Opinion

Google LLC v. Lee

Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Mar 28, 2019
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.3%

“Post-SAS cases have held that it is appropriate to remand to the PTAB to consider non-instituted claims as well as non-instituted grounds.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Post-SAS cases have held that it is appropriate to remand to the PTAB to consider non-instituted claims as well as non-instituted grounds.”
  • “We will treat claims and grounds the same in considering the SAS issues currently before us.”
  • remanding non-instituted grounds for consideration by the Board

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

GOOGLE LLC,

Appellant

v.

JI-SOO LEE,

Appellee

______________________

2017-2228

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2016-

00045.

______________________

Decided: March 28, 2019

______________________

ISRAEL SASHA MAYERGOYZ, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, ar-

gued for appellant. Also represented by GREGORY A.

CASTANIAS, Washington, DC; DAVID B. COCHRAN, Cleve-

land, OH.

JAMES E. HOPENFELD, Singer Bea LLP, San Francisco,

CA, argued for appellee.

______________________

2 GOOGLE LLC v. LEE

Before PROST, Chief Judge, MAYER and LOURIE,

Circuit Judges.

PROST, Chief Judge.

Google LLC (“Google”) petitioned for inter partes re-

view challenging the validity of claims 45 and 46 of U.S.

Patent No. 6,233,518 (“the ’518 patent”). The Patent Trial

and Appeal Board (“Board”) instituted review of both

claims but on only one of the five grounds raised in the pe-

tition. In its final written decision, the Board held that

Google failed to establish that claims 45 and 46 are un-

patentable.

We affirm the Board’s determination that claims 45

and 46 are not unpatentable over the instituted ground.

We remand, however, for the Board to consider whether

claims 45 and 46 are unpatentable based on the four non-

instituted grounds.

I

The ’518 patent is purportedly assigned to Ji-Soo Lee

(“Lee”). 1 The ’518 patent relates to “a traffic information

providing service method and system, and in particular, to

a method and a system for providing an image vector-based

traffic information.” ’518 patent col. 1 ll. 7–10. Claim 45 is

representative and states:

45. A method for displaying an image-based traffic

information comprising the steps of:

receiving a traffic information map which includes

at least a traffic state map, said traffic state map

includes a plurality of time-variant image vector

entities in a specified region and each of the time-

variant image vector entity includes an attribute-

1 The assignment is disputed in the related district

court litigation.

GOOGLE LLC v. LEE 3

designating statement, a[] shape-designating

statement and a position-designating statement;

displaying a first image in accordance with a basic

map on a screen, said basic map including a plural-

ity of time-invariant image vector entities in the

specified region; and

displaying a second image in accordance with said

traffic state map such that said second image is cu-

mulatively displayed on the first image.

Id. at claim 45.

Google filed an IPR petition challenging claims 45 and

46 of the ’518 patent based on five grounds. The Board in-

stituted review of claims 45 and 46 on obviousness based

on U.S. Patent No. 5,313,200 (“Sone”) alone or in combina-

tion with U.S. Patent No. 5,966,135 (“Roy”). Google Inc. v.

Lee, No. IPR2016-00045, 2016 WL 2866242, at *12 (PTAB

Apr. 25, 2016) (“Institution Decision”). The Board did not

institute review of claims 45 and 46 on the following

grounds: (1) anticipation by Sone; (2) obviousness in view

of the combination of Japanese Patent No. JPH 09-252260

(“Yamada”) and PCT Publication No. WO 95/24029

(“Rosenquist”); (3) anticipation by U.S. Patent No.

5,293,163 (“Kakihara”); and (4) anticipation by Japanese

Patent No. JPH 08-7197 (“Degawa”). Id.

In its institution decision, the Board construed the

claim term “image vector entity” as “a format of infor-

mation representing an image to be displayed which in-

cludes a shape designating statement and a position

designating statement used to draw the shape of a real en-

tity at the specified position.” Id. at *3–4. The Board main-

tained the same construction in its final written decision.

Google Inc. v. Lee, No. IPR2016-00045, Paper No. 28, at 9–

11 (PTAB Apr. 21, 2017) (“Final Written Decision”).

In its final written decision, the Board held that Google

had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

4 GOOGLE LLC v. LEE

claims 45 and 46 of the ’518 patent were unpatentable as

obvious based on Sone alone or in combination with Roy.

Id. at 20.

Google timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

II

Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying

factual determinations. Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805

F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We review the Board’s

ultimate obviousness determination de novo and underly-

ing factual findings for substantial evidence. Harmonic

Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir.

2016). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229

(1938).

Google seeks to overturn the Board’s decision uphold-

ing the validity of claims 45 and 46. Specifically, Google

argues that the Board’s analysis deviated from its con-

struction of “image vector entities”—“a format of infor-

mation representing an image to be displayed which

includes a shape designating statement and a position des-

ignating statement used to draw the shape of a real entity

at the specified position”—and instead required that “Sone

transmit the precise shape of the congestion marks” to sat-

isfy the limitation. Appellant’s Br. 21–22. Although

Google attempts to frame its patentability arguments as an

issue of claim construction or application, the arguments

are directed to the Board’s factual analysis of the prior art,

which we review for substantial evidence.

The Board determined that “Sone does not teach or

suggest that the data received from the beacon transmit-

ters contains information that represents the shape or ap-

pearance of the specific congestion marks or arrows that

are displayed by Sone’s vehicle-mounted display system”

GOOGLE LLC v. LEE 5

because “the directional congestion marks or arrows that

are depicted on Sone’s display are generated locally” by the

processor of Sone’s vehicle-mounted display system. Final

Written Decision, at 14–15 (emphases added). The Board

therefore concluded that “the Petition does not sufficiently

persuade us that the type of congestion data sets received

by Sone’s display system would contain ‘image vector enti-

ties’ (i.e., ‘information representing an image to be dis-

played which includes a shape designating statement and

a position designating statement used to draw the shape of

a real entity at the specified position’).” Id. at 15 (emphasis

added). We hold that substantial evidence supports the

Board’s finding that Sone does not disclose “receiving a

traffic information map which includes at least a traffic

state map,” wherein the traffic state map includes “a plu-

rality of time-variant image vector entities” because the

congestion marks or arrows that are displayed in Sone are

generated locally. Id. (citing Sone at col. 3 ll. 12–21, col. 4

ll. 61–67).

Google also argues that the Board erred in finding that

a person of ordinary skill in art would not have been moti-

vated to combine Sone and Roy. Appellant’s Br. 36–45. Be-

fore the Board, Google presented five rationales for

combining Sone and Roy. See Final Written Decision, at

18–20. Google reargues many of these rationales on ap-

peal. See Appellant’s Br. 36–45. However, the Board con-

sidered and rejected each of these rationales, all for a

similar reason—that they do not adequately explain why

one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to

convert congestion data sets into image vector entities be-

fore they are received by Sone’s vehicle-mounted display

system. See Final Written Decision, at 18–20. We hold that

substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that a

person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been mo-

tivated to combine Sone and Roy.

We have considered Google’s remaining arguments and

find them unpersuasive. We affirm the Board’s final

6 GOOGLE LLC v. LEE

written decision that claims 45 and 46 of the ’518 patent

are not unpatentable as obvious based on Sone alone or in

combination with Roy.

III

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS Insti-

tute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018), Google challenges

the Board’s decision to institute review of claims 45 and 46

of the ’518 patent on only one of the five grounds raised in

its petition. Google requests that we “remand to the Board

so that it may consider these additional, uninstituted

grounds.” Appellant’s Br. 46. Lee contends that we should

not remand for the Board to consider the non-instituted

grounds because in declining to institute them, the Board

already substantively considered and rejected each of the

non-instituted grounds. Appellee’s Br. 35–39. 2 We agree

with Google that remand is appropriate for the Board to

address the non-instituted grounds.

The Supreme Court explained in SAS “that the peti-

tioner’s petition, not the Director’s discretion, is supposed

to guide the life of” an IPR. 138 S. Ct. at 1356. The Court

thus held that the Board cannot institute review of fewer

than all claims challenged by a petitioner. Id. at 1359–60.

Since SAS, we have recognized that the Court’s reasoning

2 At oral argument, Lee also argued that the only

proper mechanism for Google to request a remand pursu-

ant to SAS was to file a motion to remand before the appeal

was heard. Oral Argument at 10:42–12:01, Google LLC, v.

Ji-Soo Lee (No. 2017-2228), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/

oral-argument-recordings. While we have remanded non-

instituted grounds pursuant to SAS based on requests

made in motions, we have not stated that this is the only

mechanism to request SAS-based remand. Google properly

preserved this argument by requesting remand pursuant

to SAS in its opening brief. See Appellant’s Br. 45–46.

GOOGLE LLC v. LEE 7

also prohibits the Board from instituting review of fewer

than all grounds raised by a petitioner in its petition. See

PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed.

Cir. 2018) (“We will treat claims and grounds the same in

considering the SAS issues currently before us.”). Follow-

ing SAS, we have remanded to the Board to consider non-

instituted claims and grounds. See, e.g., Adidas AG v.

Nike, Inc., 894 F.3d 1256, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (remanding

non-instituted grounds for consideration by the Board); see

also BioDelivery Scis. Int’l, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics,

Inc., 898 F.3d 1205, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Post-SAS cases

have held that it is appropriate to remand to the PTAB to

consider non-instituted claims as well as non-instituted

grounds.”) (collecting cases).

Here, the Board instituted review on one ground of

Google’s petition, but declined to institute review on addi-

tional grounds. Remand is appropriate for the Board to ad-

dress the non-instituted grounds in Google’s petition.

IV

Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s

findings, we affirm the Board’s determination that claims

45 and 46 of the ’518 patent are not unpatentable over Sone

alone or in combination with Roy. We remand, however,

for the Board to consider whether claims 45 and 46 are un-

patentable over the non-instituted grounds.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Lee.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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