Opinion

L. Pittman v. Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs

Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Jun 12, 2019
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Wojcik, J. ~ Dissenting Opinion by: Simpson, J.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.9%

holding that when both parents share legal custody of a child, the consent of both parents is needed with respect to major decisions

How later courts described this case

  • holding that when both parents share legal custody of a child, the consent of both parents is needed with respect to major decisions

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Laurie S. Pittman, Ph.D., :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1007 C.D. 2018

: Argued: March 12, 2019

Bureau of Professional and :

Occupational Affairs, State :

Board of Psychology, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: June 12, 2019

Laurie S. Pittman, Ph.D. (Petitioner) petitions for review of the June

25, 2018 order of the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs (Bureau),

State Board of Psychology (Board) suspending Petitioner’s license to practice

psychology with the suspension immediately stayed in favor of no less than three

years of supervised probation. We affirm.

I. Background

The underlying facts, as found by the Board, are as follows.

Petitioner has worked as a licensed psychologist in the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania since 1997. She routinely performs custody evaluations and has

conducted nearly 100 throughout her career.

In 2013, the married parents of three minor children (Mother and

Father) were in the process of divorcing and shared joint legal custody of their

children. Mother scheduled an appointment for a custody evaluation with

Petitioner on November 22, 2013. During intake, Mother indicated that the

custody evaluation was required in order for her children to attend court-ordered

therapy.

Petitioner was aware that consent from both parents is required to

perform a custody evaluation and knew that Mother and Father were involved in a

contentious divorce. At the time of the scheduled appointment, Petitioner entered

the lobby and found that only Mother and the children were present. Mother

immediately handed Petitioner photographs showing injuries to one of the

children’s backs. After seeing these photos, Petitioner no longer intended to

perform a custody evaluation, but instead determined that she was a mandated

reporter of suspected child abuse.1

Petitioner then individually interviewed the three children and

Mother, who each described similar instances of abuse by Father. Mother also

expressed ongoing frustration about the divorce proceeding. The interviews lasted

a total of six hours. Petitioner did not obtain Father’s consent to evaluate the

children or attempt to evaluate Father before, during, or after the interviews with

Mother and the children.

Thereafter, Petitioner drafted a nearly 50-page report titled, “Custodial

and Psychological Report of [Mother], [children]” (Custodial Report). In the

1

See Section 6311(a) of the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL), 23 Pa. C.S. §6311(a),

defining mandated reporters of suspected child abuse as including persons licensed to practice in

any health-related field under the jurisdiction of the Department of State.

2

Custodial Report, Petitioner made the following recommendations: (1) all family

members receive therapy in order to heal from the abuse and divorce; (2) an x-ray

be taken of the youngest child’s back; (3) Mother be awarded sole custody of the

children; (4) Father be prohibited from spending time with the children until first

receiving psychotherapy; and (5) if Father receives psychotherapy, his therapist

should coordinate with the children’s therapist to determine if and when Father is

ready to make amends. Petitioner did not include a disclaimer in the Custodial

Report limiting the extent of her findings and recommendations in lieu of obtaining

Father’s consent or evaluation. She did not attempt to contact Father before,

during, or after writing the Custodial Report.

Petitioner filed a report of suspected child abuse to the Pennsylvania

Department of Human Services, ChildLine and Abuse Registry (ChildLine). She

did not provide ChildLine with a copy of the Custodial Report; however, she did

give a copy of the Custodial Report to Mother. See Board 7/25/2018 Opinion at

14. Ultimately, ChildLine concluded that the report of suspected child abuse was

unfounded. Mother was not awarded sole custody of the children per Petitioner’s

recommendation, and the shared custody agreement between Mother and Father

remained in place. As of the date of the Board’s hearing, there were no further

allegations of abuse in the present matter.

Christopher A. Connolly, a Professional Conduct Investigator II for

the Pennsylvania Department of State, Bureau of Enforcement and Investigation

was assigned to investigate a complaint and determine whether Petitioner engaged

in unprofessional conduct. He completed a final investigation report for this case.

The Bureau of Enforcement and Investigation also requested that psychologist,

David J. LaPorte, Ph.D, review the case. In 2016, Dr. LaPorte issued an expert

3

report detailing his review of the investigative findings, and other relevant

documents. On April 12, 2017, amended on September 26, 2017, the Board issued

a four-count order to show cause (OSC) against Petitioner alleging violations under

the Professional Psychologists Practice Act (Act).2 The alleged violations were

based on Petitioner’s issuance of an improper custody evaluation.

In Counts I, II, and III of the OSC, the Bureau alleged that Petitioner

was subject to discipline under Section 8(a)(9) of the Act3 for failing to comply

with American Psychological Association (APA) standards in violation of Ethical

Principle 3(e) of the Board’s regulations, 49 Pa. Code §41.61.4 Specifically, the

Bureau alleged in Count I that Petitioner violated Section 9.01(b) of the APA

Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (APA Code) by providing

a psychological opinion about Father without first evaluating him or making an

2

Act of March 23, 1972, P.L. 136, No. 52, as amended, 63 P.S. §§1201-1218.

3

Section 8(a)(9) permits the Board to revoke or suspend a license for “[v]iolating a

lawful regulation promulgated by the board, including, but not limited to, ethical regulations, or

violating a lawful order of the board previously entered in a disciplinary proceeding.” 63 P.S.

§1208(a)(9).

4

Ethical Principle 3(e) of the Board’s regulations provides:

As practitioners and researchers, psychologists act in accord with

American Psychological Association standards and guidelines

related to practice and to the conduct of research with human

beings and animals. In the ordinary course of events, psychologists

adhere to relevant governmental laws and institutional regulations.

Whenever the laws, regulations or standards are in conflict,

psychologists make known their commitment to a resolution of the

conflict. Both practitioners and researchers are concerned with the

development of laws and regulations which best serve the public

interest.

49 Pa. Code §41.61.

4

effort to evaluate him;5 in Count II that Petitioner violated Section 903 of the APA

Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology (APA Guidelines) by failing to

clarify the limitations of her opinions without Father’s evaluation;6 and in Count

5

Section 9.01(b) of the APA Guidelines, concerning Bases for Assessments, provides:

(b) Except as noted in 9.01(c), psychologists provide opinions of

the psychological characteristics of individuals only after they have

conducted an examination of the individuals adequate to support

their statements or conclusions. When, despite reasonable efforts,

such an examination is not practical, psychologists document the

efforts they made and the result of those efforts, clarify the

probable impact of their limited information on the reliability and

validity of their opinions, and appropriately limit the nature and

extent of their conclusions or recommendations. []

APA Code, Section 9.01(b), see 49 Pa. Code §41.61, Ethical Principle 3(e).

Additionally, Section 9.01(c) states:

When psychologists conduct a record review or provide

consultation or supervision and an individual examination is not

warranted or necessary for the opinion, psychologists explain this

and the sources of information on which they based their

conclusions and recommendations.

APA Code, Section 9.10(c); see 49 Pa. Code §41.61, Ethical Principle 3(e).

6

Section 9.03 of the APA Guidelines provides:

Forensic practitioners recognize their obligations to only provide

written or oral evidence about the psychological characteristics of

particular individuals when they have sufficient information or

data to form an adequate foundation for those opinions or to

substantiate their findings (EPPCC Standard 9.01). Forensic

practitioners seek to make reasonable efforts to obtain such

information or data, and they document their efforts to obtain it.

When it is not possible or feasible to examine individuals about

whom they are offering an opinion, forensic practitioners strive to

(Footnote continued on next page…)

5

III, that Petitioner violated Section 3.10(b) of the APA Code by failing to obtain

Father’s consent before evaluating the children.7 Additionally, in Count IV, the

Bureau alleged that Petitioner violated Section 8(a)(11) of the Act8 by failing to

conform to the standards of acceptable and prevailing psychological practice.

(continued…)

make clear the impact of such limitations on the reliability and

validity of their professional products, opinions, or testimony.

When conducting a record review or providing consultation or

supervision that does not warrant an individual examination,

forensic practitioners seek to identify the sources of information on

which they are basing their opinions and recommendations,

including any substantial limitations to their opinions and

recommendations.

APA Guidelines, Section 9.03; see 49 Pa. Code §41.61, Ethical Principle 3(e).

7

Section 3.10(b) of the APA Code states:

(b) For persons who are legally incapable of giving informed

consent, psychologists nevertheless (1) provide an appropriate

explanation, (2) seek the individual’s assent, (3) consider such

persons’ preferences and best interests, and (4) obtain appropriate

permission from a legally authorized person, if such substitute

consent is permitted or required by law. When consent by a legally

authorized person is not permitted or required by law,

psychologists take reasonable steps to protect the individual’s

rights and welfare.

APA Code, Section 3.10(b); see 49 Pa. Code §41.61, Ethical Principle 3(e).

8

Section 8(a)(11) permits the Board to revoke or suspend a license for:

Committing immoral or unprofessional conduct. Unprofessional

conduct shall include any departure from, or failure to conform to,

the standards of acceptable and prevailing psychological practice.

Actual injury to a client need not be established.

(Footnote continued on next page…)

6

Petitioner filed a response to the OSC denying the Bureau’s

allegations. Petitioner asserted that each of the three children separately reported

numerous instances where Father physically, psychologically, and emotionally

abused them, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 268,9 and stated that she was provided

with documentary evidence supporting these abuse allegations. Petitioner averred

that once Mother handed her photos of suspected child abuse, she was no longer a

neutral custody evaluator but an advocate for the children as a mandated reporter

of suspected child abuse under Section 6311 of the CPSL, 23 Pa. C.S. §6311.10

A hearing was held before the Board. The Bureau’s expert, Dr.

LaPorte, testified that once Petitioner became a mandated reporter, she should have

stopped the custody evaluation because she could no longer maintain neutrality

and, by her own admission, had become an “advocate” for the children. Dr.

(continued…)

63 P.S. §1208(a)(11).

9

But see R.R. at 414 (Petitioner’s testimony that during her interviews of the three

children, the daughter told Petitioner that unlike her brothers, she had not been abused).

10

Petitioner also argued that the Superior Court has already recognized her status as a

mandated reporter; as such, she was entitled to statutory immunity and did not violate the APA

Code. In a separate and unrelated action, [Father] v. Pittman, 150 A.3d 58, 68 (Pa. Super.

2016), Father sued Petitioner for defamation and negligence for producing the recommendations

and conclusions within her Custodial Report. Our Superior Court denied Father’s request for

Petitioner’s records of interviews with Mother and the children, as both irrelevant and

confidential under the CPSL, and thus, not discoverable. In its analysis of Father’s defamation

claim, the court stated that while Petitioner initially came into contact with Mother and the

children as a neutral third-party custody evaluator, she became a mandated reporter of abuse

when she obtained information of their alleged abuse. In this disciplinary proceeding, Petitioner

asserted that the Board erred in failing to apply collateral estoppel to the Superior Court’s finding

that she acted as a mandated reporter. We note that Petitioner’s status as a mandated reporter

was not disputed in this matter.

7

LaPorte testified that psychologists are “not hired to be advocates,” and there is no

written requirement that psychologists become “advocates” for the children in

making a mandated report of suspected child abuse. Dr. LaPorte explained that in

contentious custody cases, it is very common for one parent to alienate children

against the other. He continued that without evaluating both parents, Petitioner

had an incomplete understanding of the case. He stressed that these were

allegations of abuse and stated that these pictures of suspected abuse could have

been photo-shopped. Citing the “Grossman ruling,”11 Dr. LaPorte stated that

because Father shared custody of the children, Petitioner needed Father’s consent

to conduct the custody evaluation. R.R. at 355-56, 360, 363, 373-75, 385, 394-96,

402.

Dr. LaPorte described the distinction between a mandated reporter

gathering information to make a report of suspected child abuse and investigating

as a “gray” area absent specific guidelines from the Board. Nevertheless, Dr.

LaPorte testified that Petitioner’s use of extensive testing and recommendations

were unnecessary actions for a mandated reporter. He also acknowledged that he

had not filed a report of suspected child abuse with ChildLine since it was

established; however, he explained that such reports were previously made to a

local agency and that the law has essentially remained the same. R.R. at 351, 376-

77, 395, 397, 401.

In sum, Dr. LaPorte opined that Petitioner performed an improper

custody evaluation in violation of APA standards because she did not: evaluate

11

See Grossman v. State Board of Psychology, 825 A.2d 748, 759 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)

(holding that when both parents share legal custody of a child, the consent of both parents is

needed with respect to major decisions).

8

Father; gather information from a wide variety of sources as required for custody

evaluations; perform the kind of evaluation necessary to make recommendations

concerning custody or mental health treatment for Father; or qualify the limitations

of her data without Father’s evaluation. Dr. LaPorte also testified that while

Petitioner could have recommended that the youngest child see a physician, she did

not have the professional competence to recommend the performance of medical

procedures, such as x-rays. R.R. at 357, 359, 361, 391-92, 401.

Petitioner testified that she initially intended to perform a custody

evaluation during the scheduled appointment. She said she believed that Mother

had contacted Father about the custody evaluation and that Father was expected to

attend. She recognized that consent from both parents is necessary to perform a

custody evaluation in matters of joint custody and admitted that she did not contact

Father herself. Petitioner stated that when she entered her office lobby to meet the

family on the date of their appointment, Mother “immediately presented pictures

that showed injuries to a child’s back,” a timeline of allegations of abuse, police

reports, and other documents. R.R. at 411-13, 427, 430-32, 439.

Petitioner said that after seeing the photos depicting suspected child

abuse, she “switched gears;” she no longer intended to perform a custody

evaluation as a neutral third party, but was now an advocate for the children

conducting a mandated report of suspected child abuse. Petitioner said that she

could not obtain Father’s consent because he was the alleged perpetrator in her

report of suspected child abuse and ChildLine reports are intended to be

confidential. R.R. at 413-14, 416-17, 427-29, 440.

Petitioner testified that she interviewed Mother and the children to

gain information necessary to make a report of suspected child abuse to

9

ChildLine.12 Petitioner stated that she asked the children a variety of questions,

such as what they liked best about Mother and Father’s respective houses, and she

inquired further about their experiences of alleged abuse by Father. Petitioner

stated that she required this much information in order to call ChildLine because

ChildLine “asks if you’ve done evaluations, assessments, [etc].” R.R. at 417, 419,

424, 434.13

Throughout her testimony, Petitioner stressed that she drafted the

Custodial Report to give to the referring therapist to obtain court-ordered therapy

for the children. She described a tension between her belief that the children truly

needed therapy and the referring therapist’s position that therapy could not be

administered without a custody evaluation, stating that she “couldn’t do the

custody evaluation because it became about mandated reporting.” Petitioner

maintained that she did not conduct a custody evaluation but instead made a report

of suspected child abuse. R.R. at 424, 428, 435, 443, 447.14

12

Section 6313(b) of the CPSL, 23 Pa. C.S. §6313(b), sets forth the information to be

provided in the ChildLine report.

13

Petitioner stated that filing a report to ChildLine over the phone can take anywhere

from 20 minutes to an hour and that her call to ChildLine concerning the present matter took

approximately 20 minutes. R.R. at 407.

14

Several Board members questioned Petitioner about the distinction between a custody

evaluation and a ChildLine report, and their exchange reads, in relevant part:

DR. ERICKSON: [] I saw within your [Custodial R]eport that

there were a number of test results that you presented. What

relevance did that have if this test is – if this [Custodial R]eport

was simply a mandated reporting report?

(Footnote continued on next page…)

10

(continued…)

[PETITIONER]: Because the Court-ordered therapist said she

couldn’t do therapy for the children until there was a custody

evaluation. And the children needed therapy.

DR. ERICKSON: But this wasn’t a custody evaluation. That’s

your contention.

[PETITIONER]: Correct. But it was for the court-ordered

therapist, who said she couldn’t do the therapy.

DR. ERICKSON: But I thought this was a mandated reporter

report. Isn’t that your position?

[PETITIONER]: Yes.

DR. ERICKSON: Okay. So I’m still not clear as to the relevance

of the psychological test data being in the report.

[PETITIONER]: Because ChildLine often will ask, have you done

assessments?

DR. ERICKSON: And in your experience, ChildLine is competent

to interpret psychological tests such as these?

[PETITIONER]: Well, that’s why I wrote what the numbers

meant, what the tests – what the T-scores and the percentiles

meant.

***

DR. SPAYD: I think I’m actually just rephrasing Dr. Erickson’s

question, just to be clear. It’s my understanding that you believe

your [Custodial R]eport had two functions, both as a mandated

reporter, and to the court-ordered therapist.

[PETITIONER]: Yes.

DR. SPAYD: This kind of hybrid – ?

(Footnote continued on next page…)

11

Petitioner testified that she made recommendations in the Custodial

Report without interviewing or treating Father because all of the children described

abuse by Father, the children did not want to stay in Father’s household, and, if

therapy was recommended for everyone but Father, Father would be further

alienated from the family. Petitioner testified that after she filed the ChildLine

report, she gave Mother a copy of the Custodial Report, explaining that she did so

because Mother was representing herself in the divorce and custody proceedings.

R.R. at 434, 444.

Mother also testified at the hearing and primarily spoke about Father’s

alleged abuse of the children. Mother stated that she notified Father about the

custody evaluation, prior to the appointment with Petitioner, but Father did not

respond. R.R. at 450-58, 470.

In its June 25, 2018 decision, the Board found that Petitioner

evaluated the children and made custody and treatment recommendations based on

allegations of abuse without obtaining Father’s consent or allowing him to first

(continued…)

[PETITIONER]: Yes.

DR. BRADLEY: [] But you did not submit a copy of this

[Custodial R]eport to ChildLine? Your report was only verbal at

the time?

[PETITIONER]: They didn’t ask me for the [R]eport. I don’t

know why that was. I told them that I had it, but they didn’t ask

for the copy. Again, this was before 2015, when everything

became streamlined. And you could go online and you could like

type in all of the information. So you were up to the mercy of who

you were talking to on ChildLine.

R.R. at 443-47.

12

respond and supply crucial information. The Board determined that Petitioner did

perform a custody evaluation, not just a report to assist in the mandated reporting

of suspected child abuse.

Based on those findings, the Board sustained all four counts against

Petitioner and ordered that her license to practice psychology be indefinitely

suspended, with the suspension indefinitely stayed pending no less than three years

of probation under the condition that she have a Board-approved practice

supervisor. The Board concluded that while there is no direct evidence that

Petitioner is a danger to the public as a therapist, she is a danger to the public as a

forensic therapist because her actions put a parent and potentially other parents in

positions where they might lose custody of their children because of an improperly

conducted custody evaluation. The Board ordered Petitioner to pay a civil penalty

of $5,000 and successfully complete at least 30 hours of remedial education on the

topic of forensic psychology prior to seeking reinstatement to unrestricted status of

her license.

On November 15, 2018, Petitioner filed an emergency motion for stay

with the Board, which the Board denied on December 6, 2018. The Board’s order

stated that it “shall be effective immediately,” but notes that the probation, civil

penalty, and continuing education shall commence on January 7, 2019.

On December 28, 2018, Petitioner filed an emergency application for

stay or supersedeas, injunction pending review, peremptory mandamus, and other

relief with this Court, claiming that the Board posted its June 25, 2018 order on a

Commonwealth website and informed various insurers that she is on probation.

She asserted that these actions caused her to lose patients and credentialing with

insurers. Petitioner claimed that if the Board’s order was not stayed, the

13

information remained on the website, and the letters to the insurers are not

retracted, she would be unable to engage in her profession without the possibility

of incurring further sanctions. Following argument, by order dated January 4,

2019, this Court granted her requested relief finding that she had met the standard

enunciated in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Process Gas Consumers

Group, 467 A.2d 805 (Pa. 1983). As a result, all sanctions imposed by the Board’s

June 25, 2018 and December 6, 2018 orders were stayed.

II. Discussion

As a “person licensed or certified to practice in any health-related

field under the jurisdiction of the Department of State,” Petitioner indisputably

qualifies as a mandated reporter under Section 6311 of the CPSL. 23 Pa. C.S.

§6311. Mandated reporters are obligated to notify ChildLine upon a suspicion of

child abuse by filing a report. 23 Pa. C.S. §6313(a)(1)-(2). Section 6318 of the

CPSL generally provides that a person who makes a report of suspected child

abuse in good faith shall have immunity from civil and criminal liability.15

15

Section 6318(a) of the CPSL states:

(a) General rule.--A person, hospital, institution, school,

facility, agency or agency employee acting in good faith shall

have immunity from civil and criminal liability that might

otherwise result from any of the following:

(1) Making a report of suspected child abuse or making a referral

for general protective services, regardless of whether the report is

required to be made under this chapter.

(2) Cooperating or consulting with an investigation under this

chapter, including providing information to a child fatality or

near-fatality review team.

(Footnote continued on next page…)

14

On appeal,16 Petitioner argues that the Board erred by failing to afford

her immunity in this proceeding under Section 6318(a) of the CPSL because her

interviews with Mother and the children and the Custodial Report were necessary

to fulfill her responsibility as a mandated reporter of child abuse. We disagree.

By its plain language, Section 6318(a) provides immunity from civil

and criminal liability to persons who, acting in good faith, make a report of

suspected child abuse. To be clear, the Board did not impose discipline based on

Petitioner’s filing a report of suspected abuse with ChildLine. Rather, the Board’s

order is based on Petitioner’s conducting interviews and issuing a Custodial Report

in a manner that violates the Act and the Board’s regulations. Section 6318(a) of

the CPSL does not authorize a licensed psychologist to disregard professional

standards as required by the Act and the Board’s regulations.

(continued…)

(3) Testifying in a proceeding arising out of an instance of

suspected child abuse or general protective services.

(4) Engaging in any action authorized under section 6314

(relating to photographs, medical tests and X-rays of child subject

to report), 6315 (relating to taking child into protective custody),

6316 (relating to admission to private and public hospitals) or

6317 (relating to mandated reporting and postmortem

investigation of deaths).

23 Pa. C.S. §6318(a).

16

Our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether there has been a violation

of constitutional rights, whether errors of law were committed, or whether necessary findings of

fact made by the Board are supported by substantial evidence. Morris v. State Board of

Psychology, 697 A.2d 1034, 1035-36 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).

15

Moreover, while Petitioner testified that she gathered information

from Mother and the children that was necessary to make a report to ChildLine, the

information she collected far exceeded the information identified by Section

6313(b) of the CPSL, which states as follows:

(b) Contents of report.-- A written report of suspected

child abuse, which may be submitted electronically, shall

include the following information, if known:

(1) The names and addresses of the child, the child’s

parents and any other person responsible for the child’s

welfare.

(2) Where the suspected abuse occurred.

(3) The age and sex of each subject of the report.

(4) The nature and extent of the suspected child abuse,

including any evidence of prior abuse to the child or any

sibling of the child.

(5) The name and relationship of each individual

responsible for causing the suspected abuse and any

evidence of prior abuse by each individual.

(6) Family composition.

(7) The source of the report.

(8) The name, telephone number and e-mail address of

the person making the report.

(9) The actions taken by the person making the report,

including those actions taken under section 6314 (relating

to photographs, medical tests and X-rays of child subject

to report), 6315 (relating to taking child into protective

custody), 6316 (relating to admission to private and

public hospitals) or 6317 (relating to mandated reporting

and postmortem investigation of deaths).

16

(10) Any other information required by Federal law or

regulation.[17]

(11) Any other information that the department requires

by regulation.

23 Pa. C.S. §6313(b).

Further, although Petitioner avers that her actions were for the benefit

of ChildLine, she testified that she did not provide a copy of the Custodial Report

to ChildLine and that she gave Mother a copy in order for her to obtain court-

ordered therapy for the children. Petitioner contends that she could not obtain

Father’s consent or evaluation because ChildLine reports are meant to be

confidential. However, substantial evidence, including Petitioner’s own testimony,

supports the Board’s findings that Petitioner actually performed a custody

evaluation in order for the children to receive court-ordered therapy.

Petitioner alternatively argues that if this Court was to find that she

did perform a custody evaluation, Father’s consent was not required under the

“bona fide emergency” exception recognized in Grossman. In Grossman, the

mother’s attorney hired a psychologist, Dr. Grossman, to review another

psychologist’s recommendation of joint custody. Dr. Grossman asked the

mother’s counsel to obtain the father’s consent, but evaluated the child without

first confirming that the father had consented.

Upon learning of Dr. Grossman’s actions in interviewing the child, the

father contacted Dr. Grossman and ordered him to stop seeing the child; however,

Dr. Grossman again met with the child. Dr. Grossman did not produce a formal

17

Subsection (10) of Section 6313(b) of the CPSL was added by the Act of April 15,

2014, P.L. 417, after Petitioner evaluated Mother and the children and issued the Custodial

Report.

17

report of his findings, but he provided feedback about the meetings to the mother’s

attorney. After the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court became aware that

Dr. Grossman had met with the child without first obtaining the father’s consent,

the court ordered that both parents be prohibited from having another professional

evaluate the child without consent from the other parent. Dr. Grossman testified in

the custody trial and the Board issued an OSC, which resulted in the suspension of

Dr. Grossman’s license.

On appeal, we stated the following:

Dr. Grossman argues that he was investigating possible

child abuse, and consequently, did not have to obtain the

consent of [the father] before he met with [the child] on

July 14, 1996. The Board noted that where there is a

“bona fide emergency” a psychologist need not obtain

the consent of both parents in the performance of a

custody evaluation. The Board cited allegations of

sexual abuse or a child’s threat of suicide as examples.

825 A.2d at 759. Like the Board, this Court recognized the existence of an

emergency exception, and agreed that it did not apply to Dr. Grossman’s actions.

Instead, we held that in matters of shared custody, consent from both parents is

required for major decisions before evaluating the child.

Throughout her brief, Petitioner asserts that she was faced with a

“bona fide emergency” as contemplated in Grossman. However, she cites no

evidence to support these assertions. Consequently, we reject her contention that

the Board’s decision is in conflict with our holding in Grossman.

III. Conclusion

In joint custody matters, consent from both parents is required to

perform a custody evaluation. See Grossman; see also APA Code, Section

18

3.10(b); 49 Pa. Code §41.61, Ethical Principle 3(e). The Board found that

Petitioner performed a custody evaluation without first obtaining Father’s consent.

The Board also determined that Petitioner issued a nearly 50-page report, titled in

part, “Custodial Report,” in which she made psychological evaluations about the

entire family and advocated that Mother be awarded sole custody and Father be

denied access to the children until first undergoing psychotherapy. The Board

noted that Petitioner admittedly made no efforts to evaluate or contact Father. The

Board found that Petitioner failed to obtain information from both parties and did

not have a complete picture when making the custody evaluation, which is

particularly concerning in the context of a contentious custody proceeding.

Similarly, the Board found that Petitioner failed to limit the nature of her findings

within the Custodial Report.

The evidence of record supports the Board’s findings that Petitioner’s

conduct in interviewing the children and making the Custodial Report violated

various sections of the APA’s Code and Guidelines in violation of Ethical

Principle 3(e) of the Board’s regulations and acted in an unprofessional way that

departed from acceptable and prevailing standards of psychological practice. The

depth and breadth of the interviews Petitioner conducted far exceeded that

necessary to make a report of suspected abuse to ChildLine. The immunity from

civil and criminal liability afforded under Section 6318 of the CPSL to persons

making a good faith report of suspected child abuse is not relevant to the Board’s

authority to take disciplinary action based on findings of professional misconduct.

Accordingly, we affirm.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

19

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Laurie S. Pittman, Ph.D., :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1007 C.D. 2018

:

Bureau of Professional and :

Occupational Affairs, State :

Board of Psychology, :

:

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 12th day of June, 2019, the order of the Bureau of

Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Board of Psychology, dated June 25,

2018, is AFFIRMED. The stay granted by this Court’s January 4, 2019 order is

LIFTED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Laurie S. Pittman, Ph.D., :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1007 C.D. 2018

: Argued: March 12, 2019

Bureau of Professional and :

Occupational Affairs, State Board :

of Psychology, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

DISSENTING OPINION

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: June 12, 2019

Because I believe the statutory grant of immunity in Section 6318 of

the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL), 23 Pa. C.S. §6318, is broader than that

applied by the Majority, I respectfully dissent. I would vacate the adjudication of

the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Board of Psychology

(Board), which imposed discipline and a “civil penalty” on Laurie S. Pittman, Ph.D.

(Petitioner), and remand for an express determination on whether she acted in good

faith.

Section 6318(a) of the CPSL provides that a person who makes a report

of suspected child abuse in good faith shall have immunity from civil and criminal

liability.1 The Majority treats this broad grant of immunity as inapplicable to

1

Section 6318(a) of the Child Protective Services Law states:

professional licensing matters. Majority Op. at 15. However, by its terms, the

immunity provision applies to “civil and criminal liability.” 23 Pa. C.S. §6318(a).

This case was not a criminal proceeding; rather, it was a civil proceeding, with civil

law burdens of proof, to which the immunity applies. Any doubt about this

interpretation is dispelled by the Board’s imposition of a “civil penalty” of $5,000

upon Petitioner in its order.

Moreover, the grant of immunity applies to making a report of

suspected child abuse “regardless of whether the report is required to be made under

this chapter.” 23 Pa. C.S. §6318(a)(1). This statutory language broadens the

(a) General rule.--A person, hospital, institution, school,

facility, agency or agency employee acting in good faith

shall have immunity from civil and criminal liability that

might otherwise result from any of the following:

(1) Making a report of suspected child abuse or making

a referral for general protective services, regardless of

whether the report is required to be made under this chapter.

(2) Cooperating or consulting with an investigation

under this chapter, including providing information to a child

fatality or near-fatality review team.

(3) Testifying in a proceeding arising out of an instance

of suspected child abuse or general protective services.

(4) Engaging in any action authorized under section

6314 (relating to photographs, medical tests and X-rays of

child subject to report), 6315 (relating to taking child into

protective custody), 6316 (relating to admission to private

and public hospitals) or 6317 (relating to mandated reporting

and postmortem investigation of deaths).

23 Pa. C.S. §6318(a) (emphasis added).

RES - 2

immunity grant beyond the information to be included in a formal report under

Section 6313 of the CPSL, 23 Pa. C.S. §6313, and beyond the immediate

circumstances of the reporting. The Majority’s conclusion to the contrary is reached

without discussion of the broadening language referenced above. See Majority Op.

at 16-17.

In my view, this is exactly the type of situation to which the broad grant

of immunity applies. Because the General Assembly desired more reporting of

suspected child abuse under the CPSL, it granted immunity to good faith reporters

to protect against second-guessing years later by persons removed from the

exigencies of the moment. The broad grant of immunity also protects good faith

reporters from strategic retaliatory lawsuits and other attempts to intimidate them–

efforts which can occur in civil litigation like the instant child custody case. The

after-the-fact professional analysis here only serves to chill the duty of good faith

reporting.

No one argues that Petitioner acted with any improper motive here, but

the Board made no finding as to Petitioner’s state of mind. The Board acted as

though the statutory immunity provision was mere surplusage. I respectfully

disagree with that approach, and I would remand for the Board to consider the

“general rule” statutory immunity and to determine whether Petitioner acted in good

faith.

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

RES - 3

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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