Opinion

Mike Baloga v. Pittston Area School District

  • 927 F.3d 742
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Jun 25, 2019
Status
Published
Author
Krause
On the bench
Krause, Cowen, Fuentes
Cited by
265 cases
Authority
More cited than 95.0%

recognizing that a municipality may be held liable under Section 1983 when an official with final decision-making authority has issued an official proclamation, policy, or edict or, alternatively, a course of conduct that is so permanent and well-settled as to virtually constitute law that is violative of the plaintiff’s rights

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing that a municipality may be held liable under Section 1983 when an official with final decision-making authority has issued an official proclamation, policy, or edict or, alternatively, a course of conduct that is so permanent and well-settled as to virtually constitute law that is violative of the plaintiff’s rights
  • agreeing that school board was entitled to summary judgment when there was “no evidence that those who do qualify as policymakers, such as Booth or the school board, knew about, much less approved, Baloga’s transfer for an allegedly unconstitutional reason or delegated [to a subordinate] final policymaking authority, as needed to impute liability to the municipality”
  • setting forth this same standard in the context of a public employee (school district custodian and vice president of a custodial union), and noting that if a plaintiff satisfies these elements, the government may avoid liability by showing that it would have taken the adverse action even in the absence of the protected conduct (internal citation omitted)
  • explaining that municipal liability stems only from “a custom . . . though not authorized by law, [that] was so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 18-1344

_______________

MIKE BALOGA,

Appellant

v.

PITTSTON AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT;

JIM SERINO

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(M.D. Pa. No. 3-16-cv-01039)

Honorable Richard P. Conaboy, U.S. District Judge

_______________

Argued: October 23, 2018

Before: KRAUSE, COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 25, 2019)

Cynthia L. Pollick [ARGUED]

The Employment Law Firm

363 Laurel Street

Pittston, PA 18640

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Mike Baloga

William J. McPartland

Thomas A. Specht [ARGUED]

Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin

P.O. Box 3118

Scranton, PA 18505

Counsel for Defendants-Appellees Pittston Area

School District and Jim Serino

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Mike Baloga, a custodian for the Pittston Area School

District and vice president of the custodial union, alleges that

the District and its maintenance director, Jim Serino, violated

his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him based on

his union association and related speech. Treating Baloga’s

speech and association claims together, the District Court

granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Serino,

concluding that Baloga’s activity was not constitutionally

protected because it did not implicate a matter of public

concern. As we recently emphasized in Palardy v. Township

2

of Millburn, however, where a public employee asserts

retaliation in violation of the First Amendment as a free speech

claim and a pure union association claim, those claims must be

analyzed separately, and consistent with longstanding

Supreme Court precedent, there is no need to make a separate

showing of public concern for a pure union association claim

because membership in a public union is “always a matter of

public concern.” 906 F.3d 76, 80–81, 83 (3d Cir. 2018), cert.

denied, No. 18-830, — S. Ct. —, 2019 WL 2078114, at *1

(May 13, 2019). Because Baloga has raised a triable issue

about whether he was retaliated against based solely on his

union association, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and

remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

A. Factual Background 1

Baloga became a full-time custodian for the District in

1999. Between 2008 and 2016, he worked most of the year at

the primary center, 2 where his duties related to field

1

The facts set forth here are drawn from the parties’

statements of undisputed facts, deposition testimony, and

exhibits. Because we are reviewing a district court’s grant of

summary judgment, we recite the facts in the light most

favorable to Baloga as the non-moving party and make all

reasonable inferences in his favor. See Hugh v. Butler Cty.

Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266–67 (3d Cir. 2005).

2

The record refers interchangeably to the location

where Baloga spent most of his time as both the “primary

3

maintenance and outdoor work. Given the seasonal nature of

that work, however, the District would transfer Baloga to the

high school each year from December through late February or

March of the following year, with the specific rotation dates

depending on the District’s needs. 3

In addition to these job responsibilities, Baloga began

serving as the vice president of the custodial union in 2010. In

this role, he was regularly approached by fellow custodians

about problems they were having with the District, and Baloga

made efforts to solve them internally, often acting as the

union’s “mouthpiece” in relaying concerns to the District. JA

63. However, the decision whether to escalate an issue to an

official grievance was decided by Thomas Rome, the union

president, in consultation with Baloga.

According to Baloga and Rome, the relationship

between the union and the District—and, in particular, its

maintenance director, Jim Serino—was strained. Over the

years, Baloga testified, Serino repeatedly threatened that the

school board would eliminate union members’ days off if the

union continued to file grievances. And according to Rome,

“[t]here was never a good atmosphere” between the union and

Serino, and it appeared that Serino did not “ha[ve] respect for

the bargaining unit.” JA 64. Rome also testified that he

center” and the “primary school.” For consistency, we will

refer to the location as the “primary center.”

3

Although the Collective Bargaining Agreement

prohibited transfers between the two schools, Baloga’s

transfers were permitted as a past practice.

4

thought Serino “wanted [Baloga] out of the mix” because

Baloga, “being [at the high school] . . . , being pro union, [and]

being pro contract,” might “interfere” with Serino’s directives.

JA 64. School board members and others employed by the

District likewise perceived Serino to have a negative attitude

toward the union.

In the 2015–2016 school year, Baloga rotated from the

primary center to the high school in early January, a little later

than usual. Within a couple of weeks, Baloga learned that the

District intended to require custodians to work on Martin

Luther King Jr. Day even though they had received that day as

a holiday for the past twenty-six years. Teachers and students

continued to have the day off. On January 15, 2016, after

consulting with Baloga, Rome filed a grievance on behalf of

the union, challenging the District’s decision as a violation of

a past practice. The same day, Baloga sent a text message to

Serino, and the following exchange ensued:

Baloga: I have plans on Monday.

Why are they making us

work. We never worked a

[Martin Luther King Jr.]

day ever. In my 26 years.

Do I have to take a day off?

Serino: Unfortunately there is [sic]

multiple events and lots of

work that needs to be

completed. A day will have

to be used if you are not

present.

Baloga: You can’t do anything as

boss. You[’re] the director.

5

You have a lot of influence.

Why can’t you talk to

[superintendent] Kevin

[Booth].

Serino: Already did.

Baloga: In the past [former

maintenance director]

Clarence always got us the

day off. It really hurts us

with families.

JA 25. Shortly after the union filed the grievance, Baloga also

exchanged words with his direct supervisor, Ken Bangs, who

told him that “because you filed a grievance on Martin Luther

. . . King Day, the board now says you have to work full days

on snow days.” JA 212.

On the following Friday, January 22, 2016, Baloga and

Serino spoke in person about the grievance. According to

Baloga, Serino was “very, very angry,” accused him of

“complaining,” and said that if Baloga was “not happy [at the

high school],” Serino “could transfer [him] today.” 4 JA 215.

Baloga demurred, telling Serino that he was happy in his

position but that “people are coming to me as the vice president

[of the union] wondering why they’re getting a day taken off

4

Although Serino testified that he told Baloga during

their conversation that Baloga was bringing down morale,

Baloga disputes this and contends that Serino was upset

because he thought Baloga was telling others that morale in the

District was low.

6

them,” JA 40, to which Serino responded: “You should have

never filed that grievance until you talked to me,” JA 36.

Later that day, less than three weeks into Baloga’s

rotation, Bangs notified him that he was being transferred back

to the primary center, effective the next business day—that is,

more than a month before his usual transfer date. Serino did

not explain the transfer decision to Baloga, but he asserted in

subsequent deposition testimony that there were two reasons:

(1) Baloga’s colleagues said he was “bringing the morale” of

the group down by “whining,” JA 102; and (2) the District had

hired new employees, so Baloga’s continued assistance at the

high school was no longer necessary. Notwithstanding the

District’s prior practice of annual rotations, Baloga has not

been assigned to work at the high school again since the

transfer.

Although the early (and, effectively, permanent)

transfer did not change his pay or benefits, Baloga testified that

it negatively affected him in other ways. For example, he could

no longer go home during lunchtime to help his wife, who

homeschools their eight children, because the primary center is

twice as far as the high school from his home. He also could

no longer work the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift—a benefit only

available to workers at the high school—which had allowed

him to go home early at least once a month. Finally, he

described the transfer as effectively a demotion in job

responsibilities, with attendant reputational and emotional

costs, as his tasks at the primary center during the winter

months were menial relative to those at the high school,

reducing him to “a mop and a broom.” JA 38. Fearful of

further retribution, however, Baloga did not file a grievance to

contest his transfer.

7

B. Procedural Background

Baloga eventually filed the underlying complaint in this

action, asserting two First Amendment retaliation claims

against the District and Serino (the “Defendants”)—one for a

violation of his freedom of speech and one for a violation of

his right to associate with the union. The parties then filed

cross-motions for summary judgment, with the Defendants

arguing that Baloga’s activity was not constitutionally

protected, but that, even if it were, he failed to establish the

other elements of a retaliation claim. Defendants further

argued that there was no municipal policy or custom as

required to support liability against the District under Monell

v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978), and that Serino was entitled to qualified

immunity because any constitutional right at issue was not

“clearly established” at the relevant time.

The District Court denied Baloga’s motion and—

reaching only the question whether Baloga’s activity was

constitutionally protected—granted the Defendants’. 5

5

As for Baloga’s motion, the Court explained that

summary judgment was inappropriate because the motivation

for Baloga’s transfer was “far from clear.” JA 8. Although the

Court acknowledged that “the temporal proximity” between

the union’s filing of the Martin Luther King Jr. Day grievance

and Baloga’s transfer was “somewhat suggestive of a

retaliatory motive,” it concluded that many other factors, such

as the transitory nature of Baloga’s transfers and the fact that

the District had recently hired new employees to work in the

high school, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the

8

Although the Defendants sought summary judgment on both

Baloga’s speech and association claims, the District Court

explicitly discussed only Baloga’s speech, concluding that it

was not constitutionally protected because it did not address a

matter of public concern under Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138

(1983). Rather, the Court reasoned, his speech implicated only

“his personal preference to have a paid holiday” and, at most,

a concern for employee morale. JA 12. Even if Baloga’s

speech did touch on a matter of public concern, the Court

continued, Baloga’s “interest in speaking out” was subordinate

to the interest of the District in assigning its personnel in a

manner that “promotes harmony in the workplace and efficient

performance of its mission.” JA 15. Without separately

analyzing Baloga’s association claim, the District Court then

granted summary judgment to the Defendants on both counts

of the complaint. This appeal followed.

II. Jurisdiction and Applicable Standards

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1331, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review a district court’s grant or denial of summary

judgment de novo, see EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444,

448 (3d Cir. 2015), and may affirm on any basis supported by

the record, Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir.

2009). Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A dispute is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a

District’s decision to transfer Baloga was not retaliatory. JA

8–9.

9

verdict for the nonmoving party,” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d

410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)), and a fact is “material” where

“its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the

suit under the applicable substantive law,” id. (citing Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248). At the summary judgment stage, our role is

“not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the

matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, and like the District Court,

we must review the facts in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, see Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d

265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).

III. Discussion

To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 6 a plaintiff must prove that “(1) he

engaged in ‘constitutionally protected conduct,’ (2) the

defendant engaged in ‘retaliatory action sufficient to deter a

person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional

rights,’ and (3) ‘a causal link [existed] between the

constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.’” 7

6

To establish any claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) the conduct at issue was committed by a

person acting under the color of state law, and (2) the

complained-of conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured

under the Constitution or federal law. See Kaucher v. Cty. of

Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006). Only the second

criterion is at issue here.

7

The first element of the analysis requires a legal

determination; the remaining steps present questions for the

10

Palardy, 906 F.3d at 80–81 (quoting Thomas v. Indep. Twp.,

463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006)). If a plaintiff satisfies these

elements, the government may avoid liability if it can show by

a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the

adverse action “even in the absence of the protected conduct.”

Miller v. Clinton Cty., 544 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2008)

(quoting Watters v. City of Phila., 55 F.3d 886, 892 (3d Cir.

1995)).

Here, we address only Baloga’s association claim

because he failed to press his speech claim on appeal. 8 The

fact finder. See Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 195

(3d Cir. 2001); see also Watters v. City of Phila., 55 F.3d 886,

899 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen considering the protected status

of [First Amendment activity], an appellate court must . . .

make an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of

the case.” (citations omitted)); Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d

228, 233–35 (3d Cir. 2000) (“It is a question of fact whether

the [allegedly adverse action] reached the threshold of

actionability under section 1983.” (citation omitted)); Zamboni

v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 79–80, 79 n.6, 80 (3d Cir. 1988)

(noting that whether protected activity was a motivating factor

for an employer’s adverse action and whether the employer

would have taken the action regardless are questions for the

jury).

8

In his briefing on appeal, Baloga refers almost

exclusively to the associational rights at stake and at oral

argument, Baloga’s counsel confirmed that the crux of her

client’s argument was that he was retaliated against for his

association with the union, not for his speech. As Baloga has

not meaningfully briefed or argued his speech claim on appeal,

11

District Court disposed of the association claim (like the

speech claim) on the first element, treating Baloga’s speech

and association as coextensive and concluding that Baloga did

not engage in constitutionally protected activity because his

speech did not involve a matter of public concern. As a result,

it had no need to reach the other arguments raised by the

Defendants. Defendants urge us to affirm on any of those

bases, namely (A) that Baloga’s activity was not

constitutionally protected; (B) that even if it were, Baloga has

not raised a triable issue on the remaining elements of his

retaliation claim; (C) that the record does not support liability

against the District under Monell; or (D) that Serino is entitled

to qualified immunity. We consider these arguments in turn,

beginning with the focus of the parties’ briefing, whether

Baloga’s conduct was constitutionally protected.

A. Element One: Constitutionally Protected

Conduct

Public employees do not surrender their First

Amendment rights merely because they work for the

government. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006);

Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 194. Nevertheless, “[w]hen a citizen

enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept

certain limitations on his or her freedom.” Garcetti, 547 U.S.

he has waived it. See In re: Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.

VI), 873 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2017). But even if his passing

references to the free speech claim he raised in the District

Court, e.g., as a “back up” argument, Oral Arg. at 09:45–10:20,

were sufficient to preserve it on appeal, we would agree, for

substantially the same reasons identified by the District Court,

that it does not survive summary judgment.

12

at 418. In the context of speech, the Supreme Court has

demanded that we “arrive at a balance between the interests of

the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of

public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in

promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs

through its employees.” Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.

563, 568 (1968). We therefore undertake a three-prong

inquiry: (1) whether the employee spoke as a citizen; (2)

whether the statement involved a matter of public concern; and

(3) whether the government employer nevertheless had “an

adequate justification for treating the employee differently

from any other member of the general public” based on its

needs as an employer. Palardy, 906 F.3d at 81 (citation

omitted).

As there is no dispute in this case that the first prong is

satisfied, 9 we consider below the second and third, that is, the

public concern requirement and the balance of interests.

1. The Public Concern Requirement

Until recently, our Court had spoken only briefly about

whether the public concern requirement that applies to speech

claims also applies to association claims, and we did so outside

the union context. In Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Board of Public

Education, a public high school teacher alleged that she had

9

Defendants do not contest the District Court’s finding

that Baloga spoke as a private citizen and not pursuant to his

official duties as an employee. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424;

Palardy, 906 F.3d at 81. Thus, they have waived on appeal

any arguments to the contrary.

13

been retaliated against for criticizing the school administration

in a paragraph of a faculty newsletter. 968 F.2d 393, 395–96

(3d Cir. 1992). In addition to alleging a violation of her

freedom of speech, the teacher claimed that her right to

freedom of association had been violated because the

statements in the newsletter were intended to garner faculty

opposition to the school administration. Id. at 400. After

acknowledging the split among Courts of Appeals on the

question of whether the public concern element applied

generally to freedom of association claims, we found it

unnecessary to enter the fray because Sanguigni’s particular

association claim “implicate[d] associational rights in

essentially the same way and to the same degree” as her free

speech claim and thus was subject to the public concern

requirement applicable to any speech claim. 10 Id. at 400; see

also Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185 n.4 (explaining that application

of the public concern requirement is appropriate where the

“associational claim is linked closely enough with [the] free-

speech claim”).

10

Specifically, we said that Sanguigni’s association

claim was subject to the public concern requirement because

“that claim is based on speech that does not implicate

associational rights to any significantly greater degree than the

employee speech at issue in Connick.” Sanguigni, 968 F.2d at

400. In Connick, an employee circulated a questionnaire to her

colleagues in an apparent effort to solicit their support for her

position with respect to the office’s transfer policy, handling of

grievances, and other matters. See 461 U.S. at 141. But neither

Sanguigni nor Connick concerned union association.

14

In Palardy, however, we observed that in the context of

a pure association claim based on union membership, i.e.,

based on status as a union affiliate and not any particular

speech on behalf of the union, the public concern element is

necessarily satisfied. 906 F.3d at 81–83. There, the plaintiff,

the vice president and then president of his union, alleged that

he was passed over for promotion in the police department

because of his leadership role in the union and his union-related

activities. Id. at 79–80. As here, the district court analyzed

Palardy’s speech and association together and concluded that

Palardy’s activity was not constitutionally protected because

Palardy’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern.

Id. at 80.

We reversed. Where union-related speech forms the

basis of an association claim, we explained, courts must assess

whether the public concern prong is met on a case-by-case

basis. See id. at 83. Indeed, because labor unions advocate for

their members on a multitude of issues, “the number of

possible subjects for union-related speech is similarly wide-

ranging.” Id. But where an association claim is premised on

one’s membership in a union—“a dichotomy” where one is

either a member of a union or one is not—no “justiciable basis”

exists to determine which union association merits First

Amendment protection and which does not. Id. Thus,

consistent with longstanding Supreme Court precedent “that a

public employee possesses a First Amendment right to

associate with a union,” id. (citing Smith v. Ark State Highway

Emp., 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979)), we recognized that “mere

membership in a public union is always a matter of public

concern,” id. And because Palardy’s association claim was

premised on the notion that he was retaliated against based on

his “involve[ment] in union leadership,” i.e., “simply because

15

of his union membership, and not because of his advocacy on

any particular issue,” we concluded that the public concern

requirement did not stand in the way of that claim. Id. at 79,

81.

Although we spoke in Palardy primarily about union

“membership,” our recognition of the public concern inherent

in union membership applies with particular force to union

leaders, for the right of union membership “would be

meaningless unless an employee’s right to participate in union

activities were also recognized.” Roberts v. Van Buren Pub.

Sch., 773 F.2d 949, 957 (8th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). As

we said long ago, “[p]lainly efforts of public employees to

associate together for the purpose of collective bargaining

involve associational interests which the first amendment

protects from hostile state action.” Labov v. Lalley, 809 F.2d

220, 222–23 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Smith, 441 U.S. at 464

(“The First Amendment . . . protects the right of associations

to engage in advocacy on behalf of their members.”). And

because a union’s ability to file grievances on behalf of its

members is essential to its collective bargaining power, see

Morfin v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 906 F.2d 1434, 1439 (10th

Cir. 1990), retaliation against a union leader for the union’s

decision to file a grievance—as distinct from retaliation based

on the substance of the grievance—constitutes retaliation

based on association rather than on speech per se, see

Columbus Educ. Ass’n v. Columbus City Sch. Dist., 623 F.2d

1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1980) (“[R]etaliat[ion] against the zealous

representation by a union spokesperson of a member’s

grievance impermissibly infringes upon the constitutional right

of free association . . . .”); see also Prof’l Ass’n of Coll.

Educators (PACE), TSTA/NEA v. El Paso Cty. Cmty. Coll.

Dist., 730 F.2d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he First

16

Amendment [right of association] is violated by state action

whose purpose is either to intimidate public employees from

joining a union or from taking an active part in its affairs or to

retaliate against those who do.”).

Baloga has adduced sufficient evidence to persuade a

reasonable jury that is what occurred here. In addition to the

evidence of Serino’s general animus toward the union and its

leadership, Baloga testified that after he told Serino that union

members were approaching him “as the [union] vice president”

to complain about losing the holiday, JA 40, Serino responded

angrily, “you should have never filed that grievance until you

talked to me,” JA 215 (emphasis added), and Ken Bangs said

that because “you filed a grievance on Martin Luther . . . King

Day . . . you have to work full days on snow days,” JA 212

(emphasis added). But, of course, Baloga was not the person

who actually filed the grievance for the union—union

president Thomas Rome did. Thus, “you” in this context could

only mean “you, as representative of the union.” In other

words, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Baloga,

Baloga was transferred because his union filed a grievance

and—based on his status as a union leader—management

attributed responsibility for that filing to him. Under Palardy,

that is enough to make out a viable association claim. See 906

F.3d at 84 (holding that “evidence suggesting [Township

administrator] harbored animosity toward [Palardy] because of

his union affiliation” as “a union member and leader” was

sufficient to survive summary judgment).

Defendants take a different view. They contend that, as

in Sanguigni, Baloga’s association claim “implicate[s]

associational rights in essentially the same way and to the same

degree,” 968 F.2d at 400, that his speech claim does, so that the

17

public concern requirement is not per se satisfied and should

be found wanting here. But, as we explained in Palardy, that

view is misplaced in the context of a retaliation claim based on

union membership. Baloga, like Palardy, is arguing not

merely—or even principally—that he was punished for his

speech specific to the subject of the Martin Luther King Jr. Day

holiday but, rather, that he was penalized for his “affiliation”

as “a union member and leader,” Palardy, 906 F.3d at 84, of

the union that had filed this and other grievances. The

substance of that latest grievance is simply irrelevant to his

claim. So understood, Baloga’s association claim

“implicate[s] associational rights” in a different way and to a

different degree than his speech claim, and because union

membership (and, a fortiori, leadership) necessarily involves a

“public concern,” summary judgment should not have been

granted on the ground that this element was lacking.

2. Balance of Interests

Having concluded that the public concern element does

not bar Baloga’s association claim, we consider whether we

may nevertheless affirm on the ground that Baloga’s

associational interests are outweighed by the Defendants’

interest in maintaining an efficient workplace and avoiding

disruption. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Watters, 55 F.3d at

895. We have not addressed the question whether that so-

called “Pickering balancing” applies to pure association claims

based on union membership and we need not do so today, 11 for

11

Pickering and Watters both involved speech claims,

and, in Palardy, we did not explicitly address whether

Pickering balancing is required for union-based association

claims. Four circuits have concluded or suggested that it is,

18

even assuming it does, Defendants have not established as a

matter of law that their interest outweighs Baloga’s.

A public employer bears the burden of justifying an

adverse action taken against an employee once the public

concern element has been met. See Baldassare, 250 F.3d at

197–98. The weight of this burden “varies depending upon the

nature of the employee’s expression.” Id. at 198. On one side

of the scale is the employee’s interest in associating with and

acting on behalf of the union and the public’s interest in unions

serving the legitimate interests of their employee-members.

See Palardy, 906 F.3d at 84; O’Donnell v. Yanchulis, 875 F.2d

1059, 1061–62 (3d Cir. 1989). On the other side is the

government-employer’s interests in “promoting workplace

efficiency and avoiding workplace disruption.” McGreevy v.

see Cook v. Gwinnett Cty. Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 1313, 1320–21

(11th Cir. 2005); Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745,

748–50 (5th Cir. 1993); Roberts, 773 F.2d at 957; see also

Wilton v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 772 F.2d 88, 91 (4th

Cir. 1985) (not citing Pickering but holding that “a first

amendment right to associate may be validly limited where the

limitation is necessary to a substantial and legitimate state

interest”), but one has held that courts should not undertake

Pickering balancing where the union and the employer have a

collective bargaining agreement, see Shrum v. City of Coweta,

449 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, the parties argue

about the balancing of interests but do not raise or engage the

threshold question whether such balancing is required in this

context. We will assume without deciding that it is required

here as we conclude that the balancing of interests would not

justify summary judgment in any event.

19

Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Pickering, 391

U.S. at 568); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.

In balancing the competing interests, we consider

“whether the [First Amendment activity] impairs discipline by

superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental

impact on close working relationships for which personal

loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the

performance of the [employee’s] duties or interferes with the

regular operation of the enterprise.” Baldassare, 250 F.3d at

198 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)).

This is a “fact-intensive” exercise, Miller, 544 F.3d at 548, and

no single factor is dispositive, Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 198.

Where the material facts are undisputed, the employee’s

association is protected as a matter of law unless the

government’s interest outweighs it. See Azzaro v. Cty. of

Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 980 (3d Cir. 1997); O’Donnell, 875

F.2d at 1062.

Defendants identify two interests that they contend

outweigh Baloga’s associational interests: first, that the

District has unfettered discretion concerning when to move

Baloga between the high school and the primary center; and

second, the need to avoid the disruption that Baloga allegedly

caused by bringing down employee morale. On this record,

however, neither suffices to tip the balance in the Defendants’

favor.

As for the first, Defendants can hardly carry their

burden with the tautology that they are entitled to do as they

please in any area normally subject to their discretion. If that

were the case, few retaliation claims would survive Pickering

20

balancing. 12 Although a public institution undoubtedly has an

interest in assigning employees according to its needs, it may

not do so for the purpose of chilling the exercise of

constitutional rights. Instead, in the context of a retaliation

claim, it must articulate and substantiate a legitimate non-

discriminatory reason for its actions. See, e.g., Miller, 544 F.3d

at 548 (including among an employer’s interests “the

employer’s prerogative of removing employees whose conduct

impairs performance” (emphasis added)); Roberts, 773 F.2d at

957 (explaining that an employee’s associational right could be

outweighed by the government’s needs “if the employee

engages in the allegedly protected activities on the job,

interfering with the performance of his duties or if the

employee harasses coworkers and disrupts operations”

(citations omitted)).

A generalized interest in doing business-as-usual does

not constitute such a reason and cannot categorically outweigh

an employee’s interest in associating with a union. This is

particularly true where, as here, the institution asserting such

an interest has explicitly sanctioned the existence of the union

and the grievance procedure it employs by entering into a

collective bargaining agreement. See Shrum, 449 F.3d at 1139

(explaining that a public employer’s interest in efficient

operations does not outweigh an employee’s interest in union

12

To the extent Defendants are arguing not an “interest”

per se, but that they would have transferred Baloga even in the

absence of his protected activity, that argument goes to

causation, see Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216,

232–33 (3d Cir. 2008), which we address separately below, see

infra Section III.B.2.

21

association where the employer “already balanced those

interests when it agreed to a collective bargaining agreement”

and “presumably received the benefit of its bargain”); PACE,

730 F.2d at 263 (“[I]f a public employer voluntarily establishes

a grievance procedure, then discriminates or retaliates against

union members in administering that process, it violates the

first amendment.”); see also Azzaro, 110 F.3d at 980 (“By

adopting a policy against sexual harassment and a process for

reporting and dealing with it, [the] County had affirmatively

recognized that complaints [in accordance with that policy] . . .

do not pose an undue threat of disruption.”).

As for their second proffered interest, the need to avoid

disruption in the workplace is certainly legitimate. See Rankin,

483 U.S. at 388; Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d

979, 991 (3d Cir. 2014). But the scant evidence that

Defendants provide of such disruption or the potential for such

disruption, see Watters, 55 F.3d at 898–99, is not sufficient to

outweigh Baloga’s associational interests. Indeed, Defendants

offer only Serino’s self-serving hearsay testimony that other

employees said Baloga was “bringing the morale . . . down” by

“whining,” JA 102, but adduced no employee testimony or

other evidence that Baloga’s union activities “impair[ed]

discipline” by his superiors, impeded the performance of his

duties, or interfered with the “regular operation of the

enterprise,” Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 198 (quoting Rankin, 483

U.S. at 388); see Swineford v. Snyder Cty. Pa., 15 F.3d 1258,

1273 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the government’s interest

outweighed employee’s where the government adduced

evidence that “office conditions became intolerable” and the

employee’s conduct “had an adverse effect on the discharge of

[her] duties”). Nor was Baloga’s relationship with Serino—

which is a “particularly important” consideration in the

22

balancing calculus, Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 198—“of such a

personal and intimate nature” that Baloga’s actions “would

seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working

relationship,” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n.3; see De Ritis v.

McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444, 458 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding highly

relevant for the purposes of Pickering balancing the

particularized need for strong relationships between employees

and their manager in a small public defender’s office where

employees represented the positions of their supervisor in

court). Our task is to weigh the opposing interests, and given

how little Defendants have placed on their side of the scale,

they have not succeeded in tipping the balance in their favor.

In sum, because Baloga’s union membership involves a

matter of public concern and Defendants have failed to

establish that their purported interests in efficiency and

avoiding disruption outweigh Baloga’s associational interests,

his conduct was protected by the First Amendment, and the

District Court erred in holding otherwise.

B. Remaining Elements of a Retaliation Claim

1. Element Two: Adverse Action

Even assuming Baloga’s conduct was protected,

Defendants argue that summary judgment was justified

because no reasonable jury could find Baloga’s transfer back

to the primary center to constitute an adverse action “sufficient

to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his

constitutional rights.” Appellees’ Br. 41; see Allah v.

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000). We are not

persuaded.

23

Whether a public employer’s conduct rises to the level

of an actionable wrong is “a fact intensive inquiry focusing on

the status of the [employee], the status of the retaliator, the

relationship between the [employee] and the retaliator, and the

nature of the retaliatory acts.” Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d

399, 419 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Suarez

Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2000)).

A public employer “adversely affects an employee’s First

Amendment rights . . . when it makes decisions, which relate

to . . . transfer . . . based on the exercise of an employee’s First

Amendment rights.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Suarez

Corp. Indus., 202 F.3d at 686).

Although the nature of the retaliatory acts committed by

the public employer must “be more than de minimis,”

amounting to more than “criticism, false accusations, or verbal

reprimands,” id. (citation omitted), the threshold is “very low,”

O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2006).

Indeed, we have observed that “an act of retaliation as trivial

as failing to hold a birthday party for a public employee . . .

when intended to punish her for exercising her” First

Amendment right may suffice. Suppan, 203 F.3d at 234

(quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 76 n.8

(1990)).

In this case, Defendants urge that “any alleged adverse

effect on Baloga due to his transfer was de minimis.”

Appellees’ Br. 42. But a reasonable juror could conclude

otherwise. Baloga testified that, due to his transfer being

expedited and then effectively deemed permanent, he could no

longer go home during his lunch hour approximately three

months every year to help his wife with childcare

responsibilities, and he could no longer work the shift that

24

allowed him to go home early from the high school at least

once a month. He also attested to consequences for his actual

job responsibilities and reputation: whereas he engaged in a

number of “big projects” at the high school, he had no

significant work to do at the primary center during the winter

months because the fields were covered in snow, “reduc[ing

him] to a mop and a broom.” JA 38. We cannot say as a matter

of law, then, that the alleged retaliation had no “adverse effect”

for, viewed in the light most favorable to Baloga, the record

supports the opposite inference. 13 See Suppan, 203 F.3d at

234–35 (holding that evidence of “stress” and “loss of

reputation” from an unsatisfactory employment rating was

sufficient to raise triable issue on adverse action); see also

Cook v. Gwinnett, 414 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2005)

(deeming “los[s] [of] additional prestige and office

responsibilities that came with being a team leader” sufficient

to constitute adverse action); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d

888, 901 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding reputational harm stemming

from involuntary transfer “from one school in the district to

another” demonstrated sufficient adversity).

13

In support of their argument, Defendants make much

of the fact that the union itself continued to file grievances after

Baloga’s transfer. But the question here is not whether a union

can operate after one of its members is retaliated against but

whether an ordinary union member would be deterred from

exercising his or her associational rights in the face of that

retaliation. And given the “very low” threshold for that

showing in the First Amendment retaliation context,

O’Connor, 440 F.3d at 128, Baloga has put forth sufficient

evidence to bring that question to a jury.

25

2. Element Three: Causation

Defendants next argue that they are entitled to summary

judgment based on Baloga’s failure to prove the third element

of a retaliation claim, causation. Yet again, however, there

remain disputed issues of material fact.

If a public employee makes out the first two elements

of a retaliation claim, he then bears the initial burden of

showing that his constitutionally protected conduct was a

“substantial” or “motivating factor” in the allegedly retaliatory

conduct. Suppan, 203 F.3d at 235. He can establish the

requisite causal connection by showing either: “(1) an

unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the

protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a

pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal

link.” 14 Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d

259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). If the employee

makes out this prima facie case of retaliation, “the burden shifts

to the [employer] to show by a preponderance of the evidence

that it would have reached the same decision even in the

absence of the protected conduct.” Suppan, 203 F.3d at 235

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In view of the

standard at summary judgment, that means that an employer,

to prevail on causation, “must present evidence of such quality

that no reasonable juror could conclude that the protected

14

We have also observed that if such evidence is

lacking, an employee may nevertheless prove causation “from

the evidence gleaned from the record as a whole.” Conard v.

Pa. State Police, 902 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting

Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016)).

26

activity was the but-for cause of the termination.” Hill v. City

of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 126 n.11 (3d Cir. 2005).

Here, Defendants do not dispute that Baloga put

forward sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of

causation. 15 Rather, they argue that they have met their burden

15

This apparent concession is with good reason: The

record contains ample evidence from which a reasonable juror

could conclude that a causal link existed between Baloga’s

union activities and his transfer—either because “an unusually

suggestive temporal proximity,” Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 267,

existed between when the union filed the Martin Luther King

Jr. Day grievance, when Serino approached Baloga about the

grievance, and when Baloga was transferred to the primary

center, given that all of the events occurred within the span of

one week, see Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d

183, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that temporal proximity

can itself be sufficient to establish a causal link) or because of

the combination of the temporal proximity and the evidence of

Serino’s animus toward the union more generally, see id.

(holding that an employee who was terminated 10 days after

engaging in protected conduct and whose boss had made

negative comments about her protected conduct had put forth

sufficient evidence from which a fact finder could determine

the existence of a causal link); see also Merkle v. Upper Dublin

Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 795 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Where a

reasonable inference can be drawn that an employee’s

[protected conduct] was at least one factor considered by an

employer in deciding whether to take action against the

employee, the question of whether the [protected conduct] was

27

to show they would have transferred Baloga to the primary

center in the absence of his protected conduct for two reasons:

first, because they transferred him every year, and second,

because it is undisputed that the District had hired more

employees to work at the high school that school year, thereby

obviating the need for Baloga to continue working there.

True though they may be, however, neither of those

facts precludes a reasonable jury, considering the record as a

whole, from finding causation. That the Defendants intended

to transfer Baloga at some point in the future does not logically

rebut Baloga’s point that his union activity was the cause of his

accelerated and apparently permanent transfer, which is the

adverse action at issue. Nor is the fact that the District had

hired more employees dispositive of whether it otherwise

would have transferred Baloga at that time. To the contrary,

the record reflects that, although one new hire was slated to

begin work the Monday that Baloga was transferred, some, if

not all, of the new employees were hired in March or April of

2015, 16 i.e., well before Baloga was even assigned to the high

school, let alone transferred away from it. And at no point

before this transfer was Baloga advised that his rotation to the

high school would be any shorter than usual or that his job

duties there were being assumed by others. Viewed in the light

a motivating factor in that determination is best left to the

jury.”).

16

The record is not clear if the District hired two or three

additional employees and, if three, when the third employee

was hired. But even the employee who began in late-January

was necessarily hired before that time.

28

most favorable to Baloga, this sequence supports an inference

that, notwithstanding the new hires, the District assigned

Baloga to the high school in January 2016 with the expectation

that he would complete his normal two-to-three month

rotation, and that retaliation, not a new hire, accounted for its

sudden change of heart just three weeks into that assignment

and on the very day of Baloga’s conversation with Serino.

Other evidence also arguably supports that inference.

As the District Court itself recognized, the “temporal

proximity” between the union’s filing of the Martin Luther

King Jr. Day grievance and Baloga’s transfer was “somewhat

suggestive of a retaliatory motive.” JA 8. And, likewise, the

temporal proximity—mere hours—between Baloga’s

exchange with Serino in which Serino expressed anger over

Baloga’s “complaining” and threatened to “transfer [him]

today,” JA 215, and Baloga’s being notified of his transfer

effective the next business day raises questions about the

credibility of Defendants’ explanation for their actions, cf.

Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280–81 (3d

Cir. 2000) (explaining that temporal proximity between an

employee’s protected conduct and the employer’s adverse

action coupled with inconsistent reasons given for the action

can call into doubt the employer’s stated basis for the action).

Also potentially probative to a jury are Serino’s and Bang’s

alleged threats of reprisal for the union’s activities, the

testimony about Serino’s general anti-union animus, and the

myriad conflicting accounts about Appellees’ motivation for

Baloga’s transfer in Serino’s testimony, Rome’s testimony,

and Bangs’ testimony.

While the District Court concluded that factors such as

the transitory nature of Baloga’s transfers and the fact of new

29

hires precluded summary judgment in Baloga’s favor, it also

recognized that the motivation for Baloga’s transfer (were it to

reach the question of causation) was “far from clear,” JA 8,

and, in view of the countervailing evidence, we must agree.

Because a trier of fact could conclude on this record that

Baloga would not have been transferred in the absence of his

union activities, the quintessential “factual issue” of causation,

Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 889 (3d Cir. 1997),

remains, in this case, a question for the jury.

C. Monell Liability

The District next argues that even if Baloga can

establish a constitutional violation, the District itself could not

be held liable because there is no evidence that any municipal

policy or custom caused that violation. See Monell, 436 U.S.

at 690–91. A municipality may be held liable pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 only if a plaintiff is able to identify such a policy

or custom. See A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile

Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 580 (3d Cir. 2004). That requires a

plaintiff to show, for a policy, that an official with final

decision-making authority has “issue[d] an official

proclamation, policy, or edict,” Andrews v. City of Phila., 895

F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990), or, for a custom, that a course

of conduct, though not authorized by law, was “‘so permanent

and well settled’ as to virtually constitute law,” id. (quoting

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). In either case, the policymaker, as

defined under state law, must be “responsible either for the

policy or, through acquiescence, for the custom.” Andrews,

895 F.2d at 1480–81.

We agree with the District Court that the record here

does not support Monell liability. As Baloga’s repeated

30

invocation of Superintendent Kevin Booth’s authority

demonstrates, Serino did not have final decision-making

authority and thus was not a policymaker under Pennsylvania

law. See Brennan, 350 F.3d at 428 (“[I]f a municipal

employee’s decision is subject to review, even discretionary

review, it is not final and that employee is therefore not a

policymaker for purposes of imposing municipal liability

under § 1983.”). There is also no evidence that those who do

qualify as policymakers, such as Booth or the school board,

knew about, much less approved, Baloga’s transfer for an

allegedly unconstitutional reason or delegated him final

policymaking authority, as needed to impute liability to the

municipality. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481. On that basis,

we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment

to the District.

D. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants argue that summary judgment was

proper as to Serino because he is entitled to qualified

immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields

government officials performing discretionary functions “from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Miller, 544

F.3d at 547 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)). The analysis is guided by two questions: (1) did the

government actor violate a constitutional right? and (2) was

that right “clearly established” at the time of the challenged

conduct? See Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 986. As Baloga has

raised a triable issue concerning the violation of his First

Amendment right to association, our analysis here focuses on

the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis.

31

For a right to be clearly established, “there must be

sufficient precedent at the time of action, factually similar to

the plaintiff’s allegations, to put defendant on notice that his or

her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.” Mammaro v. N.J.

Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir.

2016) (citation omitted). Although the right at issue may not

be defined “at a high level of generality,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011), the precise action in question “need

not have previously been held unlawful” for the right to be

clearly established. Dougherty, 722 F.3d at 993 (citing

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); see also

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (“[O]fficials can still

be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in

novel factual circumstances.”). Where there is neither

Supreme Court nor circuit precedent on point, “a robust

consensus of cases of persuasive authority” may establish the

federal right at issue. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (citation

omitted).

Here, Defendants contend that Serino is entitled to

qualified immunity because “[t]here is no clearly established

case law . . . that stands for the [proposition] that . . . a grievance

about a day off[] constitutes constitutionally protected . . .

association.” Appellees’ Br. 51. But Defendants

misunderstand the right at issue. Viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to Baloga, Serino retaliated against Baloga

because he ascribed to him responsibility for the union’s

grievance based on his leadership of the union. Thus, the right

at issue is a public employee’s right not to be subjected to

adverse treatment for his leadership role in a public union—

not, as Defendants contend, for the content of the grievance

that the union filed.

32

Once the right at issue is properly identified, it is

apparent that “[t]he contours of [that] right,” Anderson, 483

U.S. at 640, were clearly established when Serino ordered

Baloga’s transfer. The Supreme Court has long recognized the

right to become a member of a union and the attendant right

not to be penalized for that membership. See, e.g., Smith, 441

U.S. at 465 (“The First Amendment . . . protects the right of

associations to engage in advocacy on behalf of their members

[and] [t]he government is prohibited from infringing upon [this

right] either by a general prohibition against certain forms of

advocacy or by imposing sanctions for the expression of

particular views it opposes.”) (citations omitted); N.L.R.B. v.

Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (“[A]n employer

is free to communicate to his employees any of his general

views about unionism or any of his specific views about a

particular union, so long as the communications do not contain

a ‘threat of reprisal . . . .’”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,

532 (1945) (holding that a state may regulate labor unions but

“[s]uch regulation . . . must not trespass upon the domain set

apart for . . . free assembly”).

So have we and other Courts of Appeals. See, e.g.,

Labov, 809 F.2d at 222–23 (“Plainly efforts of public

employees to associate together for the purpose of collective

bargaining involve associational interests which the first

amendment protects from hostile state action.”); Cook, 414

F.3d at 1320 (“[T]he law is clearly established that public

employees have a First Amendment right to engage in

associative activity without retaliation . . . [and] courts have

long held that freedom of association protection extends to

membership in organizations such as labor unions.”) (citations

omitted); Morfin, 906 F.2d at 1439 (“The unconstitutionality

of retaliating against an employee for participating in a union

33

[is] clearly established . . . .”); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686,

693 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We have no doubt that an employee who

is disciplined solely in retaliation for his membership in and

support of a union states a valid first amendment claim . . . .”);

PACE, 730 F.2d at 262 (“Th[e] right of association

encompasses the right of public employees to join unions and

the right of their unions to engage in advocacy and to petition

government in their behalf.”).

Given this “robust consensus,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at

742, we have no difficulty concluding that Baloga’s right not

to face retaliation for his leadership role in a public union was

clearly established at the relevant time and, thus, Serino is not

entitled to qualified immunity. 17

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and

reverse in part the District Court’s order granting summary

judgment and will remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

17

Defendants also weakly suggest that it was not clearly

established in 2016 that a public employer’s retaliatory transfer

would be actionable if it did not affect the employee’s pay. The

case law is to the contrary. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 74–75, 75

n.8; Brennan, 350 F.3d at 419; Suppan, 203 F.3d at 234.

34

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.