Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association v. Hackerd.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Hackerd, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-1340.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-1340

CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. HACKERD.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Hackerd, Slip Opinion No.

2019-Ohio-1340.]

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct—

Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice—Public

reprimand.

(No. 2018-1434—Submitted January 9, 2019—Decided April 11, 2019.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct

of the Supreme Court, No. 2017-068.

_______________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Richard Earl Hackerd, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0055306, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1991.

{¶ 2} In a complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct on

November 30, 2017, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, alleged that

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Hackerd committed several ethical violations by representing the former spouse of

a former client in a child-custody case and opposing the former client’s motion to

disqualify him from that representation.

{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations of fact and mitigating factors.

After conducting a hearing, a panel of the board issued a report recommending that

Hackerd be publicly reprimanded for engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to

the administration of justice. The panel unanimously dismissed three other alleged

rule violations. The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law,

and recommended sanction.

{¶ 4} We accept the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and agree that

a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction in this case.

Misconduct

{¶ 5} In November 2006, Hackerd agreed to represent Rainie Krenn, the

wife of his longtime friend and former client Tim Krenn, in a child-support and

visitation matter involving Ms. Krenn’s daughter from a previous relationship. Mr.

Krenn later agreed to adopt the child, and Hackerd represented the couple in the

stepparent-adoption proceeding. The Krenns divorced in 2015, and Hackerd did

not participate in those proceedings.

{¶ 6} In January 2017, Ms. Krenn initiated postdecree proceedings seeking

to have Mr. Krenn cited for contempt, to modify the court’s prior school-placement

order, and to enforce the parenting-time and child-support orders. Mr. Krenn

retained Hackerd to represent him in the postdecree proceedings.

{¶ 7} In March 2017, Ms. Krenn asked the trial court to disqualify Hackerd

from representing Mr. Krenn in the proceedings. At a hearing on the motion, Ms.

Krenn testified that when Hackerd was representing her, she told him personal, and

possibly inflammatory, things about her past, and she expressed concern that this

information might be used against her in the pending litigation.

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January Term, 2019

{¶ 8} On March 15, 2017, the trial court granted Ms. Krenn’s motion. Five

days later, Hackerd appealed the judgment. While that appeal was pending, the

trial court issued an order suspending Mr. Krenn’s parenting time. Hackerd moved

the court of appeals to vacate that ruling and filed a brief opposing Ms. Krenn’s

motion to dismiss the motion to vacate. The court of appeals denied Hackerd’s

motion and later affirmed the disqualification entry. On October 19, 2017, Hackerd

withdrew from the case.

{¶ 9} The panel found that Hackerd violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d)

(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice) by continuing to represent Mr. Krenn in contravention of

the trial court’s disqualification order. But citing the insufficiency of the evidence,

the panel unanimously dismissed three other charges arising from allegations that

Hackerd violated the duties he owed to his former client, Ms. Krenn, when he

represented Mr. Krenn against her in the postdecree matters involving substantially

similar issues to those that were the subject of Hackerd’s prior representation of

Ms. Krenn. See Gov.Bar R. V(12)(G).1 The board adopted the panel’s findings of

fact and misconduct.

Sanction

{¶ 10} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the

aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions

imposed in similar cases.

{¶ 11} The parties stipulated and the board agreed that four mitigating

factors are present—Hackerd has no prior disciplinary record, he acted without a

dishonest or selfish motive, he offered full and free disclosure to the board and

1

We have held that a unanimous dismissal by the panel precludes further review of the dismissal

by either the board or this court. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Maciak, 153 Ohio St.3d 185,

2018-Ohio-544, 102 N.E.3d 485.

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demonstrated a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and he

presented evidence of his good character and reputation. See Gov.Bar R.

V(13)(C)(1), (2), (4), and (5). The board also noted that Hackerd exhibited

complete remorse for his misconduct. No aggravating factors are present. See

Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B).

{¶ 12} The board recommends that we publicly reprimand Hackerd for his

misconduct. The board notes that we have never before sanctioned an attorney for

a stand-alone violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). But in Akron Bar Assn. v. Fink, 131

Ohio St.3d 34, 2011-Ohio-6342, 959 N.E.2d 1045, we publicly reprimanded an

attorney who stipulated that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) and Gov.Bar R.

V(4)(G) by failing to respond to letters of inquiry and two subpoenas duces tecum

he received from a certified grievance committee of a local bar association. And in

Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 146 Ohio St.3d 209, 2016-Ohio-1584, 54 N.E.3d

1208, we publicly reprimanded an attorney who stipulated to six rule violations,

including a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), arising from her failure to attend a

scheduled custody hearing, failure to properly withdraw from representation, and

initial failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation.

{¶ 13} Based on our independent review of the record in this case and our

precedent, we agree that Hackerd’s continued representation of Mr. Krenn in

violation of the trial court’s disqualification order violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4. Given

this single rule violation, the absence of any aggravating factors, and the presence

of significant mitigating factors, we agree that a public reprimand is the appropriate

sanction in this case.

{¶ 14} Accordingly, Richard Earl Hackerd is publicly reprimanded. Costs

are taxed to Hackerd.

Judgment accordingly.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART,

JJ., concur.

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January Term, 2019

DONNELLY, J., not participating.

_________________

Jones Day, L.L.P., Robert S. Faxon, and Joseph Z. Czerwien; and Heather

M. Zirke, Bar Counsel, and Kari L. Burns, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator.

Gallagher Sharp, L.L.P., and Monica A. Sansalone, for respondent.

_________________

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