Opinion

Varlen Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Comp

  • 924 F.3d 456
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
May 16, 2019
Status
Published
Author
Barrett
On the bench
Sykes, Barrett, Eve
Nature of suit
civil
Cited by
70 cases
Authority
More cited than 85.1%

explaining that an expert who based his opinion on his experience “still needed to show how his experience or expertise led to his conclusions”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that an expert who based his opinion on his experience “still needed to show how his experience or expertise led to his conclusions”
  • under either New York or Illinois law the insured bears the burden of proving that the exception to the exclusion applies
  • “[C]ourts do not have to scour the record or make a party’s argument for it.”
  • policy announced an exclusion and then an exception: “but this exclusion does not apply” given certain conditions

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 17-3212

VARLEN CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:13-cv-05463 — Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2018 — DECIDED MAY 16, 2019

____________________

Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Varlen Corporation owned and op-

erated two industrial sites that were found to have significant

amounts of groundwater contamination related to the sites’

operations. When its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Com-

pany, refused to indemnify it, Varlen sued. Varlen’s case

turned on testimony from an expert witness, who was ex-

cluded by the district court because he didn’t use reliable

2 No. 17-3212

methods. We agree with the district court’s exclusion and af-

firm its grant of summary judgment to Liberty Mutual.

I.

Varlen, an Illinois corporation, owned and operated two

industrial facilities related to railroad operations during the

time period relevant to this appeal. At the first, which the par-

ties call the LASI site, Varlen performed operations such as

plating parts for locomotive engines in chrome. At the second,

the Silvis site, Varlen’s operations included refueling diesel

engines. Varlen discovered contamination at both sites.

The LASI site was equipped with a sump that held

wastewater from the chrome plater. When the water in the

sump reached a certain level, a pump would engage, pump-

ing the water to a holding tank. Varlen found a chemical

called hexavalent chromium contaminating the area around

the sump.

At the Silvis site, Varlen discovered two types of ground-

water contamination. It found a chlorinated solvent by a tank

into which metal parts were dipped to degrease them. It also

found diesel fuel near a large tank where locomotives would

refuel.

The contamination at these two sites cost Varlen millions

of dollars in damages and remediation expenses. Varlen

sought indemnification from its insurer, Liberty Mutual. But

Varlen’s policy with Liberty Mutual had an exclusion for any

property damage arising out of chemical leaks or discharges,

and Liberty Mutual denied coverage on this ground.

Varlen sued Liberty Mutual. To overcome the pollution

exclusion, it pointed to a policy provision stating that, despite

the exclusion, Liberty Mutual would cover chemical leaks or

No. 17-3212 3

discharges that were “sudden and accidental.” Lacking direct

evidence of how the damage occurred, it proffered the expert

testimony of geologist Daniel Rogers to prove that the con-

tamination of the LASI and Silvis sites occurred suddenly and

accidentally.

Rogers testified that the contaminants at the LASI site

were released because the concrete sump leaked. He opined

that the releases were “sudden and accidental” because they

were not intended and occurred in sudden spurts each time

that the sump failed. When asked about his basis for these

opinions, he explained that he had experience working with

sumps and had personal knowledge of these sumps in partic-

ular.

Rogers also testified that the releases at the Silvis site were

likely “sudden and accidental.” There are two relevant zones

at the Silvis site: the area around the diesel refueling station

and the area where the chlorinated solvents were stored. Rog-

ers asserted that the contamination around the diesel refuel-

ing area was too large to have occurred by minor leakage. In-

stead, he testified that the contamination was “consistent with

overfills of diesel locomotives” and suggested that “tens of

gallons to hundreds of gallons [] would have been released

before it was noticed.” He also said that the value of the fuel

made it unlikely that such a fuel spill would have occurred

intentionally. Turning to the contamination at the chlorinated

solvent storing area, Rogers surmised that it was “indicative

of a drum overturning and suddenly leaking out rather than

from operations.” He based this opinion in part on the fact

that the contamination was found around where the solvent

was stored, not where it was used.

4 No. 17-3212

Both parties moved for summary judgment. Liberty Mu-

tual also moved to strike Rogers’s testimony. The district

court granted the motion to strike, holding that Rogers’s opin-

ions were unreliable and speculative under Federal Rule of

Evidence 702. It then granted Liberty Mutual’s motion for

summary judgment. Varlen appealed.

II.

Liberty Mutual is entitled to summary judgment against

Varlen if no reasonable jury could find that the releases were

“sudden and accidental” at either the LASI or Silvis sites. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255–56 (1986). And Liberty Mutual correctly asserts that

Varlen has pointed to no admissible evidence that would per-

mit a reasonable jury to make that finding.

Rogers’s expert testimony is the only evidence that Varlen

offered as to whether the contamination occurred in a sudden

and accidental fashion.1 But before Rogers’s expert testimony

can be admitted, it must be deemed reliable under Rule 702 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence, which tracks the Supreme

Court’s opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

509 U.S. 579 (1993). The court must decide that the witness is

“qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-

ing, or education”; the testimony will “help the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”; “the

1 In its order granting summary judgment against Varlen, the district

court noted that Varlen “relie[d] exclusively on Rogers’ expert opinions”

to “ward off Liberty Mutual’s request for summary judgment under the

[pollution] exclusion.” On appeal, Varlen makes a passing attempt at re-

butting the district court’s statement, offering a few conclusory claims and

theories—none of which are enough to lead us to disagree with the district

court’s assessment. Varlen’s case rises or falls on Rogers’s testimony.

No. 17-3212 5

testimony is based on sufficient facts or data” and “reliable

principles and methods”; and the expert has “reliably applied

the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” FED. R.

EVID. 702. An expert’s proponent has the burden of establish-

ing the admissibility of the opinions by a preponderance of

the evidence. See Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698,

705 (7th Cir. 2009).

The district court determined that Rogers’s testimony did

not meet these requirements because it was not based on reli-

able methods or principles. It did not abuse its discretion in

reaching that conclusion. See Brown v. Burlington N. Santa Fe

Ry. Co., 765 F.3d 765, 772 (7th Cir. 2014) (“If the court properly

[followed the Daubert framework], we then review its ulti-

mate decision to exclude expert testimony for an abuse of dis-

cretion.”).

In Rogers’s report and testimony, he asserted that the dis-

charges at the LASI site must have been “sudden and acci-

dental.” He suspected that the contamination occurred in con-

nection with a failure in the sump pump in the 1970s. He

claimed to base this on his experience with sumps, his site vis-

its, and his knowledge of the sites’ operations. This type of

evidence is not necessarily unreliable. See Metavante Corp. v.

Emigrant Sav. Bank, 619 F.3d 748, 761 (7th Cir. 2010) (“An ex-

pert’s testimony is not unreliable simply because it is founded

on his experience rather than on data.”). But Rogers still

needed to show how his experience or expertise led to his con-

clusions.

Rogers attempted to base his conclusions on inferences

from qualities of the “plume” of contamination. That is, he

looked at the size and scope of the contamination and worked

backward to surmise how it must have occurred. For instance,

6 No. 17-3212

Rogers testified that at the LASI site, the contaminant mass

must have been very large to create a plume with the size and

concentration of the one at that site. He concluded that the

contamination must have therefore been sudden and acci-

dental.

But Rogers failed to explain why this data mattered or

why his inferences were justified. When pressed specifically

on the connection between the contaminant mass and the cir-

cumstances of the release, he simply stated that the data was

“an indication” but acknowledged that it was “not conclu-

sive.” He opined that the sump itself had a “sudden and acci-

dental nature.” But it’s not clear what he meant, considering

that the sump is just a basin in the ground. Rogers did say in

passing that the contamination concentrations were “not uni-

form,” but he didn’t explain why that was significant.

Rogers’s testimony about the Silvis site was equally lack-

ing. He said that the volume of the contamination at the fuel-

ing location was inconsistent with “minor leakage” and

opined instead that it may have resulted from overfills of die-

sel locomotives. As to the chlorinated solvent storing area,

Rogers suggested that perhaps a drum got punctured and

caused the contamination. But Rogers offered no methodol-

ogy to explain how he drew those conclusions.

In short, Rogers failed to demonstrate that his conclusions

were anything more than guesses. To satisfy Daubert, Rogers

needed to provide an explanation of how the evidence led to

his conclusions. He had to articulate a justification for his in-

ference that the chemical spills were sudden and accidental

beyond a simple say-so. If Rogers made an argument based

on a reliable methodology, then Varlen has not pointed it out,

either to us or to the district court. And courts do not have to

No. 17-3212 7

scour the record or make a party’s argument for it. See D.Z. v.

Buell, 796 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2015). The district court did

not abuse its discretion in excluding Rogers’s testimony. And

without Rogers’s testimony and report, there is no issue of

material fact as to whether the contamination occurred sud-

denly and accidentally.2 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986) (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary

judgment … against a party who fails to make a showing suf-

ficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

2 This is true regardless of whether Illinois or New York law applies.

In its opening brief, Varlen took no position on the choice-of-law issue,

instead arguing that it ought to prevail under either state’s law. In Liberty

Mutual’s response brief, it asserted that New York law applies. Varlen

then made the argument in its reply brief that Illinois law applies. Even if

Varlen has not forfeited this argument, the question is purely academic.

Under either law, Varlen bears the burden of proving that the exception

to the pollution exclusion applies. See Santa's Best Craft, LLC v. St. Paul Fire

& Marine Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 339, 347 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that under Illi-

nois law, “[i]nsurers have the burden of proving that an exclusion ap-

plies,” while insureds “have the burden to prove that an exception to an

exclusion restores coverage”); Mahl Bros. Oil Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine

Ins. Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 474, 494 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that under

New York law, “[o]nce an insurer satisfies its burden of proof that the

claims are within the pollution exclusion, the burden shifts to the insured

to demonstrate, either through a reasonable interpretation of the underly-

ing complaint or extrinsic evidence, that the discharge was in fact ‘sudden

and accidental’”). Varlen can’t carry its burden under either law without

Rogers’s testimony.

8 No. 17-3212

proof at trial.”). We thus AFFIRM the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to Liberty Mutual.3

3Varlen also suggests in passing that it might have a claim under a

theory of “wrongful entry … or other invasion of the right of private oc-

cupancy.” This theory is inadequately briefed and we do not consider it.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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