Dutra Group v. Batterton

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–266. Argued March 25, 2019—Decided June 24, 2019

Respondent Christopher Batterton was working on a vessel owned by

petitioner Dutra Group when a hatch blew open and injured his

hand. Batterton sued Dutra, asserting a variety of claims, including

unseaworthiness, and seeking general and punitive damages. Dutra

moved to dismiss the claim for punitive damages, arguing that they

are not available on claims for unseaworthiness. The District Court

denied Dutra’s motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held: A plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on a claim of un-

seaworthiness. Pp. 10–19.

(a) This case is governed by Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S.

19, and Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U. S. 404. Miles es-

tablishes that the Court “should look primarily to . . . legislative en-

actments for policy guidance” when exercising its inherent common-

law authority over maritime and admiralty cases, while recognizing

that such statutory remedies may be supplemented to “achieve the

uniform vindication” of the policies served by the relevant statutes.

498 U. S., at 27. And in Atlantic Sounding, the Court allowed recov-

ery of punitive damages but justified that departure from the statu-

tory remedial scheme based on the established history of awarding

punitive damages for certain maritime torts, including maintenance

and cure. 557 U. S., at 413–414. P. 10.

(b) The overwhelming historical evidence suggests that punitive

damages are not available for unseaworthiness claims. Neither The

Rolf, 293 F. 269, nor The Noddleburn, 28 F. 855—on which Batterton

relies—contains a relevant discussion of exemplary or punitive dam-

ages. And two other cases to which Batterton points—The City of

Carlisle, 39 F. 807, and The Troop, 118 F. 769—both involve mainte-

nance and cure, not unseaworthiness, claims. The lack of punitive

2 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

Syllabus

damages in traditional maritime law cases is practically dispositive.

Pp. 11–13.

(c) This Court cannot sanction a novel remedy here unless it is re-

quired to maintain uniformity with Congress’s clearly expressed poli-

cies, particularly those in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones

Act)—which codified the rights of injured mariners by incorporating

the rights provided to railway workers under the Federal Employers’

Liability Act (FELA). Early decisions held that FELA damages were

strictly compensatory. See, e.g., American R. Co. of P. R. v. Didrick-

sen, 227 U. S. 145, 149. And the Federal Courts of Appeals have

unanimously held that punitive damages are not available under

FELA. This Court’s early discussions of the Jones Act followed the

same practices, see, e.g., Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130,

135, and lower courts have uniformly held that punitive damages are

not available under the Jones Act. Adopting Batterton’s rule would

be contrary to Miles’s command that federal courts should seek to

promote a “uniform rule applicable to all actions” for the same injury,

whether under the Jones Act or the general maritime law. 498 U. S.,

at 33. Pp. 13–15.

(d) Batterton argues that punitive damages are justified on policy

grounds or as a regulatory measure. But unseaworthiness in its cur-

rent strict-liability form is this Court’s own invention and came after

passage of the Jones Act, and a claim of unseaworthiness serves as a

duplicate and substitute for a Jones Act claim. It would, therefore,

exceed the Court’s objectives of pursuing policies found in congres-

sional enactments and promoting uniformity between maritime stat-

utory law and maritime common law to introduce novel remedies

contradictory to those provided by Congress in similar areas. Allow-

ing punitive damages on unseaworthiness claims would also create

bizarre disparities in the law. First, due to Miles’s holding, which

limited recovery to compensatory damages in wrongful-death actions,

a mariner could make a claim for punitive damages if he was injured

onboard a ship, but his estate would lose the right to seek punitive

damages if he died from his injuries. Second, because unseaworthi-

ness claims run against the owner of the vessel, the owner could be

liable for punitive damages while the ship’s master or operator—who

could be more culpable—would not be liable for such damages under

the Jones Act. Finally, allowing punitive damages would place Amer-

ican shippers at a significant competitive disadvantage and discour-

age foreign-owned vessels from employing American seamen. The

maritime doctrine mentioned by Batterton, which encourages special

solicitude for the welfare of seamen, has its roots in the paternalistic

approach taken toward mariners by 19th century courts and has

never been a commandment that maritime law must favor seamen

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 3

Syllabus

whenever possible. Pp. 15–18.

880 F. 3d 1089, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,

and THOMAS, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. GINSBURG,

J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,

joined.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–266

_________________

THE DUTRA GROUP, PETITIONER

v. CHRISTOPHER BATTERTON

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2019]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

By granting federal courts jurisdiction over maritime

and admiralty cases, the Constitution implicitly directs

federal courts sitting in admiralty to proceed “in the man-

ner of a common law court.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,

554 U. S. 471, 489–490 (2008). Thus, where Congress has

not prescribed specific rules, federal courts must develop

the “amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifica-

tions of those rules, and newly created rules” that forms

the general maritime law. East River S. S. Corp. v.

Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858, 864–865 (1986).

But maritime law is no longer solely the province of the

Federal Judiciary. “Congress and the States have legis-

lated extensively in these areas.” Miles v. Apex Marine

Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 27 (1990). When exercising its inher-

ent common-law authority, “an admiralty court should

look primarily to these legislative enactments for policy

guidance.” Ibid. We may depart from the policies found in

the statutory scheme in discrete instances based on long-

established history, see, e.g., Atlantic Sounding Co. v.

Townsend, 557 U. S. 404, 424–425 (2009), but we do so

2 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

Opinion of the Court

cautiously in light of Congress’s persistent pursuit of

“uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.”

Miles, supra, at 26 (quoting Moragne v. States Marine

Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375, 401 (1970)).

This case asks whether a mariner may recover punitive

damages on a claim that he was injured as a result of the

unseaworthy condition of the vessel. We have twice con-

fronted similar questions in the past several decades, and

our holdings in both cases were based on the particular

claims involved. In Miles, which concerned a wrongful-

death claim under the general maritime law, we held that

recovery was limited to pecuniary damages, which did not

include loss of society. 498 U. S., at 23. And in Atlantic

Sounding, after examining centuries of relevant case law,

we held that punitive damages are not categorically

barred as part of the award on the traditional maritime

claim of maintenance and cure. 557 U. S., at 407. Here,

because there is no historical basis for allowing punitive

damages in unseaworthiness actions, and in order to

promote uniformity with the way courts have applied

parallel statutory causes of action, we hold that punitive

damages remain unavailable in unseaworthiness actions.

I

In order to determine the remedies for unseaworthiness,

we must consider both the heritage of the cause of action

in the common law and its place in the modern statutory

framework.

A

The seaman’s right to recover damages for personal

injury on a claim of unseaworthiness originates in the

admiralty court decisions of the 19th century. At the time,

“seamen led miserable lives.” D. Robertson, S. Friedell, &

M. Sturley, Admiralty and Maritime Law in the United

States 163 (2d ed. 2008). Maritime law was largely judge-

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 3

Opinion of the Court

made, and seamen were viewed as “emphatically the

wards of the admiralty.” Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas.

480, 485 (No. 6,047) (CC Me. 1823). In that era, the pri-

mary responsibility for protecting seamen lay in the

courts, which saw mariners as “peculiarly entitled to”—

and particularly in need of—judicial protection “against

the effects of the superior skill and shrewdness of masters

and owners of ships.” Brown v. Lull, 4 F. Cas. 407, 409

(No. 2,018) (CC Mass. 1836) (Story, J.).1

Courts of admiralty saw it as their duty not to be “con-

fined to the mere dry and positive rules of the common

law” but to “act upon the enlarged and liberal jurispru-

dence of courts of equity; and, in short, so far as their

powers extend[ed], they act[ed] as courts of equity.” Ibid.

This Court interpreted the Constitution’s grant of admi-

ralty jurisdiction to the Federal Judiciary as “the power to

. . . dispose of [a case] as justice may require.” The Reso-

lute, 168 U. S. 437, 439 (1897).

Courts used this power to protect seamen from injury

primarily through two causes of action. The first, mainte-

nance and cure, has its roots in the medieval and renais-

sance law codes that form the ancient foundation of mari-

time common law.2 The duty of maintenance and cure

——————

1 Riding circuit, Justice Story described mariners in markedly pater-

nalistic terms:

“Seamen are a class of persons remarkable for their rashness,

thoughtlessness and improvidence. They are generally necessitous,

ignorant of the nature and extent of their own rights and privileges,

and for the most part incapable of duly appreciating their value. They

combine, in a singular manner, the apparent anomalies of gallantry,

extravagance, profusion in expenditure, indifference to the future,

credulity, which is easily won, and confidence, which is readily sur-

prised.” Brown, 4 F. Cas., at 409.

2 A right resembling maintenance and cure appears in the Laws of

Oleron, promulgated by Eleanor of Aquitaine around 1160, in the 13th-

century Laws of Wisbuy, in the Laws of the Hanse Towns, published in

1597, and in the Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, published in 1681.

4 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

Opinion of the Court

requires a ship’s master “to provide food, lodging, and

medical services to a seaman injured while serving the

ship.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U. S. 438,

441 (2001). This duty, “which arises from the contract of

employment, does not rest upon negligence or culpability

on the part of the owner or master, nor is it restricted to

those cases where the seaman’s employment is the cause

of the injury or illness.” Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303

U. S. 525, 527 (1938) (citations omitted).

The second claim, unseaworthiness, is a much more

recent development and grew out of causes of action unre-

lated to personal injury. In its earliest forms, an unsea-

worthiness claim gave sailors under contract to sail on a

ship the right to collect their wages even if they had re-

fused to board an unsafe vessel after discovering its condi-

tion. See, e.g., Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 F. Cas. 755, 757 (No.

3,930) (Pa. 1789); Rice v. The Polly & Kitty, 20 F. Cas. 666,

667 (No. 11,754) (Pa. 1789). Similarly, unseaworthiness

was a defense to criminal charges against seamen who

refused to obey a ship master’s orders. See, e.g., United

States v. Nye, 27 F. Cas. 210, 211 (No. 15,906) (CC Mass.

1855); United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873, 874–875

(No. 14,470) (CC Mass. 1834). A claim of unseaworthiness

could also be asserted by a shipper to recover damages or

by an insurer to deny coverage when the poor condition of

the ship resulted in damage to or loss of the cargo. See

The Caledonia, 157 U. S. 124, 132–136 (1895) (cataloging

cases).

Only in the latter years of the 19th century did unsea-

worthiness begin a long and gradual evolution toward

——————

See 30 F. Cas. 1169 (collecting sources). The relevant passages are the

Laws of Oleron, Arts. VI and VII, 30 F. Cas., at 1174–1175; the Laws of

Wisbuy, Arts. XVIII, XIX, and XXXIII, 30 F. Cas., at 1191–1192; the

Laws of the Hanse Towns, Arts. XXXIX and XLV, 30 F. Cas., at 1200;

the Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, Tit. IV, Arts. XI and XII, 30 F.

Cas., at 1209.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 5

Opinion of the Court

remedying personal injury. Courts began to extend the

cases about refusals to serve to allow recovery for mari-

ners who were injured because of the unseaworthy condi-

tion of the vessel on which they had served.3 These early

cases were sparse, and they generally allowed recovery

only when a vessel’s owner failed to exercise due diligence

to ensure that the ship left port in a seaworthy condition.

See, e.g., The Robert C. McQuillen, 91 F. 685, 686–687

(Conn. 1899); The Lizzie Frank, 31 F. 477, 480 (SD Ala.

1887); The Tammerlane, 47 F. 822, 824 (ND Cal. 1891).

Unseaworthiness remained a suspect basis for personal

injury claims until 1903, when, in dicta, this Court con-

cluded that “the vessel and her owner are . . . liable to an

indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence

of the unseaworthiness of the ship.” The Osceola, 189

U. S. 158, 175 (1903). Although this was the first recogni-

tion of unseaworthiness as a personal injury claim in this

Court, we took pains to note that the claim was strictly

cabined. Ibid. Some of the limitations on recovery were

imported from the common law. The fellow-servant doc-

trine, in particular, prohibited recovery when an employee

suffered an injury due to the negligent act of another

employee without negligence on the part of the employer.

Ibid.; see, e.g., The Sachem, 42 F. 66 (EDNY 1890) (deny-

——————

3 Most of these cases allowed recovery for personal injury in “errone-

ous reliance” on certain passages in Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 F. Cas. 755

(No. 3,930) (Pa. 1789). Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the

Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 Cornell L. Q. 381, 390 (1954) (Tetreault).

These cases misread The Cyrus as resting on an implied warranty of

seaworthiness. Tetreault 390. But The Cyrus is more fairly read to

turn on a theory of true implied condition. While a warranty would

provide a basis for damages if the breach caused an injury, an implied

condition would only allow the mariner to escape performance without

surrendering the benefit of the contract. In other words, “[t]he mani-

fest unseaworthiness of the vessel at the commencement of the voyage

would excuse non-performance by the mariners but did not constitute a

basis for damages.” Tetreault 390.

6 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

Opinion of the Court

ing recovery based on fellow-servant doctrine). Because a

claimant had to show that he was injured by some aspect

of the ship’s condition that rendered the vessel unseawor-

thy, a claim could not prevail based on “the negligence of

the master, or any member of the crew.” 4 The Osceola,

supra, at 175; see also The City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390

(SDNY 1883) (no recovery based on negligence that does

not render vessel unseaworthy). Instead, a seaman had to

show that the owner of the vessel had failed to exercise

due diligence in ensuring the ship was in seaworthy condi-

tion. See generally Dixon v. United States, 219 F. 2d 10,

12–14 (CA2 1955) (Harlan, J.) (cataloging evolution of the

claim).

B

In the early 20th century, then, under “the general

maritime law . . . a vessel and her owner . . . were liable to

an indemnity for injuries received by a seaman in conse-

quence of the unseaworthiness of the ship and her appli-

ances; but a seaman was not allowed to recover an indem-

nity for injuries sustained through the negligence of the

master or any member of the crew.” Pacific S. S. Co. v.

Peterson, 278 U. S. 130, 134 (1928); see also Plamals v.

S. S. “Pinar Del Rio,” 277 U. S. 151, 155 (1928) (vessel was

not unseaworthy when mate negligently selected defective

rope but sound rope was available on board). Because of

these severe limitations on recovery, “the seaman’s right

to recover damages for injuries caused by unseaworthiness

——————

4 To be sure, in some instances the concept of “unseaworthiness” ex-

panded to embrace conditions that resulted from the negligence of

fellow servants, see, e.g., Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S.

255, 259 (1922) (vessel was rendered unseaworthy when it left port

with gasoline in a container labeled “coal oil”); see also G. Robinson,

Handbook of Admiralty Law in the United States §37, p. 305–307 (1st

ed. 1939) (collecting cases). But it was only after the passage of the

Jones Act that negligence by a fellow mariner provided a reliable basis

for recovery. See Part I–B, infra.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 7

Opinion of the Court

of the ship was an obscure and relatively little used rem-

edy.” G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty §6–38,

p. 383 (2d ed. 1975) (Gilmore & Black).

Tremendous shifts in mariners’ rights took place be-

tween 1920 and 1950. First, during and after the First

World War, Congress enacted a series of laws regulating

maritime liability culminating in the Merchant Marine

Act of 1920, §33, 41 Stat. 1007 (Jones Act), which codified

the rights of injured mariners and created new statutory

claims that were freed from many of the common-law

limitations on recovery. The Jones Act provides injured

seamen with a cause of action and a right to a jury. 46

U. S. C. §30104. Rather than create a new structure of

substantive rights, the Jones Act incorporated the rights

provided to railway workers under the Federal Employers’

Liability Act (FELA), 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq. 46 U. S. C.

§30104. In the 30 years after the Jones Act’s passage, “the

Act was the vehicle for almost all seamen’s personal injury

and death actions.” Gilmore & Black §6–20, at 327.

But the Jones Act was overtaken in the 1950s by the

second fundamental change in personal injury maritime

claims—and it was this Court, not Congress, that played

the leading role. In a pair of decisions in the late 1940s,

the Court transformed the old claim of unseaworthiness,

which had demanded only due diligence by the vessel

owner, into a strict-liability claim. In Mahnich v. South-

ern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96 (1944), the Court stated that

“the exercise of due diligence does not relieve the owner of

his obligation” to provide a seaworthy ship and, in the

same ruling, held that the fellow-servant doctrine did not

provide a defense. Id., at 100, 101. Mahnich’s interpreta-

tion of the early cases may have been suspect, see

Tetreault 397–398 (Mahnich rests on “startling misstate-

ment” of relevant precedents), but its assertion triggered a

sea-change in maritime personal injury. Less than two

years later, we affirmed that the duty of seaworthiness

8 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

Opinion of the Court

was “essentially a species of liability without fault . . .

neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contrac-

tual in character. It is a form of absolute duty owing to all

within the range of its humanitarian policy.” Seas Ship-

ping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 94–95 (1946) (citations

omitted). From Mahnich forward, “the decisions of this

Court have undeviatingly reflected an understanding that

the owner’s duty to furnish a seaworthy ship is absolute

and completely independent of his duty under the Jones

Act to exercise reasonable care.” Mitchell v. Trawler

Racer, Inc., 362 U. S. 539, 549 (1960). As a result of Mah-

nich and Sieracki, between the 1950s and 1970s “the

unseaworthiness count [was] the essential basis for recov-

ery with the Jones Act count preserved merely as a jury-

getting device.”5 Gilmore & Black §6–20, at 327–328.

The shifts in plaintiff preferences between Jones Act

and unseaworthiness claims were possible because of the

significant overlap between the two causes of action. See

id., §6–38, at 383. One leading treatise goes so far as to

describe the two claims as “alternative ‘grounds’ of recov-

ery for a single cause of action.” 2 R. Force & M. Norris,

The Law of Seamen §30:90, p. 30–369 (5th ed. 2003). The

two claims are so similar that, immediately after the

Jones Act’s passage, we held that plaintiffs could not

submit both to a jury. Plamals, supra, at 156–157 (“Sea-

men may invoke, at their election, the relief accorded by

the old rules against the ship, or that provided by the new

against the employer. But they may not have the benefit

of both”). We no longer require such election. See McAl-

lister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U. S. 221, 222, n. 2

(1958). But a plaintiff still cannot duplicate his recovery

——————

5 The decline of Jones Act claims was arrested, although not reversed,

by our holding that some negligent actions on a vessel may create Jones

Act liability without rendering the vessel unseaworthy. See Usner v.

Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U. S. 494 (1971); see also 1B Benedict

on Admiralty §23, p. 3–35 (7th rev. ed. 2018).

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Opinion of the Court

by collecting full damages on both claims because, “whether

or not the seaman’s injuries were occasioned by the un-

seaworthiness of the vessel or by the negligence of the

master or members of the crew, . . . there is but a single

wrongful invasion of his primary right of bodily safety and

but a single legal wrong.” Peterson, 278 U. S., at 138; see

also 2 Force, supra, §§26:73, 30:90.

II

Christopher Batterton worked as a deckhand and crew

member on vessels owned and operated by the Dutra

Group. According to Batterton’s complaint, while working

on a scow near Newport Beach, California, Batterton was

injured when his hand was caught between a bulkhead

and a hatch that blew open as a result of unventilated air

accumulating and pressurizing within the compartment.

Batterton sued Dutra and asserted a variety of claims,

including negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and

cure, and unearned wages. He sought to recover general

and punitive damages. Dutra moved to strike Batterton’s

claim for punitive damages, arguing that they are not

available on claims for unseaworthiness. The District

Court denied Dutra’s motion, 2014 WL 12538172 (CD Cal.,

Dec. 15, 2014), but agreed to certify an interlocutory ap-

peal on the question, 2015 WL 13752889 (CD Cal., Feb. 6,

2015).

The Court of Appeals affirmed. 880 F. 3d 1089 (CA9

2018). Applying Circuit precedent, see Evich v. Morris,

819 F. 2d 256, 258–259 (CA9 1987), the Court of Appeals

held that punitive damages are available for unseaworthi-

ness claims. 880 F. 3d, at 1096. This holding reaffirmed a

division of authority between the Circuits. Compare

McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L. L. C., 768 F. 3d 382, 391

(CA5 2014) (en banc) (punitive damages are not recover-

able), and Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 15 F. 3d 200, 203

(CA1 1994) (same), with Self v. Great Lakes Dredge &

10 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

Opinion of the Court

Dock Co., 832 F. 2d 1540, 1550 (CA11 1987) (“Punitive

damages should be available in cases where the shipowner

willfully violated the duty to maintain a safe and seawor-

thy ship . . .”). We granted certiorari to resolve this divi-

sion. 586 U. S. ___ (2018).

III

Our resolution of this question is governed by our deci-

sions in Miles and Atlantic Sounding. Miles establishes

that we “should look primarily to . . . legislative enact-

ments for policy guidance,” while recognizing that we

“may supplement these statutory remedies where doing so

would achieve the uniform vindication” of the policies

served by the relevant statutes. 498 U. S., at 27. In At-

lantic Sounding, we allowed recovery of punitive damages,

but we justified our departure from the statutory remedial

scheme based on the established history of awarding

punitive damages for certain maritime torts, including

maintenance and cure. 557 U. S., at 411–414 (discussing

cases of piracy and maintenance and cure awarding dam-

ages with punitive components). We were explicit that our

decision represented a gloss on Miles rather than a depar-

ture from it. Atlantic Sounding, supra, at 420 (“The rea-

soning of Miles remains sound”). And we recognized the

importance of viewing each claim in its proper historical

context. “ ‘[R]emedies for negligence, unseaworthiness,

and maintenance and cure have different origins and may

on occasion call for application of slightly different princi-

ples and procedures.’ ” 557 U. S., at 423.

In accordance with these decisions, we consider here

whether punitive damages have traditionally been awarded

for claims of unseaworthiness and whether conformity

with parallel statutory schemes would require such dam-

ages. Finally, we consider whether we are compelled on

policy grounds to allow punitive damages for unseawor-

thiness claims.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 11

Opinion of the Court

A

For claims of unseaworthiness, the overwhelming his-

torical evidence suggests that punitive damages are not

available. Batterton principally relies on two cases to

establish that punitive damages were traditionally avail-

able for breach of the duty of seaworthiness. Upon close

inspection, neither supports this argument.

The Rolph, 293 F. 269, 271 (ND Cal. 1923), involved a

mate who brutally beat members of the crew, rendering

one seaman blind and leaving another with impaired

hearing. The central question in the case was not the

form of damages, but rather whether the viciousness of

the mate rendered the vessel unseaworthy. The Rolph,

299 F. 52, 54 (CA9 1924). The court concluded that the

master, by staffing the vessel with such an unsuitable

officer, had rendered it unseaworthy. Id., at 55. To the

extent the court described the basis for the damages

awarded, it explained that the judgment was supported by

testimony as to “the expectation of life and earnings of

these men.” 293 F., at 272. And the Court of Appeals

discussed only the seamen’s entitlement “to recover an

indemnity” for their injuries. 299 F., at 56. These are

discussions of compensatory damages—nowhere does the

court speak in terms of an exemplary or punitive award.6

The Noddleburn, 28 F. 855, 857–858 (Ore. 1886), in-

volved an injury to a British seaman serving on a British

vessel and was decided under English law. The plaintiff

in the case was injured when he fell to the deck after being

——————

6 Even if this case did involve a sub silentio punitive award, we share

the Fifth Circuit’s reluctance to “rely on one dust-covered case to

establish that punitive damages were generally available in unseawor-

thiness cases.” McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L. L. C., 768 F. 3d 382, 397

(2014) (Clement, J., concurring). Absent a clear historical pattern,

Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19 (1990), commands us to seek

conformity with the policy preferences the political branches have

expressed in legislation.

12 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

Opinion of the Court

ordered aloft and stepping on an inadequately secured

line. Id., at 855. After the injury, the master neglected

the man’s wounds, thinking the injury a mere sprain. Id.,

at 856. The leg failed to heal and the man had to insist on

being discharged to a hospital, where he learned that he

would be permanently disabled. Ibid. As damages, the

court awarded him accrued wages, as well as $1,000 to

compensate for the loss in future earnings from his dis-

ability and $500 for his pain and suffering. Id., at 860. But

these are purely compensatory awards—the only discus-

sion of exemplary damages comes at the very close of the

opinion, and it is clear that they were considered because

of the master’s failure to provide maintenance and cure.

Ibid. (discussing additional award “in consideration of the

neglect and indifference with which the libelant was treated

by the master after his injury” (emphasis added)).

Finally, Batterton points to two other cases, The City of

Carlisle, 39 F. 807 (Ore. 1889), and The Troop, 118 F. 769

(Wash. 1902). But these cases, like The Noddleburn, both

involve maintenance and cure claims that rest on the

willful failure of the master and mate to provide proper

care for wounded sailors after they were injured. 39 F., at

812 (“master failed and neglected to procure or provide

any medical aid or advice . . . and was contriving and

intending to get rid of him as easily as possible”); 118 F.,

at 771 (assessing damages based on provision of Laws of

Oleron requiring maintenance). Batterton characterizes

these as unseaworthiness actions on the theory that the

seamen could have pursued that claim. But, because

courts award damages for the claims a plaintiff actually

pleads rather than those he could have brought, these

cases are irrelevant.

The lack of punitive damages in traditional maritime

law cases is practically dispositive. By the time the claim

of unseaworthiness evolved to remedy personal injury,

punitive damages were a well-established part of the

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 13

Opinion of the Court

common law. Exxon Shipping, 554 U. S., at 491. Ameri-

can courts had awarded punitive (or exemplary) damages

from the Republic’s earliest days. See, e.g., Genay v. Nor-

ris, 1 S. C. L. 6, 7 (1784); Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N. J. L.

77, 78 (1791). And yet, beyond the decisions discussed

above, Batterton presents no decisions from the formative

years of the personal injury unseaworthiness claim in

which exemplary damages were awarded. From this we

conclude that, unlike maintenance and cure, unseawor-

thiness did not traditionally allow recovery of punitive

damages.

B

In light of this overwhelming historical evidence, we

cannot sanction a novel remedy here unless it is required

to maintain uniformity with Congress’s clearly expressed

policies. Therefore, we must consider the remedies typi-

cally recognized for Jones Act claims.

The Jones Act adopts the remedial provisions of FELA,

and by the time of the Jones Act’s passage, this Court and

others had repeatedly interpreted the scope of damages

available to FELA plaintiffs. These early decisions held

that “[t]he damages recoverable [under FELA] are limited

. . . strictly to the financial loss . . . sustained.”7 American

R. Co. of P. R. v. Didricksen, 227 U. S. 145, 149 (1913); see

also Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S. 173, 175

(1913) (FELA is construed “only to compensate . . . for the

actual pecuniary loss resulting” from the worker’s injury

or death); Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S.

59, 68 (1913) (FELA imposes “a liability for the pecuniary

——————

7 Treatises from the same period lend further support to the view that

“in all actions under [FELA], an award of exemplary damages is not

permitted.” 2 M. Roberts, Federal Liabilities of Carriers §621, p. 1093

(1918); 1 id., §417, at 708; 5 J. Berryman, Sutherland on Damages

§1333, p. 5102 (4th ed. 1916) (FELA “provid[es] compensation for

pecuniary loss or damage only”).

14 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

Opinion of the Court

damage resulting to [the worker] and for that only”). In

one particularly illuminating case, in deciding whether a

complaint alleged a claim under FELA or state law, the

Court observed that if the complaint “were read as mani-

festly demanding exemplary damages, that would point to

the state law.” Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Koennecke, 239

U. S. 352, 354 (1915). And in the years since, Federal

Courts of Appeals have unanimously held that punitive

damages are not available under FELA. Miller v. Ameri-

can President Lines, Ltd., 989 F. 2d 1450, 1457 (CA6

1993); Wildman v. Burlington No. R. Co., 825 F. 2d 1392,

1395 (CA9 1987); Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 449

F. 2d 1238, 1243 (CA6 1971).

Our early discussions of the Jones Act followed the same

practices. We described the Act shortly after its passage

as creating “an action for compensatory damages, on the

ground of negligence.”8 Peterson, 278 U. S., at 135. And

we have more recently observed that the Jones Act “limits

recovery to pecuniary loss.” Miles, 498 U. S., at 32. Look-

ing to FELA and these decisions, the Federal Courts of

Appeals have uniformly held that punitive damages are

not available under the Jones Act. McBride, 768 F. 3d, at

388 (“[N]o cases have awarded punitive damages under

the Jones Act”); Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59

F. 3d 1496, 1507, n. 9 (CA5 1995) (en banc); Horsley, 15

F. 3d, at 203; Miller, supra, at 1457 (“Punitive damages

are not . . . recoverable under the Jones Act”); Kopczynski

v. The Jacqueline, 742 F. 2d 555, 560 (CA9 1984).

Batterton argues that these cases are either inapposite

or wrong, but because of the absence of historical evidence

to support punitive damages—evidence that was central to

——————

8 We also note that Congress declined to allow punitive damages

when it enacted the Death on the High Seas Act. 46 U. S. C. §30303

(allowing “fair compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained” for a

death on the high seas).

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 15

Opinion of the Court

our decision in Atlantic Sounding—we need not reopen

this question of statutory interpretation. It is enough for

us to note the general consensus that exists in the lower

courts and to observe that the position of those courts

conforms with the discussion and holding in Miles. Adopt-

ing the rule urged by Batterton would be contrary to

Miles’s command that federal courts should seek to pro-

mote a “uniform rule applicable to all actions” for the same

injury, whether under the Jones Act or the general mari-

time law. 498 U. S., at 33.

C

To the extent Batterton argues that punitive damages

are justified on policy grounds or as a regulatory measure,

we are unpersuaded. In contemporary maritime law, our

overriding objective is to pursue the policy expressed in

congressional enactments, and because unseaworthiness

in its current strict-liability form is our own invention and

came after passage of the Jones Act, it would exceed our

current role to introduce novel remedies contradictory to

those Congress has provided in similar areas. See id., at

36 (declining to create remedy “that goes well beyond the

limits of Congress’ ordered system of recovery”). We are

particularly loath to impose more expansive liabilities on a

claim governed by strict liability than Congress has im-

posed for comparable claims based in negligence. Ibid.

And with the increased role that legislation has taken over

the past century of maritime law, we think it wise to leave

to the political branches the development of novel claims

and remedies.

We are also wary to depart from the practice under the

Jones Act because a claim of unseaworthiness—more than

a claim for maintenance and cure—serves as a duplicate

and substitute for a Jones Act claim. The duty of mainte-

nance and cure requires the master to provide medical

care and wages to an injured mariner in the period after

16 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

Opinion of the Court

the injury has occurred. Calmar S. S. Corp., 303 U. S., at

527–528. By contrast, both the Jones Act and unseawor-

thiness claims compensate for the injury itself and for the

losses resulting from the injury. Peterson, supra, at 138.

In such circumstances, we are particularly mindful of the

rule that requires us to promote uniformity between mari-

time statutory law and maritime common law.9 See Miles,

supra, at 27. See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,

436 U. S. 618, 625 (1978) (declining to recognize loss-of-

society damages under general maritime law because that

would “rewrit[e the] rules that Congress has affirmatively

and specifically enacted”).

Unlike a claim of maintenance and cure, which addresses

a situation where the vessel owner and master have “just

about every economic incentive to dump an injured sea-

man in a port and abandon him to his fate,” in the unsea-

worthiness context the interests of the owner and mariner

are more closely aligned. McBride, supra, at 394, n. 12

(Clement, J., concurring). That is because there are signif-

——————

9 The dissent, post at 9, and n. 7 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.), suggests

that because of the existing differences between a Jones Act claim and

an unseaworthiness claim, recognizing punitive damages would not be

a cause of disparity. But, as the dissent acknowledges, much of the

expanded reach of the modern unseaworthiness doctrine can be at-

tributed to innovations made by this Court following the enactment of

the Jones Act. See post at 8, and n. 6; supra, at 7–8. Although Batter-

ton and the dissent would continue this evolution by recognizing

damages previously unavailable, Miles dictates that such innovation is

the prerogative of the political branches, our past expansion of the

unseaworthiness doctrine notwithstanding.

Of course, Miles recognized that the general maritime law need not

be static. For example, our decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,

Inc., 398 U. S. 375 (1970), smoothed a disjunction created by the

imperfect alignment of statutory claims with past decisions limiting

maritime claims for wrongful death. But when there is no disjunc-

tion—as here, where traditional remedies align with modern statutory

remedies—we are unwilling to endorse doctrinal changes absent

legislative changes.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 17

Opinion of the Court

icant economic incentives prompting owners to ensure

that their vessels are seaworthy. Most obviously, an

owner who puts an unseaworthy ship to sea stands to lose

the ship and the cargo that it carries. And if a vessel’s

unseaworthiness threatens the crew or cargo, the owner

risks losing the protection of his insurer (who may not

cover losses incurred by the owner’s negligence) and the

work of the crew (who may refuse to serve on an unsea-

worthy vessel). In some instances, the vessel owner may

even face criminal penalties. See, e.g., 46 U. S. C. §10908.

Allowing punitive damages on unseaworthiness claims

would also create bizarre disparities in the law. First, due

to our holding in Miles, which limited recovery to compen-

satory damages in wrongful-death actions, a mariner

could make a claim for punitive damages if he was injured

onboard a ship, but his estate would lose the right to seek

punitive damages if he died from his injuries. Second,

because unseaworthiness claims run against the owner of

the vessel, the ship’s owner could be liable for punitive

damages while the master or operator of the ship—who

has more control over onboard conditions and is best

positioned to minimize potential risks—would not be liable

for such damages under the Jones Act. See Sieracki, 328

U. S., at 100 (The duty of seaworthiness is “peculiarly and

exclusively the obligation of the owner. It is one he cannot

delegate”).

Finally, because “[n]oncompensatory damages are not

part of the civil-code tradition and thus unavailable in

such countries,” Exxon Shipping, 554 U. S., at 497, allow-

ing punitive damages would place American shippers at a

significant competitive disadvantage and would discour-

age foreign-owned vessels from employing American sea-

men. See Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative

Analysis, 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 391, 396, n. 24 (2004)

(listing civil-law nations that restrict private plaintiffs to

compensatory damages). This would frustrate another

18 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

Opinion of the Court

“fundamental interest” served by federal maritime juris-

diction: “the protection of maritime commerce.” Norfolk

Southern R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U. S. 14,

25 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis

deleted).

Against this, Batterton points to the maritime doctrine

that encourages special solicitude for the welfare of sea-

men. But that doctrine has its roots in the paternalistic

approach taken toward mariners by 19th century courts.

See, e.g., Harden, 11 F. Cas., at 485; Brown, 4 F. Cas., at

409. The doctrine has never been a commandment that

maritime law must favor seamen whenever possible.

Indeed, the doctrine’s apex coincided with many of the

harsh common-law limitations on recovery that were not

set aside until the passage of the Jones Act. And, while

sailors today face hardships not encountered by those who

work on land, neither are they as isolated nor as depend-

ent on the master as their predecessors from the age of

sail. In light of these changes and of the roles now played

by the Judiciary and the political branches in protecting

sailors, the special solicitude to sailors has only a small

role to play in contemporary maritime law. It is not suffi-

cient to overcome the weight of authority indicating that

punitive damages are unavailable.

IV

Punitive damages are not a traditional remedy for un-

seaworthiness. The rule of Miles—promoting uniformity

in maritime law and deference to the policies expressed in

the statutes governing maritime law—prevents us from

recognizing a new entitlement to punitive damages where

none previously existed. We hold that a plaintiff may not

recover punitive damages on a claim of unseaworthiness.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 19

Opinion of the Court

We reverse the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 1

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–266

_________________

THE DUTRA GROUP, PETITIONER

v. CHRISTOPHER BATTERTON

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2019]

JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BREYER and

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting.

In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U. S. 471 (2008),

the Court recognized that punitive damages normally are

available in maritime cases. Id., at 489–490, 502, 508,

n. 21. Relying on Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19

(1990), the Court today holds that unseaworthiness claims

are an exception to that general rule. Respondent Chris-

topher Batterton, defending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

his favor, relies on the Court’s more recent decision in

Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U. S. 404 (2009).

In my view, the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that

Atlantic Sounding is the controlling precedent. See 880

F. 3d 1089, 1095–1096 (2018) (case below). I would there-

fore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, cogently

explained in Senior Circuit Judge Kleinfeld’s opinion.

I

Batterton was employed as a deckhand for petitioner

The Dutra Group, a dredging and marine construction

company. As Batterton worked on a Dutra vessel, fellow

crewmembers pumped pressurized air into a below-decks

compartment. The build up of pressurized air blew open a

hatch cover that crushed Batterton’s hand, permanently

disabling him. The accident could have been prevented,

2 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

Batterton alleges, by a valve to vent excess air from the

compartment, something to hold the hatch cover open, or

simply better warnings or supervision.

Batterton filed a civil action asserting one claim of

negligence under the Jones Act1 and two claims under

general maritime law: one for breach of the duty to pro-

vide a seaworthy vessel and one for breach of the duty to

provide maintenance and cure.2 As to his unseaworthi-

ness claim, Batterton sought punitive damages, alleging

that Dutra’s breach was wanton and willful.

Dutra moved to strike or dismiss Batterton’s punitive

damages request. The District Court denied the motion,

2014 WL 12538172, *2 (CD Cal. Dec. 15, 2014), and the

Ninth Circuit, accepting an interlocutory appeal, affirmed,

880 F. 3d 1089. Longstanding Ninth Circuit precedent,

the court observed, recognized the availability of punitive

damages in seamen’s actions for unseaworthiness. Id., at

1091 (citing Evich v. Morris, 819 F. 2d 256, 258 (1987)).

Miles, 498 U. S., at 29–33, which held that loss-of-society

damages are not available in survivors’ actions for unsea-

worthiness resulting in a seaman’s wrongful death, the

court observed, did not undermine that precedent. 880

F. 3d, at 1093–1096. “Whatever room might [have] be[en]

left to support broadening Miles to cover punitive damages”

sought by a seaman, the Ninth Circuit said, “was cut off by

——————

1 The Jones Act provides: “A seaman injured in the course of employ-

ment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative

of the seaman[,] may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right

of trial by jury, against the employer. Laws of the United States

regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway em-

ployee apply to an action under this section.” 46 U. S. C. §30104.

2 “Maintenance and cure” is the right of “the seaman, ill or injured in

the service of the ship without willful misbehavior on his part[ to]

wages to the end of the voyage and subsistence, lodging, and medical

care to the point where the maximum cure attainable has been

reached.” 2 R. Force & M. Norris, The Law of Seamen §26:1, p. 26–4

(5th ed. 2003).

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 3

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

[this] Court’s decision in Atlantic Sounding,” in which this

Court, recognizing that “historically, punitive damages

have been available and awarded in general maritime

actions,” held that such damages are available in seamen’s

suits for maintenance and cure. Id., at 1095. (quoting

Atlantic Sounding, 557 U. S., at 407; alteration omitted).

Punitive damages, the Ninth Circuit concluded, are simi-

larly available when a seaman sues for unseaworthiness

under general maritime law.

II

I turn now to an examination of Miles and Atlantic

Sounding closer than the attention accorded those deci-

sions by the Court.

Miles, decided in 1990, addressed this question: In a

wrongful-death action premised on unseaworthiness, may

a deceased seaman’s parent recover damages for loss of

society? 498 U. S., at 21. As the Court explained in Miles,

historically, general maritime law did not recognize a

cause of action for wrongful death. Id., at 23 (citing The

Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (1886)). But since the late 19th

century, every State had adopted a statutory wrongful-

death cause of action. Miles, 498 U. S., at 23. And in two

statutes, Congress had provided for wrongful-death recov-

eries in maritime cases. Ibid. First, the Jones Act, 46

U. S. C. §30104, provided a right of action for the survivor

of a seaman killed in the course of his employment. Sec-

ond, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U. S. C.

§30301 et seq., provided a right of action for the survivor of

anyone killed “by wrongful act, neglect, or default . . . on

the high seas.” §30302; Miles, 498 U. S., at 24. But the

Jones Act and DOHSA left some wrongful deaths at sea

without a remedy. See Miles, 498 U. S., at 25–26.3 To fill

——————

3 These were the unprovided-for cases: “First, in territorial waters,

general maritime law allowed a remedy for unseaworthiness resulting

in injury, but not for death. Second, DOHSA allowed a remedy for

4 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

gaps in this statutory regime, and in light of legislative

abrogation of the common-law disallowance of wrongful-

death claims, the Court in Moragne v. States Marine

Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375, 409 (1970), recognized a general

maritime cause of action for the wrongful death of a long-

shoreman. See also Miles, 498 U. S., at 26–30 (claim for

wrongful death is also available to seamen’s survivors).

After recounting this history, the Miles Court addressed

the damages relief available for maritime wrongful death.

Because “Congress and the States ha[d] legislated exten-

sively in” the field of maritime law, the Court stated,

“admiralty court[s] should look primarily to these legisla-

tive enactments for policy guidance.” Id., at 27. Congress

had expressly limited damages recoverable under DOHSA

to “pecuniary loss” sustained by the decedent’s survivor.

Id., at 31 (citing 46 U. S. C. App. §762, recodified at

§30303). And the Jones Act adopted the substantive

provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45

U. S. C. §51 et seq., which the Court construed to confine

wrongful-death damages to “pecuniary loss.” Miles, 498

U. S., at 32. The Miles Court reasoned that loss-of-society

damages were nonpecuniary, that such damages could not

be recovered under DOHSA or the Jones Act, and that it

would “be inconsistent with [the Court’s] place in the

constitutional scheme . . . to sanction more expansive

remedies” under general maritime law. Miles, 498 U. S.,

——————

death resulting from unseaworthiness on the high seas, but general

maritime law did not allow such recovery for a similar death in territo-

rial waters. Finally, . . . in those States whose statutes allowed a claim

for wrongful death resulting from unseaworthiness, recovery was

available for the death of a longshoreman due to unseaworthiness, but

not for the death of a Jones Act seaman. This was because wrongful

death actions under the Jones Act are limited to negligence, and the

Jones Act pre-empts state law remedies for the death or injury of a

seaman.” Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 26 (1990) (citation

omitted).

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 5

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

at 31–33.4

Some 19 years after Miles, in Atlantic Sounding, this

Court held that punitive damages are available in actions

for maintenance and cure under general maritime law.

557 U. S., at 408. Atlantic Sounding’s reasoning had four

components. First, the Court observed, punitive damages

had a long common-law pedigree. Id., at 409–410. Sec-

ond, the “general rule that punitive damages were avail-

able at common law extended to claims arising under fed-

eral maritime law.” Id., at 411; see id., at 411–412. Third,

“[n]othing in maritime law undermine[d] the applicability

of this general rule in the maintenance and cure context,”

notwithstanding slim evidence that punitive damages

were historically awarded in maintenance and cure ac-

tions. Id., at 412; see id., at 412–415, and n. 4. Finally,

neither the Jones Act nor any other statute indicated that

Congress sought to displace the presumption that reme-

dies generally available under the common law are avail-

able for maritime claims. While the Jones Act armed sea-

men with a statutory action for negligence attributable to

a vessel operator, that remedy, Atlantic Sounding noted,

did not curtail pre-existing maritime causes of action and

remedies. Id., at 415–418. The Atlantic Sounding Court

rejected as “far too broad” the argument that the remedies

available under general maritime law were confined to

those available under the Jones Act or DOHSA. Id., at

418–419.

——————

4 The Miles Court relied on comparable reasoning in denying the

deceased seaman’s estate, which had brought a survival action, the

right to recover future earnings. See id., at 33–37. Under “the tradi-

tional maritime rule,” “there [wa]s no survival of unseaworthiness

claims.” Id., at 34. The Court declined to decide whether to recognize a

general maritime survival right, however, because, even if such a right

were recognized, it would not support recovery of lost future income.

Ibid. This damages limitation followed from the Jones Act, DOHSA,

and most States’ laws, which did not permit recovery of such damages.

See id., at 35–36.

6 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

The Atlantic Sounding inquiries control this case. As in

Atlantic Sounding, “both the general maritime cause of

action”—here, unseaworthiness—“and the remedy (puni-

tive damages) were well established before the passage of

the Jones Act.” 557 U. S., at 420; Mitchell v. Trawler

Racer, Inc., 362 U. S. 539, 544 (1960); The Osceola, 189

U. S. 158, 175 (1903). And, unlike the maritime wrongful-

death action at issue in Miles, Batterton’s claim of unsea-

worthiness resulting in personal injury was not created to

fill gaps in a statutory scheme. See Atlantic Sounding,

557 U. S., at 420; Miles, 498 U. S., at 27, 36. The damages

available for Batterton’s unseaworthiness claim, Atlantic

Sounding therefore signals, need not track those available

under the Jones Act. See 557 U. S., at 424, n. 12.

III

Applying Atlantic Sounding’s test, see supra, at 5, puni-

tive damages are not categorically barred in unseaworthi-

ness actions. Atlantic Sounding itself answers the first

two inquiries. See supra, at 5. “Punitive damages have

long been an available remedy at common law for wanton,

willful, or outrageous conduct.” 557 U. S., at 409; see id.,

at 409–410. And “[t]he general rule that punitive damages

[are] available at common law extended to claims arising

under federal maritime law.” Id., at 411; see id., at 411–

412. As next explained, the third and fourth components

of Atlantic Sounding’s test are also satisfied.

A

Atlantic Sounding asks, third, whether anything in

maritime law “undermines the applicability [to the mari-

time action at issue] of th[e] general rule” that punitive

damages are available under general maritime law. Id.,

at 412. True, there is no evidence that courts awarded

punitive damages for unseaworthiness before the mid-

20th century. See ante, at 11–13. But neither is there

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 7

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

evidence that punitive damages were unavailable in un-

seaworthiness actions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17.

Contrary to the Court’s assertion, evidence of the avail-

ability of punitive damages for maintenance and cure was

not “central to our decision in Atlantic Sounding.” Ante, at

14–15. Far from it. “[A] search for cases in which puni-

tive damages were awarded for the willful denial of

maintenance and cure . . . yields very little.” Atlantic

Sounding, 557 U. S., at 430 (ALITO, J., dissenting). The

Court in Atlantic Sounding invoked historical evidence

about punitive damages in maintenance and cure actions,

“strikingly slim” though it was, id., at 431, only to under-

score this point: Without a showing that punitive damages

were unavailable, the generally applicable common-law

rule allowing punitive damages should not be displaced.

See id., at 412–415 (majority opinion). Here, too, the

absence of evidence that punitive damages were unavail-

able in unseaworthiness cases supports adherence to the

general common-law rule permitting punitive damages.

B

Atlantic Sounding asks fourth: Has Congress “enacted

legislation departing from th[e] common-law understand-

ing” that punitive damages are generally available? See

id., at 415. Dutra contends that unseaworthiness claims

and claims under the Jones Act are “simply two paths to

compensation for the same injury.” Brief for Petitioner

19–20 (emphasis deleted). Positing that punitive damages

are unavailable under the Jones Act,5 Dutra concludes

they are likewise unavailable in unseaworthiness suits.

Id., at 17. See also ante, at 13–15. Dutra’s argument is

unavailing, for the Jones Act does not preclude the award

of punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases.

——————

5 This Court has not decided whether punitive damages are available

under the Jones Act. See Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U. S.

404, 424, n. 12 (2009) (reserving the question).

8 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

As noted, the Jones Act provides a cause of action for a

seaman injured by his or her employer’s negligence. 46

U. S. C. §30104. Congress passed the Act “primarily to

overrule The Osceola, [189 U. S. 158,] in which this Court

prohibited a seaman or his family from recovering for

injuries or death suffered due to his employers’ negli-

gence.” Atlantic Sounding, 557 U. S., at 415. The Jones

Act was intended to “enlarge th[e] protection” afforded to

seamen, “not to narrow it.” The Arizona v. Anelich, 298

U. S. 110, 123 (1936). Accordingly, the Jones Act did not

provide an “exclusive remedy” for seamen’s injuries; in-

stead, it “preserve[d]” and supplemented “common-law

causes of action.” Atlantic Sounding, 557 U. S., at 416–

417. As Miles itself recognized, the Jones Act “d[id] not

disturb seamen’s general maritime claims for injuries

resulting from unseaworthiness.” 498 U. S., at 29.

When the Jones Act was enacted, unseaworthiness and

negligence were “discrete concepts”: Unseaworthiness

related “to the structure of the ship and the adequacy of

[its] equipment and furnishings,” while negligence con-

cerned “the direction and control of operations aboard

ship.” G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty §6–3,

p. 277 (2d ed. 1975). Because these actions were distinct,

it is improbable that, by enacting the Jones Act, Congress

meant to limit the remedies available in unseaworthiness

cases. Though unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence

now “significant[ly] overlap,” ante, at 8, that overlap re-

sulted primarily from mid-20th-century judicial decisions

expanding the scope of unseaworthiness liability. See

Mitchell, 362 U. S., at 547–550.6 Those decisions do not so

——————

6 In particular, this Court held that a shipowner’s duty to provide a

seaworthy vessel was “absolute,” thereby rendering unseaworthiness a

strict-liability tort. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 94–95

(1946); Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 100–101 (1944); see

1B Benedict on Admiralty §23, pp. 3–12 to 3–16 (7th rev. ed. 2018). In

addition, courts broadened the range of conditions that could render a

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 9

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

much as hint that Congress, in enacting the Jones Act,

intended to cabin the relief available for unseaworthiness.

Even today, unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence

are “not identical.” 2 R. Force & M. Norris, The Law of

Seamen §27:25, p. 27–61 (5th ed. 2003).7 The persistent

differences between unseaworthiness and Jones Act

claims weigh against inserting into general maritime law

damages limitations that may be applicable to Jones Act

suits. See supra, at 7, n. 5.8

The Court observes that a plaintiff may not recover

twice for the same injury under the Jones Act and unsea-

worthiness. Ante, at 9. True enough. But the Court does

not explain why a bar to double recovery of compensatory

damages should affect the availability of a single award of

punitive damages. Notably, punitive damages are not

awarded to compensate the plaintiff; their office is to

punish the defendant and deter misconduct. See Exxon,

——————

vessel unseaworthy. Id., §23, at 3–16 to 3–19.

7 Unseaworthiness is a strict-liability tort, ante, at 7–8; the Jones Act

requires proof of negligence, Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531

U. S. 438, 441 (2001). Unseaworthiness claims run against the vessel’s

owner, Mahnich, 321 U. S., at 100; Jones Act claims are brought

against the seaman’s “employer,” §30104. Injury caused by the negli-

gent act or omission of a fit fellow crewmember may be actionable

under the Jones Act but is not ground for an unseaworthiness suit. 1B

Benedict on Admiralty §23, at 3–34 to 3–38; see Usner v. Luckenbach

Overseas Corp., 400 U. S. 494 (1971). And a vessel owner is liable for

unseaworthiness only when the unseaworthy condition proximately

caused the plaintiff ’s injury; under the Jones Act, a plaintiff can prevail

upon showing the “slight[est]” causal connection between the defend-

ant’s conduct and the plaintiff ’s injury. 2 Force & Norris, The Law of

Seamen §27:25, at 27–62 to 27–63. See also id., §27:2, at 27–7, and n. 6

(the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel may run to “seamen” who do

not qualify as such under the Jones Act).

8 The Court recognizes “that the general maritime law need not be

static,” but would confine changes in that law to those needed to align it

with statutory law. Ante, at 16, n. 9. As just stated, however, supra, at

8–9, the Jones Act was intended to augment, not to cabin, relief avail-

able to seamen.

10 DUTRA GROUP v. BATTERTON

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

554 U. S., at 492; W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D.

Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §2, p. 9 (5th ed.

1984). There is thus no tension between preventing dou-

ble recovery of compensatory damages and allowing the

recovery, once, of punitive damages.

IV

Finally, the Court takes up policy arguments against

the availability of punitive damages in unseaworthiness

actions. Ante, at 15–18. The Court, however, has long

recognized the general availability of punitive damages

under maritime law. E.g., Atlantic Sounding, 557 U. S., at

411–412; Exxon, 554 U. S., at 489–490; The Amiable Nancy,

3 Wheat. 546, 558 (1818).

Punitive damages serve to deter and punish “lawless

misconduct.” Ibid. The imperative of countering a

“heightened threat of harm,” Exxon, 554 U. S., at 490, is

especially pressing with regard to sailors, who face unique

“hazards in the ship’s service,” Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.

Cas. 480, 483 (No. 6,047) (CC Me. 1823) (Story, J.). These

dangers, more than paternalistic 19th-century attitudes

towards sailors, see ante, at 18, account for the Court’s

“ ‘special solicitude’ ” for “those who undertake to ‘venture

upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages.’ ” Air &

Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019)

(slip op., at 9) (quoting American Export Lines, Inc. v.

Alvez, 446 U. S. 274, 285 (1980)).

Dutra and the Court warn that allowing punitive dam-

ages in unseaworthiness actions could impair maritime

commerce. Brief for Petitioner 33–34; ante, at 17–18. But

punitive damages have been available in maintenance and

cure cases in all Circuits for the last decade, Atlantic

Sounding, 557 U. S. 404, and in unseaworthiness cases in

some Circuits for longer, see Self v. Great Lakes Dredge &

Dock Co., 832 F. 2d 1540, 1550 (CA11 1987); Evich, 819

F. 2d, at 258. No tidal wave has overwhelmed commerce

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 11

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

in those Circuits.

Permitting punitive damages for unseaworthiness, the

Court further urges, would create “bizarre disparities.”

Ante, at 17. I see no “bizarre disparit[y]” in allowing an

injured sailor to seek remedies unavailable to survivors of

deceased seamen. See Keeton, supra, §127, at 949, 951

(state wrongful-death statutes frequently limit survivors’

recoveries to pecuniary damages). Nor is it “bizarre” to

permit recovery of punitive damages against a shipowner

“for injuries due to unseaworthiness of the vessel.” The

Arizona, 298 U. S., at 120. Exposure to such damages

helps to deter wrongdoing, particularly when malfeasance

is “hard to detect.” Exxon, 554 U. S., at 494. If there is

any “bizarre disparit[y],” it is the one the Court today

creates: Punitive damages are available for willful and

wanton breach of the duty to provide maintenance and

cure, but not for similarly culpable breaches of the duty to

provide a seaworthy vessel.

* * *

For the reasons stated, I would affirm the Court of

Appeals’ judgment.