Nicholas Coffey v. Adam Carroll

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 19a0181p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

NICHOLAS SAMUEL COFFEY, ┐

Plaintiff-Appellee, │

│

> No. 18-1314

v. │

│

│

ADAM CARROLL; MICHAEL PRANGER; JAMES PILCHAK, │

Defendants-Appellants. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

No. 2:16-cv-13081—Sean F. Cox, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: August 5, 2019

Before: MERRITT, THAPAR, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: John C. Clark, GIARMARCO, MULLINS & HORTON, PC, Troy, Michigan, for

Appellants. Thomas M. Loeb, Farmington Hills, Michigan, for Appellant.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

READLER, Circuit Judge. The qualified immunity doctrine serves to shield public

officials—oftentimes, police officers—from liability and harassment for reasonable acts

undertaken in the line of duty. As the doctrine affords a public official immunity from the costs

of litigation, federal courts have an obligation to weigh the issue as early as practicable, and

certainly no later than summary judgment. By the same token, where the law is settled and the

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record is murky as to whether an official has acted reasonably when judged against that settled

legal standard, the claims are often left for resolution at trial.

This appears to be such a case. In the proceedings below, three City of Taylor

(Michigan) police officers were accused by Plaintiff Nicholas Coffey of violating his

constitutional rights while arresting him for attempted larceny. The officers believe they are

entitled to qualified immunity regarding the events surrounding the arrest. In a well-reasoned

opinion, the district court found that material questions of fact permeated the case, and therefore

denied summary judgment to the officers. Following an independent review of the record, we

AFFIRM the district court’s order.

I. BACKGROUND

A caller to 911 reported that two men had approached her parked car, and that one of

them tried to break in. Officers Adam Carroll, Michael Pranger, and James Pilchak were

dispatched to the scene. The 911 caller gave the officers a lead in tracking the purported

burglars. Mother Nature did the rest. Because the attempted break in took place with fresh snow

on the ground, the officers could track prints in the snow revealing the men’s escape. The

incriminating trail of snowprints led the officers to the home of Nicholas Coffey.

Outside the home, David Coffey, Coffey’s father, told the officers that Coffey and his

friend, Drew Jerrell, were inside. But, says David Coffey, he never gave the officers permission

to enter the home. The officers, however, say that David Coffey did consent to them entering the

home, and they did so. What happened outside the home, and the events that ensued inside, are

at the crux of this dispute. And these facts, like the case more broadly, are deeply disputed.

Perhaps the lone point of agreement is this: When the officers found Coffey, he was

asleep on a loveseat. According to Coffey, he was sleeping there after a long night and morning

of drinking. Coffey’s father says that the officers tried to wake Coffey by poking him in the

chest, and that when poking proved unsuccessful, one of the officers punched Coffey in the face

and yelled “stop resisting.” Making matters worse, Coffey says, as he was waking, the officers

flipped him onto his stomach and handcuffed him. Coffey says he did not resist the arrest.

Nonetheless, he explains, the officers used his face to open the storm door as they dragged him

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out of the house. The officers then placed Coffey in the backseat of the police car. The

encounter left him with injuries to his ear, mouth, nose, and chin.

The officers describe these events differently. Officer Carroll, they say, upon discovering

Coffey asleep on the loveseat, tapped Coffey on the shoulder a few times. When Coffey woke

up, the officers say he grabbed Officer Carroll’s finger and twisted it. The officers claim they

attempted to arrest Coffey, but that he fought, kicked Officers Pranger and Pilchak, and pulled

his arms away. When the officers eventually restrained Coffey, they handcuffed him and placed

him in the backseat of a police car.

Coffey spent the next two nights in jail, at which point the county prosecutor approved a

felony arrest warrant. After a preliminary hearing, at which Officers Carroll and Pranger

testified, the trial court bound over Coffey. Eventually, Coffey was tried for three counts of

assaulting a police officer. The jury acquitted him of the charges.

Coffey then turned the tables. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he filed his own action against

the officers and the City of Taylor. Coffey alleged that the officers, under the supervision of the

City, violated Coffey’s constitutional rights by engaging in conduct amounting to unlawful entry,

excessive force, and malicious prosecution. By stipulation, the suit against the City was

dismissed, and the claims against the officers proceeded through discovery.

Following discovery, the officers moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity. The district court granted parts of their motion and denied other parts. The court

found there existed a material dispute of fact over whether the officers unlawfully entered

Coffey’s home, whether the officers used excessive force when arresting him, and whether

Officers Carroll and Pranger influenced or participated in the decision to prosecute Coffey for

assaulting a police officer. But the district court found no issue of material fact as to whether

Officer Pilchak (unlike the other two officers) influenced or participated in the decision to

prosecute Coffey, primarily because Pilchak did not testify at Coffey’s preliminary hearing.

Accordingly, the district court entered judgment in Pilchak’s favor on Coffey’s malicious-

prosecution claim.

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The officers appealed the district court’s order partially denying their motion for

summary judgment. Coffey has not done the same with respect to the district court’s partial

grant of summary judgment to Officer Pilchak.

II. JURISDICTION

Before turning to the merits of the appeal, we must first consider our jurisdiction. Unlike

our practice with respect to most interlocutory appeals, we have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory

appeals by government officials challenging a denial of qualified immunity. See Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). But, generally speaking, those appeals must sound in law,

not fact. After all, it is equally true that at this intermediate step, other than in instances where

the plaintiff’s version of the facts is “blatantly contradicted” by the record such that it is

“demonstrably false,” we do not have jurisdiction to resolve on an interlocutory basis

disagreements over the district court’s reading of the factual record. Diluzio v. Village of

Yorksville, 796 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2015).

So, we must ask at the outset, is this appeal one of law, which we can hear now, or one of

fact, which, save for a narrow band of cases, we cannot? At times, the officers’ arguments take

aim at the factual record. For example, they argue their conduct was justified because Coffey

resisted arrest, a fact Coffey contests. As Coffey’s version of the events is not blatantly

contradicted by the record, these fact-based arguments are not appropriate for our interlocutory

resolution.

But other arguments present “a series of strictly legal questions.” Phelps v. Coy,

286 F.3d 295, 298–99 (6th Cir. 2002). For instance, does Coffey’s unlawful-entry claim fail

because the officers entered Coffey’s home while in hot pursuit? Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6

(2013) (“[F]ederal and state courts nationwide are sharply divided on the question whether an

officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a home without a

warrant while in hot pursuit of that suspect.”). Is the evidence supporting Coffey’s excessive-

force claim inadmissible because it is not based on personal knowledge? See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on

personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant

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or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”). And does Coffey’s malicious-

prosecution claim fail because he did not show that the officers influenced or participated in the

decision to prosecute him? See Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 237 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing

McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 444–45 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S.

1090 (2006)). Because “these are the kind of questions that may be raised by interlocutory

appeal . . . [,] we have jurisdiction” here. Phelps, 286 F.3d at 298–99; see also Livermore ex rel

Rohm v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 2007). We will, however, entertain the officers’

arguments only to the extent they challenge the district court’s legal determinations. We “must

ignore the defendant’s attempts to dispute the facts” as read by the district court. Bunkley v. City

of Detroit, 902 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard Of Review

The qualified immunity doctrine protects public officials “from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

In resolving issues of qualified immunity, our case law affords something to everyone involved.

For government officials named as defendants, our cases instruct that their qualified immunity

assertion be addressed early in the proceeding. That is so because qualified immunity is “an

immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” and “it is effectively lost if a case is

erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (emphasis deleted). For

plaintiffs challenging qualified immunity assertions, our cases afford them a favorable standard

of review of the record. At this interlocutory stage, we take “the most favorable view of the facts

to the plaintiff.” Thompson v. Grida, 656 F.3d 365, 367 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted). And for ourselves, we are afforded some latitude in reviewing a summary

judgment decision addressing qualified immunity. We review that decision “de novo because

application of this doctrine is a question of law.” Nelson v. City of Madison Heights, 845 F.3d

695, 699 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 399 (6th

Cir. 2009)) (italics in original) (internal quotations omitted).

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Our review is twofold. We must (1) “determine if the facts alleged make out a violation

of a constitutional right,” and (2) “ask if the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ when the

event occurred such that a reasonable [official] would have known that his conduct violated it.”

Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). These steps may be addressed in any order, and the

official need only prevail on one of them to be granted qualified immunity. Id. (citing Pearson,

555 U.S. at 236).

B. The Officers Are Not Entitled To Summary Judgment On Coffey’s Unlawful-

Entry Claim.

Coffey argues that the officers unlawfully entered his home on the day they arrested him.

Lacking a warrant, the officers attempt to justify their search on a host of alternative grounds:

Coffey’s father consented to their entry, Coffey was in public view (and thus not actually “at

home”), and the entry occurred while the officers were in “hot pursuit” of Coffey. The district

court determined there was an issue of material fact as to whether Coffey’s father, David,

consented to the officers entering the home, rejected the other two grounds purportedly justifying

the search, and denied the officers summary judgment on this claim. We agree.

1. Reading The Record In The Light Most Favorable To Coffey, A Reasonable

Jury Could Find That The Officers Violated The Constitutional Prohibition

Against Unlawful Entry.

For Fourth Amendment purposes, the search here occurred on sacred ground. “[T]he

Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.” Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). A government official may knock on a person’s front door and try to

initiate a consensual entry. See United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 2005). But

absent consent, and in the absence of a warrant or exigent circumstances, the Fourth Amendment

prohibits the official from entering the home. Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 685

(6th Cir. 2005).

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a. Whether The Officers Had Consent To Enter Coffey’s Home Is An

Issue Of Material Fact.

If David Coffey had authority to consent to the officers’ entrance, and if he in fact did

consent, the officers’ search satisfied the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Matlock,

415 U.S. 164, 169–71 (1974). The problem is, as the district court recognized, even assuming

David Coffey did have such authority, we do not know whether he in fact consented. The

officers argue that he did. But David Coffey testified that he did not. Since this is a dispute of

material fact, and neither side’s testimony can be easily discredited, we do not have jurisdiction

to settle the dispute at this stage.

b. Coffey Had A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy When He Was In

His Home.

Regardless whether there was consent, the officers alternatively argue they are entitled to

summary judgment on a different legal and factual basis. The controlling law? Relying on

United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), the officers argue that one who is exposed to

public view is not deemed inside a home for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. And the

relevant fact? Coffey, they say, was close to his front door when the officers arrived.

Unfortunately for the officers, the law is not entirely as they say. Santana stands for the

proposition that a person in the doorway of a home is “exposed to public view,” meaning the

person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes. But

Santana contrasts standing fully “exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if [a

person] had been standing completely outside her house” with being “merely visible to the

public” in some respect. Id. at 42. In other words, close to the doorway is not close enough

when a search and seizure is premised upon Santana’s public-view exception.

Nor do these facts, when assessed in the light most favorable to Coffey, the non-moving

party, suggest that Coffey was in the doorway when the officers arrived. At that moment, the

parties agree, Coffey was sleeping on a loveseat. And that’s not something you ordinarily find in

a doorway. Coffey says it was in fact inside the home, and even the officers say that Coffey was

in “close proximity” to the doorway rather than in the doorway. As a result, we must assume at

this stage that Coffey was not fully visible to the officers until they were several feet inside the

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house. These collective flaws doom the officers’ public-view-theory-based summary judgment

argument.

c. The Officers Were Not In Hot Pursuit Of Coffey.

As a final justification for the search, the officers contend they were in “hot pursuit” of

Coffey, meaning a warrant was not required before they could enter Coffey’s home. The law,

they say, supports a “hot pursuit” exception to the Fourth Amendment, justifying their

warrantless entry. Alternatively, for purposes of qualified immunity, the officers say it is not

clearly established that entry into a misdemeanor-suspect’s home when officers are in hot pursuit

constitutes an unreasonable search.

As a threshold matter, Coffey contends that the “hot pursuit” argument was not raised at

all, meaning the argument is forfeited. Forfeiture is oftentimes a delicate issue. On the one

hand, we do not want to reward a party for hiding the ball from the district court. We rely on

district courts to tackle issues in the first instance, and we cannot expect them to do so when

issues are overlooked by the parties. On the other hand, we do not want to flunk a party simply

because an issue was inartfully raised below. This case is a prime example of the challenge in

resolving forfeiture arguments: While there is no reference to exigent circumstances in the

officers’ motion for summary judgment or statement of facts, the exigent-circumstance exception

was discussed briefly at the summary-judgment hearing. So was the argument forfeited?

Because the officers’ hot pursuit arguments squarely fail on the merits, we leave this type of

forfeiture analysis for another day.

As to the merits, the “hot pursuit” justification has been recognized as an exception to

traditional search and seizure law. The justification has been invoked in instances where an

officer without a warrant justifiably chases a suspect into a private home when the criminal has

fled arrest in a public place. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967). “The ‘pursuit’

begins when police start to arrest a suspect in a public place, the suspect flees and the officers

give chase.” Smith v Stoneburner, 716 F.3d 926, 931 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Cummings v. City of

Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 686 (6th Cir. 2005)). “[T]he emergency nature of the situation,” turns an

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ordinary pursuit into a “hot” one, creating the need for “immediate police action,” justifying

what might otherwise be an illegal search and seizure. Cummings, 418 F.3d at 686.

This does not remotely describe the officers’ entry into Coffey’s home. It was neither

“hot” nor in “pursuit,” in any fair sense of those words. The sequence of events lacked an

emergency. At most, Coffey had attempted (and failed) to commit a non-violent property crime

earlier in the day, meaning that when the officers arrived at his house sometime later, their

pursuit was lukewarm at best. Nor were the officers truly in pursuit of Coffey, as that term is

understood in the case law. Pursuit is defined as an effort to catch and detain an individual

following an attempted arrest and subsequent escape. See Stoneburner, 716 F.3d at 931. But

here, the officers encountered Coffey for the first time after they entered the home; it was only

then that they began to arrest him. In other words, this was not pursuit following a failed arrest.

The district court thus correctly concluded that the search was not justified by an exigent

emergency.

2. The Right Against Unlawful Entry Is Clearly Established.

We likewise reject the officers’ argument that no clearly established law prohibited them

from entering Coffey’s home. When determining whether an asserted right is “clearly

established” for purposes of actions under § 1983, we are careful to not define rights “at a high

level of generality.” See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). To do so runs the risk of

making any and every “right” one that is “clearly established.” Rather, to be fair to well-

intentioned public officials, we require that “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

Here, the district court defined the right at issue as the Fourth Amendment right against

an officer entering a person’s home without a warrant; doing so makes the search presumptively

unlawful. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 (“[A] basic principle of Fourth Amendment law, that

searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”

(internal quotations omitted)). That Coffey was suspected of committing only a misdemeanor

raises the bar for law enforcement, erecting a “double presumption” against warrantless entry,

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one, that a warrant is ordinarily necessary, and two, that a misdemeanor offense is not serious

enough to justify an otherwise unreasonable search. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750

(1984) (“When the government’s interest [in the entry] is only to arrest for a minor offense, th[e]

presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut . . . .”). This “double presumption” is well

settled. Indeed, six years ago we observed that the “double presumption” had been clearly

established by the Supreme Court for more than 25 years. Stoneburner, 716 F.3d at 933. By the

time the officers entered Coffey’s home then, the relevant law had been clearly established for

more than three decades, contrary to the officers’ contention.

To sum up, the officers did not have a warrant to enter Coffey’s home, there were no

exigent circumstances identified by the officers justifying their entrance, and there is an issue of

material fact as to whether David Coffey gave the officers consent to enter. If the issues of fact

are ultimately resolved in Coffey’s favor, the officers violated the clearly established

constitutional prohibition against unlawful entry. Thus, the district court correctly denied

summary judgment to the officers on Coffey’s unlawful-entry claim.

C. The Officers Are Not Entitled To Summary Judgment On Coffey’s Excessive-

Force Claim.

Regardless whether the officers’ search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,

Coffey argues that the officers used excessive force when arresting him. Finding that Coffey

submitted admissible evidence sufficient to create an issue of material fact as to whether the

force used by the officers was excessive, the district court denied the officers qualified immunity

as to Coffey’s excessive-force claim. We agree with the district court’s legal conclusion that

Coffey’s evidence was admissible; we lack jurisdiction to entertain the officers’ fact-based

arguments, and thus ignore those arguments in resolving this appeal.

1. Coffey’s Evidence In Support Of His Excessive-Force Claim Is Admissible

Based On Personal Knowledge.

The officers raise a threshold legal issue: Did the district court err in considering the

evidence that Coffey submitted in support of his excessive-force claim where none of the

evidence was based on personal knowledge? Coffey had two witnesses testify on his behalf—

himself and his father. The officers argue that Coffey has no personal knowledge of the events

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because he cannot remember what happened and because he was intoxicated. And as for his

father, the officers say he too has no personal knowledge because he had an obstructed view of

the relevant events. In the absence of reliable evidence supporting Coffey’s claim, the officers

assert they are entitled to summary judgment.

We see no error in the district court’s legal conclusions. First, whether Coffey consumed

alcohol earlier that day and the previous day would seem to go to the credibility of Coffey’s

testimony, not its substance. See Fed. R. Evid. 601 (explaining that whether a person was

allegedly intoxicated is an issue of credibility to be determined by the jury). Second, the notion

that Coffey had no memory of the relevant events is belied by the fact that he testified to events

occurring after he woke up. Finally, while David Coffey did testify at his deposition that he had

an obstructed view of part of the incident, he would of course have personal knowledge of the

things he could see. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Coffey’s evidence is

admissible. To the extent the officers challenge the credibility of Coffey’s evidence, we lack

jurisdiction to entertain those fact-based arguments.

2. Viewing The Evidence In The Light Most Favorable To Coffey,

A Reasonable Jury Could Conclude That The Officers Used Excessive

Force When Arresting Him.

Claims that an officer used excessive force when arresting a person are “analyzed under

the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 388 (1989). In applying that standard, we ask “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their

underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397. The contours of this reasonableness inquiry

admittedly are somewhat undefined, as the test “is not capable of precise definition or

mechanical application.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). But one aspect of the

inquiry is settled: “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968)).

Taking all of this together, our bottom-line inquiry is whether the totality of the

circumstances justifies a particular level of force. Mitchell v. Schlabach, 864 F.3d 416, 421 (6th

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Cir. 2017). Factors to consider in making this inquiry include (but are not limited to) “the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. While weighing those factors is a legal question upon which

we can rule, we lack jurisdiction to hear arguments quibbling with the district court’s reading of

the factual record.

Considering the Graham factors, a jury reasonably could conclude the officers’ conduct

reflected excessive force:

Severity of the crime. The officers were investigating Coffey for an alleged violation of

M.C.L. § 750.356a(2)(b)—a misdemeanor offense of attempted larceny from a motor vehicle.

Generally speaking, a nonviolent misdemeanor offense is not a particularly serious crime.

Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447, 459 (6th Cir. 2016); Goodwin v. City of Painsville, 781 F.3d

314 (6th Cir. 2015); Thomas v. Plummer, 489 F. App’x 116, 126 (6th Cir. 2012).

Immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. David Coffey testified that his

son was asleep when officers awoke him by punching him in the face. Coffey testified that he

woke up while being turned onto his stomach for purposes of being handcuffed. Coffey adds

that, once he was handcuffed, the officers then used his head and face to open a storm door.

The officers respond that Coffey was resisting arrest, thereby threatening their safety. But

we ignore this fact-based dispute; nothing in the record “blatantly contradicts” Coffey’s claim

that he was not resisting—the lone basis, theoretically, for us to take up the issue. See Bunkley,

902 F.3d at 560. Given the district court’s reading of the factual record and taking Coffey’s

assertions as true, it is difficult to see how he was an immediate threat to the officers at the time

it is alleged they used excessive force. See, e.g., Thomas, 489 F. App’x at 127 (holding that

officer’s use of a taser was unreasonable on a person kneeling with her hands over her head).

Actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. According to the

officers, Coffey grabbed one officer’s finger and kicked other officers. Coffey disputes these

claims, and adds that even if he did the things alleged, neither act was done “intentionally.” For

purposes of summary judgment, the district court accepted Coffey’s version of events. As that

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telling is not “blatantly contradicted” by the record, we have no basis to overturn the decision

below.

To sum up, after dismissing any argument related to the district court’s reading of the

facts, the Graham factors on balance support the conclusion that the officers arguably acted in an

objectively unreasonable manner.

3. The Right To Be Free From Excessive Force Is Clearly Established Federal Law.

Having determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers violated

Coffey’s constitutional rights, we must also determine whether the right at issue was clearly

established. On this question, the analysis is relatively straightforward. A suspect has a clearly

established constitutional right to be free from the use of physical force by police officers when

he is not resisting efforts to apprehend him. Hagans v. Franklin County Sheriff’s Office,

695 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (summarizing cases from 2004 onwards in which “the suspects

were compliant or had stopped resisting” and noting that excessive force was found in such

cases). Drawing the line at a suspect’s active resistance defines the right at a level of

particularity appropriate for a claim pursued under § 1983. Id.

Measured against this legal backdrop, Coffey’s claim survives the officers’ qualified

immunity defense. He has articulated a specific, precise, and established constitutional right to

be free from excessive force. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying the officers

qualified immunity and summary judgment on this claim.

D. Officers Carroll And Pranger Are Not Entitled To Summary Judgment On

Coffey’s Malicious-Prosecution Claim.

Lastly, Coffey asserts that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the officers

because they subjected him to malicious prosecution by way of their false testimony at his

preliminary-examination hearing. Only the two officers testified at the hearing. Coffey alleges

they falsely testified that he assaulted them. The district court found there was an issue of

material fact as to whether that testimony was false. Likewise, the district court concluded that

Coffey had a clearly established right to be free from prosecution tainted by the false testimony

of a police officer when that testimony formed the basis of the probable cause to prosecute

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Coffey. With those two rulings in mind, the court denied summary judgment to the two officers,

leaving the factual nature of those claims to be resolved at trial.

1. Reading The Record In The Light Most Favorable To Coffey, A Reasonable

Jury Could Conclude The Officers Violated Coffey’s Right To Be Free From

Malicious Prosecution.

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence clearly establishes that one who has “made, influenced,

or participated in the decision to prosecute” another may not do so maliciously. King v.

Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 582–83 (6th Cir. 2017). In seeking to validate a claim for malicious

prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant “ma[d]e, influence[d], or

participate[d] in the decision to prosecute,” Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 237 (6th Cir. 2007);

(2) that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution, id.; (3) that the legal

proceeding resulted in the plaintiff suffering a “deprivation of liberty,” as understood in our

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and distinct from the initial seizure, Johnson v. Knorr,

477 F.3d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 2007); and (4) the criminal proceeding must have been resolved in the

plaintiff’s favor. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994).

Given the nature of Coffey’s malicious-prosecution claim, our decision in Sykes v.

Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2010), is instructive. We held there that an officer can

influence or participate in the decision to prosecute a defendant when the officer testifies at a

preliminary hearing in which the decision was made to bind over the defendant. Id. at 313–14.

See also Manuel v. City of Joliet, III., 137 S. Ct. 911, 918 (2017) (the Fourth Amendment right to

be free from malicious prosecution is violated when “a judge’s probable-cause determination”

justifying one’s detention “is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements.”).

In view of this precedential backdrop, we cannot say the district court erred in concluding

that Coffey had submitted sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Officers

Carroll and Pranger violated Coffey’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious

prosecution. As the two officers testified at the preliminary hearing, a jury reasonably could

conclude that the officers influenced or participated in the decision to prosecute Coffey. And

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Coffey, there is an issue of material fact as to

whether the officers’ testimony was false.

No. 18-1314 Coffey v. Carroll et al. Page 15

The officers challenge only the first element of the malicious-prosecution claim, namely,

whether the officers made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute Coffey. They

note that in Skousen v. Brighton High School, 305 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2002), we reversed a

district court’s denial of summary judgment in favor of a police officer accused of malicious

prosecution. But compare that case to this one. In Skousen, the officer’s alleged role in the

purported malicious behavior included interviewing witnesses, writing up a police report, and

then submitting that report to the prosecutor’s office; there was no evidence the officer caused

the plaintiff to be prosecuted. Id. at 524–25, 529. That omission from Skousen is critical. Here,

the officers were not only the complaining witnesses regarding the assault of a police officer, but

they also then testified to that effect at the preliminary hearing.

2. The Right To Be Free From Malicious Prosecution Is Clearly Established.

We likewise agree with the district court regarding the existence of a right to be free from

malicious prosecution. While clearly established, the right is a narrow one. Johnson v. Moseley,

790 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 2015). As we have previously said, “[a] police officer violates a suspect’s

clearly established right to freedom from malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment

‘only when his deliberate or reckless falsehoods result in arrest and prosecution without probable

cause.’ ” Id. at 655 (quoting Newman v. Township of Hamburg, 773 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir.

2014)). Providing false testimony (both written and oral), as alleged here, could have resulted in

Coffey’s arrest and prosecution without probable cause. Reading the facts in the light most

favorable to Coffey, a reasonable jury could conclude that Officers Carroll and Pranger

deliberately provided untrue testimony at the preliminary hearing, which resulted in the court

finding probable cause to continue legal proceedings against Coffey. Accordingly, the district

court did not err in denying the two officers’ motion for summary judgment on Coffey’s

malicious-prosecution claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM district court’s judgment and remand for further

proceedings.