Ivan Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph

Case: 17-30267 Document: 00514970577 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/24/2019

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 17-30267 May 24, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

MORGAN WEBB; BRIANA WEBB, Clerk

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

TOWN OF SAINT JOSEPH; EDWARD L. BROWN,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SOUTHWICK, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Ivan Webb sued the Town of St. Joseph and its Mayor, arguing that they

violated his federal and state constitutional rights by seeking—and then

seeking to collect on—a judgment that he owed over $50,000 for violating a

local ordinance. The district court concluded that the criteria for municipal

liability were not met and that the Mayor was at least entitled to qualified

immunity. We affirm summary judgment on the federal § 1983 claims, and

vacate and remand the state-law claim.

I

This case has a convoluted procedural history spanning both state and

federal court. It began straightforwardly, however: in November 2006, Ivan

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Webb petitioned the St. Joseph Board of Aldermen for a permit to place a

mobile home on his father’s property. 1 He also requested the right to place

additional mobile homes on the property in the future. 2 Although the Board

only granted him a permit to place one mobile home on the property, Webb

placed a second home without a permit. 3 St. Joseph issued Webb a ticket for

violating a local ordinance providing that “[n]o building or other structure shall

be built or constructed in the Town of St. Joseph without there first being

obtained a permit from the Mayor and Board authorizing or approving the

construction of such building or other structure.” 4 Webb then applied for and

was denied a second permit. 5

An assortment of court proceedings followed. The permit violation was

first tried before the Mayor’s Court, which found that Webb had violated the

ordinance by placing a second mobile home on the property. 6 It ordered Webb

to pay a fine of $100 per day beginning February 14, 2007, until he removed

the second trailer from the lot. 7 Webb appealed to state district court, which

held a de novo trial and also sided with St. Joseph. 8 The district court entered

a $58,200 judgment for St. Joseph—“representing the fine of $100 per day for

each of the 582 days from February 14, 2007 through the date of trial,

1 See Webb v. Town of St. Joseph (Webb I), 560 F. App’x 362, 363 (5th Cir. 2014)

(per curiam).

2 Id.

3 Id.

4 Id. Although the ticket was initially issued on February 7, 2007, the Chief of

Police remedied the error by certified letter on February 14, 2017. See Town of St.

Joseph v. Webb, 87 So. 3d 958, 960 (La. Ct. App. 2012).

5 See Town of St. Joseph, 87 So. 3d at 960.

6 See Webb I, 560 F. App’x at 363–64. The Mayor did not preside due to a conflict

of interest. Instead, the Louisiana Supreme Court appointed a state trial court judge

to preside. See Town of St. Joseph, 87 So. 3d at 960.

7 See Webb I, 560 F. App’x at 363–64.

8 See id. at 364.

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September 18, 2008.” Webb’s appeal of this decision was dismissed due to his

failure to pay court fees. 9

At this point, St. Joseph officials attempted to collect on the $58,200

judgment. The Town Attorney, Karl Koch, filed a motion in the state district

court for execution by writ of fieri facias, which allowed St. Joseph to seize and

attempt to sell two lots belonging to Webb. 10 One of the lots was sold at a

sheriff’s sale, while the other was not ultimately sold. St. Joseph’s mayor,

Edward L. Brown, also sent Webb a letter notifying him that his alderman’s

wages—$500 a month—would be entirely withheld as a setoff on the money he

owed the town.

Webb moved to annul the judgment, arguing that the matter had

exceeded the Mayor’s Court’s jurisdictional limits and that the ordinance did

not apply to mobile homes. 11 The district court denied the motion. 12 Webb

suspensively appealed to the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal, which

ruled in his favor in March 2012 and annulled the district court’s judgment. 13

It held that although the Louisiana Constitution required Webb to be given

reasonable notice of the charge against him, the ticket issued to Webb and the

complaint filed against him in the Mayor’s Court accused him only of violating

a single offense. 14 The Second Circuit Court of Appeal therefore held that “the

imposition of a fine of $58,200 for violations of the ordinance for 582 days

constituted an illegal sentence,” concluded that it could correct an illegal

9 See id.

10 See id.

11 See Town of St. Joseph, 87 So. 3d at 961.

12 See id.

13 See id. at 963.

14 See id. at 962–63.

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criminal sentence at any time, and reduced the fine to $100 for a single

violation of the ordinance. 15

St. Joseph still withheld Webb’s alderman’s wages after the Second

Circuit Court of Appeal annulled the judgment, while it sought a writ of review

from the Louisiana Supreme Court. The decision became final once the

Louisiana Supreme Court denied the application for review in June 2012. 16 For

three months, St. Joseph continued to withhold wages and did not immediately

offer Webb backpay for the wages that had already been withheld. The Webbs

allege that Mayor Brown made an intentional decision to continue withholding

his wages and backpay even after the judgment was annulled, while the

defendants contend that this was the result of an “oversight.”

As for Webb’s properties, one of the lots was never sold and St. Joseph

notified him that the writ of fieri facias on that lot had expired. The other lot

had already been sold at a sheriff’s sale, and St. Joseph reimbursed Webb $792

for the amount that the Town received from the sale. Webb suggests that he is

owed more from the sale and is owed rental income that he could have made

from both properties. The defendants counter that Webb’s attorney in fact

argued against voiding the original sale after a lawyer for the Sheriff had

identified a potential legal problem, since the property was sold to Webb’s

brother.

In October 2012, Webb sued St. Joseph and Mayor Brown in federal

court, seeking damages for violations of his federal and state constitutional

rights. After Webb filed his federal suit, St. Joseph offered him $10,486.54 in

backpay for the withheld wages in October 2012. Webb interpreted this as

15 See id. at 963.

16 See Town of St. Joseph v. Webb, 91 So. 3d 976 (La. 2012) (mem.).

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contingent on his settling the case and did not initially accept the money. By

February 2013, however, Webb accepted the return of his wages.

The district court initially granted St. Joseph’s motion to dismiss Webb’s

complaint as barred by res judicata, reasoning that Webb could have brought

the same claims or causes of action in his state court suit to annul the original

judgment. 17 We reversed, holding that when properly resolving any doubts

against applying res judicata in favor of Webb, there was insufficient evidence

that Webb could have brought the same claims or causes of actions in his state

lawsuit. 18 For example, Webb had alleged “violations of his rights based on

conduct that necessarily occurred after the [state] appellate decision,” such as

“that the Town continued to enforce the illegal sentence, retained the proceeds

that resulted from the sale of one of Webb’s properties seized by the Town

pursuant to the writ of fieri facias, and withheld Webb’s salary until October

2012.” 19

Webb passed away in 2015 and his heirs, Morgan and Briana Webb, were

substituted as plaintiffs. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district

court granted summary judgment to St. Joseph and to the Mayor in his

individual capacity. It also denied the Webbs’ motion to disqualify the Town

Attorney from representing the defendants. The Webbs appeal.

II

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 20

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

17 See Webb v. Town of St. Joseph, No. 12-02644, 2013 WL 2617090 (W.D. La.

June 11, 2013).

18 See Webb I, 560 F. App’x at 366–67.

19 Id. at 367.

20 See Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 389 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc).

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as a matter of law.’” 21 “We resolve factual controversies in favor of the

nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when

both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” 22

A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has two foundational elements: “a

violation of the Constitution or of federal law, and . . . that the violation was

committed by someone acting under color of state law.” 23 The Webbs’ § 1983

claim against St. Joseph must meet the requirements for municipal liability

established by Monell v. Department of Social Services 24 and its progeny. As

their § 1983 claim against Mayor Brown in his individual capacity is subject to

his qualified immunity defense, they must show that his actions “were

objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the

violation.” 25

III

We turn first to the Webbs’ claim against St. Joseph. While

municipalities can be sued directly under § 1983, Monell establishes that they

“cannot be found liable on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat

superior.” 26 In other words, “the unconstitutional conduct must be directly

attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or

imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will

almost never trigger liability.” 27 To overcome summary judgment on a

21 Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a)).

22 Id. (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Flowers, 854 F.3d 842, 844 (5th

Cir. 2017)).

23 Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 293–94 (5th Cir. 2019).

24 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

25 Sims v. City of Madisonville, 894 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

26 Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 395 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised

(Mar. 31, 2017) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91).

27 Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001); accord

Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 412 (5th Cir. 2015).

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municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must therefore “demonstrate a dispute of

fact as to three elements: that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the

municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a

constitutional right.” 28

A

Our caselaw establishes three ways of establishing a municipal policy for

the purposes of Monell liability. First, a plaintiff can show “written policy

statements, ordinances, or regulations.” 29 Second, a plaintiff can show “a

widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a

custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” 30 Third, even a single decision

may constitute municipal policy in “rare circumstances” when the official or

entity possessing “final policymaking authority” for an action “performs the

specific act that forms the basis of the § 1983 claim.” 31

The Webbs do not allege any written municipal policy or widespread

practice. Instead, their argument centers on whether an official with “final

policymaking authority” took the actions underpinning their § 1983 claim—

namely, the initial effort to obtain a judgment penalizing Webb for 582 days of

violations rather than a single day, coupled with the related effort to collect on

that judgment by withholding Webb’s alderman’s wages and seizing his

property. We therefore will focus our inquiry on this issue.

28 Davidson, 848 F.3d at 395.

29 Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 389–90.

30 Id. at 390.

31 Davidson, 848 F.3d at 395 (citing, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 480, 482, 484–85 (1986)); see also Anderson v. City of McComb, 539 F. App’x

385, 388 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013) (“When the policymakers are the violators, no further

proof of municipal policy or custom is required.”).

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B

“[A] final decisionmaker’s adoption of a course of action ‘tailored to a

particular situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations’

may, in some circumstances, give rise to municipal liability under § 1983.” 32

This requires the “deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from

among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for

establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” 33

Therefore, the “critical question” is generally “to decide who is the final

policymaker, which is an issue of state law.” 34

Our inquiry does not end where state law does not establish the relevant

actor as a final policymaker, however. A municipal employee may also possess

final policymaking authority where the final policymaker has delegated that

authority, either expressly or impliedly. 35 Not all delegations of authority are

delegations of policymaking authority—“[w]e have long recognized that the

‘discretion to exercise a particular function does not necessarily entail final

policymaking authority over that function.’” 36

The Webbs argue that St. Joseph’s liability is grounded in the actions of

two officials, the Town Attorney and Mayor Brown. We address in turn

32 Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406 (1997) (quoting

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481).

33 Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 638 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pembaur,

475 U.S. at 483–84) (first emphasis added).

34 Advanced Tech. Bldg. Sols., L.L.C. v. City of Jackson, 817 F.3d 163, 166 (5th

Cir. 2016) (citing Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1993)).

35 See Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 2010).

36 Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 542–43 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bolton

v. City of Dallas, 541 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)); see Zarnow, 614

F.3d at 167 (“There is a fine distinction between a policymaker and a

decisionmaker.”); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)

(“Policymakers act in the place of the governing body in the area of their

responsibility; they are not supervised except as to the totality of their

performance.”).

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whether each is a “final policymaker” whose one-time actions could generate

municipal liability.

1

The Town Attorney took most of the actions relevant to this case. He filed

the initial charge against Webb; pursued a judgment through the Louisiana

courts; and initiated proceedings to collect on the judgment, including by

seeking writs of fieri facias on Webb’s properties. If the Town Attorney acted

as a final policymaker, we would easily conclude that these actions could

ground municipal liability. We ultimately agree with the district court, though,

that the Town Attorney was not a final policymaker for St. Joseph.

We first look to where state law rests policymaking authority,

considering “the relevant legal materials, including state and local positive

law, as well as custom or usage having the force of law.” 37 The relevant statute

provides only that the municipal attorney’s “duties in such capacity may

include representation of all municipal officers . . . in actions against them in

connection with and arising out of their functions as such officers, and other

duties as prescribed by the mayor.” 38 This suggests that the Town Attorney

was authorized to act in a representative—not policymaking—capacity, and

the Webbs present no evidence that state or local custom imbued the Town

Attorney with general policymaking authority. In cases where an attorney has

been treated as a local government policymaker, there was substantially

clearer vesting of such authority or other unique circumstances not present

37Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

38 La. Rev. Stat. § 33:386(C).

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here. 39 Indeed, the Webbs at points appear to concede that the Town Attorney

does not inherently hold policymaking authority for St. Joseph.

Instead, the Webbs principally argue that Mayor Brown delegated his

final policymaking authority to the Town Attorney. They cite his affidavit,

where he described how he “left the decisions regarding how to proceed with

the litigation against Ivan Webb up to the Town Attorneys” and how, even

though he “directed the [Town Attorney] to proceed with the collection efforts,

he “left the decisions about how to conduct these legal proceedings up to the

Town’s attorney . . . [and] expected that the Town’s attorney would only come

to [him] for decisions about matters which required a decision by the client.”

They also reference Louisiana law providing that a town’s mayor, as the “chief

executive officer of the municipality,” 40 may “delegate the performance of

administrative duties to such municipal officers or employees as he deems

necessary and advisable.” 41 In sum, they suggest that once the Mayor left

decisions about how to collect the judgment against Webb up to the Town

Attorney, the Town Attorney became a final policymaker.

39 See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484–85 (observing that Ohio law authorized a

county prosecutor not just to render legal advice, but also to instruct county officers

“in matters connected with their official duties”); Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608,

624 (5th Cir. 2015) (observing that a district attorney “arguably” was a final

policymaker in the specific area of determining what witnesses to use in prosecutions,

though not deciding the issue); Turner v. Upton County, 915 F.2d 133, 137–38 (5th

Cir. 1990) (concluding that a county could be liable for the actions of a district

attorney, not because the district attorney was an authorized policymaker for the

county, but because he was a member of a conspiracy including the county sheriff—

who was an authorized policymaker); cf. Bennett, 728 F.2d at 769 (concluding that a

city attorney had no policymaking authority because he was “employed only to give

legal advice”).

40 La. Rev. Stat. § 33:362(B).

41 Id. § 33:404(A)(2).

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This argument conflates policymaking authority with decision-making

authority, something our caselaw counsels against. 42 A true policymaker must

“decide the goals for a particular city function and devise the means of

achieving those goals.” 43 We see no indication that the Town Attorney was

given final policymaking authority in this vein, beyond a grant of decision-

making authority to pursue the goal of enforcing the city ordinance and

collecting the judgment. Although the Town Attorney had the discretion to

make certain decisions about how to pursue St. Joseph’s judgment against

Webb, “[i]f the mere exercise of discretion by an employee could give rise to a

constitutional violation, the result would be indistinguishable from respondeat

superior.” 44 The wrongful conduct alleged by the plaintiffs on the part of the

Town Attorney therefore does not fall into the narrow category of action by a

final policymaker that can by itself ground municipal liability.

2

This raises the natural question of whether the Mayor’s status as a final

policymaker could ground § 1983 liability on the part of St. Joseph. 45 Even

when an official with final policymaking authority does not directly act to set

policy, a municipality may be liable in “extreme factual situations” when that

official ratifies a subordinate’s decision, which requires more than the defense

of a decision or action shown to be unconstitutional after the fact. 46 A

municipality may also be liable when a policymaker engages in deliberately

indifferent failure to control subordinates in a way likely to result in violation

42 See Valle, 613 F.3d at 543–44 (“Although [the relevant ordinances] confer

decisionmaking or operational command authority on [the official], it does not follow

that [the official] . . . acts in a policymaking capacity.”); Bolton, 541 F.3d at 548–50.

43 Bennett, 728 F.2d at 769; accord Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 167.

44 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988) (plurality opinion).

45 The parties appear to agree that Mayor Brown qualifies as a final

policymaker for the purposes of municipal liability.

46 See Davidson, 848 F.3d at 395–96.

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of constitutional rights. 47 The Webbs do not argue, however, that Mayor Brown

was deliberately indifferent in failing to control the Town Attorney—nor do

they argue that Mayor Brown subsequently ratified the Town Attorney’s

actions. 48 We have held that such arguments can be waived. 49 On the record

and arguments before us, we cannot conclude that the plaintiffs have

established a genuine fact issue over whether St. Joseph can be held liable for

its mayor’s indirect actions in failing to supervise, or subsequently ratifying,

its Town Attorney’s conduct.

The question therefore becomes whether Mayor Brown, acting as a final

policymaker, himself made decisions that threatened Webb’s constitutional

rights. The Webbs argue that the Mayor took three categories of actions that

can ground municipal liability: first, he was generally involved as a

47 See Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 390 (“To base deliberate indifference on a single

incident, ‘it should have been apparent to the policymaker that a constitutional

violation was the highly predictable consequence of a particular policy.’” (quoting

Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2003)).

48 The Webbs fleetingly argue that St. Joseph is liable because Mayor Brown

“approv[ed] the acts of the Town Attorney,” but present no further argument on this

point. This is not enough to demonstrate the sort of “extreme factual situation” where

ratification applies. See, e.g., Culbertson, 790 F.3d at 621 (“If a final policymaker

approves a subordinate’s recommendation and also the subordinate’s reasoning, that

approval is considered a ratification chargeable to the municipality. This theory of

ratification has been limited to ‘extreme factual situations.’” (emphasis added and

citations omitted)); Okon v. Harris Cty. Hosp. Dist., 426 F. App’x 312, 317 n.10 (5th

Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“Only if the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s

decision and the basis for it would their ratification be chargeable to the

municipality.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth,

588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding no ratification where a policymaker

“determined after investigation that [the challenged conduct] complied with the

department’s policies”); World Wide St. Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia,

591 F.3d 747, 755 (5th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that ratification might occur if the

supervisor explicitly ratified or defended a subordinate’s actions and “the

subordinate’s actions are sufficiently extreme—for instance, an obvious violation of

clearly established law”).

49 See Valle, 613 F.3d at 544 & n.5 (holding that litigants waived their

ratification argument by failing to raise it in their opening brief).

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policymaker throughout the decision-making process; second, he personally

initiated the withholding of Webb’s alderman’s wages; and third, he was

responsible for the failure to stop withholding Webb’s wages and to return the

wages already withheld until three months after the annulment of the

judgment became final. 50

We have no difficulty concluding that the Webbs failed to present

sufficient summary judgment evidence that Mayor Brown was involved

throughout the decision-making process in a way that would generate

municipal liability, especially in light of the simultaneous suggestion that the

Town Attorney had been delegated decision-making authority. 51 But the

Webbs also argue that Mayor Brown took affirmative actions to impede Webb’s

constitutional rights, which poses a closer issue. They have presented

sufficient evidence to support their allegation that Mayor Brown was

personally involved in the initial decision to collect on the judgment, including

by withholding Webb’s alderman’s wages—he conceded as much in his

affidavit, and the letter informing Webb of the withholding came from and was

signed by the Mayor. It is less clear, though, whether the Mayor made any

affirmative decision to continue withholding Webb’s wages—and not to return

wages already withheld—until three months after the annulment became

final. There is a paucity of evidence on both sides on this issue: Mayor Brown

asserts only that this was the result of an “oversight” by his office, while the

Webbs present no evidence to the contrary beyond arguing that a jury could

50 There is no concrete suggestion that Mayor Brown was personally involved

in the seizure of Webb’s properties or subsequent attempts to sell them. Nor is there

any indication that the Mayor made decisions regarding the language of the charging

instrument or the nature of the judgment sought.

51 See, e.g., Davidson, 848 F.3d at 395 (observing that although a single action

by a policymaker can establish municipal liability, this only occurs in “rare

circumstances” where “a policymaker performs the specific act the forms the basis of

the § 1983 claim” (emphasis added).

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infer from a history of bad blood between Webb and the Mayor that the decision

was no oversight. We ultimately conclude that the Webbs have not shown a

fact issue over whether the continued withholding of Webb’s wages was the

result of a “deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among

various alternatives by [the Mayor].” 52

In sum, the Webbs argue that this falls into the narrow range of cases

where municipal liability can stem from individual, one-off decisions by an

authorized policymaker. They have not shown that the Town Attorney was a

final policymaker for these purposes, and therefore have not shown that St.

Joseph should be liable as a municipality for his discretionary decisions. It is

possible that affirmative decisions made by the Mayor, rather than the Town

Attorney, could have generated municipal liability. The only affirmative

decision by Mayor Brown that the Webbs have adequately substantiated,

however, was his initial decision to take efforts to collect on the—at that time,

final—judgment. With our focus substantially narrowed, we therefore turn to

whether this decision was the “moving force” behind a violation of a

constitutional right.

C

After establishing a sufficiently official municipal policy promulgated by

an authorized policymaker, a plaintiff must then show that the policy was the

“moving force” behind the constitutional violation. 53 This requires showing

either that the policy itself was unconstitutional 54 or that it was adopted with

52 E.g., Garza, 922 F.3d at 638.

53 See Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 390.

54 See Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 404 (“Where a plaintiff claims that a particular

municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so, resolving

these issues of fault and causation is straightforward.”).

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deliberate indifference to the “known or obvious fact that such constitutional

violations would result.” 55

As we have explained, the only potential municipal policy that could

ground the Webbs’ claim against St. Joseph arises from Mayor Brown’s alleged

decision, as a final policymaker, to initially begin undertaking efforts to collect

on the judgment. The Webbs offer two arguments as to why this specific

decision was unconstitutional.

First, the Webbs argue that it was impermissible for St. Joseph to

withhold Webb’s wages without formal garnishment procedures. The

defendants aver that the withholding was authorized by Louisiana Civil Code

article 1893, which allows for “compensation” by operation of law “when two

persons owe to each other sums of money or quantities of fungible things

identical in kind, and these sums or quantities are liquidated and presently

due,” such that “both obligations [are extinguished] to the lesser amount.” 56

They argue that they were not required to institute formal garnishment

procedures as a result. In response, the Webbs argue that this was

inappropriate “self-help” to which St. Joseph was not entitled to resort in lieu

of a formal statutory garnishment proceeding. They also observe that if St.

Joseph had pursued garnishment, it would only have been able to seize 25% of

Webb’s alderman’s wages, not the entirety of the wages. The Webbs point to no

authority, though, that allows us to conclude that it violates federal

constitutional law for a municipality to pursue one statutorily authorized

mechanism to collect on a final judgment over another. In fact, they appear to

55 Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 316–17 (5th Cir. 2018), as revised

(Sept. 25, 2018).

56 La. Civ. Code art. 1893; see also, e.g., Richard v. Vidrine Auto. Servs., Inc.,

729 So. 2d 1174, 1177–78 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (describing how an employer’s claim for

compensation can authorize setoffs against wages in certain circumstances).

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concede that state-law limitations on garnishment do not generate a federal

claim that could support § 1983 liability.

More broadly, the Webbs contend that the judgment was

unconstitutional and that St. Joseph was therefore not authorized to take

efforts to collect on it. They submit no caselaw, and we are not aware of any,

establishing that a municipality violates constitutional rights when it

undertakes efforts to collect on a final court judgment—albeit one later

determined to be unconstitutional—by withholding wages in a manner

authorized by law. 57 St. Joseph and its policymakers were initially entitled to

rely on the judgment, rendered final by Webb’s failure to perfect his appeal,

and to undertake steps to collect on that judgment.

***

A common thread running throughout the Supreme Court’s and our own

caselaw on municipal liability is that such liability “is limited to action for

which the municipality is actually responsible.” 58 The Webbs have painted a

picture of poor decisions and bureaucratic dysfunction—but they have not

established that St. Joseph policy was the moving force behind the violation of

any constitutional right. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to St. Joseph on the Webbs’ § 1983 claim.

IV

The same analysis demonstrates why Mayor Brown is entitled to

summary judgment on the claim against him in his individual capacity. As we

57 At oral argument and in their briefing, the Webbs attempt to analogize this

case to our decision in Ballard v. Wall, where we held that private attorneys could be

liable under § 1983 as state actors when they allegedly conspired with a judge to

essentially operate a “debtor’s prison” to extract money from judgment debtors. 413

F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2005). We do not extract from Ballard a principle that any effort

to collect on a final judgment ultimately determined to be unlawful is

unconstitutional.

58 Burge, 187 F.3d at 471 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479).

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have explained, the summary judgment record does not support the Webbs’

far-reaching allegations that the Mayor was personally involved throughout

the challenged conduct. It also does not support their allegation that the Mayor

deliberately withheld Webb’s wages even after the judgment was finally

annulled. They cite no evidence, for example, that Webb asked for his wages to

be reinstated and was denied. 59 At most, the summary judgment evidence

allows that the Mayor made the initial decision to pursue collection on the

$58,200 final judgment. As in their arguments for municipal liability, however,

the Webbs offer no way for us to conclude that this specific action by the Mayor

violated Webb’s constitutional rights—let alone that such action was

unreasonable given clearly established law. 60 We will therefore also affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to Mayor Brown on the § 1983

claim against him in his individual capacity.

Again, our decision is shaped by the arguments and evidence the Webbs

have presented. They do not allege that Mayor Brown is individually liable due

to failure to supervise the Town Attorney or subsequent adoption of the Town

Attorney’s actions. And, while they do allege that Mayor Brown made the

affirmative decision to continue withholding Webb’s wages after the

annulment became final, they do not present evidence sufficient to support this

59 While Webb sent Mayor Brown a letter in May 2011 demanding the return

of his alderman’s wages, this was before the Second Circuit Court of Appeal annulled

the judgment.

60 Mayor Brown raises the defense of qualified immunity, which requires the

Webbs to show “(1) that [he] violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that

the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” E.g., Cutler

v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Because we conclude that the Webbs have not adequately

substantiated any concrete conduct on Mayor Brown’s part that violated Webb’s

constitutional rights, we need not address the “clearly established” prong of qualified

immunity.

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conclusion. Perhaps on a different record, the Mayor would not be entitled to

summary judgment on his individual liability. Not here.

V

We must turn to two final housekeeping matters. First, the Webbs also

argue that the district court erred in denying the motion to disqualify the Town

Attorney from acting both as counsel and as a potential witness. We review

this for abuse of discretion, assessing fact-finding for clear error and

performing a “‘careful examination,’ or de novo review, of the district court’s

application of the relevant rules of attorney conduct.” 61 In evaluating a motion

to disqualify, “[a] court must take into account not only the various ethical

precepts adopted by the profession but also the social interests at stake.” 62

Acknowledging that the relevant rules establish that a lawyer shall not

act as advocate where the lawyer is also likely to be a necessary witness, 63 the

district court concluded that the Town Attorney’s testimony was unnecessary.

It explained that details about the Town Attorney’s motivations and reasoning

were irrelevant to the fundamental question—whether the complained-of

conduct emerged from a municipal policy established by an authorized

policymaker. We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to

disqualify.

61 F.D.I.C. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1311–12 (5th Cir. 1995).

62 Id. at 1314 (“Among the factors that we have considered in the past are

whether a conflict has (1) the appearance of impropriety in general, or (2) a possibility

that a specific impropriety will occur, and (3) the likelihood of public suspicion from

the impropriety outweighs any social interests which will be served by the lawyer’s

continued participation in the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

63 See ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 3.7(a); ABA Model Code of Prof’l

Responsibility DR 5–101(B), 5–102(A). The relevant portion of the Model Rules of

Professional Conduct is identical to Louisiana’s rule concerning the propriety of

counsel acting as a witness.

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Second, the district court summarily dismissed Webb’s state-law claim

for violation of his right to be free of excessive fines under Article I, Section 20

of the Louisiana Constitution. Although the district court suggested that its

analysis applied with “equal force” to the state-law claim, its discussion was

otherwise specific to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The decision did not address the merits

of the Webbs’ federal or state constitutional claims, instead resolving the

individual-capacity claim on qualified immunity and the municipal-liability

claim on the absence of culpable action by a final policymaker. These

conclusions do not provide a sufficient basis for rejecting the state

constitutional claim.

This said, the district court has discretion to decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, especially where the sole

federal claims have been eliminated prior to trial. 64 We therefore vacate the

summary judgment on the Webbs’ state-constitution claim and remand for the

district court to determine whether it is appropriate to continue to exercise

federal jurisdiction over the state-law claim, and, if so, to address that claim

more fully.

VI

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to both

defendants on the Webbs’ § 1983 claims. We vacate the grant of summary

judgment on the Webbs’ state constitutional claim, however, and remand for

the district court to assess its jurisdiction over this claim.

64 See, e.g., Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 345–47 (5th Cir. 2008).

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