Satele v. Superior Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM TUPUA SATELE,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

S248492

Second Appellate District, Division Three

B288828

Los Angeles County Superior Court

NA039358

July 18, 2019

Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar,

Kruger, and Groban concurred.

SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT

S248492

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

Petitioner, William Tupua Satele, asked the superior court

to release ballistics evidence for expert testing in preparation for

filing a habeas corpus petition. The court denied the request

under the authority of Penal Code section 1054.9, which governs

discovery in habeas corpus proceedings involving certain

judgments, including a sentence of death. Specifically, the court

found that Satele had failed to show good cause to believe his

access to the evidence was reasonably necessary to obtain relief,

as the statute requires. The trial court erred. Section 1054.9’s

good cause requirement applies only to physical evidence in

possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities,

not to evidence held by the court. Court documents, including

exhibits, are generally open to public inspection and may be

released subject to such conditions the court deems necessary to

safeguard their integrity. A threshold showing of good cause is

not required. We issue a writ of mandate directing the trial

court to vacate its order and conduct further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Satele was sentenced to death for the first degree murders

of Renesha Ann Fuller and Edward Robinson, with a special

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

circumstance finding for multiple murders. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187,

subd. (a), 189, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(3); People v. Nunez and

Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1 (Nunez and Satele).) Briefly, the facts

are these: Satele and codefendant Daniel Nunez shot the

victims from a car while they stood in front of Robinson’s home.

Robinson was shot three or four times; Fuller was shot twice.

(Nunez and Satele, at pp. 5–6.) About an hour later Satele was

heard to say, “ ‘We were out looking for niggers,’ ” and either he

or Nunez said, “ ‘I think we hit one of ’em.’ ” (Id. at p. 6.) The

prosecution introduced evidence that Nunez and Satele were

members of the West Side Wilmas gang and that murdering a

Black couple with no gang ties, like the victims in this case,

would enhance their gang status. (Id. at pp. 6, 9.) Also

connecting Satele to the crime was a semiautomatic gun

recovered from a car he was driving hours after the shooting. A

ballistics comparison identified it as the murder weapon. (Id. at

pp. 6–7.)

Satele’s death judgment was affirmed on direct appeal.

(Nunez and Satele, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 63.) In January 2017,

Satele’s habeas counsel informally asked the prosecutor for

discovery under section 1054.9. As relevant here, counsel

requested “[a]ll materials concerning the testing and

examination of ballistics evidence, including, but not limited to

reports, bench notes and photographs.” In October 2017, Satele

sought an order requiring the prosecutor to produce the evidence

for testing by an expert, again citing section 1054.9.

At the hearing on the motion, habeas counsel explained

that he had been unable to obtain ballistics bench notes or

1

All further undesignated statutory references are to the

Penal Code.

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SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

photographs from the prosecutor. Counsel asked the court to

release various items, including bullets, shell casings, and the

weapon, for expert testing. The items were trial exhibits held

by the court clerk.

The trial court found Satele had failed to meet the good

cause requirement of section 1054.9. It observed that two

prosecution experts and one defense expert had all agreed that

the ballistics evidence matched the weapon seized from Satele’s

car. According to the court, “sometimes that is just what it is.

It is just painfully obvious that they’re a match, and it sort of

sounds like that’s what we have here. Unless we’re paying for

yet another person to come in to look at the bullets or look at the

evidence and say, ‘It’s a match.’ ” In the court’s view, the

statute’s good cause requirement was meant to preclude such

fishing expeditions, which could go on “ad infinitum.”

Habeas counsel interjected that there may be some

“confusion here.” He clarified that, despite his reliance on

section 1054.9 in his moving papers, “it’s not really a [section]

1054.9” motion, because the court, not the prosecutor, held the

evidence. He explained, “It’s just evidence of the court” and

“[w]e just want our expert to be able to look at it” with all

necessary precautions to preserve the chain of custody. The

court denied Satele access to the physical evidence under any

circumstances. The court explained: “It finally sort of dawned

on me why I’m struggling, and it is because of the phrase ‘good

cause.’ I’m not seeing that there is good cause. Good cause to

believe that the access to the physical evidence is reasonably

necessary for the defendant to get relief.”

The Court of Appeal summarily denied Satele’s petition

for writ of mandate. We denied his petition for review, which

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

framed the issue in terms of whether physical evidence must be

released for a defense expert’s examination when scientific or

technological developments have undermined a prosecution’s

expert’s opinion. Instead, we granted review on our own motion

and directed the People to show cause why the relief requested

should not be granted “on the ground that the superior court

abused its discretion by applying Penal Code section 1054.9

[former] subdivision (c) [now subdivision (d)] to a motion for

access to trial evidence that is in the possession of the superior

court.” We treat this review proceeding as one in mandate and

resolve it under our original jurisdiction. (People v. Picklesimer

(2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340–341; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.)

II. DISCUSSION

The question is whether section 1054.9’s provisions apply

to evidence held by the court. The statute partially abrogated

the general rule that a person seeking habeas corpus relief from

a judgment of death is not entitled to postconviction discovery

until a court issues an order to show cause. (People v. Superior

Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523, 528 (Morales); see

generally People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1255–1261.)

It authorizes discovery of materials, including physical

evidence, to facilitate the prosecution of a habeas petition or

motion to vacate the judgment. (Morales, at p. 528.)2 It vests

2

The statute in effect at the time Satele filed his motion

applied only to persons sentenced to death or life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole. (§ 1054.9, former subd. (a),

added by Stats. 2002, ch. 1105, § 1.) Effective January 1, 2019,

section 1054.9 was amended to apply to cases involving a serious

felony or a violent felony resulting in a sentence of 15 years or

more. (§ 1054.9, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 482,

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

jurisdiction in the trial court to grant discovery and order the

preservation of evidence within the statute’s scope. (Morales, at

pp. 531, 533.)

Under section 1054.9, subdivision (a) (section 1054.9(a)),

upon a showing of good faith but unsuccessful efforts to obtain

discovery materials from trial counsel, the court shall order that

the defendant “be provided reasonable access to any of the

materials described in subdivision (c).” In essence, “[i]f that

showing is made, the defendant is entitled to discovery.” (Catlin

v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 300, 305.) Subdivision (c)

defines “ ‘discovery materials’ ” as “materials in the possession

of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the

same defendant would have been entitled at time of trial.”

(§ 1054.9, subd. (c) (section 1054.9(c)).) Reading these

provisions together, we have explained that the discovery

contemplated under section 1054.9(a) applies only to those

materials “currently in the possession of the prosecution or law

enforcement authorities involved in the investigation or

prosecution of the case.” (Morales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 534,

italics added; accord, In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 695,

697.)

A defendant’s right to access such discovery materials is

expressly qualified, however, by subdivision (d), which states:

“In response to a writ or motion satisfying the conditions in

subdivision (a), the court may order that the defendant be

§ 2.) The statute’s expansion applies prospectively only.

(§ 1054.9, subd. (j).) The amendment also redesignated former

subdivision (b) as subdivision (c), and former subdivision (c) as

subdivision (d), without substantive change. We will refer to the

subdivisions by their current designations.

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

provided access to physical evidence for the purpose of

examination, including, but not limited to, any physical

evidence relating to the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of

the defendant only upon a showing that there is good cause to

believe that access to physical evidence is reasonably necessary

to the defendant’s efforts to obtain relief.” (§ 1054.9, subd. (d),

italics added (§ 1054.9(d)); see id., subd. (a) [containing the

qualifier, “except as provided in subdivision (b) or (d)”].)3 We

have not yet interpreted whether the good cause requirement

applies only to evidence possessed by prosecution and law

enforcement authorities, or whether it also applies to physical

evidence held by a court clerk. We now conclude it does not.

“It is well settled that the proper goal of statutory

construction ‘is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent,

giving the words of the statute their usual and ordinary

meaning. When the statutory language is clear, we need go no

further.’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 987.) We

consider the language in the context of the entire statute and

the statutory scheme of which it is a part (Phelps v. Stostad

(1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32), harmonizing provisions relating to the

same subject matter, to the extent possible (Cooley v. Superior

Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 248).

The statutory language provides strong indicators that the

reference to “physical evidence” in section 1054.9(d) means

evidence “in the possession of the prosecution and law

enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would

have been entitled at time of trial.” (§ 1054.9(c).)

3

Section 1054.9(d) clarifies that its provisions do not cover

access for postconviction DNA testing. Those procedures are

found in section 1405.

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SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

Subdivision (d) authorizes an order for access to physical

evidence “[i]n response to a writ or motion satisfying the

conditions in subdivision (a).” As relevant here, those conditions

are: “the prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus

or a motion to vacate a judgment”; a case in which a sentence of

death has been imposed; and “a showing that good faith efforts

to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and

were unsuccessful.” (§ 1054.9, subds. (a), (b).) Thus, the

conditions in subdivision (a) explicitly incorporate the definition

of “ ‘discovery materials’ ” in subdivision (c). This reading

accords with subdivision (c)’s statement that “ ‘discovery

materials’ ” are defined “[f]or the purposes of this section” (italics

added), rather than more narrowly for the purposes of

subdivision (a). As noted, that definition applies to “materials

in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement

authorities . . . .” (§ 1054.9(c).)

“It is elementary that, absent indications to the contrary,

‘a word or phrase . . . accorded a particular meaning in one part

or portion of the law, should be accorded the same meaning in

other parts or portions of the law . . . .’ ” (County of San

Bernardino v. City of San Bernardino (1997) 15 Cal.4th 909,

926.) The word “discovery” is used consistently throughout

section 1054.9. As noted, subdivision (a) refers to good faith

efforts to obtain “discovery materials,” and subdivision (c) offers

a definition of that term. Newly enacted subdivision (b) makes

clear that the trial court has discretion to entertain successive

requests for “discovery.” Newly enacted subdivision (f) provides

that “[t]his section does not require the retention of any

discovery materials not otherwise required by law or court

order.” Section 1054.9’s drafting is also consistent with related

provisions of the code that “limit trial discovery to materials the

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SATELE v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

prosecutor possesses or knows ‘to be in the possession of the

investigating agencies . . . .’ ” (In re Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at

p. 696, quoting § 1054.1, italics omitted.) These statutory

provisions “are the only means for the defendant to compel

discovery” from prosecutors, investigating law enforcement

agencies, or others “ ‘employed to assist them in performing

their duties.’ ” (In re Steele, at p. 696.)

Discovery is generally understood to mean an exchange of

information among the parties to an action. (See § 1054,

subd. (c); Cal. Const., art. I, § 30, subd. (c); cf. Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 2017.010.) The trial court and its clerk are not parties to the

criminal action. We have found no published decision applying

the discovery provisions of section 1054.9 to materials held by

the court. On the contrary, all have addressed requests for

materials possessed by the prosecution or law enforcement

authorities. (See, e.g., In re Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 689;

Davis v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 881, 884–885;

Hurd v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107–

1108.) Moreover, although the issue was not squarely

presented, we emphasized in Morales that the provisions of

section 1054.9 “[do] not extend to judicial or other non-law-

enforcement agencies, such as jury commissioners or indigent

defense programs.” (Morales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 534, italics

added.)

In short, section 1054.9 requires a defendant to show good

cause to access “discovery materials” (§ 1054.9(a)), i.e.,

“materials in the possession of the prosecution and law

enforcement authorities . . .” (§ 1054.9(c)). Based on the

statute’s plain language, the good cause requirement does not

apply to evidence possessed by the court clerk.

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A question remains: If section 1054.9 does not govern

here, what standards control access to physical evidence

retained by the court as a trial exhibit? Section 1417 provides

that “[a]ll exhibits which have been introduced or filed in any

criminal action or proceeding shall be retained by the clerk of

the court who shall establish a procedure to account for the

exhibits properly . . . until final determination of the action or

proceedings . . . .”4 In capital cases, the final determination of

the action is “30 days after the date of execution of sentence” or

“one year after the date of the defendant’s death” if the

defendant dies while awaiting execution. (§ 1417.1,

subds. (d)(1), (2).)

Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have

recognized a “general right” under the common law “to inspect

and copy public records and documents, including judicial

records and documents.” (Nixon v. Warner Communications,

Inc. (1978) 435 U.S. 589, 597, fn. omitted; accord, Sander v. State

Bar of California (2013) 58 Cal.4th 300, 313–314, 322–323;

Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231

Cal.App.4th 471, 483.) “The right of access ‘serves the important

functions of ensuring the integrity of judicial proceedings in

particular and of the law enforcement process more generally.’ ”

(KNSD Channels 7/39 v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th

1200, 1203; see Sander, at p. 318.) To this end, rule 2.550(c) of

the California Rules of Court provides that “[u]nless

confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to

be open.” The rule defines “ ‘record’ ” to include “all or a portion

4

Sections 1417.2 and 1417.3 set forth some exceptions to

this general rule not applicable here.

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

of any document, paper, exhibit, transcript, or other thing filed

or lodged with the court . . . .” (Id., rule 2.550(b)(1).)5 The

definition encompasses trial exhibits.

The court’s jurisdiction to entertain a request for access to

court exhibits derives from its inherent supervisory power over

its own records and files. (Nixon v. Warner Communications,

Inc., supra, 435 U.S. at p. 598; cf. People v. Johnson (1992) 3

Cal.4th 1183, 1258.) Specifically, the California Rules of Court

authorize the court to permit an exhibit’s release for

examination outside of a court facility. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule

2.400(c).) In fashioning such an order, the court retains

inherent authority to consider such factors as the need for

testing, the administrative burden attendant to testing, any

conditions necessary to maintain the integrity of the exhibit and

chain of custody, as well as other equitable factors.

Here, the court denied access to the ballistics evidence

based solely on Satele’s failure to establish “good cause to

believe that access to physical evidence is reasonably necessary

to the defendant’s effort to obtain relief.” (§ 1054.9(d).) The

court erred because section 1054.9(d) does not apply to a request

for access to court exhibits. While the court has inherent

authority to fashion an order respecting such access, its strict

application of a good cause requirement is inconsistent with the

presumption that such documents are open for inspection. (See

KNSD Channels 7/39 v. Superior Court, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th

at pp. 1203–1204.) Accordingly, we vacate the order and

5

The California Public Records Act does not apply to

records of the court. (See Gov. Code, § 6252, subds. (a), (f)(1).)

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

remand for the trial court to exercise its inherent authority to

grant access under whatever conditions it deems necessary.

III. DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a writ of

mandate issue directing that the trial court vacate its order

denying access to exhibits and conduct further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

CORRIGAN, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CHIN, J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

11

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Satele v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding XXX

Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S248492

Date Filed: July 18, 2019

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Los Angeles

Judge: Laura L. Laesecke

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Sanger Swysen & Dunkle, Robert M. Sanger and Stephen K. Dunkle for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Jackie Lacey, District Attorney, Phyllis C. Asayama and Scott D. Collins, Deputy District Attorneys, for

Real Party in Interest.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Robert M. Sanger

Sanger Swysen & Dunkle

125 East De La Guerra Street, Suite 102

Santa Barbara, CA 93101

(805) 962-4887

Scott D. Collins

Deputy District Attorney

320 West Temple Street, Suite 540

Los Angeles, CA 90012

(213) 974-5911