judicial immunity in certain circumstances. There, a petitioner sought

declaratory relief relating to alleged constitutional violations in relation to his

requests under the Right-to-Know Law.10 The petitioner sought relief in this

Court’s original jurisdiction against various members of a county judiciary, the

court administrator, and other county officials, alleging constitutional violations for

their actions in denying him access to certain documents. This Court noted that not

only are judges absolutely immune when performing judicial acts, but the court

administrator, “acting under direction of a common pleas judge,” had quasi-

judicial immunity from the petitioner’s constitutional and civil rights claims. Id. at

405 n.11 (citing Feingold v. Hill, 521 A.2d 33, 37-38 (Pa. Super. 1987)).

We held that quasi-judicial immunity extends to prothonotaries in Schneller

v. Prothonotary of Montgomery County (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1316 C.D. 2016, filed

September 12, 2017),11 where a petitioner brought an action in mandamus to

compel a county prothonotary to accept and file his notice of appeal. The

prothonotary notified the petitioner it was declining to file his notice of appeal

based on an injunction issued by the trial court enjoining the petitioner from

making certain claims in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

without an attorney. Because the petitioner filed the action in mandamus five

years after the prothonotary notified the petitioner it would not file the appeal, this

Court concluded that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

10

Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.

11

Schneller, an unreported opinion, is cited for its persuasive value in accordance with

Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures. 210 Pa. Code

§ 69.414(a).

8

Id., slip op. at 13. Nonetheless, this Court also acknowledged that to the extent the

petitioner advanced a constitutional tort law claim against the prothonotary, that

claim was “barred by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity because the

[p]rothonotary’s refusal to file the notice of appeal was clearly done in connection

with her official duties as an officer of the court, and also pursuant to the trial

court’s order enjoining” the petitioner. Id. at 13 n.10.12

Following a similar rationale, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit has also determined that prothonotaries and court administrators are

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. For example, in Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411

F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969),13 the petitioner averred a violation of his

constitutional rights when the prothonotary of the Pennsylvania Superior Court did

not accept the petitioner’s filings “at the direction of the Court.” Id. at 457. The

district court granted summary judgment to the prothonotary on the basis that the

prothonotary was acting pursuant to court order and, therefore, was immune from

liability. The Third Circuit agreed, and quoted Ginsburg v. Stern, 125 F. Supp.

596, 602 (W.D. Pa. 1954), aff’d, 225 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1955), a case which

addressed the rationale underlying judicial immunity for the prothonotary of the

Supreme Court: “‘the Prothonotary is the Clerk of the Supreme Court and is

required to follow the instructions of the court which he represents. In this

connection there existed no discretion on his part but to obey the order and

mandate of the court . . . . were the Prothonotary who holds his position by

12

We also note that this Court has often determined county prothonotaries are generally

immune from suit as local agencies protected from liability under the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S.

§§ 8541-8542. See Ullman v. Symons (Pa. Cmwlth., 2131 C.D. 2007, filed May 12, 2008), slip

op. at 5-6.

13

Although not binding, decisions from the Third Circuit have persuasive value.

Kutnyak v. Dep’t of Corr., 923 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

9

sufferance of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, to refuse to obey its mandate, he

would be contemptuous of that court and subject to summary dismissal.’”

Lockhart, 411 F.2d at 460. The Third Circuit also described “the danger of

influencing public officials by threat of suit, the deterrent effect of potential

liability, the drain on time caused by frivolous suits,” and the “manifest unfairness

of subjecting” a prothonotary to liability as a consequence of actions taken at the

direction of public officials. Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded the

prothonotary was immune from suit. Id.

The Third Circuit reiterated this point in Gallas v. Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 773 (3d Cir. 2000), where it extended quasi-judicial

immunity to a deputy court administrator of the Family Court Division of the Court

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The deputy court administrator had

released documents to a newspaper reporter pursuant to a judge’s order, and the

Third Circuit concluded that the deputy court administrator “should be absolutely

immune” from liability for that action. Id. at 772. In so doing, the Third Circuit

noted this was consistent with federal court precedent acknowledging quasi-

judicial immunity for officials performing quasi-judicial functions. Id. at 772-73

(citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226 (1988); Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d

1240, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1996); McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir.

1992); Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 763 (7th Cir. 1989)). See also

Davis v. Philadelphia Cty., 195 F. Supp. 2d 686, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (concluding

that a clerk of judicial records had quasi-judicial immunity from claims for alleged

failure to perfect appeals).

Here, “accept[ing] as true all well-pleaded material allegations in the

[P]etition . . . , as well as all inferences reasonably deduced therefrom,” we

10

conclude that “the law will not permit recovery” for Petitioner because Petitioner

complains of quasi-judicial actions taken by Prothonotary. Saxberg, 42 A.3d at

1211-12. Petitioner’s claims are a challenge to actions taken by Prothonotary that

are integral to the judiciary, including filing and maintaining pleadings.

Prothonotary “serve[s] at the pleasure of the [Supreme C]ourt,” Pa.R.A.P. 3111,

and carries out duties pursuant to rules and directives set forth by the Supreme

Court. This includes disposing of administrative motions, directing parties with

regard to filing matters, and maintaining dockets and records. Pa.R.A.P. 3301,

3305, 3113. Prothonotary’s duties are further set forth in the Supreme Court’s

Internal Operating Procedures, which specify that “motions, petitions[,] and

applications will be monitored by the Prothonotary’s office for compliance with

applicable appellate rules. Proposed filings that are not in compliance will not be

docketed.” 210 Pa. Code § 63.7. Therefore, when Prothonotary dismisses cases,

she is acting pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court as set forth in its internal

operating procedures and the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Prothonotary’s action

of dismissing Petitioner’s PAAs pursuant to Rule 3115 was “clearly done in

connection with her official duties as an officer of the court,” and Prothonotary is

protected by quasi-judicial immunity from Petitioner’s claims. Schneller, slip op.

at 13 n.10. Moreover, because quasi-judicial immunity is absolute, Prothonotary is

immune from suit not only for Petitioner’s claims for damages but from the

equitable relief he seeks as well.14 DeFerro v. Coco, 719 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D.

Pa. 1989); see also Guarrasi, 25 A.3d at 405 n.11.

14

Taking as true Petitioner’s averments that Prothonotary dismissed his PAAs as

untimely, although his PAAs were timely filed, Petitioner’s relief is with the Supreme Court in

the form of a petition to file his PAAs nunc pro tunc rather than the relief he seeks here.

11

When Prothonotary is acting pursuant to rules and internal operating

procedures with regard to filings and the docket, her actions are taken without

discretion but pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directives, and civil liability cannot

“be imposed upon a public official acting pursuant to court order and direction.”

Lockhart, 411 F.2d at 460. Further, we acknowledge “the danger of influencing

public officials by threat of suit, the deterrent effect of potential liability, [and] the

drain on time caused by frivolous suits,” that arises should prothonotaries and court

administrators be subject to civil liability for their quasi-judicial actions taken

pursuant to governing statutes and rules of the court for which they serve. Id.

Petitioner’s claims arise from actions taken by Prothonotary as an arm of the

judiciary; thus, Prothonotary is protected by quasi-judicial immunity for any of the

relief Petitioner seeks. Because we conclude that Prothonotary is protected by

quasi-judicial immunity, we do not need to address the other grounds set forth in

the POs. Accordingly, we sustain Prothonotary’s POs and dismiss the Petition,

with prejudice.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in this case.

12

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alton D. Brown, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 426 M.D. 2018

:

Amy Dreibelbis, Esquire, :

Respondent :

ORDER

NOW, August 7, 2019, the Preliminary Objections of Amy Dreibelbis,

Esquire are SUSTAINED, and Alton D. Brown’s Petition for Review is

DISMISSED, with prejudice.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge