Mangiafico v. Town of Farmington

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ENRICO MANGIAFICO v. TOWN OF

FARMINGTON ET AL.

(SC 19993)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983), every person who, under

color of any statute, ordinance or regulation of any state, subjects

another person to the deprivation of constitutional rights, shall be liable

to the injured party in an action at law or suit in equity.

The plaintiff landowner, M, sought, inter alia, injunctive relief and to recover

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from the named defendant, the town

of Farmington, among other defendants, alleging that the town’s designa-

tion of M’s property as blighted, its assessment of daily punitive fines,

and its imposition of liens on his property constituted a taking in violation

of the federal and state constitutions. After the town had received com-

plaints regarding the appearance of M’s property, the town council voted

to place it on the town’s blighted building list. Thereafter, when M failed

to make certain improvements, the town began assessing daily punitive

fines for the alleged violation of the town’s blight ordinance and com-

menced an action to recover those fines. M neither paid the fines nor

filed an administrative appeal challenging them. As a result, the town

manager caused two liens to be placed on M’s property and to be

recorded in the town’s land records. After M commenced the present

action, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted in part the motion and dis-

missed most of M’s claims, including his § 1983 claims, on the ground

that he had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by

statute (§ 7-152c [g]) by failing to file an appeal with the Superior Court

challenging the assessment of the fines. Subsequently, the trial court

granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to M’s

remaining claim and rendered judgment for the defendants, from which

M appealed to the Appellate Court. That court affirmed the judgment

of the trial court, concluding, inter alia, that M’s failure to exhaust

his administrative remedies deprived the trial court of subject matter

jurisdiction over M’s § 1983 claims. On the granting of certification, M

appealed to this court. Held:

1. The Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court’s dismissal of M’s

§ 1983 claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that

M was required but failed to file an appeal challenging the assessment

of the fines in accordance with § 7-152 (g) prior to bringing his § 1983

claims, as M was not required to exhaust his available state administra-

tive remedies before filing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court:

although state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state courts are bound by federal precedent

governing the construction and application of that federal statute, the

United States Supreme Court previously held in Patsy v. Board of

Regents (457 U.S. 496) that, in light of the legislative purpose and history

of the law, exhaustion of state administrative remedies generally is not

a prerequisite to bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and none

of the federal exceptions to that general rule of nonexhaustion applied

in the present case; moreover, this court concluded that its prior holdings

in Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac (194 Conn. 677) and Pet v. Dept. of Health

Services (207 Conn. 346), which created an additional, unwarranted

exception to that general rule by requiring the exhaustion of state admin-

istrative remedies prior to the filing of a § 1983 action seeking injunctive

relief, were inconsistent with Patsy and its progeny, and must be over-

ruled, as those cases incorrectly treated a plaintiff’s burden of alleging

and proving the lack of an adequate legal remedy in a § 1983 action for

injunctive relief as a prerequisite to the exercise of a court’s subject

matter jurisdiction rather than as an essential element of the plaintiff’s

claim for injunctive relief, and, accordingly, a plaintiff’s failure to allege

or establish the lack of an adequate remedy does not deprive a court

of subject matter jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim.

2. This court declined to address the merits of the defendants’ alternative

ground for affirming the Appellate Court’s judgment, raised for the first

time on appeal to this court, that the plaintiff’s takings claims were not

ripe for judicial review because there purportedly had not been a final

administrative decision as required by Williamson County Regional

Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank (473 U.S. 172): although this

court, in Port Clinton Associates v. Board of Selectman (217 Conn. 588),

previously has treated the Williamson County finality requirement as

jurisdictional in nature, recent developments in federal case law estab-

lished that it is a prudential rather than a jurisdictional requirement,

and, therefore, this court abandoned its conclusion in Port Clinton

Associates that the Williamson County finality requirement is a jurisdic-

tional defect that may be raised for the first time on appeal; accordingly,

because the defendants did not raise their ripeness claim in the trial

court, and because the purported lack of a final administrative decision

did not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, that claim

was not preserved for appellate review.

Argued October 9, 2018—officially released April 16, 2019

Procedural History

Action seeking to enjoin the named defendant from

enforcing a blight ordinance, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Hartford, where the court, Scholl, J., granted in part

the defendants’ motion to dismiss; thereafter, the court,

Scholl, J., granted the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which

the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, Alvord,

Keller and Beach, Js., which affirmed the judgment of

the trial court, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certifi-

cation, appealed to this court. Reversed in part; fur-

ther proceedings.

Jon L. Schoenhorn, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Kenneth R. Slater, Jr., with whom was Daniel J.

Krisch, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

ECKER, J. The principal issue in this certified appeal

is whether a claim brought in state court alleging a

deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 may

be dismissed for failure to exhaust state administrative

remedies. The plaintiff, Enrico Mangiafico, is a home-

owner who was the subject of a series of enforcement

actions under a municipal blight ordinance in the town

of Farmington.2 In 2013, the plaintiff commenced this

state court action alleging, in relevant part, that the

defendants’ designation of his property as blighted,

their assessment of daily punitive fines, and their impo-

sition of municipal blight liens constituted an uncon-

stitutional taking of his property in violation of the

fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution

and § 1983. The defendants successfully moved in the

trial court to dismiss the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that

the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies because he had not filed an appeal pursuant

to General Statutes § 7-152c (g).3 The Appellate Court

affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See Mangiafico v.

Farmington, 173 Conn. App. 158, 177, 163 A.3d 689

(2017).

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that he was not

required to exhaust his state administrative remedies.

The defendants respond that the plaintiff’s § 1983

claims properly were dismissed, under settled Connect-

icut precedent, for failure to exhaust state administra-

tive remedies. Alternatively, the defendants contend

that dismissal was required under the ripeness doctrine

articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Wil-

liamson County Regional Planning Commission v.

Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed.

2d 126 (1985) (Williamson County), because there was

no final decision in this case due to the plaintiff’s failure

to appeal his assessments pursuant to § 7-152c (g).

Our disposition is controlled largely by Patsy v.

Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 73

L. Ed. 2d 172 (1982), in which the United States Supreme

Court held in unequivocal terms that ‘‘exhaustion of

state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to

an action under § 1983 . . . .’’ We repeatedly have

acknowledged that the Patsy doctrine applies in § 1983

cases litigated in our state courts. See Laurel Park,

Inc. v. Pac, 194 Conn. 677, 690, 485 A.2d 1272 (1984);

Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539,

549, 473 A.2d 1176 (1984). We have deviated from Patsy

in one respect, by creating an exception to its applicabil-

ity in actions for injunctive relief under § 1983. See Pet

v. Dept. of Health Services, 207 Conn. 346, 369, 542 A.2d

672 (1988) (holding that ‘‘no form of injunctive relief,

under § 1983 or otherwise, is justified as an exception to

the [administrative] exhaustion requirement’’); Laurel

Park, Inc. v. Pac, supra, 691 (holding that ‘‘none of the

concerns expressed in Patsy’’ warrant an ‘‘exception to

the exhaustion doctrine’’ in cases for injunctive relief).

Following oral argument in the present case, this court

sua sponte ordered the parties to submit supplemental

briefs addressing the continued viability of the injunc-

tive relief exception in light of Patsy and its progeny

and whether we should ‘‘overrule Pet v. Department of

Health Services in this case?’’

We conclude, in light of Patsy and its progeny, that

a plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative rem-

edies prior to filing a § 1983 claim in state court, regard-

less of the type of relief sought. We therefore overrule

our holdings in Pet and Laurel Park, Inc., that exhaus-

tion of state administrative remedies is a jurisdictional

prerequisite to the filing of a § 1983 action for injunctive

relief. We decline to address the defendants’ unpre-

served Williamson County defense and, accordingly,

reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

It will be useful at the outset to review the statutory

and regulatory scheme governing blight designations

and citations in the town of Farmington. General Stat-

utes § 7-148 (c) (7) (H) (xv) provides municipalities

with the power to ‘‘[m]ake and enforce regulations for

the prevention and remediation of housing blight . . .

provided such regulations define housing blight and

require such municipality to give written notice of any

violation to the owner and occupant of the property

and provide a reasonable opportunity for the owner

and occupant to remediate the blighted conditions prior

to any enforcement action being taken . . . .’’ The stat-

ute further provides municipalities with the authority

to ‘‘prescribe civil penalties for the violation of such

regulations of not less than ten or more than one hun-

dred dollars for each day that a violation continues and,

if such civil penalties are prescribed, such municipality

shall adopt a citation hearing procedure in accordance

with section 7-152c . . . .’’ General Statutes § 7-148 (c)

(7) (H) (xv).

Pursuant to § 7-148 (c) (7) (H) (xv), the town adopted

regulations governing ‘‘blighted premises,’’ which are

defined, in relevant part, as ‘‘[a]ny vacant building or

structure’’ that (A) ‘‘pose[s] a serious threat to the health

and safety of persons in the [t]own,’’ (B) ‘‘is not being

maintained and contributes to housing decay,’’ (C) ‘‘[is

a location at which] [i]llegal activities are conducted

. . . as documented in [p]olice [d]epartment records,’’

(D) ‘‘is a fire hazard as determined by the [f]ire [m]ar-

shall or as documented in [f]ire [d]epartment records,’’

or (E) ‘‘is a factor creating a substantial and unreason-

able interference with the use and enjoyment of other

premises within the surrounding area as documented

by neighborhood complaints, police reports or the can-

cellation of insurance on proximate properties.’’ Farm-

ington Town Code § 88-2 (A) through (E) (2003) (town

code). The regulations provide that ‘‘[n]o owner of real

property, taxable or tax-exempt, within the [t]own of

Farmington shall cause or allow blighted premises to

be created, nor shall any owner allow the continued

existence of blighted premises.’’ Id., § 88-3. Under the

regulations, the town manager must ‘‘complete a list of

blighted properties,’’ which is then ‘‘approve[d], disap-

prove[d], or modif[ied]’’ by the town council. Id., § 88-

4 (B) and (C). After the list of blighted properties has

been approved by the town council, ‘‘the [t]own [m]an-

ager, or his designee, shall undertake regular inspec-

tions for the purpose of documenting continuous blight

and shall issue a citation and impose a penalty of not

more than $100 for each day that the building or struc-

ture’’ continues to be blighted. Id., § 88-5 (A). Each day

that the building or structure is deemed to be blighted

constitutes ‘‘a separate offense.’’ Id.

Section 7-152c (a) authorizes municipalities to ‘‘estab-

lish by ordinance a citation hearing procedure’’ to

enforce any ‘‘assessments and judgments’’ imposed in

the exercise of its municipal powers. Under the citation

hearing procedure, the municipality must, ‘‘within

twelve months from the expiration of the final period

for the uncontested payment of fines, penalties, costs

or fees . . . send notice to the person cited,’’ informing

them ‘‘(1) [o]f the allegations against him and the

amount of the fines, penalties, costs or fees due; (2)

that he may contest his liability before a citation hearing

officer by delivering in person or by mail written notice

within ten days of the date thereof; (3) that if he does

not demand such a hearing, an assessment and judg-

ment shall be entered against him; and (4) that such

judgment may issue without further notice.’’ General

Statutes § 7-152c (c). The municipality must provide

any person requesting a citation hearing with ‘‘written

notice of the date, time and place for the hearing’’ and an

opportunity to ‘‘present evidence in his behalf.’’ General

Statutes § 7-152c (e). At the conclusion of the hearing,

the hearing officer must ‘‘announce his decision . . . .’’

General Statutes § 7-152c (e). If the hearing officer

‘‘determines that the person is not liable’’ for the viola-

tion, he must dismiss the matter. General Statutes § 7-

152c (e). If, however, the hearing officer ‘‘determines

that the person is liable for the violation,’’ he must

‘‘enter and assess the fines, penalties, costs or fees

against such person as provided by the applicable ordi-

nances of the municipality.’’ General Statutes § 7-

152c (e).

A person subject to an assessment of fines under § 7-

152c ‘‘is entitled to judicial review by way of appeal.’’

General Statutes § 7-152c (g). The appeal must be ‘‘insti-

tuted within thirty days of the mailing of notice of such

assessment by filing a petition to reopen assessment,

together with an entry fee . . . which shall entitle such

person to a hearing in accordance with the rules of the

judges of the Superior Court.’’ General Statutes § 7-152c

(g). Under the rules of the Superior Court, the hearing

on the petition to reopen ‘‘shall be de novo,’’ and ‘‘[t]here

shall be no right to a hearing before a jury.’’ Practice

Book § 23-51 (c). Any assessment of fines that is not

overturned on appeal or paid in full ‘‘shall constitute a

lien upon the real estate against which the penalty was

imposed from the date of such penalty. Each such lien

may be continued, recorded and released in the manner

provided by the general statutes for continuing,

recording and releasing property tax liens.’’ General

Statutes § 7-148aa.

II

The following facts are taken as true for purposes of

this appeal. The plaintiff owns a home located at 23

Lakeview Drive in Farmington, which suffered cata-

strophic damage sometime prior to 2009, causing it to

become uninhabitable for a lengthy period of time. The

demolition and rebuilding of the home was delayed by

the plaintiff’s insurance company, resulting in a settle-

ment agreement sometime in August, 2011.

In July, 2012, the defendant Kathleen Eagen, who

was the town manager, received complaints about the

appearance of the plaintiff’s home. Chris Foryan, the

town building official, verbally informed the plaintiff of

these complaints on July 25, 2012. The plaintiff asked

Foryan to schedule a meeting with Eagen as soon as

practicable, explaining that he would be away on vaca-

tion in early August. A meeting was held on July 27,

2012, but Eagen did not attend.

On August 14, 2012, without prior notice to the plain-

tiff or an opportunity for him to be heard, the individual

defendants—Eagan, Jeffrey Hogan, Nancy Nickerson,

Charles Keniston, and C.J. Thomas—convened a town

council meeting at which they each voted to place the

plaintiff’s home on the town’s blighted building list.

Eight days later, on August 22, 2012, Eagen sent the

plaintiff a letter informing him that his home had been

placed on the blighted building list and demanding that

he undertake certain improvements and construction

prior to October 1, 2012. The plaintiff tried to comply

with the letter’s demands. Nonetheless, on September

4, 2012, without prior notice and more than three weeks

before the October 1 deadline, town building officials

began imposing daily punitive fines of $100 on the plain-

tiff based on the alleged blight condition.

On September 14, 2012, the plaintiff sent a letter to

the defendants asking them to remove his home from

the blighted building list because it did not satisfy the

definition of blight in the town code. The defendants

declined to remove the plaintiff’s property from the list

and, instead, began a citation enforcement action to

recover the daily punitive fines. The plaintiff requested

and was granted a hearing before a municipal hearing

officer, at which he challenged the blight designation

and the imposition of daily fines. At the hearing, which

was conducted on October 15, 2012, the hearing officer

stated that he lacked the authority to rule on the propri-

ety of the blight designation or the procedures used

to designate the plaintiff’s property as blighted. The

hearing officer explained, however, that he had the

authority to remit some of the daily punitive fines and

to amend the plaintiff’s construction schedule. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer reduced

the total amount of fines from $4000 to $2000 and

ordered the plaintiff to present a building plan to munic-

ipal officials within thirty days.

On January 4, 2013, the town citation officer again

began imposing daily punitive fines of $100 for the plain-

tiff’s alleged violation of the blight ordinance. On Febru-

ary 21, 2013, without notice to the plaintiff, a second

hearing was held before a municipal hearing officer,

resulting in the imposition of $4700 in fines for the time

period between January 4 and February 19, 2013. The

plaintiff did not have an opportunity to contest his liabil-

ity because he was not given notice of the hearing.

The plaintiff did not pay the accumulated assessed

fines; nor did he file an appeal pursuant to § 7-152c (g).

As a result, Eagan, on behalf of the town, caused two

municipal real estate liens to be placed on the plaintiff’s

property and recorded on the town’s land records: (1)

a lien in the amount of $2000 for nonpayment of the

hearing officer’s assessment of fines for the period

between September 4 and October 15, 2012; and (2) a

lien in the amount of $4700 for nonpayment of the

hearing officer’s assessment of fines for the period

between January 4 and February 19, 2013.

III

The plaintiff commenced this action on September 5,

2013. The complaint contains five counts, respectively

alleging that (1) the blight designation, the daily punitive

fines, and the liens constituted an ‘‘unconstitutional

taking of property without compensation and [a] viola-

tion of due process of law,’’ in violation of the fourteenth

amendment to the United States constitution, article

first, §§ 10 and 11 of the Connecticut constitution, and

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, (2) the defendants, by their

actions, intentionally caused the plaintiff to endure

emotional distress, (3) the town’s blight ordinance is

‘‘unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff’s property,’’

pursuant to General Statutes § 52-29 and 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2201 and 2202, (4) the plaintiff is entitled to a dis-

charge of the municipal blight liens pursuant to § 7-

148aa and General Statutes §§ 49-35a through 49-37,

and (5) indemnification from the town for the money

damages owed to the plaintiff by the individually named

defendants, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 7-101a and

7-465. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory

relief, as well as monetary damages. More specifically,

he requested (1) an injunction prohibiting the defen-

dants from enforcing the blight ordinance and imposing

the daily punitive fines, (2) a declaration that the town’s

blight ordinance is ‘‘unconstitutionally vague and arbi-

trary as applied to the plaintiff’’ and that the enforce-

ment of the ordinance has violated the plaintiff’s right

to due process of law, (3) reasonable attorney’s fees,

(4) discharge of the municipal blight liens, and (5) com-

pensatory and punitive damages.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s com-

plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion

was premised on the straightforward legal theory that

the plaintiff had failed to exhaust the administrative

remedy provided by § 7-152c (g) because he had not

filed an appeal with the Superior Court challenging the

hearing officer’s citation assessments. The trial court

granted in part the motion to dismiss on the ground

that there was ‘‘no dispute that the plaintiff did not file

an appeal [with] the Superior Court from any of the

decisions of the town or its hearing officer,’’ and such

an appeal ‘‘would have provided the plaintiff with a de

novo hearing in which he could have contested the

imposition of the fines as well as the designation of

his property as blighted.’’ The trial court’s dismissal

encompassed counts one (constitutional claims under

§ 1983), two (intentional infliction of emotional dis-

tress), three (declaration that town’s blight ordinance

is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the plaintiff),

and five (indemnification) of the plaintiff’s complaint

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court

denied the defendants’ motion with respect to count

four (discharge of the municipal blight liens), however,

on the ground that the exhaustion doctrine did not

apply to that particular claim because § 7-148aa ‘‘gives

the court subject matter jurisdiction’’ to ‘‘release anti-

blight liens in the same manner that property tax liens

are released.’’

The plaintiff moved for reconsideration on the theory

that exhaustion would have been futile ‘‘because of

the ongoing and prospective nature of the daily $100

punitive fines,’’ which continued to accrue unabated

each day. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that ‘‘requir-

ing [him] to engage in a protracted process whereby

he would have to appeal each and every daily punitive

fine imposed or to be imposed—past or future—in order

to exhaust administrative remedies and obtain judicial

review is a futility which is barred by federal legal

precedent.’’ The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion

for reconsideration but denied the relief requested

therein.

On December 11, 2014, the plaintiff filed a second

motion for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court

‘‘should reconsider its ruling on the plaintiff’s futility

argument’’ in light of the defendants’ position ‘‘in a new

action involving blight citations issued . . . after the

commencement of the current action . . . .’’ (Empha-

sis in original.) The plaintiff explained that he had com-

menced a second action challenging ‘‘258 blight

citations on his 23 Lakeview Drive, Farmington prop-

erty, totaling $25,800 in fines, issued between Septem-

ber, 2013 through May, 2014 . . . .’’ The town had

moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s second action as prema-

ture because it had not commenced, and might not ever

commence, a citation assessment action under § 7-152c

to collect the fines imposed.4 The plaintiff argued that

the town’s position in the second action was contrary

to its position in the present action that § 7-152c (g)

provided the plaintiff with an adequate administrative

remedy and was ‘‘proof that any further efforts made

by the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies [in

connection with the conduct at issue in the present

lawsuit] would be, and is, both futile and/or ‘useless.’ ’’

The defendants opposed the plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration on the theory that the second action

was in a different procedural posture than the present

action, and, therefore, the town’s legal arguments in

the two actions were neither contrary nor inconsistent.

The trial court agreed with the defendants and denied

the plaintiff’s second motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, on October 1, 2014, the defendants

moved for summary judgment on count four of the

plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the blight

assessments underlying the municipal liens were indis-

putably ‘‘valid and final and subject to no further chal-

lenge on the merits . . . .’’ The trial court granted the

motion because the plaintiff had failed to file an appeal

from the assessments underlying the liens in the Supe-

rior Court pursuant to § 7-152c (g), and, ‘‘[i]n the

absence of [such] an appeal, the town’s decisions are

final and not reviewable.’’ With all counts having been

decided as a matter of law, the trial court rendered

judgment in favor of the defendants.

The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, without

success. See Mangiafico v. Farmington, supra, 173

Conn. App. 177. The Appellate Court rejected the plain-

tiff’s argument that the administrative exhaustion doc-

trine does not apply to federal claims brought pursuant

to § 1983 and his alternative argument that exhaustion

would have been futile. See id., 171–72. It held, to the

contrary, that the plaintiff was required to exhaust his

administrative remedies under § 7-152c (g) and § 91-2

(G) of the town code because ‘‘[t]he Superior Court,

being a court of general jurisdiction . . . could have

addressed all of the plaintiff’s claims and provided ade-

quate relief if the plaintiff prevailed.’’ Id., 172. With

respect to count four of the plaintiff’s complaint, seek-

ing discharge of the municipal blight liens, the Appellate

Court held that ‘‘the plaintiff could not attack the valid-

ity of the assessments secured by the liens because

those assessments were final, and therefore valid, and

there was no dispute that the liens were in proper form

and duly recorded.’’ Id., 175. We granted the plaintiff’s

petition for certification to appeal limited to the issue

of whether ‘‘the Appellate Court properly conclude[d]

that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

to entertain the plaintiff’s federal civil rights complaint

due to the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative

remedies?’’5 Mangiafico v. Farmington, 327 Conn. 920,

170 A.3d 681 (2017).

IV

We first address the plaintiff’s claim that he was not

required to exhaust his state administrative remedies

prior to bringing a § 1983 action. The plaintiff contends

that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to an action for

damages or equitable relief under § 1983 and, alterna-

tively, that exhaustion would have been futile because

the town’s citation appeals process did not permit him

to challenge either the inclusion of his property on the

blighted buildings list, the unconstitutional vagueness

of the blight ordinance as applied to his property, or

the defendants’ failure to follow the proper statutory

and regulatory procedures. The defendants respond

that the plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims properly

were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

because ‘‘[i]t is well established that the doctrine of

exhaustion of remedies applies even if a plaintiff asserts

constitutional violations.’’ We agree with the plaintiff

that he was not required to exhaust his state administra-

tive remedies before filing his § 1983 claims in state

court.

‘‘As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable

standard of review. The standard of review of a motion

to dismiss is . . . well established. In ruling upon

whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a

court must take the facts to be those alleged in the

complaint, including those facts necessarily implied

from the allegations, construing them in a manner most

favorable to the pleader. . . . A motion to dismiss

tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the

court is without jurisdiction. . . . Because the exhaus-

tion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates

subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as

a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dis-

missal of the [plaintiff’s] claim. . . . [B]ecause [a]

determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neiman v. Yale

University, 270 Conn. 244, 250–51, 851 A.2d 1165 (2004).

Section 1983, aptly called the ‘‘workhorse of civil

rights litigation’’; Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824

F.2d 1049, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1987); provides ‘‘every per-

son’’ with a procedural vehicle to obtain redress against

state and municipal actors whose conduct has deprived

that person ‘‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws’’ of the United

States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Section 1983 claims

often are filed in federal court, but state courts unques-

tionably ‘‘have concurrent jurisdiction over claims

brought under § 1983.’’ Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn.

128, 133, 913 A.2d 415 (2007). This does not mean, of

course, that state courts hearing § 1983 claims are free

to depart from United States Supreme Court precedent

governing the construction and application of the fed-

eral statute. Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)

264, 315–23, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821) (holding that constitu-

tional structure, and supremacy clause in particular,

requires that United States Supreme Court have juris-

diction to review judgment of state’s high court as to

questions of federal law). The elements of a § 1983

action, and the defenses thereto, ‘‘are defined by federal

law’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Sullins v.

Rodriguez, supra, 134; and state courts applying § 1983

‘‘may not expand or contract the contours’’ of the right

to relief. Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 743, 646 A.2d

152 (1994); see also Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose,

496 U.S. 356, 376, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332

(1990) (holding that ‘‘a state court entertaining a § 1983

action must adhere to [the federal courts’] interpreta-

tion’’ of § 1983). Accordingly, this court has recognized

that it must not ‘‘erect a constitutionally impermissible

barrier to the vindication of federal rights’’ in state

court. Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 136. We also have

acknowledged that ‘‘[i]t would be a bizarre result’’ if

this court were to adopt an interpretation of a claim

or defense under § 1983 that is different from that of

the federal circuit in which our state courts are located,

resulting in a different outcome depending on whether

the plaintiff filed his § 1983 action in a state courthouse

or in a federal courthouse a few blocks away. (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Schnabel v. Tyler, supra, 743

n.4 (recognizing that decisions of Second Circuit Court

of Appeals are ‘‘entitled to great weight’’ in § 1983 cases

because ‘‘the federal statute confers concurrent juris-

diction on the federal and state courts’’ [internal quota-

tion marks omitted]). ‘‘We do not believe that when

Congress enacted the concurrent jurisdiction provision

of § 1983 that it intended to create such a disparate

treatment of plaintiffs depending on their choice of

a federal or state forum.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.

These principles dictate the proper resolution of the

present case. As noted previously in this opinion, the

United States Supreme Court held more than thirty-five

years ago that ‘‘exhaustion is not a prerequisite to an

action under § 1983 . . . .’’ Patsy v. Board of Regents,

supra, 457 U.S. 501. The court’s holding in Patsy is

premised on the history and purpose of the Civil Rights

Act of 1871 (act), including § 1 of the act, which is the

precursor to § 1983. Id., 502–507. Section 1 of the act

was intended ‘‘to throw open the doors of the United

States courts to individuals who were threatened with,

or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional

rights . . . and to provide these individuals immediate

access to the federal courts notwithstanding any provi-

sion of state law to the contrary.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 504. ‘‘A major

factor motivating the expansion of federal jurisdiction

through [§ 1 of the act] was the belief of the 1871 Con-

gress that the state authorities had been unable or

unwilling to protect the constitutional rights of individu-

als or to punish those who violated these rights.’’ Id.,

505. ‘‘[T]his perceived defect in the [s]tates’ [fact-find-

ing] processes’’ was ‘‘particularly relevant’’ to the

exhaustion question because ‘‘exhaustion rules are

often applied in deference to the superior [fact-finding]

ability of the relevant administrative agency.’’ Id., 506.

In light of the clear legislative intent to provide an

immediate remedy for alleged violations of federal law,

the United States Supreme Court ‘‘conclude[d] that

exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not

be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursu-

ant to § 1983.’’ Id., 516.

The Patsy nonexhaustion rule applies broadly, and

with very limited exceptions. The United States

Supreme Court has recognized only two instances in

which an aggrieved party will be required to exhaust

his or her administrative remedies before commencing

a § 1983 lawsuit. First, exhaustion may be required by

some other federal statute, such as the Prison Litigation

Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a), or the Individuals

with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1415

(l), both of which expressly predicate relief on the

exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Patsy v.

Board of Regents, supra, 457 U.S. 508 (recognizing that,

‘‘[i]n § 1997e, Congress . . . created a specific, limited

exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing

actions pursuant to § 1983’’); Frazier v. Fairhaven

School Committee, 276 F.3d 52, 64 (1st Cir. 2002) (hold-

ing that ‘‘plaintiffs who bring an IDEA-based claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which they seek only money

damages, must exhaust the administrative process

available under the IDEA as a condition precedent to

entering a state or federal court’’); see generally Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129

L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994) (noting that ‘‘§ 1983 contains no

exhaustion requirement beyond what Congress has pro-

vided’’). Second, the United States Supreme Court has

held that state ‘‘taxpayers are barred by the principle

of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the

validity of state tax systems in federal courts’’ without

first exhausting their state judicial remedies. Fair

Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454

U.S. 100, 116, 102 S. Ct. 177, 70 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1981).

Except in these limited contexts, however, ‘‘the

Supreme Court [and the] circuit courts of appeals have

confirmed that, as a general rule, exhaustion of state

administrative remedies is not required prior to bringing

suit under § 1983.’’6 Talbot v. Lucy Corr Nursing Home,

118 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1997).

This court has never questioned the general proposi-

tion that Patsy applies with full force to § 1983 claims

brought in state court. The point was established as a

matter of federal law in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,

146–49, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 101 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1988)

(applying Patsy to hold that plaintiff’s failure to comply

with Wisconsin’s notice of claim requirement could not

be used as exhaustion requirement to bar plaintiff from

bringing his §1983 claim in state court), and it has been

embraced by this court, with the limited deviation dis-

cussed subsequently in this opinion, in every instance

in which the issue has received attention. See New

England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817, 831

n.17, 988 A.2d 229 (2010) (noting that ‘‘the requirement

that a litigant exhaust state administrative remedies

. . . is not a prerequisite to bringing an action [in state

court] pursuant to § 1983’’); Fetterman v. University

of Connecticut, supra, 192 Conn. 549 (holding that plain-

tiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies

before filing § 1983 action in state court).

We have, unfortunately, deviated from the Patsy non-

exhaustion rule in one particular context involving

claims under § 1983 seeking injunctive relief. As in

Laurel Park, Inc., we held in Pet that although ‘‘exhaus-

tion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequi-

site to an action for damages under § 1983,’’ it is a

‘‘standard prerequisite for injunctive relief.’’7 (Empha-

sis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v.

Dept. of Health Services, supra, 207 Conn. 368–69; Lau-

rel Park, Inc. v. Pac, supra, 194 Conn. 691 (holding

that Patsy did not abrogate ‘‘standard prerequisite’’ that

plaintiff seeking injunctive relief have no adequate rem-

edy at law, and, therefore, plaintiff must exhaust avail-

able administrative remedies as ‘‘condition precedent’’

to seeking injunctive relief under §1983); see also Flan-

agan v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportuni-

ties, 54 Conn. App. 89, 95, 733 A.2d 881 (‘‘When the

claim is for injunctive relief . . . our Supreme Court

has noted, ‘[i]n Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac, [supra, 691],

which included a § 1983 count, that notwithstanding

[Patsy v. Board of Regents], supra, [457 U.S. 516] the

fundamental requirement of inadequacy of an available

legal remedy in order to obtain injunctive relief remains

in full force.’ Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, supra,

[368–69].’’), cert. denied, 250 Conn. 925, 738 A.2d 656

(1999).

This aspect of our holdings in Pet and Laurel Park,

Inc., is inconsistent with Patsy and its progeny and,

therefore, must be overruled.8 Neither the United States

Supreme Court nor the federal circuit courts of appeals

have recognized a distinction between claims for dam-

ages and injunctive relief for purposes of applying the

Patsy nonexhaustion rule; the federal circuit courts that

have addressed the issue uniformly have concluded that

Patsy applies regardless of the relief sought. Thus, the

Patsy nonexhaustion rule is applicable to ‘‘a request

for injunctive relief in a § 1983 action’’ because to hold

otherwise ‘‘would in effect . . . [deny] the preceden-

tial effect of Patsy’’ by ‘‘requiring exhaustion before

bringing this type of § 1983 action.’’ James v. Richman,

547 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 2008); see also DeSario v.

Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that

availability of state administrative remedy ‘‘does not

bar injunctive relief for plaintiffs’’ in light of Patsy),

vacated on other grounds sub nom. Slekis v. Thomas,

525 U.S. 1098, 119 S. Ct. 864, 142 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1999);

Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255, 258

(1st Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiff was not required

to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing

§ 1983 action for injunctive relief and monetary dam-

ages because, in Patsy, United States ‘‘Supreme Court

. . . held expressly that [§] 1983 claimants need not

avail themselves of state judicial and administrative

remedies before going to federal court’’), cert. denied,

486 U.S. 1044, 108 S. Ct. 2037, 100 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1988);

United Church of the Medical Center v. Medical Center

Commission, 689 F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding

that trial court improperly dismissed plaintiff’s § 1983

action for declaratory and injunctive relief because

‘‘Patsy is fully dispositive of the exhaustion question’’).

The injunctive relief exception created in Pet and

Laurel Park, Inc., arose from an effort to observe the

time-honored equitable principle that a party seeking

injunctive relief must establish that he has no adequate

remedy at law9 and that irreparable harm will ensue

absent injunctive relief. See Pet v. Dept. of Health Ser-

vices, supra, 207 Conn. 369 (noting ‘‘the fundamental

requirement of inadequacy of an available legal remedy

in order to obtain injunctive relief’’); Laurel Park, Inc.

v. Pac, supra, 194 Conn. 691 (‘‘[t]he inadequacy of an

available legal remedy is a standard prerequisite for

injunctive relief’’); see generally Hartford v. American

Arbitration Assn., 174 Conn. 472, 476, 391 A.2d 137

(1978) (‘‘A party seeking injunctive relief has the burden

of alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of

an adequate remedy at law. The allegations and proof

are conditions precedent to the granting of an injunc-

tion.’’). In Pet and Laurel Park, Inc., we incorrectly

treated the existence of an inadequate legal remedy as

a prerequisite to the exercise of the court’s subject

matter jurisdiction, rather than as an essential element

of a plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief. See Murphy

v. Zoning Commission, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173, 181–82 (D.

Conn. 2001) (observing that ‘‘the question of whether

a claimant is required to exhaust state administrative

remedies is conceptually distinct from the question of

whether a party is entitled to injunctive relief after a

showing that any legal remedy would be inadequate’’

because ‘‘a § 1983 claimant seeking injunctive relief

is [not] required to exhaust state administrative rem-

edies’’).

Consistent with Patsy, we now hold that a § 1983

plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative reme-

dies, regardless of the type of relief sought in the com-

plaint. Although a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief

under § 1983 must allege and prove that no adequate

remedy at law exists, this burden is not part of the

exhaustion requirement but, rather, a part of the plain-

tiff’s burden of pleading and proof.10 Therefore, a plain-

tiff’s failure to allege or establish the lack of an adequate

legal remedy does not deprive the trial court of subject

matter jurisdiction over a claim brought pursuant to

§ 1983.

To summarize, the trial court in the present case

granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claims because it concluded that the plaintiff

had failed to exhaust his available state administrative

remedies. We hold that the plaintiff was not required

to exhaust his available state administrative remedies

before filing a § 1983 claim in state court.11 The dismissal

of the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for lack of jurisdiction,

therefore, must be reversed.12

The foregoing discussion also explains why we must

reject the defendants’ argument that the trial court prop-

erly dismissed the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims on the

ground that ‘‘exhaustion of remedies applies even if a

plaintiff asserts constitutional violations.’’ The defen-

dants are correct that ‘‘[i]t is well established [as a

matter of Connecticut law] that a plaintiff may not cir-

cumvent the requirement to exhaust available adminis-

trative remedies merely by asserting a constitutional

claim.’’ St. Paul Travelers Cos. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn.

800, 813, 12 A.3d 852 (2011). But § 1983 claims are not

governed by state law; they are governed by federal

law, and, in Patsy, the United States Supreme Court

eliminated any exhaustion requirement under § 1983

because the purpose of the statute is to provide ‘‘imme-

diate access’’ to the courts for ‘‘individuals who were

threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation

of constitutional rights . . . notwithstanding any pro-

vision of state law to the contrary.’’ (Citation omitted.)

Patsy v. Board of Regents, supra, 457 U.S. 504; see

also Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1998)

(recognizing that ‘‘Patsy’s categorical statement that

exhaustion is not required and the expansive view of

the federal courts in protecting constitutional rights

allow plaintiffs to seek relief under § 1983 without first

resorting to state administrative procedures’’). The

plaintiff, accordingly, was not required to exhaust his

state administrative remedies prior to filing his § 1983

claims in state court.

V

Lastly, we address the defendants’ alternative argu-

ment that the plaintiff’s claims are not ripe for judicial

review under ‘‘the finality doctrine established by the

United States Supreme Court in Williamson County .

. . .’’ The defendants acknowledge that this finality

argument is not the same as the exhaustion argument

raised in and decided by the trial court and the Appellate

Court. They contend, nonetheless, that this court must

address their unpreserved alternative ground for

affirmance because it ‘‘concerns subject matter jurisdic-

tion,’’ which ‘‘must be considered whenever raised.’’ We

disagree that the Williamson County finality doctrine

implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and,

therefore, we decline to address the merits of this

unpreserved claim.

‘‘This court previously has held that [o]nly in [the]

most exceptional circumstances can and will this court

consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has

not been raised and decided in the trial court. . . .

This rule applies equally to [alternative] grounds for

affirmance.’’13 (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn. 483, 498–99, 43

A.3d 69 (2012). A claim that a court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, however, ‘‘may be raised at any time during

the proceedings,’’ including for the first time on appeal.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 506. ‘‘We have

long held that because [a] determination regarding a

trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of

law, our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, 280

Conn. 514, 532, 911 A.2d 712 (2006).

The respondent in Williamson County filed a lawsuit

in federal court under § 1983, alleging that the applica-

tion of various government regulations to its property

constituted an unconstitutional taking without just

compensation in violation of the fifth amendment to

the United States constitution. Williamson County

Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,

supra, 473 U.S. 182. The United States Supreme Court

rejected the claim on two related but independent

grounds, which have become known as the ‘‘finality’’

and ‘‘compensation’’ prongs of Williamson County.

Under the finality prong, ‘‘a claim that the application

of government regulations effects a taking of a property

interest is not ripe until the government entity charged

with implementing the regulations has reached a final

decision regarding the application of the regulations to

the property at issue.’’ Id., 186. The court observed

that the respondent in Williamson County could have

sought variances to avoid the application of the chal-

lenged governmental regulations but failed to do so.

Id., 187–91. In light of the respondent’s failure to request

any variances, the court concluded that the petitioner

planning and zoning commission had not ‘‘arrived at a

final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the

regulations at issue to the particular land in question,’’

and the respondent’s § 1983 claim therefore was prema-

ture.14 Id., 191.

Under the compensation prong of Williamson

County, which is distinct from the finality prong, a

plaintiff’s takings claim is not ripe for review until after

the plaintiff has sought just compensation in state court.

Id., 194. The court reasoned that ‘‘[t]he [f]ifth [a]mend-

ment does not proscribe the taking of property; it pro-

scribes taking without just compensation’’; id.; and,

therefore, a takings claim is ‘‘premature until the prop-

erty owner has availed itself of the process’’ for

obtaining just compensation. Id., 195. Accordingly, a

‘‘property owner has not suffered a violation of the

[j]ust [c]ompensation [c]lause until the owner has

unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just compensation

through the procedures provided by the [s]tate for

obtaining such compensation . . . .’’ Id.

Thus, pursuant to Williamson County, a plaintiff’s

takings claim is not ripe for review until (1) the relevant

administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive

decision, and (2) the plaintiff has sought just compensa-

tion through the procedures provided by the state.15 See

Sherman v. Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 561 (2d Cir. 2014)

(recognizing that, for takings claim to be ripe under

Williamson County doctrine, ‘‘the plaintiff must show

that (1) the state regulatory entity has rendered a final

decision on the matter, and (2) the plaintiff has sought

just compensation by means of an available state proce-

dure’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Severance

v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 496 (5th Cir. 2009) (‘‘The

Supreme Court . . . has adopted a special, two-prong

test for evaluating ripeness under the [t]akings [c]lause.

. . . A takings claim is not ripe until (1) the relevant

governmental unit has reached a final decision as to

how the regulation will be applied to the landowner,

and (2) the plaintiff has sought compensation for the

alleged taking through whatever adequate procedures

the state provides.’’ [Citation omitted.]). Although

developed in the context of fifth amendment takings

jurisprudence, the Williamson County ripeness doc-

trine also ‘‘applies to due process claims arising from

the same nucleus of facts as a takings claim.’’ Kurtz v.

Verizon New York, Inc., 758 F.3d 506, 515 (2d Cir. 2014)

(citing cases); see also John Corp. v. Houston, 214 F.3d

573, 584 (5th Cir. 2000) (‘‘Since Williamson County was

decided, courts have applied these principles to not

only substantive due process claims, but also to proce-

dural due process and equal protection claims. In most

cases, however, only Williamson County’s finality

requirement has been applied to claims other than the

‘due process takings’ claim described in that case.’’).

The defendants contend that Williamson County

established jurisdictional requirements in light of the

United States Supreme Court’s use of jurisdictional ter-

minology (‘‘finality’’ and ‘‘ripeness’’) to describe the

doctrine. Indeed, this court itself has treated the Wil-

liamson County finality requirement as jurisdictional

in nature.16 See Port Clinton Associates v. Board of

Selectmen, 217 Conn. 588, 604, 587 A.2d 126, cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 814, 112 S. Ct. 64, 116 L. Ed. 2d 39

(1991). In Port Clinton Associates, the plaintiff alleged

that the denial of permission to expand its marina con-

stituted ‘‘an illegal ‘taking’ under the fifth and fourteenth

amendments to the United States constitution, and vio-

lations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (predicated upon the uncon-

stitutional taking).’’ Id., 589. The trial court dismissed

the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to file an

administrative appeal under General Statutes § 8-8. Id.,

604–607. We agreed with the plaintiff that ‘‘federal law

prevent[ed] us from applying the exhaustion doctrine

to a § 1983 claim’’; id., 599; but affirmed the judgment of

the trial court on the alternative jurisdictional ground,

under Williamson County, that ‘‘there can be no regula-

tory ‘taking,’ and thus no deprivation of ‘private prop-

erty without just compensation,’ until there has been a

final administrative decision.’’ Id. Because the plaintiff

in that case had failed to present an alternative and

less grandiose plan of development to the final decision

maker,17 we held that there was no final decision, and,

therefore, ‘‘the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider

the taking claim . . . .’’ Id., 609–10.

It has become clear in recent years, long since the

issuance of our decision in Port Clinton Associates,

that the Williamson County ripeness doctrine ‘‘is not,

strictly speaking, jurisdictional.’’ Horne v. Dept. of Agri-

culture, 569 U.S. 513, 526, 526 n.6, 133 S. Ct. 2053, 186

L. Ed. 2d 69 (2013) (reasoning that, because ‘‘[a] [c]ase

or [c]ontroversy exists once the government has taken

private property without paying for it . . . [the exis-

tence of] an alternative remedy . . . does not affect

the jurisdiction of the federal court’’); see also Sherman

v. Chester, supra, 752 F.3d 561 (‘‘[b]ecause Williamson

County is a prudential rather than a jurisdictional rule,

we may determine that in some instances, the rule

should not apply and we still have the power to decide

the case’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), quoting

Sansotta v. Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 2013).

It therefore follows that a Williamson County ripeness

defense may be waived if it is not timely raised. See

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept.

of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 729, 130 S.

Ct. 2592, 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2010) (holding that defen-

dants objection that plaintiffs’ takings claim was

‘‘unripe because petitioner has not sought just compen-

sation’’ had been waived because objection did not

appear ‘‘in the briefs in opposition to the petition for

writ of certiorari, and . . . is [not] jurisdictional’’); Sui-

tum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,

734, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 137 L. Ed. 2d 980 (1997) (addressing

‘‘only the ‘final decision’ prong of Williamson [County]’’

because that was only prong ‘‘addressed below and

briefed before this [c]ourt’’); Rosedale Missionary Bap-

tist Church v. New Orleans, 641 F.3d 86, 88–89 (5th

Cir. 2011) (noting that United States Supreme Court

has ‘‘explicitly held that Williamson County’s ripeness

requirements are merely prudential, not jurisdictional,

so although a court may raise them sua sponte, it may

consider them waived or forfeited as well’’ [footnotes

omitted]).

In light of this doctrinal development, we must aban-

don our conclusion in Port Clinton Associates that the

Williamson County ripeness doctrine is a jurisdictional

defect that may be raised for the first time on appeal.

Because the defendants raised their Williamson

County defense for the first time in this certified appeal,

and because the defense is nonjurisdictional, the viabil-

ity of that defense is not preserved for appellate review.

See, e.g., State v. Darryl W., 303 Conn. 353, 371, 33 A.3d

239 (2012) (‘‘[i]t is our long-standing position that [t]o

review [a] claim, which has been articulated for the

first time on appeal and not before the trial court, would

result in a trial by ambuscade of the trial judge’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, we decline to

address whether there was a final decision by the initial

decision maker as required by Williamson County.18

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed with

respect to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and the case is

remanded to that court with direction to remand the

case to the trial court with direction to deny the defen-

dants’ motion to dismiss as to the plaintiff’s § 1983

claims and for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1

Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983, provides a cause of action

against ‘‘[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, [or]

regulation . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .’’

2

The defendants are the town, Kathleen Eagen, Jeffrey Hogan, Nancy

Nickerson, Charles Keniston, and C.J. Thomas. We refer hereinafter to the

defendants collectively as the defendants, except when it is necessary to

identify a defendant individually by name.

3

General Statutes § 7-152c (g) provides: ‘‘A person against whom an

assessment has been entered pursuant to this section is entitled to judicial

review by way of appeal. An appeal shall be instituted within thirty days of

the mailing of notice of such assessment by filing a petition to reopen

assessment, together with an entry fee in an amount equal to the entry fee

for a small claims case pursuant to section 52-259, at a superior court facility

designated by the Chief Court Administrator, which shall entitle such person

to a hearing in accordance with the rules of the judges of the Superior Court.’’

4

The trial court in the second action subsequently denied the town’s

motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff because

the town’s ‘‘position [was] inconsistent with its prior argument’’ in this case.

See Mangiafico v. Farmington, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,

Docket No. HHD-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (February 10, 2015) (order denying motion

to dismiss). The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court

in the second action, holding that the plaintiff’s claims in that case were

not ripe for adjudication because the town never had sought to enforce

the citations and the time for doing so had expired. See Mangiafico v.

Farmington, 173 Conn. App. 178, 191, 163 A.3d 631 (2017). The Appellate

Court’s holding in the second action is not at issue in this appeal.

5

In his principal brief, the plaintiff also claims that the Appellate Court

improperly (1) upheld the dismissal of his complaint insofar as it contained

a claim for inverse condemnation, and (2) upheld the trial court’s grant of

the blight liens. These issues are outside the scope of the certified question,

and, therefore, we decline to address them. See, e.g., State v. Cote, 314 Conn.

570, 581, 107 A.3d 367 (2014) (declining to review claim that ‘‘is beyond the

scope of the certified question’’); see also Practice Book § 84-9 (‘‘[t]he issues

which the appellant may present are limited to those set forth in the petition

for certification, except where the issues are further limited by the order

granting certification’’).

6

The defendants argue that there is a third exception to the Patsy nonex-

haustion doctrine when there are ongoing, coercive state administrative

proceedings that implicate important state interests. In support of this argu-

ment, the defendants rely on Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton

Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 and n.2, 106 S. Ct. 2718, 91 L. Ed.

2d 512 (1986), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the

principles of comity underlying the abstention doctrine established in

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), require

federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a § 1983 action

filed while coercive state administrative proceedings are ongoing. See gener-

ally Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78, 134 S. Ct. 584,

187 L. Ed. 2d 505 (2013) (noting that federal courts will abstain from exercis-

ing jurisdiction under Younger abstention doctrine only in following ‘‘excep-

tional circumstances’’: [1] ‘‘federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal

prosecutions’’; [2] ‘‘certain civil enforcement proceedings’’; and [3] ‘‘pending

civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of

the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions’’ [internal quota-

tion marks omitted]); Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial

Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (‘‘Younger abstention is mandatory

when: [1] there is a pending state proceeding, [2] that implicates an important

state interest, and [3] the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an

adequate opportunity for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional

claims’’), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085, 124 S. Ct. 2812, 159 L. Ed. 2d 247

(2004). The United States Supreme Court noted in Ohio Civil Rights Com-

mission that application of the Younger abstention doctrine was ‘‘fully

consistent’’ with the nonexhaustion principles set forth in Patsy because

the administrative proceedings at issue in that case were ‘‘coercive rather

than remedial, began before any substantial advancement in the federal

action took place, and involve an important state interest.’’ Ohio Civil Rights

Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., supra, 628 n.2.

Ohio Civil Rights Commission did not create a general exception to the

Patsy nonexhaustion doctrine in § 1983 cases; it simply held that the doctrine

was not an impediment to federal abstention under Younger when there is an

ongoing, coercive state administrative proceeding that implicates important

state interests. The defendants in the present case did not seek abstention

under the Younger doctrine; nor did they claim that a state analogue to the

Younger abstention doctrine applies. The cases on which they rely, therefore,

are inapplicable. See Brown ex rel. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 890 (10th

Cir. 2009) (holding that coercive state administrative proceedings are

‘‘exempt from Patsy and entitled to Younger deference’’); Moore v. Asheville,

396 F.3d 385, 395 n.4 (4th Cir.) (noting that ‘‘Younger requires federal courts

to abstain in favor of pending state administrative proceedings that are

coercive in nature’’), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 819, 126 S. Ct. 349, 163 L. Ed.

2d 59 (2005); O’Neill v. Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 793 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding

that ‘‘considerations of comity demand that we remain sensitive to the

legitimate interests of the states’’ and abstain from exercising jurisdiction

under Younger when there are ongoing, coercive state administrative pro-

ceedings), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1015, 115 S. Ct. 1355, 131 L. Ed. 2d 213

(1995); University Club v. New York, 842 F.2d 37, 41–42 (2d Cir. 1988)

(noting that abstention under Younger doctrine is required when there is

ongoing, coercive state administrative proceeding implicating important

state interests); Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255, 260–61

(1st Cir. 1987) (observing that, ‘‘[i]n Patsy and cases like it, abstention

[under the Younger doctrine] was unnecessary’’ because state administrative

proceeding was neither coercive nor ongoing [footnote omitted]), cert.

denied, 486 U.S. 1044, 108 S. Ct. 2037, 100 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1988); Farm

Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. v. Angoff, 909 S.W.2d 348, 355 (Mo.

1995) (‘‘[a]pplying the Younger principle, as reiterated in Ohio Civil Rights

Commission,’’ because ‘‘the proceedings are clearly coercive, the adminis-

trative action began before the issues were joined in the § 1983 action, and

Missouri has an important interest in preventing unfair discrimination by

licensed insurance companies’’). Our holding in the present case is limited

to the administrative exhaustion claim raised and argued by the parties, and

we need not and do not address whether the Younger abstention doctrine,

or a state analogue thereof, would be applicable under the circumstances

of this case.

7

The plaintiff’s complaint in the present case sought both injunctive relief

and monetary damages under § 1983. Because ‘‘exhaustion of state adminis-

trative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action for damages under § 1983’’;

Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, supra, 207 Conn. 368; the dismissal of the

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for monetary damages plainly was improper.

8

In overruling our prior precedent, we are mindful of the principle of

stare decisis, which ‘‘gives stability and continuity to our case law.’’ Conway

v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 658, 680 A.2d 242 (1996). Stare decisis, however,

is ‘‘not an inexorable command’’ or an ‘‘absolute impediment to change,’’

especially when a prior decision ‘‘is clearly wrong.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id. 660; see also State v. Miranda, 274 Conn. 727, 734, 878

A.2d 1118 (2005) (‘‘[i]t is more important that the court should be right upon

later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with

previous declarations’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), quoting Barden

v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 154 U.S. 288, 322, 14 S. Ct. 1030, 38 L.

Ed. 992 (1894). Our conclusion today, moreover, is not a matter of choice,

but is compelled by the supremacy clause of the United States constitution.

See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 740–41, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 173 L. Ed.

2d 920 (2009) (holding that supremacy clause of United States constitution

prohibits states from ‘‘shut[ting] the courthouse door to federal [§ 1983]

claims’’ by divesting their state courts of jurisdiction).

9

The required showing of ‘‘no adequate remedy at law’’ typically refers

to the availability of alternative relief in the form of monetary damages. See

Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004) (‘‘[i]f an

injury can be appropriately compensated by an award of monetary damages,

then an adequate remedy at law exists, and no irreparable injury may be

found to justify specific relief’’).

10

In Laurel Park, Inc., and Pet, we did not view Patsy ‘‘as having abrogated

this fundamental requirement for injunctive relief even in the federal courts.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, supra,

207 Conn. 369; accord Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac, supra, 194 Conn. 691.

Although the issue is outside the scope of this certified appeal, we note

that subsequent federal case law has cast doubt on this view. See James

v. Richman, supra, 547 F.3d 217–18 (holding that injunctive and declaratory

relief are available under § 1983, even if adequate remedy at law exists,

because to hold otherwise would ‘‘impose a de facto exhaustion require-

ment’’ contrary to Patsy); DeSario v. Thomas, supra, 139 F.3d 86 (holding

that, in light of Patsy, availability of adequate remedy ‘‘does not bar injunctive

relief for plaintiffs’’ under § 1983); see also Romano v. Greenstein, 721 F.3d

373, 376 n.7 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting claim that ‘‘the [D]istrict [C]ourt lacked

subject matter jurisdiction because [the plaintiff] had an adequate remedy

at law—judicial review in state court—which precludes her from seeking

permanent injunctive relief’’ because plaintiff ‘‘was permitted to bring her

§ 1983 claim regardless of whether she had exhausted her state judicial

remedy’’).

11

In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the plaintiff’s claim that

the exhaustion requirement should be excused under the futility exception;

see Neiman v. Yale University, supra, 270 Conn. 258–59; because an appeal

under § 7-152c (g) is inadequate to redress the alleged constitutional vio-

lations.

12

Our holding does not affect the disposition of the plaintiff’s state law

claims, which are not at issue in this certified appeal.

13

In the absence of a grant of special permission prior to the filing of the

appellee’s brief, only ‘‘those grounds [that] were raised and briefed in the

Appellate Court’’ may be raised as alternative grounds for affirmance in a

certified appeal to this court. See Practice Book § 84-11 (a) (‘‘Upon the

granting of certification, the appellee may present for review alternative

grounds upon which the judgment may be affirmed provided those grounds

were raised and briefed in the Appellate Court. . . . If such alternative

grounds for affirmation . . . were not raised in the Appellate Court, the

party seeking to raise them in the Supreme Court must move for special

permission to do so prior to the filing of that party’s brief. Such permission

will be granted only in exceptional cases where the interests of justice so

require.’’). The defendants neither requested nor received special permission

to raise an alternative ground for affirmance in this certified appeal.

14

The court in Williamson County distinguished between finality and

exhaustion, explaining as follows: ‘‘The question whether administrative

remedies must be exhausted is conceptually distinct . . . from the question

whether an administrative action must be final before it is judicially review-

able. . . . While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap,

the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial [decision

maker] has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual,

concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administra-

tive and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of

an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be

unlawful or otherwise inappropriate. Patsy concerned the latter, not the

former.

‘‘The difference is best illustrated by comparing the procedure for seeking

a variance with the procedures that, under Patsy, [the] respondent would

not be required to exhaust. While it appears that the [s]tate provides proce-

dures by which an aggrieved property owner may seek a declaratory judg-

ment regarding the validity of zoning and planning actions taken by county

authorities . . . [the] respondent would not be required to resort to those

procedures before bringing its § 1983 action, because those procedures

clearly are remedial. Similarly, [the] respondent would not be required to

appeal the [c]ommission’s rejection of the preliminary plat to the Board of

Zoning Appeals, because the [b]oard was empowered, at most, to review

that rejection, not to participate in the Commission’s [decision making].

‘‘Resort to those procedures would result in a judgment whether the

[c]ommission’s actions violated any of [the] respondent’s rights. In contrast,

resort to the procedure for obtaining variances would result in a conclusive

determination by the [c]ommissioner whether it would allow [the] respon-

dent to develop the subdivision in the manner [the] respondent proposed.’’

(Citations omitted.) Williamson County Regional Planning Commission

v. Hamilton Bank, supra, 473 U.S. 192–93.

15

The compensation prong of the Williamson County doctrine currently

is under reconsideration by the United States Supreme Court. See Knick v.

Scott, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 1262, 200 L. Ed. 2d 416 (2018) (granting

plaintiff’s petition for writ of certiorari limited to issue of whether property

owner is required to ripen federal takings claim by seeking just compensation

in state court).

16

Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s clarification of the prudential

nature of the Williamson County ripeness doctrine, many other courts also

considered one or both prongs of the doctrine to be jurisdictional. See, e.g.,

Kolton v. Frerichs, 869 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2017) (reversing prior decisions

of United States Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit as ‘‘no longer authorita-

tive to the extent they deem Williamson County jurisdictional’’); Rosedale

Missionary Baptist Church v. New Orleans, 641 F.3d 86, 88–89 (5th Cir.

2011) (recognizing that Samaad v. Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 934 [5th Cir. 1991],

in which United States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit held that ‘‘the

ripeness of a takings claim under Williamson County is a jurisdictional

requirement that cannot be waived or forfeited’’ is ‘‘no longer good law’’

because ‘‘the Supreme Court has since explicitly held that Williamson Coun-

ty’s ripeness requirements are merely prudential, not jurisdictional’’); see

generally Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC v. Durham, U.S. , 136 S. Ct.

1409, 1411–12, 194 L. Ed. 2d 821 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the

denial of certiorari) (noting that, even though United States Supreme Court

has ‘‘explained—in no uncertain terms—that’’ second prong of Williamson

County doctrine is prudential, rather than jurisdictional, ‘‘several [federal

circuit] [c]ourts of [a]ppeals continue to treat the Williamson County rule

as a jurisdictional rule limiting the courts’ power to consider federal tak-

ings claims’’).

17

Consistent with the distinction between finality and exhaustion deline-

ated in Williamson County; see footnote 14 of this opinion; we noted that

‘‘a property owner need not pursue remedial procedures that merely review

the propriety of the initial [decision maker’s] action.’’ (Emphasis in original.)

Port Clinton Associates v. Board of Selectmen, supra, 217 Conn. 606. Under

the regulatory and statutory scheme at issue in Port Clinton Associates,

the plaintiff ‘‘had no [decision maker] other than the board of selectman

itself from which it could have obtained a more favorable result’’ because

‘‘an administrative appeal to the Superior Court’’ under § 8-8 provides only

remedial ‘‘review of the propriety [of] the initial [decision maker’s] action,’’

which is ‘‘precisely the type of procedure that a claimant under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 need not pursue as a prerequisite to filing his suit.’’ (Emphasis in

original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 607.

18

Nothing herein is intended to preclude the defendants from raising a

defense based on Williamson County in the trial court, and we express no

opinion regarding the merits of any such defense.