McDonough v. Smith

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MCDONOUGH v. SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SPECIAL

DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF

RENSSELAER, NEW YORK

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 18–485. Argued April 17, 2019—Decided June 20, 2019

Petitioner Edward McDonough processed ballots as a commissioner of

the county board of elections in a primary election in Troy, New York.

Respondent Youel Smith was specially appointed to investigate and

to prosecute a case of forged absentee ballots in that election.

McDonough became his primary target. McDonough alleges that

Smith fabricated evidence against him and used it to secure a grand

jury indictment. Smith then brought the case to trial and presented

allegedly fabricated testimony. That trial ended in a mistrial. Smith

again elicited allegedly fabricated evidence in a second trial, which

ended on December 21, 2012, with McDonough’s acquittal on all

charges. On December 18, 2015, McDonough sued Smith under 42

U. S. C. §1983, asserting, as relevant here, a claim for fabrication of

evidence. The District Court dismissed the claim as untimely, and

the Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the 3-year limita-

tions period began to run “when (1) McDonough learned that the evi-

dence was false and was used against him during the criminal pro-

ceedings; and (2) he suffered a loss of liberty as a result of that

evidence,” 898 F. 3d 259, 265. Thus, the court concluded,

McDonough’s claim was untimely, because those events undisputedly

had occurred by the time McDonough was arrested and stood trial.

Held: The statute of limitations for McDonough’s §1983 fabricated-

evidence claim began to run when the criminal proceedings against

him terminated in his favor—that is, when he was acquitted at the

end of his second trial. Pp. 3–15.

(a) The time at which a §1983 claim accrues “is a question of feder-

2 MCDONOUGH v. SMITH

Syllabus

al law,” “conforming in general to common-law tort principles,” and is

presumptively—but not always—“when the plaintiff has ‘a complete

and present cause of action.’ ” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388.

An accrual analysis begins with identifying “the specific constitution-

al right” alleged to have been infringed. Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S.

___, ___. Here, the claimed right is an assumed due process right not

to be deprived of liberty as a result of a government official’s fabrica-

tion of evidence. Pp. 4–5.

(b) Accrual questions are often decided by referring to the common-

law principles governing analogous torts. Wallace, 549 U. S., 388.

The most analogous common-law tort here is malicious prosecution,

which accrues only once the underlying criminal proceedings have re-

solved in the plaintiff’s favor. Following that analogy where it leads:

McDonough could not bring his fabricated-evidence claim under

§1983 prior to favorable termination of his prosecution. Malicious

prosecution’s favorable-termination requirement is rooted in prag-

matic concerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation

over the same subject matter and the related possibility of conflicting

civil and criminal judgments, and likewise avoids allowing collateral

attacks on criminal judgments through civil litigation. See Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 484–485. Because a civil claim such as

McDonough’s, asserting that fabricated evidence was used to pursue

a criminal judgment, implicates the same concerns, it makes sense to

adopt the same rule. The principles and reasoning of Heck—which

emphasized those concerns with parallel litigation and conflicting

judgments—confirm the strength of this analogy. This case differs

because the plaintiff in Heck had been convicted and McDonough was

acquitted, but McDonough’s claims nevertheless challenge the validi-

ty of the criminal proceedings against him in essentially the same

manner as the plaintiff in Heck challenged the validity of his convic-

tion. Pp. 5–9.

(c) The soundness of this conclusion is reinforced by the conse-

quences that would follow from imposing a ticking limitations clock

on criminal defendants as soon as they become aware that fabricated

evidence has been used against them. That rule would create practi-

cal problems in jurisdictions where prosecutions regularly last nearly

as long as—or even longer than—the limitations period. Criminal de-

fendants could face the untenable choice of letting their claims expire

or filing a civil suit against the very person who is in the midst of

prosecuting them. The parallel civil litigation that would result if

plaintiffs chose the second option would run counter to core principles

of federalism, comity, consistency, and judicial economy. Smith’s

suggested workaround—stays and ad-hoc abstentions—is poorly

suited to the type of claim at issue here. Pp. 9–11.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 3

Syllabus

(d) Smith’s counterarguments do not sway the result. First, relying

on Wallace, Smith argues that Heck is irrelevant to McDonough’s

claim. The Court in Wallace rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on Heck,

but Wallace involved a false-arrest claim—analogous to common-law

false imprisonment—and does not displace the principles in Heck

that resolve this case. Second, Smith argues that McDonough theo-

retically could have been prosecuted without the fabricated evidence,

and was not convicted even with it; and thus, because a violation

could exist no matter its effect on the outcome, the date of that out-

come is irrelevant. Although the argument for adopting a favorable-

termination requirement would be weaker in the context of a fabri-

cated-evidence claim that does not allege that the violation’s conse-

quence was a liberty deprivation occasioned by the criminal proceed-

ings themselves, that is not the nature of McDonough’s claim. His

claim remains most analogous to a claim of common-law malicious

prosecution. Nor does it change the result that McDonough suffered

harm prior to his acquittal, because the Court has never suggested

that the date on which a constitutional injury first occurs is the only

date from which a limitations period may run. Third, Smith argues

that the advantages of his rule outweigh its disadvantages as a mat-

ter of policy. But his arguments are unconvincing. It is not clear

that the Second Circuit’s approach would provide more predictable

guidance, and while perverse incentives for prosecutors and risk of

foreclosing meritorious claims could be valid considerations in other

contexts, they do not overcome other considerations here. Pp. 11–15.

898 F. 3d 259, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and GORSUCH,

JJ., joined.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–485

_________________

EDWARD G. MCDONOUGH, PETITIONER v. YOUEL

SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SPECIAL DISTRICT

ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF

RENSSELAER, NEW YORK,

AKA TREY SMITH

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2019]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Edward McDonough alleges that respondent

Youel Smith fabricated evidence and used it to pursue

criminal charges against him. McDonough was acquitted,

then sued Smith under 42 U. S. C. §1983. The courts

below, concluding that the limitations period for

McDonough’s fabricated-evidence claim began to run when

the evidence was used against him, determined that the

claim was untimely. We hold that the limitations period

did not begin to run until McDonough’s acquittal, and

therefore reverse.

I

This case arises out of an investigation into forged

absentee ballots that were submitted in a primary election

in Troy, New York, in 2009. McDonough, who processed

the ballots in his capacity as a commissioner of the county

board of elections, maintains that he was unaware that

they had been forged. Smith was specially appointed to

2 MCDONOUGH v. SMITH

Opinion of the Court

investigate and to prosecute the matter.

McDonough’s complaint alleges that Smith then set

about scapegoating McDonough (against whose family

Smith harbored a political grudge), despite evidence that

McDonough was innocent. Smith leaked to the press that

McDonough was his primary target and pressured him to

confess. When McDonough would not, Smith allegedly

fabricated evidence in order to inculpate him. Specifically,

McDonough alleges that Smith falsified affidavits, coached

witnesses to lie, and orchestrated a suspect DNA analysis

to link McDonough to relevant ballot envelopes.

Relying in part on this allegedly fabricated evidence,

Smith secured a grand jury indictment against

McDonough. McDonough was arrested, arraigned, and

released (with restrictions on his travel) pending trial.

Smith brought the case to trial a year later, in January

2012. He again presented the allegedly fabricated testi-

mony during this trial, which lasted more than a month

and ended in a mistrial. Smith then reprosecuted

McDonough. The second trial also lasted over a month,

and again, Smith elicited allegedly fabricated testimony.

The second trial ended with McDonough’s acquittal on all

charges on December 21, 2012.

On December 18, 2015, just under three years after his

acquittal, McDonough sued Smith and other defendants

under §1983 in the U. S. District Court for the Northern

District of New York. Against Smith, McDonough asserted

two different constitutional claims: one for fabrication

of evidence, and one for malicious prosecution without

probable cause. The District Court dismissed the mali-

cious prosecution claim as barred by prosecutorial immun-

ity, though timely. It dismissed the fabricated-evidence

claim, however, as untimely.

McDonough appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, which affirmed. 898 F. 3d 259 (2018).

The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 3

Opinion of the Court

disposition of the malicious prosecution claim. As for the

timeliness of the fabricated-evidence claim, because all

agreed that the relevant limitations period is three years,

id., at 265, the question was when that limitations period

began to run: upon McDonough’s acquittal, or at some

point earlier. In essence, given the dates at issue,

McDonough’s claim was timely only if the limitations

period began running at acquittal.

The Court of Appeals held that McDonough’s fabricated-

evidence claim accrued, and thus the limitations period

began to run, “when (1) McDonough learned that the

evidence was false and was used against him during the

criminal proceedings; and (2) he suffered a loss of liberty

as a result of that evidence.” Ibid. This rule, in the Sec-

ond Circuit’s view, followed from its conclusion that a

plaintiff has a complete fabricated-evidence claim as soon

as he can show that the defendant’s knowing use of the

fabricated evidence caused him some deprivation of lib-

erty. Id., at 266. Those events undisputedly had occurred

by the time McDonough was arrested and stood trial.

Ibid.

As the Second Circuit acknowledged, id., at 267, other

Courts of Appeals have held that the statute of limitations

for a fabricated-evidence claim does not begin to run until

favorable termination of the challenged criminal proceed-

ings.1 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 586

U. S. ___ (2019), and now reverse.

II

The statute of limitations for a fabricated-evidence

claim like McDonough’s does not begin to run until the

criminal proceedings against the defendant (i.e., the §1983

——————

1 See Floyd v. Attorney General of Pa., 722 Fed. Appx. 112, 114 (CA3

2018); Mills v. Barnard, 869 F. 3d 473, 484 (CA6 2017); Bradford v.

Scherschligt, 803 F. 3d 382, 388 (CA9 2015); Castellano v. Fragozo, 352

F. 3d 939, 959–960 (CA5 2003) (en banc).

4 MCDONOUGH v. SMITH

Opinion of the Court

plaintiff) have terminated in his favor. This conclusion

follows both from the rule for the most natural common-

law analogy (the tort of malicious prosecution) and from

the practical considerations that have previously led this

Court to defer accrual of claims that would otherwise

constitute an untenable collateral attack on a criminal

judgment.

A

The question here is when the statute of limitations

began to run. Although courts look to state law for the

length of the limitations period, the time at which a §1983

claim accrues “is a question of federal law,” “conforming in

general to common-law tort principles.” Wallace v. Kato,

549 U. S. 384, 388 (2007). That time is presumptively

“when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of

action,’ ” ibid., though the answer is not always so simple.

See, e.g., id., at 388–391, and n. 3; Dodd v. United States,

545 U. S. 353, 360 (2005). Where, for example, a particu-

lar claim may not realistically be brought while a violation

is ongoing, such a claim may accrue at a later date. See

Wallace, 549 U. S., at 389.

An accrual analysis begins with identifying “ ‘the specific

constitutional right’ ” alleged to have been infringed.

Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 12)

(quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U. S. 266, 271 (1994)

(plurality opinion)). Though McDonough’s complaint does

not ground his fabricated-evidence claim in a particular

constitutional provision, the Second Circuit treated his

claim as arising under the Due Process Clause. 898 F. 3d,

at 266. McDonough’s claim, this theory goes, seeks to

vindicate a “ ‘right not to be deprived of liberty as a result

of the fabrication of evidence by a government officer.’ ”

Ibid. (quoting Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F. 3d 342, 349 (CA2

2000)); see also, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269

(1959). We assume without deciding that the Second

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 5

Opinion of the Court

Circuit’s articulations of the right at issue and its contours

are sound, having not granted certiorari to resolve those

separate questions. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477,

480, n. 2 (1994) (accepting the lower courts’ characteriza-

tion of the relevant claims).2

B

As noted above, this Court often decides accrual ques-

tions by referring to the common-law principles governing

analogous torts. See Wallace, 549 U. S., at 388; Heck, 512

U. S., at 483. These “principles are meant to guide rather

than to control the definition of §1983 claims,” such that

the common law serves “ ‘more as a source of inspired

examples than of prefabricated components.’ ” Manuel,

580 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12).

Relying on our decision in Heck, McDonough analogizes

his fabricated-evidence claim to the common-law tort of

——————

2 In accepting the Court of Appeals’ treatment of McDonough’s claim

as one sounding in denial of due process, we express no view as to what

other constitutional provisions (if any) might provide safeguards

against the creation or use of fabricated evidence enforceable through a

42 U. S. C. §1983 action. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 70

(1992) (“Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accord-

ingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution’s commands”).

Moreover, because the Second Circuit understood McDonough’s due

process claim to allege a deprivation of liberty, we have no occasion to

consider the proper handling of a fabricated-evidence claim founded on

an allegation that the use of fabricated evidence was so egregious as to

shock the conscience, see, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S.

833, 849 (1998), or caused harms exclusively to “interests other than

the interest in freedom from physical restraint,” Albright v. Oliver, 510

U. S. 266, 283 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see also,

e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton

on Law of Torts §119, p. 870 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser & Keeton) (“[O]ne

who is wrongfully prosecuted may suffer both in reputation and by

confinement”). Accordingly, we do not address what the accrual rule

would be for a claim rooted in other types of harm independent of a

liberty deprivation, as no such claim is before us. See 898 F. 3d 259,

266 (CA2 2018).

6 MCDONOUGH v. SMITH

Opinion of the Court

malicious prosecution, a type of claim that accrues only

once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in

the plaintiff ’s favor. 512 U. S., at 484; Prosser & Keeton

§119, at 871, 874–875; Restatement (Second) of Torts

§§653, 658 (1976); 3 D. Dobbs, P. Hayden, & E. Bublick,

Law of Torts §§586, 590, pp. 388–389, 402–404 (2d ed.

2011) (Dobbs). McDonough is correct that malicious pros-

ecution is the most analogous common-law tort here.

Common-law malicious prosecution requires showing, in

part, that a defendant instigated a criminal proceeding

with improper purpose and without probable cause. Re-

statement (Second) of Torts §653; see also Dobbs §586, at

388–389; Prosser & Keeton §119, at 871.3 The essentials

of McDonough’s claim are similar: His claim requires him

to show that the criminal proceedings against him—and

consequent deprivations of his liberty4—were caused by

Smith’s malfeasance in fabricating evidence. At bottom,

both claims challenge the integrity of criminal prosecu-

——————

3 The Second Circuit borrowed the common-law elements of malicious

prosecution to govern McDonough’s distinct constitutional malicious

prosecution claim, which is not before us. See 898 F. 3d, at 268, n. 10.

This Court has not defined the elements of such a §1983 claim, see

Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at 14–15), and

this case provides no occasion to opine on what the elements of a

constitutional malicious prosecution action under §1983 are or how

they may or may not differ from those of a fabricated-evidence claim.

Similarly, while noting that only McDonough’s malicious prosecution

claim was barred on absolute-immunity grounds below, we make no

statement on whether or how the doctrine of absolute immunity would

apply to McDonough’s fabricated-evidence claim. Any further consider-

ation of that question is properly addressed by the Second Circuit on

remand, subject to ordinary principles of waiver and forfeiture.

4 Though McDonough was not incarcerated pending trial, he was

subject to restrictions on his ability to travel and other “ ‘restraints not

shared by the public generally,’ ” Justices of Boston Municipal Court v.

Lydon, 466 U. S. 294, 301 (1984), and as the case comes to this Court, it

is undisputed that McDonough has pleaded a liberty deprivation. See

898 F. 3d, at 266.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 7

Opinion of the Court

tions undertaken “pursuant to legal process.” See Heck,

512 U. S., at 484.5

We follow the analogy where it leads: McDonough could

not bring his fabricated-evidence claim under §1983 prior

to favorable termination of his prosecution. As Heck

explains, malicious prosecution’s favorable-termination

requirement is rooted in pragmatic concerns with avoiding

parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject

matter and the related possibility of conflicting civil and

criminal judgments. See id., at 484–485; see also Prosser

& Keeton §119, at 874; Dobbs §589, at 402. The require-

ment likewise avoids allowing collateral attacks on crimi-

nal judgments through civil litigation. Heck, 512 U. S., at

484. These concerns track “similar concerns for finality

and consistency” that have motivated this Court to refrain

from multiplying avenues for collateral attack on criminal

judgments through civil tort vehicles such as §1983. Id.,

at 485; see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 490

(1973) (noting the “strong policy requiring exhaustion of

state remedies” in order “to avoid the unnecessary friction

between the federal and state court systems”); Younger v.

Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 43 (1971) (“Since the beginning of

this country’s history Congress has, subject to few excep-

tions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try

state cases free from interference by federal courts”).

Because a civil claim such as McDonough’s, asserting that

fabricated evidence was used to pursue a criminal judg-

——————

5 Smith urges the Court to steer away from the comparison to mali-

cious prosecution, noting that the Second Circuit treats malicious

prosecution claims and fabricated-evidence claims as distinct. See id.,

at 268, and n. 12. But two constitutional claims may differ yet still

both resemble malicious prosecution more than any other common-law

tort; comparing constitutional and common-law torts is not a one-to-one

matching exercise. See, e.g., Heck, 512 U. S., at 479, 484 (analogizing

malicious prosecution to several distinct claims). Tellingly, Smith has

not suggested an alternative common-law analogy. See Tr. of Oral Arg.

44–46.

8 MCDONOUGH v. SMITH

Opinion of the Court

ment, implicates the same concerns, it makes sense to

adopt the same rule.6

Heck confirms the strength of this analogy. In Heck, a

prisoner serving a 15-year sentence for manslaughter

sought damages under §1983 against state prosecutors

and an investigator for alleged misconduct similar to that

alleged here, including knowingly destroying exculpatory

evidence and causing an illegal voice identification proce-

dure to be employed at the prisoner’s trial. 512 U. S., at

478–479. The Court took as a given the lower courts’

conclusion that those claims all effectively “challeng[ed]

the legality of ” the plaintiff ’s conviction. Id., at 480, n. 2.

Looking first to the common law, the Court observed that

malicious prosecution “provide[d] the closest analogy to”

such claims because, unlike other potentially analogous

common-law claims, malicious prosecution “permits dam-

ages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process.”

Id., at 484.

Emphasizing the concerns with parallel litigation and

conflicting judgments just discussed, see id., at 484–486,

the Court in Heck held that “in order to recover damages

for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,

or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a plaintiff

in a §1983 action first had to prove that his conviction had

been invalidated in some way, id., at 486. This favorable-

termination requirement, the Court explained, applies

whenever “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would nec-

essarily imply” that his prior conviction or sentence was

——————

6 Such considerations are why Congress has determined that a peti-

tion for writ of habeas corpus, not a §1983 action, “is the appropriate

remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of

their confinement,” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 490 (1973),

including confinement pending trial before any conviction has occurred,

see id., at 491 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410

U. S. 484 (1973)).

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invalid. Id., at 487.

This case differs from Heck because the plaintiff in Heck

had been convicted, while McDonough was acquitted.

Although some claims do fall outside Heck’s ambit when a

conviction is merely “anticipated,” Wallace, 549 U. S., at

393, however, McDonough’s claims are not of that kind,

see infra, at 11–12. As articulated by the Court of Ap-

peals, his claims challenge the validity of the criminal

proceedings against him in essentially the same manner

as the plaintiff in Heck challenged the validity of his con-

viction. And the pragmatic considerations discussed in

Heck apply generally to civil suits within the domain of

habeas corpus, not only to those that challenge convic-

tions. See Preiser, 411 U. S., at 490–491. The principles

and reasoning of Heck thus point toward a corollary result

here: There is not “ ‘a complete and present cause of ac-

tion,’ ” Wallace, 549 U. S., at 388, to bring a fabricated-

evidence challenge to criminal proceedings while those

criminal proceedings are ongoing. Only once the criminal

proceeding has ended in the defendant’s favor, or a result-

ing conviction has been invalidated within the meaning of

Heck, see 512 U. S., at 486–487, will the statute of limita-

tions begin to run.7

C

The soundness of this conclusion is reinforced by the

consequences that would follow from the Second Circuit’s

approach, which would impose a ticking limitations clock

on criminal defendants as soon as they become aware that

fabricated evidence has been used against them. Such a

rule would create practical problems in jurisdictions where

prosecutions regularly last nearly as long as—or even

longer than—the relevant civil limitations period. See

——————

7 Because McDonough was not free to sue prior to his acquittal, we

need not reach his alternative argument that his claim was timely

because it alleged a continuing violation.

10 MCDONOUGH v. SMITH

Opinion of the Court

Brief for Petitioner 53–55; Brief for Criminal Defense

Organizations et al. as Amici Curiae 23–24. A significant

number of criminal defendants could face an untenable

choice between (1) letting their claims expire and (2) filing

a civil suit against the very person who is in the midst of

prosecuting them. The first option is obviously undesir-

able, but from a criminal defendant’s perspective the latter

course, too, is fraught with peril: He risks tipping his hand

as to his defense strategy, undermining his privilege

against self-incrimination, and taking on discovery obliga-

tions not required in the criminal context. See SEC v.

Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F. 2d 1368, 1376 (CADC

1980) (en banc). Moreover, as noted above, the parallel

civil litigation that would result if plaintiffs chose the

second option would run counter to core principles of

federalism, comity, consistency, and judicial economy. See

supra, at 7–8.

Smith suggests that stays and ad hoc abstention are

sufficient to avoid the problems of two-track litigation.

Such workarounds are indeed available when claims

falling outside Heck’s scope nevertheless are initiated

while a state criminal proceeding is pending, see Wallace,

549 U. S., at 393–394 (noting the power of district courts

to stay civil actions while criminal prosecutions proceed);

Heck, 512 U. S., at 487–488, n. 8 (noting possibility of

abstention), but Smith’s solution is poorly suited to the

type of claim at issue here. When, as here, a plaintiff ’s

claim “necessarily” questions the validity of a state pro-

ceeding, id., at 487, there is no reason to put the onus to

safeguard comity on district courts exercising case-by-case

discretion—particularly at the foreseeable expense of

potentially prejudicing litigants and cluttering dockets

with dormant, unripe cases. Cf. Panetti v. Quarterman,

551 U. S. 930, 943 (2007) (noting that a scheme requiring

“conscientious defense attorneys” to file unripe suits

“would add to the burden imposed on courts, applicants,

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 11

Opinion of the Court

and the States, with no clear advantage to any”). The

accrual rule we adopt today, by contrast, respects the

autonomy of state courts and avoids these costs to liti-

gants and federal courts.

In deferring rather than inviting such suits, we adhere

to familiar principles. The proper approach in our federal

system generally is for a criminal defendant who believes

that the criminal proceedings against him rest on know-

ingly fabricated evidence to defend himself at trial and, if

necessary, then to attack any resulting conviction through

collateral review proceedings. McDonough therefore had a

complete and present cause of action for the loss of his

liberty only once the criminal proceedings against him

terminated in his favor.

III

Smith’s counterarguments do not sway the result.

First, Smith argues that Heck is irrelevant to

McDonough’s claim, relying on this Court’s opinion in

Wallace. Wallace held that the limitations period begins

to run on a §1983 claim alleging an unlawful arrest under

the Fourth Amendment as soon as the arrestee “becomes

detained pursuant to legal process,” not when he is ulti-

mately released. 549 U. S., at 397. The Court rejected the

plaintiff ’s reliance on Heck, stating that the Heck rule

comes “into play only when there exists ‘a conviction or

sentence that has not been . . . invalidated,’ that is to say,

an ‘outstanding criminal judgment.’ ” Wallace, 549 U. S.,

at 393. The Court thus declined to adopt the plaintiff ’s

theory “that an action which would impugn an anticipated

future conviction cannot be brought until that conviction

occurs and is set aside,” because doing so in the context of

an action for false arrest would require courts and liti-

gants “to speculate about whether a prosecution will be

brought, whether it will result in conviction, and whether

the pending civil action will impugn that verdict—all this

12 MCDONOUGH v. SMITH

Opinion of the Court

at a time when it can hardly be known what evidence

the prosecution has in its possession.” Ibid. (citations

omitted).8

Smith is correct that Heck concerned a plaintiff serving

a sentence for a still-valid conviction and that Wallace

distinguished Heck on that basis, but Wallace did not

displace the principles in Heck that resolve this case. A

false-arrest claim, Wallace explained, has a life independ-

ent of an ongoing trial or putative future conviction—it

attacks the arrest only to the extent it was without legal

process, even if legal process later commences. See 549

U. S., at 389–390, 393. That feature made the claim anal-

ogous to common-law false imprisonment. Id., at 389. By

contrast, a claim like McDonough’s centers on evidence

used to secure an indictment and at a criminal trial, so it

does not require “speculat[ion] about whether a prosecu-

tion will be brought.” Id., at 393. It directly challenges—

and thus necessarily threatens to impugn—the prosecu-

tion itself. See Heck, 512 U. S., at 486–487.

Second, Smith notes (1) that a fabricated-evidence claim

in the Second Circuit (unlike a malicious prosecution

claim) can exist even if there is probable cause and (2) that

McDonough was acquitted. In other words, McDonough

theoretically could have been prosecuted without the

fabricated evidence, and he was not convicted even with it.

Because a violation thus could exist no matter its effect on

the outcome, Smith reasons, “the date on which that out-

come occurred is irrelevant.” Brief for Respondent 26.

Smith is correct in one sense. One could imagine a

fabricated-evidence claim that does not allege that the

violation’s consequence was a liberty deprivation occa-

sioned by the criminal proceedings themselves. See n. 2,

——————

8 Heck itself suggested that a similar rule might allow at least some

Fourth Amendment unlawful-search claims to proceed without a

favorable termination. See 512 U. S., at 487, n. 7.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 13

Opinion of the Court

supra. To be sure, the argument for adopting a favorable-

termination requirement would be weaker in that context.

That is not, however, the nature of McDonough’s claim.

As already explained, McDonough’s claim remains most

analogous to a claim of common-law malicious prosecu-

tion, even if the two are not identical. See supra, at 6–7.

Heck explains why favorable termination is both relevant

and required for a claim analogous to malicious prosecu-

tion that would impugn a conviction, and that rationale

extends to an ongoing prosecution as well: The alternative

would impermissibly risk parallel litigation and conflicting

judgments. See supra, at 7–8. If the date of the favorable

termination was relevant in Heck, it is relevant here.

It does not change the result, meanwhile, that

McDonough suffered harm prior to his acquittal. The

Court has never suggested that the date on which a con-

stitutional injury first occurs is the only date from which a

limitations period may run. Cf. Wallace, 549 U. S., at

389–391, and n. 3 (explaining that the statute of limita-

tions for false-arrest claims does not begin running when

the initial arrest takes place). To the contrary, the injury

caused by a classic malicious prosecution likewise first

occurs as soon as legal process is brought to bear on a

defendant, yet favorable termination remains the accrual

date. See Heck, 512 U. S., at 484.9

Third and finally, Smith argues that the advantages of

his rule outweigh its disadvantages as a matter of policy.

——————

9 As for Smith’s suggestion that the fabricated evidence could not

have caused any liberty deprivation where, as here, there could have

been probable cause and there was in fact an acquittal, it suffices to

reiterate that we assume the contours of the claim as defined by the

Second Circuit, see supra, at 5, 6–7, and nn. 2, 4, and thus accept its

undisputed conclusion that there was a sufficient liberty deprivation

here, see 898 F. 3d, at 266; see also Garnett v. Undercover Officer

C0039, 838 F. 3d 265, 277 (CA2 2016) (explaining that “a further

deprivation of liberty can result from the fabrication of evidence even if

the initial arrest is lawful”).

14 MCDONOUGH v. SMITH

Opinion of the Court

In his view, the Second Circuit’s approach would provide

more predictable guidance, while the favorable-

termination approach fosters perverse incentives for pros-

ecutors (who may become reluctant to offer favorable

resolutions) and risks foreclosing meritorious claims (for

example, where an outcome is not clearly “favorable”).

These arguments are unconvincing. We agree that clear

accrual rules are valuable but fail to see how assessing

when proceedings terminated favorably will be, on bal-

ance, more burdensome than assessing when a criminal

defendant “learned that the evidence was false and was

used against him” and deprived him of liberty as a result.

898 F. 3d, at 265. And while the risk of foreclosing certain

claims and the potential incentive effects that Smith

identifies could be valid considerations in other contexts,10

they do not overcome the greater danger that plaintiffs

will be deterred under Smith’s theory from suing for re-

dress of egregious misconduct, see supra, at 10—nor

do they override the guidance of the common law and

precedent.

IV

The statute of limitations for McDonough’s §1983 claim

alleging that he was prosecuted using fabricated evidence

began to run when the criminal proceedings against him

——————

10 Because McDonough’s acquittal was unquestionably a favorable

termination, we have no occasion to address the broader range of ways

a criminal prosecution (as opposed to a conviction) might end favorably

to the accused. Cf. Heck, 512 U. S., at 486–487. To the extent Smith

argues that the law in this area should take account of prosecutors’

broad discretion over such matters as the terms on which pleas will be

offered or whether charges will be dropped, those arguments more

properly bear on the question whether a given resolution should be

understood as favorable or not. Such considerations might call for a

context-specific and more capacious understanding of what constitutes

“favorable” termination for purposes of a §1983 false-evidence claim,

but that is not the question before us.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 15

Opinion of the Court

terminated in his favor—that is, when he was acquitted at

the end of his second trial. The judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is therefore

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–485

_________________

EDWARD G. MCDONOUGH, PETITIONER v. YOUEL

SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SPECIAL DISTRICT

ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF

RENSSELAER, NEW YORK,

AKA TREY SMITH

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2019]

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and

JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting.

We granted certiorari to decide when “the statute of

limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fabrication of

evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run.” Pet. for

Cert. i. McDonough, however, declined to take a definitive

position on the “threshold inquiry in a [42 U. S. C.] §1983

suit”: “ ‘identify[ing] the specific constitutional right’ at

issue.” Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op.,

at 12) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U. S. 266, 271

(1994) (plurality opinion)). Because it is only “[a]fter

pinpointing that right” that courts can proceed to “deter-

mine the elements of, and rules associated with, an action

seeking damages for its violation,” Manuel, 580 U. S., at

___ (slip op., at 12), we should have dismissed this case as

improvidently granted.

McDonough’s failure to specify which constitutional

right the respondent allegedly violated profoundly compli-

cates our inquiry. McDonough argues that malicious

prosecution is the common-law tort most analogous to his

fabrication-of-evidence claim. But without “ ‘identify[ing]

the specific constitutional right’ at issue,” we cannot ad-

2 MCDONOUGH v. SMITH

THOMAS, J., dissenting

here to the contours of that right when “applying, select-

ing among, or adjusting common-law approaches.” Ibid.

McDonough also contends that his suit is timely because

he suffered a continuing constitutional violation, but this

argument is similarly difficult to evaluate without identi-

fying precisely what that violation was. Moreover, be-

cause the constitutional basis for McDonough’s claim is

unclear, we are unable to confirm that he has a constitu-

tional claim at all. In my view, it would be both logical

and prudent to address that antecedent question before

addressing the statute of limitations for that claim.

McDonough also urges us to resolve the question pre-

sented by extending Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475

(1973), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994). But

the analysis under both cases depends on what facts a

§1983 plaintiff would need to prove to prevail on his

claim.1 And McDonough declines to take a position on

that issue as well. See Brief for Petitioner 19 (“The Court

thus does not need to delve into what the elements of

McDonough’s constitutional claim are”); see also id., at

37–38, n. 11.

Further complicating this case, McDonough raised a

malicious-prosecution claim alongside his fabrication-of-

evidence claim. The District Court dismissed that claim

on grounds of absolute immunity. McDonough has not

fully explained the difference between that claim and his

——————

1 See Preiser, 411 U. S., at 500 (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challeng-

ing the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the

relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate

release or a speedier release from that imprisonment,” he cannot bring

suit under §1983); Heck, 512 U. S., at 486–487 (“[T]o recover damages

for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment . . . a §1983

plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been” reversed,

expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question); accord, id., at

486, n. 6 (explaining that a §1983 action will not lie where a plaintiff

would have to negate an element of the offense of which he was convicted

to succeed on his §1983 claim).

Cite as: 588 U. S. ____ (2019) 3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

fabrication claim, which he insists is both analogous to the

common-law tort of malicious prosecution and distinct

from his dismissed malicious-prosecution claim. See Tr. of

Oral Arg. 11–12; Reply Brief 3–4. Additionally, it appears

that McDonough’s fabrication claim could face dismissal

on absolute-immunity grounds on remand. Brief for United

States as Amicus Curiae 29–32.

The Court, while recognizing that it is critical to ascer-

tain the basis for a §1983 claim when deciding how to

“handl[e]” it, ante, at 5, n. 2, attempts to evade these

issues by “assum[ing] without deciding that the Second

Circuit’s articulations of the right at issue and its contours

are sound.” Ante, at 4–5. But because the parties have

not accepted the Second Circuit’s view that the claim

sounds in procedural due process,2 that claim as “articu-

lated by the Court of Appeals” might be different from the

claim McDonough actually brought. Ante, at 9. The better

course would be to dismiss this case as improvidently

granted and await a case in which the threshold question

of the basis of a “fabrication-of-evidence” claim is cleanly

presented. Moreover, even if the Second Circuit were

correct that McDonough asserts a violation of the Due

Process Clause, it would be preferable for the Court to

determine the claim’s elements before deciding its statute

of limitations.

* * *

McDonough asks the Court to bypass the antecedent

question of the nature and elements of his claim and first

determine its statute of limitations. We should have

declined the invitation and dismissed the writ of certiorari

as improvidently granted. I therefore respectfully dissent.

——————

2 See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7 (petitioner) (citing the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments); id., at 42 (respondent) (asserting that the claim is not a

procedural due process claim).