Smith v. Berryhill

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SMITH v. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–1606. Argued March 18, 2019—Decided May 28, 2019

The Social Security Act permits judicial review of “any final decision . . .

after a hearing” by the Social Security Administration (SSA). 42

U. S. C. §405(g). Claimants for, as relevant here, supplemental secu-

rity income disability benefits under Title XVI of the Act must gener-

ally proceed through a four-step administrative process in order to

obtain federal-court review: (1) seek an initial determination of eligi-

bility; (2) seek reconsideration of that determination; (3) request a

hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ); and (4) seek re-

view of the ALJ’s decision by the SSA’s Appeals Council. See 20 CFR

§416.1400. A request for Appeals Council review generally must be

made within 60 days of receiving the ALJ’s ruling, §416.1468; if the

claimant misses the deadline and cannot show good cause for doing

so, the Appeals Council dismisses the request, §416.1471.

Petitioner Ricky Lee Smith’s claim for disability benefits under

Title XVI was denied at the initial-determination stage, upon recon-

sideration, and on the merits after a hearing before an ALJ. The Ap-

peals Council later dismissed Smith’s request for review as untimely.

Smith sought judicial review of the dismissal in a Federal District

Court, which held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit. The

Sixth Circuit affirmed, maintaining that the Appeals Council’s dis-

missal of an untimely petition is not a “final decision” subject to fed-

eral-court review.

Held: An Appeals Council dismissal on timeliness grounds after a

claimant has had an ALJ hearing on the merits qualifies as a “final

decision . . . made after a hearing” for purposes of allowing judicial

review under §405(g). Pp. 5–16.

(a) The statute’s text supports this reading. In the first clause

2 SMITH v. BERRYHILL

Syllabus

(“any final decision”), the phrase “final decision” clearly denotes some

kind of terminal event, and Congress’ use of “any” suggests an intent

to use that term “expansive[ly],” Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552

U. S. 214, 218–219. The Appeals Council’s dismissal of Smith’s claim

fits that language: The SSA’s regulations make it the final stage of

review. See 20 CFR §416.1472. As for the second clause (“made after

a hearing”), Smith obtained the kind of hearing that §405(g) most

naturally suggests: an ALJ hearing on the merits. This case differs

from Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, where the Court found that

the SSA’s denial of a claimant’s petition to reopen a prior denial of

his claim for benefits—a second look that the agency had made avail-

able to claimants as a matter of grace—was not a final decision under

§405(g). Here, by contrast, the SSA’s “final decision” is much more

closely tethered to the relevant “hearing.” A primary application for

benefits may not be denied without an ALJ hearing (if requested),

§405(b)(1), and a claimant’s access to this first bite at the apple is a

matter of legislative right rather than agency grace. There is also no

danger here of thwarting Congress’ own deadline, where the only po-

tential untimeliness concerns Smith’s request for Appeals Council re-

view, not his request for judicial review following the agency’s ulti-

mate determination. Pp. 6–9.

(b) The statutory context also weighs in Smith’s favor. Appeals

from SSA determinations are, by their nature, appeals from the ac-

tion of a federal agency. In the separate administrative-law context

of Administrative Procedure Act (APA) review, an action is “final” if

it both (1) “mark[s] the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmak-

ing process” and (2) is “one by which ‘rights or obligations have been

determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’ ” Bennett v.

Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 177–178. Both conditions are satisfied when a

Social Security claimant has reached the final step of the SSA’s four-

step process and has had his request for review dismissed as untime-

ly. While the administrative-exhaustion requirement “should be ap-

plied with regard for the particular administrative scheme at issue,”

Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 765, the differences between the

two Acts here suggest that Congress wanted more oversight by the

courts rather than less under §405(g) and that “Congress designed

[the statute as a whole] to be ‘unusually protective’ of claimants,”

Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 480. SSA is also a massive

enterprise and mistakes will occur; Congress did not suggest that it

intended for this claimant-protective statute to leave a claimant with

no recourse to the courts if a mistake does happen. Pp. 9–10.

(c) Smith’s entitlement to judicial review is confirmed by “the

strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of adminis-

trative action.” Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 3

Syllabus

476 U. S. 667, 670. The heavy burden for rebutting this presumption

is not met here. Congress left it to the SSA to define the procedures

that claimants like Smith must first pass through, but it has not sug-

gested that it intended for the SSA to be the unreviewable arbiter of

whether claimants have complied with those procedures. Pp. 10–11.

(d) The arguments of amicus in support of the judgment do not

alter this conclusion. Amicus first argues that the phrase “final deci-

sion . . . made after a hearing” refers to a conclusive disposition, after

exhaustion, of a benefits claim on the merits. However, this Court’s

precedents do not support that reading; the Appeals Council’s dismis-

sal is not merely collateral but an end to a proceeding in which a sub-

stantial factual record has already been developed and on which con-

siderable resources have already been expended; and Smith’s case is

distinct from Sanders. Amicus also claims that permitting greater

judicial review could risk a flood of litigation, given the large volume

of claims handled by the SSA, but that result is unlikely, because the

number of Appeals Council untimeliness dismissals is comparatively

small, and because data from the Eleventh Circuit, which follows the

interpretation adopted here, do not bear out amicus’ warning. Third,

amicus flags related contexts that could be informed by this ruling,

but those issues are not before the Court. Finally, amicus argues

that §405(g) is ambiguous and that the SSA’s longstanding interpre-

tation of its meaning—prior to a change of position in this case—is

entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re-

sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, but this is not the kind of

question on which courts defer to agencies. Pp. 11–14.

(e) A reviewing court that disagrees with the procedural ground for

the Appeals Council dismissal should in the ordinary case remand

the case to allow the agency to address substantive issues in the first

place. While there would be jurisdiction for a court to reach the mer-

its, this general rule comports with fundamental administrative-law

principles and is confirmed by the Court’s cases discussing exhaus-

tion in the Social Security context, see City of New York, 476 U. S., at

485. Pp. 14–16.

880 F. 3d 813, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–1606

_________________

RICKY LEE SMITH, PETITIONER v. NANCY A.

BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER

OF SOCIAL SECURITY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[May 28, 2019]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Social Security Act allows for judicial review of “any

final decision . . . made after a hearing” by the Social

Security Administration (SSA). 42 U. S. C. §405(g). Peti-

tioner Ricky Lee Smith was denied Social Security bene-

fits after a hearing by an administrative law judge (ALJ)

and later had his appeal from that denial dismissed as

untimely by the SSA’s Appeals Council—the agency’s final

decisionmaker. This case asks whether the Appeals Coun-

cil’s dismissal of Smith’s claim is a “final decision . . . made

after a hearing” so as to allow judicial review under

§405(g). We hold that it is.

I

A

Congress enacted the Social Security Act in 1935, re-

sponding to the crisis of the Great Depression. 49 Stat.

620; F. Bloch, Social Security Law and Practice 13 (2012).

In its early days, the program was administered by a body

called the Social Security Board; that role has since passed

2 SMITH v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

on to the Board’s successor, the SSA.1

In 1939, Congress amended the Act, adding various

provisions that—subject to changes not at issue here—

continue to govern cases like this one. See Social Security

Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. First,

Congress gave the agency “full power and authority to

make rules and regulations and to establish procedures

. . . necessary or appropriate to carry out” the Act.

§405(a). Second, Congress directed the agency “to make

findings of fac[t] and decisions as to the rights of any

individual applying for a payment” and to provide all

eligible claimants—that is, people seeking benefits—with

an “opportunity for a hearing with respect to such deci-

sion[s].” §405(b)(1). Third, and most centrally, Congress

provided for judicial review of “any final decision of the

[agency] made after a hearing.” §405(g). At the same

time, Congress made clear that review would be available

only “as herein provided”—that is, only under the terms of

§405(g). §405(h); see Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602,

614–615 (1984).

In 1940, the Social Security Board created the Appeals

Council, giving it responsibility for overseeing and review-

ing the decisions of the agency’s hearing officers (who,

today, are ALJs).2 Though the Appeals Council originally

had just three members, its ranks have since swelled to

include over 100 individuals serving as either judges or

officers.3 The Appeals Council remains a creature of

regulatory rather than statutory creation.

Today, the Social Security Act provides disability bene-

——————

1 See Koch & Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the

Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration’s Appeals

Council, 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 199, 234–235 (1990) (Koch & Koplow).

2 See id., at 235.

3 SSA, Brief History and Current Information About the Appeals

Council, https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_ac.html (all Internet mate-

rials as last visited May 22, 2019).

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 3

Opinion of the Court

fits under two programs, known by their statutory head-

ings as Title II and Title XVI. See §401 et seq. (Title II);

§1381 et seq. (Title XVI). Title II “provides old-age, survi-

vor, and disability benefits to insured individuals irrespec-

tive of financial need.” Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U. S. 74,

75 (1988). Title XVI provides supplemental security in-

come benefits “to financially needy individuals who are

aged, blind, or disabled regardless of their insured status.”

Ibid. The regulations that govern the two programs are,

for today’s purposes, equivalent. See Sims v. Apfel, 530

U. S. 103, 107, n. 2 (2000).4 Likewise, §405(g) sets the

terms of judicial review for each. See §1383(c)(3).

Modern-day claimants must generally proceed through

a four-step process before they can obtain review from a

federal court. First, the claimant must seek an initial

determination as to his eligibility. Second, the claimant

must seek reconsideration of the initial determination.

Third, the claimant must request a hearing, which is

conducted by an ALJ. Fourth, the claimant must seek

review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council. See

20 CFR §416.1400. If a claimant has proceeded through

all four steps on the merits, all agree, §405(g) entitles him

to judicial review in federal district court.5

The tension in this case stems from the deadlines that

SSA regulations impose for seeking each successive stage

of review. A party who seeks Appeals Council review, as

relevant here, must file his request within 60 days of

receiving the ALJ’s ruling, unless he can show “good cause

for missing the deadline.” §416.1468.

The Appeals Council’s review is discretionary: It may

deny even a timely request without issuing a decision. See

——————

4 Because Smith seeks benefits under Title XVI, we cite to the regula-

tions that govern Title XVI, which are located at 20 CFR pt. 416 (2018).

The regulations that govern Title II are located at 20 CFR pt. 404.

5 Of course, if the result at any of the four preceding stages is fully

favorable, there is generally no need to proceed further.

4 SMITH v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

§416.1481. If a claimant misses the deadline and cannot

show good cause, however, the Appeals Council does not

deny the request but rather dismisses it. §416.1471.

Dismissals are “binding and not subject to further review”

by the SSA. §416.1472. The question here is whether a

dismissal for untimeliness, after the claimant has had an

ALJ hearing, is a “final decision . . . made after a hearing”

for purposes of allowing judicial review under §405(g).

B

Petitioner Ricky Lee Smith applied for disability bene-

fits under Title XVI in 2012. Smith’s claim was denied at

the initial-determination stage and upon reconsideration.

Smith then requested an ALJ hearing, which the ALJ held

in February 2014 before issuing a decision denying

Smith’s claim on the merits in March 2014.

The parties dispute what happened next. Smith’s attor-

ney says that he sent a letter requesting Appeals Council

review in April 2014, well within the 60-day deadline. The

SSA says that it has no record of receiving any such letter.

In late September 2014, Smith’s attorney sent a copy of

the letter that he assertedly had mailed in April. The

SSA, noting that it had no record of prior receipt, counted

the date of the request as the day that it received the copy.

The Appeals Council accordingly determined that Smith’s

submission was untimely, concluded that Smith lacked

good cause for missing the deadline, and dismissed

Smith’s request for review.

Smith sought judicial review of that dismissal in the

U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.

The District Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear

his suit. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

affirmed, maintaining that “an Appeals Council decision to

refrain from considering an untimely petition for review is

not a ‘final decision’ subject to judicial review in federal

court.’ ” Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security, 880

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 5

Opinion of the Court

F. 3d 813, 814 (2018).

Smith petitioned this Court for certiorari. Responding

to Smith’s petition, the Government stated that while the

Sixth Circuit’s decision accorded with the SSA’s longstand-

ing position, the Government had “reexamined the ques-

tion and concluded that its prior position was incorrect.”

Brief for Respondent on Pet. for Cert. 15.

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the

Courts of Appeals. 586 U. S. ___ (2018).6 Because the

Government agrees with Smith that the Appeals Council’s

dismissal meets §405(g)’s terms, we appointed Deepak

Gupta as amicus curiae to defend the judgment below.

586 U. S. ___ (2018). He has ably discharged his duties.

II

Section 405(g), as noted above, provides for judicial

review of “any final decision . . . made after a hearing.”

This provision, the Court has explained, contains two

separate elements: first, a “jurisdictional” requirement

that claims be presented to the agency, and second, a

“waivable . . . requirement that the administrative reme-

dies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted.” Mathews

v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 328 (1976). This case involves

the latter, nonjurisdictional element of administrative

exhaustion. While §405(g) delegates to the SSA the au-

thority to dictate which steps are generally required, see

Sims, 530 U. S., at 106, exhaustion of those steps may not

——————

6 Seven Courts of Appeals have held that there is no judicial review

under these circumstances, while two have held that there is. Compare

Brandtner v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 150 F. 3d 1306,

1307 (CA10 1998); Bacon v. Sullivan, 969 F. 2d 1517, 1520 (CA3 1992);

Matlock v. Sullivan, 908 F. 2d 492, 494 (CA9 1990); Harper v. Bowen,

813 F. 2d 737, 743 (CA5 1987); Adams v. Heckler, 799 F. 2d 131, 133

(CA4 1986); Smith v. Heckler, 761 F. 2d 516, 518 (CA8 1985); Dietsch v.

Schweiker, 700 F. 2d 865, 867 (CA2 1983), with Casey v. Berryhill, 853

F. 3d 322, 326 (CA7 2017); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F. 2d 1233,

1239 (CA11 1983).

6 SMITH v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

only be waived by the agency, see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422

U. S. 749, 767 (1975), but also excused by the courts, see

Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 484 (1986);

Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 330.7

The question here is whether a dismissal by the Appeals

Council on timeliness grounds after a claimant has re-

ceived an ALJ hearing on the merits qualifies as a “final

decision . . . made after a hearing” for purposes of allowing

judicial review under §405(g). In light of the text, the

context, and the presumption in favor of the reviewability

of agency action, we conclude that it does.

A

We begin with the text. Taking the first clause (“any

final decision”) first, we note that the phrase “final deci-

sion” clearly denotes some kind of terminal event,8 and

Congress’ use of the word “any” suggests an intent to use

that term “expansive[ly],” see Ali v. Federal Bureau of

Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 218–219 (2008). The Appeals

Council’s dismissal of Smith’s claim fits that language:

Under the SSA’s own regulations, it was the final stage of

——————

7 While Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977), can be read to cabin

Eldridge and Salfi to only constitutional claims, the Court’s subsequent

decision in City of New York demonstrates that this understanding of

§405(g) can extend to cases lacking Eldridge’s and Salfi’s constitutional

character. See City of New York, 476 U. S., at 474–475, and n. 5, 482–

484; see also City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1124–1125

(EDNY 1984) (ruling that the agency’s actions violated the Social

Security Act and its own regulations and thus declining to reach the

plaintiffs’ constitutional argument).

8 See 5 Oxford English Dictionary 920 (2d ed. 1989) (Final: “Marking

the last stage of a process; leaving nothing to be looked for or expected;

ultimate”); 4 Oxford English Dictionary 222 (1933) (same); see also

Webster’s New World College Dictionary 542 (5th ed. 2016) (Final:

“leaving no further chance for action, discussion, or change; deciding;

conclusive”); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 469 (11th ed.

2011) (Final: “coming at the end: being the last in a series, process, or

progress”).

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 7

Opinion of the Court

review. See 20 CFR §416.1472.

Turning to the second clause (“made after a hearing”),

we note that this phrase has been the subject of some

confusion over the years. On the one hand, the statute

elsewhere repeatedly uses the word “hearing” to signify an

ALJ hearing,9 which suggests that, in the ordinary case,

the phrase here too denotes an ALJ hearing. See, e.g.,

IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34 (2005) (noting “the

normal rule of statutory interpretation that identical

words used in different parts of the same statute are

generally presumed to have the same meaning”). On the

other hand, the Court’s precedents make clear that an

ALJ hearing is not an ironclad prerequisite for judicial

review. See, e.g., City of New York, 476 U. S., at 484 (em-

phasizing the Court’s “ ‘intensely practical’ ” approach to

the applicability of the exhaustion requirement and disap-

proving “mechanical application” of a set of factors).

There is no need today to give §405(g) a definition for all

seasons, because, in any event, this is a mine-run case and

Smith obtained the kind of hearing that §405(g) most

naturally suggests: an ALJ hearing on the merits.10 In

other words, even giving §405(g) a relatively strict read-

——————

9 See 42 U. S. C. §405(b)(1) (entitling claimants to a hearing on the

merits); §405(b)(2) (discussing “reconsideration” of certain findings

“before any hearing under paragraph (1) on the issue of such entitle-

ment”); §405(g) (discussing factual findings and evidence resulting from

such a “hearing”); §405(h) (discussing binding effect of decision “after a

hearing”); see also §§1383(c)(1)(A), (3) (similar).

10 We note as well that the “hearing” referred to in §405(g) cannot be

a hearing before the Appeals Council. Congress provided for a hearing

in §405(b) and for judicial review “after a hearing” in §405(g) before the

Appeals Council even existed. See supra, at 2. Moreover, the Appeals

Council makes many decisions without a hearing—e.g., denying a

petition for review without giving reasons—that are nevertheless

plainly reviewable. See 20 CFR §§ 416.1400(a)(5), 416.1467, 416.1481.

Accordingly, the fact that there was no Appeals Council hearing—much

like the fact that there was no reasoned Appeals Council decision on

the merits—does not bar review.

8 SMITH v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

ing, Smith appears to satisfy its terms.11

Smith cannot, however, satisfy §405(g)’s “after a hear-

ing” requirement as a matter of mere chronology.12 In

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977), the Court consid-

ered whether the SSA’s denial of a claimant’s petition to

reopen a prior denial of his claim for benefits qualified as a

final decision under §405(g). Id., at 102–103, 107–109.

The Court concluded that it did not, reasoning that a

petition to reopen was a matter of agency grace that could

be denied without a hearing altogether and that allowing

judicial review would thwart Congress’ own deadline for

seeking such review. See id., at 108–109. That the SSA’s

denial of the petition to reopen (1) was conclusive and (2)

postdated an ALJ hearing did not, alone, bring it within

the meaning of §405(g).

Here, by contrast, the SSA’s “final decision” is much

more closely tethered to the relevant “hearing.” Unlike a

petition to reopen, a primary application for benefits may

not be denied without an ALJ hearing (assuming the

claimant timely requests one, as Smith did). §405(b)(1).

Moreover, the claimant’s access to this first bite at the

apple is indeed a matter of legislative right rather than

agency grace. See id., at 108. And, again unlike the

situation in Sanders, there is no danger here of thwarting

Congress’ own deadline, given that the only potential

untimeliness here concerns Smith’s request for Appeals

——————

11 We

return below to the possibility, suggested by amicus, that “final

decision . . . made after a hearing” could signify a final decision “on a

matter on which the Act requires a hearing.” Brief for Court-Appointed

Amicus Curiae 13; see infra, at 11–12. Here, we note only that while

Congress certainly could have written something like “final decision on

the merits . . . made after a hearing,” it did not.

12 The alternative risks untenable breadth. The Battle of Yorktown

predates our ruling today, but no one would describe today’s opinion as

a “decision made after the Battle of Yorktown.” As we explain, how-

ever, the dismissal of Smith’s claim is tethered to Smith’s hearing in a

way that more distant events are not.

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 9

Opinion of the Court

Council review—not his request for judicial review follow-

ing the agency’s ultimate determination.

B

The statutory context weighs in Smith’s favor as well.

Appeals from SSA determinations are, by their nature,

appeals from the action of a federal agency, and in the

separate administrative-law context of the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA), an action is “final” if it both (1)

“mark[s] the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmak-

ing process” and (2) is “one by which ‘rights or obligations

have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences

will flow.’ ” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 177–178

(1997). Both conditions are satisfied when a Social Secu-

rity claimant has reached the fourth and final step of the

SSA’s four-step process and has had his request for review

dismissed as untimely. It is consistent to treat the Ap-

peals Council’s dismissal of Smith’s claim as a final deci-

sion as well.

To be clear, “the doctrine of administrative exhaustion

should be applied with a regard for the particular admin-

istrative scheme at issue,” Salfi, 422 U. S., at 765, and we

leave this axiom undisturbed today. The Social Security

Act and the APA are different statutes, and courts must

remain sensitive to their differences. See, e.g., Sullivan v.

Hudson, 490 U. S. 877, 885 (1989) (observing that “[a]s

provisions for judicial review of agency action go, §405(g)

is somewhat unusual” in that its “detailed provisions . . .

suggest a degree of direct interaction between a federal

court and an administrative agency alien to” APA review).

But at least some of these differences suggest that Con-

gress wanted more oversight by the courts in this context

rather than less, see ibid.,13 and the statute as a whole is

——————

13 The noteworthy counterpoint is §405(h), which withdraws federal-

court jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1346. While that provision

clearly serves “to route review through” §405(g), see Sanders, 430 U. S.,

10 SMITH v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

one that “Congress designed to be ‘unusually protective’ of

claimants,” City of New York, 476 U. S., at 480.

We note further that the SSA is a massive enterprise,14

and mistakes will occur. See Brief for National Organiza-

tion of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives as

Amicus Curiae 13 (collecting examples).15 The four steps

preceding judicial review, meanwhile, can drag on for

years.16 While mistakes by the agency may be admirably

rare, we do not presume that Congress intended for this

claimant-protective statute, see City of New York, 476

U. S., at 480, to leave a claimant without recourse to the

courts when such a mistake does occur—least of all when

the claimant may have already expended a significant

amount of likely limited resources in a lengthy proceeding.

C

Smith’s entitlement to judicial review is confirmed by

“the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial

review of administrative action.” Bowen v. Michigan

Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670 (1986).

“That presumption,” of course, “is rebuttable: It fails when

a statute’s language or structure demonstrates that Con-

——————

at 103, n. 3; see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 614–615 (1984),

that routing choice does not simultaneously constrict the route that

Congress did provide.

14 For example, the agency receives roughly 2.5 million new disability

claims per year. See SSA, Annual Performance Report Fiscal Years

2017–2019, p. 32 (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY19Files/

2019APR.pdf.

15 See also Koch & Koplow 257 (noting that each Appeals Council

member “typically spends only ten to fifteen minutes reviewing an

average case” given “the pressures of the caseload”).

16 See SSA, FY 2020 Congressional Justification 9 (Mar. 2019)

(estimating 2019 average processing time for the first three steps at

113 days, 105 days, and 515 days, respectively), https://www.

ssa.gov/budget/FY20Files/FY20-JEAC.pdf; Brief for National Organ-

ization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives as Amicus

Curiae 11.

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 11

Opinion of the Court

gress wanted an agency to police its own conduct.” Mach

Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. 480, ___–___ (2015) (slip

op., at 4–5). But the burden for rebutting it is “ ‘heavy,’ ”

id., at ___ (slip op., at 5), and that burden is not met here.

While Congress left it to the SSA to define the procedures

that claimants like Smith must first pass through, see

Sims, 530 U. S., at 106, Congress has not suggested that it

intended for the SSA to be the unreviewable arbiter of

whether claimants have complied with those procedures.

Where, as here, a claimant has received a claim-ending

timeliness determination from the agency’s last-in-line

decisionmaker after bringing his claim past the key proce-

dural post (a hearing) mentioned in §405(g), there has

been a “final decision . . . made after a hearing” under

§405(g).17

III

Amicus’ arguments to the contrary have aided our con-

sideration of this case, but they have not dissuaded us

from concluding that the Appeals Council’s dismissal of

Smith’s claim satisfied §405(g).

Amicus first argues that the phrase “final decision . . .

made after a hearing” refers to a conclusive disposition,

after exhaustion, of a benefits claim on the merits—that

is, on a basis for which the Social Security Act entitles a

claimant to a hearing. This reading follows, amicus ar-

gues, from the Court’s observations that §405(g) generally

requires exhaustion, and moreover from Sanders’ sugges-

tion, see 430 U. S., at 108, that review is not called for

——————

17 A different question would be presented by a claimant who assert-

edly faltered at an earlier step—e.g., whose request for an ALJ hearing

was dismissed as untimely and who then appealed that determination

to the Appeals Council before seeking judicial review. While such a

claimant would not have received a “hearing” at all, the Court’s prece-

dents also make clear that a hearing is not always required. See supra,

at 5–6. Because such a situation is not before us, we do not address it.

12 SMITH v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

where a claimant loses on an agency-determined proce-

dural ground that is divorced from the substantive mat-

ters for which a hearing is required. Even if Smith did

receive a hearing on the merits, amicus argues, the con-

clusive determination was not on that basis, and “[i]t

would be unnatural to read the statute as throwing open

the gates to judicial review of any final decision, no matter

how collateral,” just because such a hearing occurred.

Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 34.

We disagree. First, as noted above, the Court’s prece-

dents do not make exhaustion a pure necessity, indicating

instead that while the SSA is empowered to define the

steps claimants must generally take, the SSA is not also

the unreviewable arbiter of whether a claimant has suffi-

ciently complied with those steps. See supra, at 5–6, and

n. 7. Second, the Appeals Council’s dismissal is not mere-

ly collateral; such a dismissal calls an end to a proceeding

in which a substantial factual record has already been

developed and on which considerable resources have al-

ready been expended. See supra, at 10, and n. 16. Accept-

ing amicus’ argument would mean that a claimant could

make it to the end of the SSA’s process and then have

judicial review precluded simply because the Appeals

Council stamped “untimely” on the request, even if that

designation were patently inaccurate. While there may be

contexts in which the law is so unforgiving, this is not one.

See supra, at 9–11.

Smith’s case, as noted above, is also distinct from Sand-

ers. See supra, at 8. Sanders, after all, involved the SSA’s

denial of a petition for reopening—a second look that the

agency had made available to claimants as a matter of

grace. See 430 U. S., at 101–102, 107–108. But Smith is

not seeking a second look at an already-final denial; he

argues that he was wrongly prevented from continuing to

pursue his primary claim for benefits. That primary

claim, meanwhile, is indeed a matter of statutory entitle-

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 13

Opinion of the Court

ment. See §405(b).

Amicus also emphasizes that the SSA handles a large

volume of claims, such that a decision providing for

greater judicial review could risk a flood of litigation. That

result seems unlikely for a few reasons. First, the number

of Appeals Council untimeliness dismissals is compara-

tively small—something on the order of 2,500 dismissals

out of 160,000 dispositions per year.18 Second, the inter-

pretation that Smith and the Government urge has been

the law since 1983 in the Eleventh Circuit, and the data

there do not bear out amicus’ warning. See Reply Brief for

Respondent 14–15 (collecting statistics). Third, while

amicus flags related contexts that could be informed by

today’s ruling, see Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus

Curiae 36–40, those issues are not before us. We therefore

do not address them other than to reinforce that such

questions must be considered in the light of “the particular

administrative scheme at issue.” See Salfi, 422 U. S., at

765. Today’s decision, therefore, hardly knocks loose a

line of dominoes.

Finally, amicus argues that the meaning of §405(g) is

ambiguous and that the SSA’s longstanding interpretation

of §405(g)—prior to its changed position during the pen-

dency of this case—is entitled to deference under Chevron

U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U. S. 837 (1984). The Government and Smith main-

tain that the statute unambiguously supports the Gov-

ernment’s new position, and Smith further asserts that

deference is inappropriate where the Government itself

has rejected the interpretation in question in its filings.

We need not decide whether the statute is unambiguous

——————

18 See Brief for Respondent 43, n. 17 (number of timeliness dismis-

sals); SSA, Annual Statistical Supplement 2018 (Table 2.F11) (number

of dispositions), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/

2018/2f8-2f11.pdf.

14 SMITH v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

or what to do with the curious situation of an amicus

curiae seeking deference for an interpretation that the

Government’s briefing rejects. Chevron deference “ ‘is

premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity consti-

tutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency

to fill in the statutory gaps.’ ” King v. Burwell, 576 U. S.

___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 8). The scope of judicial review,

meanwhile, is hardly the kind of question that the Court

presumes that Congress implicitly delegated to an agency.

Indeed, roughly six years after Chevron was decided, the

Court declined to give Chevron deference to the Secretary

of Labor’s interpretation of a federal statute that would

have foreclosed private rights of action under certain

circumstances. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U. S.

638, 649–650 (1990). As the Court explained, Congress’

having created “a role for the Department of Labor in

administering the statute” did “not empower the Secretary

to regulate the scope of the judicial power vested by the

statute.” Id., at 650. Rather, “[a]lthough agency determi-

nations within the scope of delegated authority are enti-

tled to deference, it is fundamental ‘that an agency may

not bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no juris-

diction.’ ” Ibid. Here, too, while Congress has empowered

the SSA to create a scheme of administrative exhaustion,

see Sims, 530 U. S., at 106, Congress did not delegate to

the SSA the power to determine “the scope of the judicial

power vested by” §405(g) or to determine conclusively

when its dictates are satisfied. Adams Fruit Co., 494

U. S., at 650. Consequently, having concluded that Smith

and the Government have the better reading of §405(g),

we need go no further.

IV

Although they agree that §405(g) permits judicial review

of the Appeals Council’s dismissal in this case, Smith and

the Government disagree somewhat about the scope of

Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 15

Opinion of the Court

review on remand.19 Smith argues that if a reviewing

court disagrees with the procedural ground for dismissal, it

can then proceed directly to the merits, while the Govern-

ment argues that the proper step in such a case would be

to remand. We largely agree with the Government.

To be sure, there would be jurisdiction for a federal

court to proceed to the merits in the way that Smith avers.

For one, as noted above, exhaustion itself is not a jurisdic-

tional prerequisite. See supra, at 5–6. Moreover, §405(g)

states that a reviewing “court shall have power to enter,

upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judg-

ment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remand-

ing the cause for a rehearing”—a broad grant of authority

that reflects the high “degree of direct interaction between

a federal court and an administrative agency” envisioned

by §405(g). Hudson, 490 U. S., at 885. In short, there is

no jurisdictional bar to a court’s reaching the merits.

Fundamental principles of administrative law, however,

teach that a federal court generally goes astray if it de-

cides a question that has been delegated to an agency if

that agency has not first had a chance to address the

question. See, e.g., INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U. S. 12,

16, 18 (2002) (per curiam); ICC v. Locomotive Engineers,

482 U. S. 270, 283 (1987); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318

U. S. 80, 88 (1943) (“For purposes of affirming no less than

reversing its orders, an appellate court cannot intrude

upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted

to an administrative agency”). The Court’s cases discuss-

ing exhaustion in the Social Security context confirm the

——————

19 The parties agree, as do we, on the standard of review: abuse of

discretion as to the overall conclusion, and “substantial evidence” “as to

any fact.” See §405(g); see also Brief for Respondent 43–44; Tr. of Oral

Arg. 5; cf. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 483 (1986) (“Ordi-

narily, the Secretary has discretion to decide when to waive the ex-

haustion requirement”).

16 SMITH v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

prudence of applying this general principle here, where

the agency’s final decisionmaker has not had a chance to

address the merits at all.20 See City of New York, 476

U. S., at 485 (“Because of the agency’s expertise in admin-

istering its own regulations, the agency ordinarily should

be given the opportunity to review application of those

regulations to a particular factual context”); Salfi, 422

U. S., at 765 (explaining that exhaustion serves to “pre-

ven[t] premature interference with agency processes” and

to give the agency “an opportunity to correct its own er-

rors,” “to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its

experience and expertise,” and to produce “a record which

is adequate for judicial review”). Accordingly, in an ordi-

nary case, a court should restrict its review to the proce-

dural ground that was the basis for the Appeals Council

dismissal and (if necessary) allow the agency to address

any residual substantive questions in the first instance.21

V

We hold that where the SSA’s Appeals Council has

dismissed a request for review as untimely after a claim-

ant has obtained a hearing from an ALJ on the merits,

that dismissal qualifies as a “final decision . . . made after

a hearing” within the meaning of §405(g). The judgment

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

20 We make no statement, by contrast, regarding the applicability of

this line of cases to situations in which the Appeals Council has had a

chance to address the merits. Cf. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U. S. 103, 110–112

(2000) (plurality opinion) (discussing why the inquisitorial nature

of SSA proceedings counsels against imposing an issue-exhaustion

requirement).

21 By the same token, remand may be forgone in rarer cases, such as

where the Government joins the claimant in asking the court to reach

the merits or where remand would serve no meaningful purpose.