State v. Mrza

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

04/19/2019 09:05 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets

302 Nebraska R eports

STATE v. MRZA

Cite as 302 Neb. 931

State of Nebraska, appellee, v.

Sami S. Mrza, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed April 19, 2019. No. S-18-372.

1. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. Assignments of error

on direct appeal regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel must

specifically allege deficient performance, and an appellate court will not

scour the remainder of the brief in search of such specificity.

2. ____: ____. Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

may be determined on direct appeal is a question of law. In reviewing

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, an appellate

court decides only whether the undisputed facts contained within the

record are sufficient to conclusively determine whether counsel did or

did not provide effective assistance and whether the defendant was or

was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance.

3. Effectiveness of Counsel: Postconviction: Records: Appeal and

Error. When a defendant’s trial counsel is different from his or her

counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must raise on direct appeal any

issue of trial counsel’s ineffective performance which is known to the

defendant or is apparent from the record, otherwise, the issue will be

procedurally barred in a subsequent postconviction proceeding.

4. Effectiveness of Counsel: Records: Appeal and Error. The fact that

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal does

not necessarily mean that it can be resolved. The determining factor is

whether the record is sufficient to adequately review the question.

5. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. Generally, to prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must

show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that this

deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense.

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6. ____: ____. To show that counsel’s performance was deficient, a

defend­ant must show that counsel’s performance did not equal that of a

lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law.

7. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Words and Phrases. To show preju-

dice, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but

for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.

8. Trial: Effectiveness of Counsel: Presumptions: Appeal and Error. In

determining whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient, there is

a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably.

9. Rules of Evidence: Proof. A proponent of evidence is not required to

conclusively prove the genuineness of the evidence or to rule out all

possibilities inconsistent with authenticity.

10. Rules of Evidence. Generally, the foundation for the admissibility of

text messages has two components: (1) whether the text messages were

accurately transcribed and (2) who actually sent the text messages.

11. ____. The rule of completeness allows a party to admit the entirety of

an act, declaration, conversation, or writing when the other party admits

a part and when the entirety is necessary to make it fully understood.

12. Trial: Prosecuting Attorneys: Appeal and Error. When a defendant

has not preserved a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for direct appeal,

an appellate court will review the record only for plain error.

13. Appeal and Error. An appellate court may find plain error on appeal

when an error unasserted or uncomplained of at trial, but plainly evident

from the record, prejudicially affects a litigant’s substantial right and,

if uncorrected, would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and

fairness of the judicial process.

14. Motions for Mistrial: Prosecuting Attorneys: Waiver: Appeal and

Error. A party who fails to make a timely motion for mistrial based

on prosecutorial misconduct waives the right to assert on appeal that

the court erred in not declaring a mistrial due to such prosecutorial

misconduct.

15. Trial: Prosecuting Attorneys: Words and Phrases. Prosecutorial mis-

conduct encompasses conduct that violates legal or ethical standards for

various contexts because the conduct will or may undermine a defend­

ant’s right to a fair trial.

16. Trial: Prosecuting Attorneys: Juries. Prosecutors are charged with the

duty to conduct criminal trials in such a manner that the accused may

have a fair and impartial trial, and prosecutors are not to inflame the

prejudices or excite the passions of the jury against the accused.

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STATE v. MRZA

Cite as 302 Neb. 931

17. ____: ____: ____. A prosecutor’s conduct that does not mislead and

unduly influence the jury does not constitute misconduct.

18. Trial: Prosecuting Attorneys. In assessing allegations of prosecutorial

misconduct in closing arguments, a court first determines whether the

prosecutor’s remarks were improper. It is then necessary to determine

the extent to which the improper remarks had a prejudicial effect on the

defendant’s right to a fair trial.

19. ____: ____. Whether prosecutorial misconduct is prejudicial depends

largely on the context of the trial as a whole.

19. Trial: Prosecuting Attorneys: Appeal and Error. In determining

whether a prosecutor’s improper conduct prejudiced the defendant’s

right to a fair trial, an appellate court considers the following factors:

(1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s conduct or remarks tended to

mislead or unduly influence the jury; (2) whether the conduct or remarks

were extensive or isolated; (3) whether defense counsel invited the

remarks; (4) whether the court provided a curative instruction; and (5)

the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.

21. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a criminal

conviction for a sufficiency of the evidence claim, whether the evidence

is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the

same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass

on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters

are for the finder of fact. The relevant question for an appellate court

is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-

ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

22. Sexual Assault: Testimony: Proof. The State is not required to cor-

roborate a victim’s testimony in cases of first degree sexual assault;

if believed by the finder of fact, the victim’s testimony alone is

sufficient.

23. Sentences: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not disturb a sen-

tence imposed within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion

by the trial court.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Lori

A. M aret, Judge. Affirmed.

Sanford J. Pollack, of Pollack & Ball, L.L.C., for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Kimberly A.

Klein for appellee.

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STATE v. MRZA

Cite as 302 Neb. 931

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Cassel, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Sami S. Mrza appeals his jury conviction and sentencing

for first degree sexual assault. Although he assigns multiple

errors, we focus on two issues: the authentication requirement

for “Snapchat” evidence and the prosecutor’s comment on

Mrza’s use of an interpreter. Because the evidence was prop-

erly authenticated, trial counsel did not perform deficiently in

failing to object to it. We find no plain error in the prosecutor’s

closing argument, but determine that the record is not sufficient

to address Mrza’s related claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. We find no error in Mrza’s other assignments, and

because the record is insufficient, we do not reach other inef-

fective assistance of counsel claims. Therefore, we affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

Mrza emigrated from Iraq to the United States in December

2014. In the fall of 2016, Mrza met N.W., the victim, in a class

at a community college. The conviction flowed from an event

on November 12, 2016, which we summarize in more detail

later in this opinion.

The State charged Mrza with first degree sexual assault,

pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319 (Reissue 2016). Mrza pled

not guilty. The case proceeded to a jury trial. Throughout the

trial, Mrza utilized an interpreter. Both N.W. and Mrza testi-

fied. The jury found Mrza guilty, and the court sentenced him

to 8 to 15 years’ imprisonment.

Mrza filed a timely appeal, which we moved to our docket.1

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

We have reordered and restated Mrza’s numerous assign-

ments of error, recognizing two primary issues. The first

1

See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018).

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assigns that because trial counsel did not object to the authen-

ticity of “Snapchat” evidence, counsel was ineffective. The

second assigns prosecutorial misconduct for “inflammatory

and prejudicial statements made during closing arguments.”

As an alternative on this second issue, Mrza assigns ineffec-

tive assist­ance of trial counsel in failing to move for a mistrial

based on those statements.

His remaining assignments of error assert that the evi-

dence was insufficient, the sentence was excessive, and trial

counsel was ineffective in two other instances, by failing to

move to suppress Mrza’s statements to law enforcement and

by “fail[ing] to adequately investigate [Mrza’s] defenses and

effectively cross-examine witnesses.”

[1] We observe that Mrza’s last assignment lacked the speci-

ficity we demand on direct appeal. We have held that when

raising an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, an

appellant must make specific allegations of the conduct that

he or she claims constitutes deficient performance by trial

counsel.2 And we have long held that an alleged error must be

both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief

of the party asserting the error to be considered by an appellate

court.3 It follows that we should not have to scour the argument

section of an appellant’s brief to extract specific allegations

of deficient performance.4 We now hold that assignments of

error on direct appeal regarding ineffective assistance of trial

counsel must specifically allege deficient performance, and

an appellate court will not scour the remainder of the brief in

search of such specificity.

Although we will not do so in the future, we have syn-

thesized a specific assignment from the argument section of

Mrza’s brief, which asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in

2

See State v. Filholm, 287 Neb. 763, 848 N.W.2d 571 (2014).

3

See, e.g., State v. Sundquist, 301 Neb. 1006, 921 N.W.2d 131 (2019).

4

See State v. Dill, 300 Neb. 344, 913 N.W.2d 470 (2018) (declining to

scour record in search of facts that might support claim).

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failing to investigate the time between the assault and N.W.’s

first interview with law enforcement for possible defenses

by failing to (1) subpoena cell phone records of N.W. and

the friend she called following the event, (2) investigate the

relationship between N.W. and her friend, (3) subpoena video

from the restaurant where N.W. and Mrza met before the event,

and (4) subpoena Snapchat to obtain self-destructing messages

from Mrza, N.W., and N.W.’s friend.

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Snapchat Authentication

Mrza argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in fail-

ing to object, on the ground of authenticity, to “Snapchat”

evidence.

(a) Additional Facts

The night after the incident, Mrza initiated a conversation

with N.W. via Snapchat (Snapchat is a photograph- and text-

sharing social media application). At trial, the State ques-

tioned N.W. about the Snapchat conversation. N.W. testified

that Mrza was her “friend” on Snapchat. They became friends

when they added each other’s “usernames.” She knew it was

his account because she typed in the username that he told

her. Later, when offering the Snapchat conversation as evi-

dence, N.W. stated that she knew the messages were between

herself and Mrza, because “it has his name on it.” She

affirmed that the photographs of the conversation contained

a fair and accurate depiction of the conversation. In the con-

versation, N.W. directly questioned Mrza about why he did

certain things to her after she told him to stop. He apologized

for his actions and promised not to do it again. After the State

offered the evidence, trial counsel did not object and the court

admitted it.

(b) Standard of Review

[2] Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

may be determined on direct appeal is a question of law. In

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STATE v. MRZA

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reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct

appeal, an appellate court decides only whether the undisputed

facts contained within the record are sufficient to conclusively

determine whether counsel did or did not provide effective

assistance and whether the defendant was or was not preju-

diced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance.5

(c) General Principles Regarding Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel

[3,4] When a defendant’s trial counsel is different from his or

her counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must raise on direct

appeal any issue of trial counsel’s ineffective per­ formance

which is known to the defendant or is apparent from the record,

otherwise, the issue will be procedurally barred in a subse-

quent postconviction proceeding.6 The fact that an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal does not

necessarily mean that it can be resolved. The determining fac-

tor is whether the record is sufficient to adequately review the

question.7 Regarding the Snapchat evidence, we conclude that

the record is sufficient to address Mrza’s claim.

[5-8] Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assist­

ance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington,8 the defend­

ant must show that his or her counsel’s performance was

deficient and that this deficient performance actually preju-

diced the defendant’s defense.9 To show that counsel’s per-

formance was deficient, a defendant must show that counsel’s

per­formance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary

training and skill in criminal law.10 To show prejudice, the

5

State v. Smith, ante p. 154, 922 N.W.2d 444 (2019).

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).

9

State v. Avina-Murillo, 301 Neb. 185, 917 N.W.2d 865 (2018).

10

Id.

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STATE v. MRZA

Cite as 302 Neb. 931

defend­ant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but

for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceed-

ing would have been different. A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the out-

come.11 In determining whether trial counsel’s performance

was deficient, there is a strong presumption that counsel

acted reasonably.12

(d) Analysis

The parties disagree as to which standard should be applied

to the authentication of the Snapchat messages. The State

contends that authentication “is satisfied by evidence suf-

ficient to support a finding that the matter in question is

what its proponent claims.”13 Mrza argues instead that the

text message standard of authentication should be applied.

Specifically, he argues that because Mrza testified that there

were more messages to the conversation, the State failed to

show that the messages were an accurate transcription of

the conversation.

[9] The State’s formulation is a correct statement of the

evidence rule governing authenticity.14 This rule does not

impose a high hurdle for authentication or identification.15 A

proponent of evidence is not required to conclusively prove

the genuineness of the evidence or to rule out all possibilities

inconsistent with authenticity.16

[10] Even if Mrza were correct that the text message authen-

tication standard governs messages sent over social media

applications, his claim would fail. Generally, the foundation

for the admissibility of text messages has two components:

11

Id.

12

State v. McGuire, 299 Neb. 762, 910 N.W.2d 144 (2018).

13

See Neb. Evid. R. 901(1), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-901(1) (Reissue 2016).

14

See State v. Savage, 301 Neb. 873, 920 N.W.2d 692 (2018).

15

Id.

16

Id.

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Cite as 302 Neb. 931

(1) whether the text messages were accurately transcribed

and (2) who actually sent the text messages.17 Mrza does

not challenge the second prong of this test, but argues only

that the State failed to prove that the messages were accu-

rately transcribed. In that regard, he conflates accuracy with

completeness.

[11] Contrary to Mrza’s argument, the existence of other

messages does not undermine the accuracy of the messages

that were offered. Mrza does not argue that the exhibit received

in evidence was not accurate as far as it went. Instead, he

argues that there were other messages not included in the

exhibit. Essentially, his argument attempts to invoke the rule

of completeness18 under the rubric of authenticity. The rule

of completeness allows a party to admit the entirety of an

act, declaration, conversation, or writing when the other party

admits a part and when the entirety is necessary to make it

fully understood.19 The rule of authentication did not require

the State to offer all of the Snapchat messages in evidence.

Where there is nothing to suggest that the other messages were

relevant or the evidence entered was misleading or prejudicial,

the State was not required to enter the entirety of the conversa-

tion into evidence.20

If Mrza believed that other messages were necessary to

make the conversation fully understood, it was his obligation

to offer them. But this was not a matter of authentication.

Because N.W. testified to the accuracy of the Snapchat mes-

sages between herself and Mrza, it was sufficient to show

that the messages were accurately transcribed and properly

authenticated. Therefore, Mrza’s trial counsel did not per-

form deficiently in failing to assert an objection based on

authentication.

17

Id.

18

See Neb. Evid. R. 106, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-106 (Reissue 2016).

19

Id.; Savage, supra note 14.

20

See Savage, supra note 14.

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STATE v. MRZA

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2. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Mrza argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument discuss-

ing Mrza’s use of an interpreter was prejudicial misconduct.

Mrza also asserts that to the extent his claim of prosecutorial

misconduct was not preserved, his trial counsel was ineffec-

tive in failing to move for a mistrial.

(a) Additional Facts

In discussing his assignment of ineffectiveness of counsel

in failing to move to suppress Mrza’s statements, his appellate

brief acknowledges that his “ability to speak and understand

the English language” was the subject of extensive testimony

“[t]hroughout the case.”21 His brief recites that there was

concern at a pretrial hearing whether he had “understood his

waiver of a preliminary hearing,” because he had not been pro-

vided an interpreter in the county court.22 His brief argues that

he had an “imperfect grasp” of the English language.23

At trial, the parties addressed Mrza’s English language

proficiency. In the State’s opening statement, it foreshadowed

evidence about Mrza’s college courses taught in English and

how he communicated with N.W. only in English. In Mrza’s

opening statement, he responded by outlining Mrza’s testimony

about reading his textbooks numerous times when studying and

that he did well in his classes.

This continued when evidence was presented. During N.W.’s

direct examination, she stated that her classes were taught in

English, she communicated with Mrza in English, he under-

stood her when she spoke in English, she understood his

English, and his class notes were in English.

The police sergeant who investigated the case stated that

he interviewed Mrza in English and that Mrza appeared to

understand English. The investigator testified that Mrza never

21

See brief for appellant at 32.

22

Id.

23

Id.

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indicated he did not understand English and that he did not

read Mrza his Miranda rights until he determined that Mrza

understood English. Both a video and audio recording and a

typed transcript of the investigator’s interview of Mrza were

received in evidence and displayed to the jury.

On direct examination, Mrza stated that he studied English

for 3 years at a university in Kurdistan; that his current

textbooks were in English, which he read them two or three

times to understand; and that he did not feel that he under-

stood English well enough to understand his trial. On cross-­

examination, Mrza stated he switched from the English “yes”

to the Kurdish “yes” because he was “saying almost every-

thing in Kurdish” already; he took four English classes at a

community college in Lincoln, Nebraska; all his classes were

taught in English; during class, he rarely used the translation

application on his cell phone; and he had a “3-plus” grade

point average.

Mrza’s prosecutorial misconduct argument focuses on the

State’s closing argument, when the prosecutor argued, “But

I’d submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, this interpreter thing

that we’ve got going on here is a charade. And it’s done to

try to garnish some type of sympathy from you guys.” The

prosecutor then commented on Mrza’s ability to understand

English. This comment cited Mrza’s academic record and how

he took all his classes in English and received high grades.

The prosecutor recalled Mrza’s use of English slang in the

Snapchat conversation and argued that someone who does not

understand English could not text in slang. This argument also

called attention to Mrza’s trial testimony in which he answered

the first half of the direct examination with the English “yes,”

but after lunch switched to the Kurdish equivalent. Mrza’s trial

counsel did not object or move for a mistrial.

In Mrza’s closing argument, his trial counsel responded by

arguing that although Mrza understands English, when inter-

viewed by law enforcement, he used “clunky” English and was

difficult to understand in the video. Trial counsel rhetorically

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questioned who, “in today’s political climate,” would try to

garner sympathy by claiming to be a refugee. In the State’s

rebuttal closing argument, it briefly responded by arguing that

Mrza’s inconsistent statements to law enforcement were not

from a lack of understanding English, but because he was dis-

tracted and thinking about what he did.

In instruction No. 10, the court told the jury that there was

evidence that Mrza had made a statement to a law enforcement

officer and that it could rely on the statement only if it decided

beyond a reasonable doubt that he made the statement, he

understood what he was saying, and the statement was freely

and voluntarily made under all of the circumstances surround-

ing its making. Otherwise, the court instructed, the jury must

disregard Mrza’s statement even if it thought it was true.

(b) Standard of Review

[12,13] When a defendant has not preserved a claim of

prosecutorial misconduct for direct appeal, we will review the

record only for plain error.24 An appellate court may find plain

error on appeal when an error unasserted or uncomplained

of at trial, but plainly evident from the record, prejudicially

affects a litigant’s substantial right and, if uncorrected, would

result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of

the judicial process.25 Generally, we will find plain error only

when a miscarriage of justice would otherwise occur.26

(c) Analysis

Mrza argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct

in his closing argument when he argued that Mrza’s use of

an interpreter at trial was a charade used to garner sympa-

thy from the jury. Mrza contends that the statements were

improper, because there was no issue at trial regarding his

24

State v. Custer, 292 Neb. 88, 871 N.W.2d 243 (2015).

25

Id.

26

Id.

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proficiency in English. Mrza contends that the statements

were the expressions of the prosecutor’s personal beliefs and

were designed to inflame the prejudices of the jurors. In addi-

tion to arguing that the prosecutor’s closing argument com-

ments were plain error, Mrza argues that counsel was ineffec-

tive for failing to object and request a mistrial. We address

this issue with Mrza’s remaining ineffective assistance of

counsel assignments below.

[14] The State responds that Mrza failed to preserve the pur-

ported misconduct. The State is correct. A party who fails to

make a timely motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial mis-

conduct waives the right to assert on appeal that the court erred

in not declaring a mistrial due to such prosecutorial miscon-

duct.27 Because Mrza did not move for a mistrial, the alleged

error was waived. Accordingly, our direct review of this issue

is confined to a search for plain error.

[15-18] Prosecutorial misconduct encompasses conduct that

violates legal or ethical standards for various contexts because

the conduct will or may undermine a defendant’s right to a

fair trial.28 Prosecutors are charged with the duty to conduct

criminal trials in such a manner that the accused may have

a fair and impartial trial, and prosecutors are not to inflame

the prejudices or excite the passions of the jury against the

accused.29 A prosecutor’s conduct that does not mislead and

unduly influence the jury does not constitute misconduct.30 In

assessing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in closing

arguments, a court first determines whether the prosecutor’s

remarks were improper. It is then necessary to determine the

extent to which the improper remarks had a prejudicial effect

on the defendant’s right to a fair trial.31

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

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Nebraska courts have not discussed the propriety of a pros-

ecutor’s comments on the use of or need for an interpreter.

We turn to the decisions of federal and other state courts

for guidance.

In Andrade v. U.S.,32 the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals assessed a similar situation and determined that the

conduct did not rise to the level of plain error. There, the

appellate court concluded that the prosecutor had arguably

transcended the bounds of permissible comment by mak-

ing comments during cross-examination about the defend­

ant’s use of an interpreter and then using these parts of

the cross-­examination during closing argument to express an

opinion about the defendant’s veracity. In the prosecutor’s

cross-examination, she commented on the defendant’s use

of an interpreter by telling him, “‘you are not going to hide

behind translation.’”33 During closing argument, the prosecutor

recounted the defendant’s testimony during cross-examination

denying that his attorney had told him what to say, and then

she commented, “‘And then he tries to hide behind the inter-

pretation, maybe, maybe she doesn’t translate for you. My

questions were simple and they were direct and Spanish is not

a very complicated language.’”34 In determining that there was

no plain error requiring reversal, the appellate court relied on

the trial court’s curative steps in ensuring proper interpretation

and use of an interpreter.

In Diaz v. U.S.,35 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

discussed a prosecutor’s comments during a “relatively long

rebuttal”36 argument regarding a defendant’s use of an inter-

preter. According to the appellate court, the prosecutor had

“ignored the factual record, implying that [the defendant]

32

Andrade v. U.S., 88 A.3d 134 (D.C. 2014).

33

Id. at 140.

34

Id. at 141.

35

Diaz v. U.S., 716 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1998).

36

Id. at 180.

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lied when he said he didn’t understand what [the alleged

victim] said to him in English even though he had ‘corrected

[the interpreter’s] English translation of what he had said.’”37

Because the comments expressed personal opinion on the

veracity and credibility of witnesses, the court concluded the

comments, as a whole, were improper. In assessing the preju-

dicial value of the comments, the court did find that the cor-

rective instructions by the court, instructing the jury about the

role of the interpreter and that arguments by counsel are not

evidence, ameliorated any harm from the statements. Other

factors showed that the comments did not mislead the jury, the

case turned on the credibility of witnesses, and there was suf-

ficient evidence without the comments to believe the victim.

The appellate court held that the defendant was not prejudiced

by improper comments.

In U.S. v. Ganadonegro,38 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

10th Circuit assessed whether questions asked and objected to

on cross-examination about the use of an interpreter amounted

to prosecutorial misconduct. In opening statements, defense

counsel discussed how the interpretation of “‘shaking’” from

English to Navajo would be the crux of the trial.39 When the

FBI interviewed the defendant, he had an interpreter present.

An expert testified to the defendant’s competency in English

and how he may have responded appropriately, even if he

did not fully understand what was being said. During cross-­

examination of the defendant, the prosecutor extensively

questioned him about his use of an interpreter, which drew

several objections from defense counsel. The prosecutor drew

a concession when the defendant admitted that he used the

interpreter once in his first trial. The court concluded that the

prosecutor’s conduct was not improper, because the defend­

ant’s defense relied heavily on his language proficiency.

37

Id.

38

U.S. v. Ganadonegro, 560 Fed. Appx. 716 (10th Cir. 2014).

39

Id. at 718.

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Cite as 302 Neb. 931

Therefore, the prosecution was entitled to pursue the theory

of the defense.

In State v. Heredia,40 the defendant challenged comments

made by the prosecutor during cross-examination and closing

argument about his use of an interpreter not under the Due

Process Clause, but under the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments

to the U.S. Constitution. During cross-examination, the pros-

ecutor asked, “‘You say that you don’t speak English that

well?’”; “‘You were able to get a social security card, right,

this one in your wallet?’”; and “‘Are you given any kind of

a test when you come to court to decide whether or not you

need an interpreter?’”41 During closing argument, the pros-

ecutor made the following statement: “‘And I’d ask you not

to be persuaded by his demeanor when he’s on the stand,

when he leans over and looks, kind of sits down, slouched

over, looks up at the interpreter and says, “como, como,” like

he doesn’t know what’s going on.’”42 The Supreme Court

of Connecticut reasoned that the comments at issue did not

burden the defendant’s right to an interpreter, but focused on

the conflict between his demeanor on the stand and the dan-

gerous assailant described by the State’s witnesses. The court

concluded that there was no violation of the defendant’s con-

stitutional rights.

We have explained that “a distinction exists between argu-

ing that a defense strategy is intended to distract jurors from

what the evidence shows, which is not misconduct, and argu-

ing that a defense counsel is deceitful, which is misconduct.”43

Similarly, we distinguish between the prosecutor’s statements

directing the jury toward evidence of the defendant’s profi-

ciency in English relevant to an issue, which is not misconduct,

and a comment which could be construed as attacking the

40

State v. Heredia, 253 Conn. 543, 754 A.2d 114 (2000).

41

Id. at 551, 754 A.2d at 120.

42

Id.

43

State v. Dubray, 289 Neb. 208, 227, 854 N.W.2d 584, 605 (2014).

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defendant as being deceitful or manipulative in his need for an

interpreter in court proceedings.

This does not mean that, in any case in which the

defendant avails himself of the services of an interpreter,

the state would be free to focus on that fact in a man-

ner that was irrelevant to the issues in the case, or in a

manner that unduly casts doubt on the necessity of those

services.44

We have held that a defendant’s inability to comprehend crimi-

nal proceedings or communicate in English at such proceedings

can result in a violation of the defendant’s due process and

Sixth Amendment rights.45 Prosecutors should carefully con-

sider this distinction in commenting on language proficiency.

We agree with Mrza that the prosecutor’s “charade . . . to

garnish . . . sympathy” comment, viewed in isolation, did not

refer to any issue at trial. A prosecutor must base his or her

argument on the evidence introduced at trial rather than on

matters not in evidence.46 But Mrza’s understanding of the

statements that he made to law enforcement officers was at

issue. The remainder of the argument, addressing facts perti-

nent to that understanding, was not improper. Thus, viewing

the matter through the prism for plain error, we must assess the

extent of prejudice associated with this isolated statement.

[19,20] Whether prosecutorial misconduct is prejudicial

depends largely on the context of the trial as a whole.47 In deter-

mining whether a prosecutor’s improper conduct prejudiced the

defendant’s right to a fair trial, an appellate court considers

the following factors: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s

conduct or remarks tended to mislead or unduly influence

the jury; (2) whether the conduct or remarks were extensive

or isolated; (3) whether defense counsel invited the remarks;

44

Heredia, supra note 40, 253 Conn. at 560, 754 A.2d at 125.

45

State v. Alarcon-Chavez, 295 Neb. 1014, 893 N.W.2d 706 (2017).

46

State v. McSwine, 292 Neb. 565, 873 N.W.2d 405 (2016).

47

Id.

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(4) whether the court provided a curative instruction; and (5)

the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.48

First, we turn to the degree to which the prosecutor’s con-

duct or remarks tended to mislead or unduly influence the

jury. Viewed in isolation, that comment could be viewed as

an attempt to unduly influence the jury. Regarding Mrza’s

interaction with N.W., his defense was not predicated on a

lack of English proficiency. But his linguistic proficiency did

bear on the voluntariness of his statements to law enforce-

ment officers.

Second, we turn to whether the conduct or remarks were

extensive or isolated. As we have observed, the “charade . . .

to garnish . . . sympathy” comment was isolated. It was brief,

particularly in the context of the 60-minute closing argument.

During rebuttal argument, the State briefly discussed Mrza’s

comprehension but only in the context of whether he under-

stood English when interviewed by law enforcement.

Third, we turn to whether defense counsel invited the

remarks. Here, we focus specifically on the “charade . . . to

garnish . . . sympathy” comment. We cannot say that defense

counsel invited this particular comment; to the contrary, it

seemed to have been a longstanding concern of the prosecutor.

Fourth, we look to whether the court gave any curative

instruction. Mrza did not object to the comments and, accord-

ingly, did not request a curative instruction or a mistrial. The

court instructed the jury that comments of attorneys are not

evidence and that their decision must be based solely on the

evidence. Moreover, instruction No. 10 instructed the jury that

in assessing the voluntariness of Mrza’s statements, it must

consider whether Mrza understood what he said.

Finally, we turn to the strength of the evidence supporting

Mrza’s conviction. The evidence ultimately presented a classic

“she said, he said” situation. In that situation, Mrza’s state-

ments to law enforcement officers were important to the State’s

48

Id.

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case. Thus, his understanding of those statements was essen-

tial to the jury’s reliance on his statements. But because the

strength of the State’s case highly depended upon a comparison

of Mrza’s credibility to that of N.W., even an isolated comment

had the potential for unfair prejudice.

After considering the above factors in the context of a

review for plain error, we conclude that the isolated comment

did not clearly demonstrate prejudice. Therefore, we do not

find plain error in the prosecutor’s closing argument.

3. Sufficiency of Evidence

Mrza argues that the evidence was insufficient to support

his conviction. We disagree.

(a) Additional Facts

We recite these facts in the light most favorable to the State.

On the evening of November 12, 2016, N.W. sent a message

via Snapchat asking Mrza to go to dinner with her. They met

at 11:30 p.m. at a restaurant on North 27th Street in Lincoln.

Around 1 a.m., they finished their meals, but N.W. did not

want to go home and suggested that they “cruise O Street.”

Mrza agreed and offered to drive.

Upon entering Mrza’s vehicle, Mrza hugged N.W. with both

hands on her mid-back. Mrza began kissing her neck. Mrza

pulled down the collar of N.W.’s T-shirt to expose her breast

and began kissing her breast. Mrza asked if she liked it, and

she responded, “‘Yes.’” Mrza began rubbing her vagina on the

outside of her pants. Again, he asked if it felt good and she

said, “‘Yes.’”

Mrza moved his hand underneath her pants. She stated that

she “wasn’t okay with that” and told him, “‘Stop. I don’t want

to do this.’” Mrza digitally penetrated N.W. N.W. stated that

Mrza was “getting frustrated” with her and was forcefully put-

ting his fingers in and out of her vagina. Mrza removed his

fingers and aggressively kissed her on the mouth.

Mrza unbuttoned his pants and “pulled out his penis.” Mrza

grabbed the back of N.W.’s head, pulled it down to his penis,

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and inserted his penis in her mouth. He forced her head up and

down on his penis. N.W. turned her head and told him, “‘Stop.

I don’t want to do this.’” N.W. pulled her head away.

Mrza tried to digitally penetrate N.W.’s vagina again, but

she stopped him. He then pulled her pants down to her mid-

thigh and attempted to perform oral sex on her. She remem-

bered telling him multiple times to stop and that she did not

want to do this.

N.W. attempted to open the vehicle door, and Mrza grabbed

her shoulder, pulled her into the car, and shut and locked the

doors. N.W. recalled that Mrza told her to get in the back seat

and that “he wanted to fuck me.” She unlocked the door and

ran to her car.

A few hours later, N.W. met a friend to tell him about the

incident and he called the police. A police officer responded

to the call and briefly interviewed N.W. before advising her

to go to the hospital for an examination. N.W. went to a hos-

pital with her mother for a sexual assault nurse examination.

At the hospital, N.W. gave a detailed statement of the events

to the examining nurse and a police sergeant. These state-

ments are nearly identical to the events to which she testified

to at trial.

(b) Standard of Review

[21] In reviewing a criminal conviction for a sufficiency

of the evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circum-

stantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same:

An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence,

pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence;

such matters are for the finder of fact. The relevant question

for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.49

49

Smith, supra note 5.

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(c) Analysis

Mrza argues that although Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2028

(Reissue 2016) states, “The testimony of a person who is a

victim of a sexual assault . . . shall not require corroboration,”

in this case, the victim’s statement lacked corroboration and

therefore was insufficient to find Mrza guilty. Mrza contends

that N.W.’s inconsistent statements to the police officer, the

nurse, and the police sergeant about when she did and did not

consent made her testimony not credible and did not provide

sufficient evidence for the jury to find Mrza guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.

[22] The State was not required to corroborate N.W.’s

testimony. Since 1989, the State has not been required to

corroborate a victim’s testimony in cases of first degree

sexual assault; if believed by the finder of fact, the victim’s

testimony alone is sufficient.50 Therefore, if the jury believed

N.W., her testimony alone was sufficient. After viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution and with-

out passing on the credibility of witnesses, there was suffi-

cient evidence for any rational trier of fact to find Mrza guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.

4. Excessive Sentence

Mrza argues that the district court imposed an excessive

sentence.

(a) Standard of Review

[23] An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed

within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion by the

trial court.51

(b) Analysis

Mrza argues that the district court abused its discretion by

imposing an excessive sentence of 8 to 15 years’ imprisonment,

50

See State v. Davis, 277 Neb. 161, 762 N.W.2d 287 (2009).

51

Id.

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rather than a probationary sentence. Mrza contends that his

crime did not cause or threaten serious harm, he had no prior

criminal or delinquent history, he has a close and positive fam-

ily support system, and he was engaged in supporting his local

ethnic community. He does not dispute that the sentence was

within the statutory limits.

We have recited the principles of law governing such claims

so many times that we see no point in doing so again here.52

Simply put, there was no abuse of discretion in the sentence

imposed by the district court.

5. R emaining Ineffective Assistance

of Counsel Claims

We have already disposed of Mrza’s assignment of inef-

fective assistance of trial counsel regarding the Snapchat evi-

dence. Three claims remain: the failure to move for a mistrial

during the prosecutor’s closing argument and the two claims

set forth in the second paragraph of the assignments of error

section (the latter of those two having been synthesized in the

fourth paragraph of that section). We have already recited the

standard of review and basic principles of law applicable to

such claims.

We recognize his ineffectiveness assignment regarding the

prosecutor’s closing argument referred by paragraph number

to the assignment of excessive sentence. But Mrza’s argument

in his brief made clear that he meant to refer to the prosecu-

torial misconduct assignment, and it is equally clear that the

mistaken numerical reference was an inadvertent typographi-

cal error.

Mrza asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective when he

failed to move for a mistrial following inflammatory state-

ments made by the prosecutor during closing argument. We

agree that Mrza has sufficiently described the deficiency in

52

See id.

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counsel’s conduct and that the record does show that no such

motion was made.

But this is not one of the rare instances where a reversal on

direct appeal is appropriate.53 Although Mrza has accurately

described what was not done, the record does not show why

trial counsel did not move for a mistrial. And we recall that in

determining whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient,

there is a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably.

Because the undisputed facts in the record cannot conclusively

determine whether counsel did or did not provide effective

assistance and whether Mrza was prejudiced by the alleged

deficient performance,54 the record is not sufficient to address

the claim on direct review.

In response to Mrza’s remaining claims of ineffective assist­

ance of trial counsel, the State responds that the record is not

sufficient to address them. We agree.

V. CONCLUSION

We conclude that there is no merit to the assignments of

error we can reach on direct appeal. Accordingly, we affirm

Mrza’s conviction and sentence.

A ffirmed.

53

See, State v. Rocha, 286 Neb. 256, 836 N.W.2d 774 (2013); State v. Faust,

265 Neb. 845, 660 N.W.2d 844 (2003), overruled on other grounds, State

v. McCulloch, 274 Neb. 636, 742 N.W.2d 727 (2007).

54

See Smith, supra note 5.