Com. v. Jackson, C.

J -S24044-19

2019 PA Super 221

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHARLES JACKSON

Appellant : No. 1598 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 18, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-0006678-2017

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 19, 2019

Appellant, Charles Jackson, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after the court,

sitting as finder of fact in Appellant's non -jury trial, found him guilty of the

single count of terroristic threats filed against him. Sentenced to three years'

probation, Appellant contends the trial court erred when it permitted the

Commonwealth to amend the bill of information on the morning of trial to

include additional victims whose involvement the criminal complaint had

previously described, and he raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence with respect to one alleged victim. We affirm.

The trial court aptly sets forth the pertinent facts and procedural history

of the case, as follows:

Around April 27, 2017, Tracy Spruell-McMoore, [a] co-worker of

Appellant [at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,

located in Philadelphia], began receiving numerous phone call

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

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hang-ups from a number without any caller identification. She

later began receiving voicemail messages. At first, the voicemail

messages contained music and then later the voicemails

contained music and a person singing along to the music. Later,

Ms. Spruell-McMoore began receiving voicemail messages where

the speaker said, "Hey Marine." While she was receiving voicemail

messages, she [could not] identify the speaker's identity because

she worked from home and [had not] been at the office in some

time. Id. at 15-17.

On May 1, 2017, around 9:49 PM, Ms. Spruell-McMoore answered

the phone call from the unidentified caller. Appellant began

casually speaking to Ms. Spruell-McMoore, to which she responded

that she [did not] know who was on the other line. Appellant

asked her to guess his identity, and she refused and stated that

she would hang up unless he told her who was calling. Appellant

finally identified himself as the unidentified caller to Ms. Spruell-

McMoore and the two began conversing about how Appellant was

doing while on administrative leave. N.T. at 18-20.

[Eventually], Appellant began ranting to Ms. Spruell-McMoore

about their co-workers. Appellant told Ms. Spruell-McMoore that

[T.R.], a co-worker that worked in a different department than

Ms. Spruell-McMoore, was a "weak ass Marine." Ms. Spruell-

McMoore was confused as to why Appellant was bringing up [T.R.],

so she asked why he was speaking about him. Appellant just

responded that "[T.R.] is just a weak ass Marine," Marines are

"weak, not strong," and that [T.R.] was "fake and needed to blow

his nose and wore panties." N.T. at 21-22.

Appellant then proceeded to complain about their manager. . . .

Appellant stated that [Manager] was "in the closet" and that she

kept bringing him into the office to complain that his work was not

up to par. Appellant further ranted that [Manager] was a "bitch"

and that her complaints about his work were "bullshit."

After he finished his tirade about [Manager], Appellant began

commenting on another co-worker, [S.B.]. Appellant said, "I don't

want to fuck [S.B.'s] wife, I want to fuck his mistress." Lastly,

Appellant began ranting about their co-worker [D.D.]. Appellant

told Spruell-McMoore that [D.D.] had pulled him into his office

while licking his lips and running his fingers across his lips.

Appellant said he [understood] the meaning of [D.D.'s] gestures

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and that he wished he could "punch that faggot in the face." N.T.

at 23

At some point during Ms. Spruell-McMoore's conversation with

Appellant, Appellant said, "They don't know who they're messing

with; I'm going to show them." Ms. Spreull-McMoore asked

Appellant what he was talking about, to which he responded, "I'm

going to show them I'm not the one. I see the light and not no

house light or ceiling light, I see the real light. Soon, they'll see

the light."

Ms. Spruell-McMoore proceeded to ask Appellant again, what he

was talking about. Appellant then started talking about how their

co-workers "messed with the wrong [n -word]." Ms. Spreull-

McMoore told Appellant not to say these things to her, to which he

responded, "We cool; I'm not talking about you. I'm not

threatening you." Ms. Spruell-McMoore responded that she [was

not] concerned about her own well-being, she was concerned

about their co-workers since she considered some of them her

friends. N.T. at 23-24.

Later during their conversation, Appellant said that he would "pop

a cap in their ass" and repeatedly said that he would "peel back

their scalp" throughout the conversation with Ms. Spruell-

McMoore. Ms. Spruell-McMoore took these threats very seriously

and told Appellant that it is against the law for federal employees

to threaten a fellow employee or anyone else. She was very upset

by the phone call and prior to the call, she had considered

Appellant a friend of hers. Ms. Spruell-McMoore tried to get more

information about Appellant's plans regarding their co-workers, to

which he replied, "Don't worry about it, you will read about it on

the news. Don't worry about it, it don't have nothing to do with

you, we cool. Those motherfuckers RO3s [Regional Officer 3s],

but not you." N.T. at 24-25.

Ms. Spruell-McMoore became increasingly upset by this

conversation and told Appellant he [could not] be saying he was

going to hurt people at their job. She asked him why he wanted

to hurt their co-workers, and he responded, "They messed with

the wrong [n -word] and I want to show them. You'll read about

it in the news and you'll see it on the news real soon. They're all

working from home, but that won't last forever." Appellant almost

constantly made these threats throughout their entire

conversation, which lasted almost an hour. N.T. at 25-28.

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After Ms. Spruell-McMoore's phone call with Appellant ended, she

immediately called [Manager] and told her that she had received

a phone call from Appellant and that Appellant had threatened

[Manager] and their co-workers. Ms. Spruell-McMoore also

warned [Manager] to be on the lookout since the threats had

deeply disturbed her, along with the fact that he knew their co-

workers were currently working from home. [Manager] advised

Ms. Spruell-McMoore to contact Criminal Protective Service and

call the local police and that [Manager] would report it to

management and leadership in the office. N.T. at 30, 46.

At some point, [D.D.] and [S.B.] learned of the threats conveyed

by Appellant directed towards them and [Manager]. Both [D.D.]

and [S.B.] took the threats seriously and were upset and

disconcerted by them. N.T. at 55-56, 65-66. [Both testified that

they, too, had received numerous voicemail messages from an

unidentified number consisting of no speaking, only music playing,

and coughing, just as Spruell-McMoore had described. S.B.

described how, in April, the caller spoke profanely to his wife and

threatened S.B. that he was coming for him. Manager also

received numerous phone calls and voice messages consisting of

coughing and indistinct words. N.T. at 44-45.]

On May 1, 2017, around 11 PM, Detective Jared Fitzgerald, a

criminal investigator for the Department of Homeland Security,

received a phone call from the Philadelphia Dispatch Center. The

Dispatch Center told him that Ms. Spruell-McMoore had called and

relayed the threats Appellant had made over the phone regarding

her co-workers. Detective Fitzgerald reached out to Ms. Spruell-

McMoore and [Manager] the following morning and Ms. Spruell-

McMoore provided him with Appellant's phone number . . . .

Detective Fitzgerald called Appellant under the guise that he was

with the wrongful termination board and set up a time to meet

with him at a library. N.T. at 68-71.

Once Appellant arrived at the meeting place, Detective Fitzgerald

told him he was from Homeland Security Federal Protection

Service and began questioning Appellant about the phone calls.

Appellant admitted he had spoken to Ms. Spruell-McMoore and

that he had made the phone calls to his co-workers. Appellant

claimed that [Manager] was out to get him, he admitted that he

had left a voicemail message for [D.D.] calling him a "faggot," and

that he had called [S.B.] and told him he "wasn't going to fuck his

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mistress, he was going to fuck his wife." Appellant further

indicated that Ms. Spruell-McMoore's recitationof their

conversation was accurate. N.T. at 73-75.

On August 7, 2017, a preliminary hearing was conducted for

Appellant. [The Bill of Information filed against him listed a single

charge of terroristic threats under Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1) and a

single complainant, Ms. Spruell-McMoore. The accompanying

criminal complaint, however described all the above -listed

employees and the phone calls they received]. At that time,

Appellant was held on one charge of terroristic threats.

[On the morning when trial was to commence, the Commonwealth

moved to amend the information to add the employees listed in

the criminal complaint as additional complainants. The

Commonwealth emphasized it was not adding charges. Pursuant

to Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa. Super.

2006), infra, the court granted the motion over Appellant's

objection, and trial commenced thereafter. N.T. at 10-12.]

Following a [non -jury] trial before [the trial court] on March 9,

2018, Appellant was convicted of terroristic threats with the intent

to terrorize another, graded as a misdemeanor in the first

degree.[] [On May 18, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant

to three years' probation.]. Appellant filed [this] timely appeal . .

Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/18, at 3-6, 1-2, 7.

Appellant raises the following issues for our consideration:

1. Where Appellant was charged with a single count of terroristic

threats, with the "victim" specified on the bill of information as

Tracey Spruell-McMoore and the date of occurrence being on

or about 5/1/17, did not the lower court err by permitting, at

the start of the trial, the late amendment of the bill of

information to specify additional complainants with additional

and various dates of alleged offenses; and did not granting

these amendments, particularly the addition of new

complainants, violate the version of Pa.R.Crim.P. 564 which

was then applicable, as well as, violate due process?

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2. Although it appears that the lower court did not find the

defendant guilty as applied to Tracey Spruell-McMoore, the

complainant originally specified on the bill of information, to

the extent that the lower court did convict the defendant of

terroristic threats with respect to this complainant, was not the

evidence insufficient as a matter of law?

Appellant's brief, at 4.

In Appellant's first issue, he contends that the court erred in permitting

the Commonwealth to amend the bill of information on the day of trial. To

the extent Appellant's issue asserts that the trial court, in granting the

Commonwealth's motion to amend the bill of information, applied the wrong

version of Rule 564 to his detriment, we find it waived for multiple reasons.

First, in response to the oral motion made on the morning of trial,

Appellant offered only a general objection to adding new complainants to the

bill of information. N.T., 3/9/18, at 10-11. He never posited that the court's

ruling was subject to former Rule 564, which had been in effect at the time of

the original bill of information, rather than current Rule 564 in effect on the

date of the motion. Appellant now argues for the first time on appeal that

principles of equity and due process implicated by the Commonwealth's day -

of -trial motion required the court to apply the former version of the rule, but

his failure to articulate this objection to the trial court compels us to find the

issue waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (party must make a timely and specific

objection at trial in order to preserve an issue for appellate review);

Commonwealth v. Smith, --- A.3d ----, 2019 PA Super 194, *2 (filed June

20, 2019) (noting it is axiomatic that "[i]ssues not raised in the lower court

are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."). See also

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Commonwealth v. Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. Super. 2008) (observing

even issues of constitutional dimension cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal).

Alternatively, we may find waiver because Appellant's court -ordered

"Supplemental Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal," filed pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), fails to set forth clearly that he predicates his challenge

on the position that former Rule 564 governs the issue. Specifically,

Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement states, in pertinent part:

The defendant in this matter was charged with a single count of

terroristic threats, with the "victim" specified on the bill of

information as Tracey Spruel-McMoore and the date of occurrence

being on or about 5/1/17. The court erred by permitting, on the

day of trial, the late amendment of the bill of information to

specify additional complainants with additional and various dates

of alleged offenses; these amendments, particularly the addition

of new complainants, violated the version of Pa.R.A.P. 564 then in

effect.

Appellant's "Supplemental Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal," filed

9/19/18, at 1.

Problematic for Appellant is that the phrase "then in effect" is part of

the larger sentence stating, "these amendments . . . violated the version of

Pa.R.A.P. 564 then in effect." The version then in effect at the time of the

amendments was current Rule 564. Moreover, insofar as Appellant apparently

intended the phrase to refer, instead, to the filing date of the original bill of

information, that intention is not apparent from a plain reading of the

statement as written. Indeed, the trial court reasonably understood

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Appellant's statement to invoke current Rule 564, and it authored its

responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion accordingly. See Trial Court Opinion, at 7.

The court's interpretation is all the more understandable when one also

considers that Appellant had never previously raised for the trial court's

consideration whether former or current Rule 564 should apply to the motion

to amend.

We observe that, generally,

issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed

waived for review. An appellant's concise statement must

properly specify the error to be addressed on appeal. In other

words, the Rule 1925(b) statement must be "specific enough for

the trial court to identify and address the issue [an appellant]

wishe[s] to raise on appeal." Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907

A.2d 1, 2 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 712, 919 A.2d

956 (2007). "[A] [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to

allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the

functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all." Id. The

court's review and legal analysis can be fatally impaired when the

court has to guess at the issues raised. Thus, if a concise

statement is too vague, the court may find waiver.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa.Super. 2011) (some

internal citations omitted).

At best, Appellant's first statement of error suffers from an ambiguity

and vagueness that left the trial court unable to identify a particular issue

Appellant wished to raise and develop on appeal. We, therefore, may find

waiver on this basis.

Finally, even if we were to conduct merits review of Appellant's issue,

we would conclude he is entitled to no relief. As the Comment to newly

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amended Rule 564 clarifies, see infra, the rule represents not a substantive

departure from its previous iteration but, instead, a codification of the

development of decisional law interpreting the rule since 1974. Because

Appellant's argument fails to explain how the court's application of the

amended rule, which merely conforms to longstanding precedent interpreting

the former version of the rule, could have altered his rights, we deem his claim

meritless.

To the extent Appellant's challenge implicates the newly amended

version of Rule 564 in effect at the time of the motion, we observe the Rule

provides:

[t]he court may allow an information to be amended, provided

that the information as amended does not charge offenses arising

from a different set of events and that the amended charges are

not so materially different from the original charge that the

defendant would be unfairly prejudiced. Upon amendment, the

court may grant such postponement of trial or other relief as is

necessary in the interests of justice.

Comment: The rule was amended in 2016 to more accurately

reflect the interpretation of this rule that has developed since it

first was adopted in 1974. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 727

A.2d 541 (Pa. 1999). See also Commonwealth v. Beck, 78

A.3d. 656 (Pa. Super 2013); Commonwealth v. Page, 965 A.2d

1212 (Pa. Super. 2009); Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d

1218 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Pa.R.Crim.P. 564, Comment.

Our jurisprudence has described both the purpose of Rule 564 and the

standards by which we assess a challenge to an amended information:

The purpose of this rule is to "ensure that a defendant is fully

apprised of the charges, and to avoid prejudice by prohibiting the

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last minute addition of alleged criminal acts of which the

defendant is uninformed." [Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1221];

Commonwealth v. Hoke, 928 A.2d 300,303 (Pa.Super. 2007).

The test to be applied when evaluating a challenge to an amended

information[, as] set forth in Commonwealth v. Bricker, 882

A.2d 1008,1019 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted)[, is]:

Whether the crimes specified in the original indictment

or information involve the same basic elements and

evolved out of the same factual situation as the crimes

specified in the amended indictment or information.

If so, then the defendant is deemed to have been

placed on notice regarding his criminal

alleged

conduct. If, however, the amended provision alleges

a different set of events, or defenses to the amended

crime are materially different from the elements or

defenses to the crime originally charged, such that the

defendant would be prejudiced by the change, then

the amendment is not permitted.

[Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Davalos, 779 A.2d 1190,1194

(Pa.Super. 2001) (citation omitted))]. Relief is warranted only

when the amendment to the information prejudices a defendant.

Commonwealth v. Roser, 914 A.2d 447,454 (Pa.Super. 2006),

appeal denied 592 Pa. 788, 927 A.2d 624 (Pa.2007); Sinclair,

897 A.2d at 1223. Factors to be considered when determining

whether Appellant was prejudiced by the Commonwealth's

amendment include whether the amendment changes the factual

scenario; whether new facts, previously unknown to appellant,

were added; whether the description of the charges changed;

whether the amendment necessitated a change in defense

strategy; and whether the timing of the request for the

amendment allowed for ample notice and preparation by

appellant. Roser, 914 A.2d at 454; Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1223.

Page, 965 A.2d at 1223-24.

In the instant matter, the amended information changed neither the

charge, the relevant factual scenario, nor time of the alleged offense as set

forth in the criminal complaint ten months earlier. Specifically, the criminal

complaint described Ms. Spruell-McMoore as the complainant who received

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Appellant's May 1, 2017, phone call in which he threatened certain named co-

workers at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The complaint

developed the history leading up to this phone call by describing Appellant's

actions over the preceding thirty days, during which he allegedly placed

numerous harassing calls and voicemails to the home and cell phone numbers

of these co-workers. So, too, did Appellant's preliminary hearing of August

7, 2017, through the testimony of Commonwealth witness Tracey Spruell-

McMoore, extensively address allegations that Appellant made statements

threatening to do harm to "three to five" named co-workers. N.T. 8/7/17, at

10-40.

The complaint and preliminary hearing thus put Appellant on notice that

the Commonwealth would advance its terroristic threats case with evidence

that he made indirect threats to harm certain co-workers during the latest in

a series of phone calls revealing an animus toward the co-workers. Amending

the information to add the co-workers as complainants and to include the

earlier phone calls as evidence supporting the charge, therefore, did not

introduce new charges or events that would necessitate a material change in

defense strategy. Accordingly, we find no violation of Rule 564.

In Appellant's second issue, he contends the evidence was insufficient

to convict him of terroristic threats, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1), with respect to

complainant Tracey Spruell-McMoore.

When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

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The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence

to enable the fact -finder to find every element of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not

weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact -

finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt

may be resolved by the fact -finder unless the evidence is so weak

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may

be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be

considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact while passing upon the

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines terroristic threats as follows:

§ 2706. Terroristic threats

(a) Offense defined.-A person commits the crime of terroristic

threats if the person communicates, either directly or

indirectly, a threat to:

(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize

another;

(2) cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility

of public transportation; or

(3) otherwise cause serious public inconvenience, or cause

terror or serious public inconvenience with reckless

disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.

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18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a).

Based on this definition, this Court has made the following observations

with regard to proving a charge of terroristic threats:

"[T]he Commonwealth must prove that 1) the defendant made a

threat to commit a crime of violence, and 2) the threat was

communicated with the intent to terrorize another or with reckless

disregard for the risk of causing terror." Commonwealth v.

Tizer, 454 Pa.Super. 1, 684 A.2d 597, 600 (1996). The harm

sought to be avoided is the psychological distress that follows an

invasion of the victim's sense of personal security. See id.

Consequently, "[n]either the [defendant's] ability to carry out the

threat nor [the victim's belief] that it will be carried out is an

essential element of the crime." Id.; see also Commonwealth

v. Hudgens, 400 Pa.Super. 79, 582 A.2d 1352, 1358 (1990).

Similarly, "[i]t is unnecessary for an individual to specifically

articulate the crime of violence which he or she intends to commit

where the type of crime may be inferred from the nature of the

statement and the context and circumstances surrounding the

utterance of the statement." Id. Thus, "[a] direct communication

between the defendant and the victim is not required to establish

the crime[.]" In re L.A., 853 A.2d 388,392 (Pa.Super. 2004).

Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 976 A.2d 1184, 1187-88 (Pa.Super. 2009),

aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 30 A.3d 1105 (Pa. 2011).

Here, the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as verdict winner allowed the finder of fact to make the

reasonable inference that Appellant made his threats of violence with the

intent to terrorize not only the employees he expressly targeted in his phone

call with Spruell-McMoore, but also Ms. Spruell-McMoore, herself.

At trial, undisputed testimony revealed Appellant had made many

"hang-up" phone calls and left harassing messages to Ms. Spruell-McMoore's

voicemail, just as he had done with the other employees whom he

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subsequently named as objects of his threats. In one such message to

Spruell-McMoore, he mockingly said "Hey, Marine," and in their subsequent

conversation, he initially refused her demand that he identify himself other

than to say she knew him, she was his employer (which was technically

inaccurate), and she was a Marine. N.T. at 18-19. Once he identified himself

and they began to talk, he specifically insulted the Marines at length, calling

them "weak, not strong," and cited a fellow employee's status as "just a weak -

ass Marine" as the sole reason for targeting him. N.T. at 21-22. From the

outset of their conversation, therefore, Appellant was implicitly hostile toward

Ms. Spruell-McMoore.

Appellant also subjected Spruell-McMoore to profane comments on

employees' private matters before transitioning, then, to voicing his intent to

do them serious bodily harm. In this vein, he used extremely violent

references to "peeling back their scalps," "popping a cap in their ass," and

"Soon, they'll see the light," and "I want to show them. You'll read about it

in the news. . . . They're all working from home, but that won't last forever."

Notably, Ms. Spruell-McMoore also worked from home. N.T. at 25-26.

Afterwards, Appellant told Spruell-McMoore not to worry about her own

personal safety, however, because "it don't have nothing to do with you, we

cool. Those motherfuckers RO3 [Regional Officer 3s], but not you." N.T. at

24-25. Spruell-McMoore is a Regional Officer 3, and Appellant had referred to

her earlier as his employer. N.T. at 26, 19.

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Appellant contends that Ms. Spruell-McMoore's testimony that she did

not feel personally threatened by his comments necessarily defeated the

Commonwealth's case as it pertained to her as a victim.' As explained above,

however, it is unnecessary to prove a victim believed the defendant would

actually carry out threats to her personal detriment. Instead, the question is

whether Appellant intended to terrorize Spruell-McMoore with his words and

conduct.

Here, the totality of circumstances allowed for the reasonable inference

that Appellant, in fact, did intend to terrorize Spruell-McMoore despite his

overt reassurances otherwise. Indeed, such reassurances ring hollow when

viewed against actions and statements strongly suggesting he held Spruell-

McMoore in the same low regard he had for the other named employees.

Indeed, Appellant systematically harassed Appellant anonymously for days

just as he did the others, twice identified her as a Marine before revealing his

intent to target an employee just for being a Marine, and vowed to do great

physical harm to a group of Regional Officers working from their homes-a

group to which Spruell-McMoore belonged. Appellant may not have expressly

' We note that Spruell-McMoore testified she was dismayed and upset over

Appellant's phone call. Indeed, Spruell-McMoore took his threats seriously

enough to text her manager immediately afterward and insist, despite the late

hour and her manager's reply that she was sleeping, that they presently

discuss a most urgent matter. N.T. at 29-30. She subsequently agreed to

meet with investigators to report the matter officially.

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threatened Spruell-McMoore, but his comments taken as a whole implicitly

threatened her throughout the conversation.

We, therefore, reject Appellant's sufficiency challenge, as the evidence

sufficed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intended to

terrorize Spruell-McMoore along with other fellow employees.2

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Jseph D. Seletyn,

Prothonotary

Date: 7/19/19

2 Appellant does not raise a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence offered to

prove he delivered his indirect threats with the intent to terrorize the other

employees. We note our concurrence with the trial court, however, that a

reasonable finder of fact could infer from the evidence that Appellant must

have known Ms. Spruell-McMoore would relate his threats to management

and, ultimately, the employees at risk. Indeed, Ms. Spruell-McMoore

maintained a professional and responsible disposition during Appellant's

alarming words, and she cautioned him periodically that his threats and

demeaning characterizations were both inappropriate and against workplace

regulations.

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