Dwayne Cochran v. Town Of Jonesborough, Tennessee

03/27/2019

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

February 20, 2019 Session

DWAYNE COCHRAN v. TOWN OF JONESBOROUGH, TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County

No. 37569 James E. Lauderback, Judge

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No. E2018-01512-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

After the plaintiff was arrested by a police officer employed by the defendant town, the

plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging that his civil rights were violated during the

course of the arrest. Plaintiff further alleged that the town was negligent in its training

and supervision of the arresting officer. The federal court dismissed the civil rights claims

with prejudice, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s

negligence claim against the town. As such, the plaintiff filed a second complaint in the

Circuit Court for Washington County, in which the plaintiff again alleged that the town

was negligent in its supervision and training of the arresting officer. After the town filed a

motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that immunity under the Tennessee

Governmental Tort Liability Act was not removed as to the Plaintiff’s claims because the

negligence claim arose out of the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights; accordingly,

the trial court determined that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-205(2) preserved

the Defendant’s immunity, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Discerning no error,

we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and

Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL

SWINEY, C.J., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined.

Gary Prince, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Dwayne Cochran.

K. Erickson Herrin, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellee, Town of Jonesborough,

Tennessee.

OPINION

Background

This case arose after the arrest of Dwayne Cochran (“Appellant”) by a police

officer employed by the Town of Jonesborough (“Appellee” or “Town of Jonesborough”)

on March 17, 2016. The undisputed facts reflect that on the day in question Appellant,

who is a farmer, blocked a Jonesborough road with his dump truck in an attempt to

unload the truck’s contents onto Appellant’s property. In the process, Appellant’s vehicle

became stuck such that it extended perpendicularly into the road and blocked the flow of

traffic. While Appellant attempted to remove the truck, a neighbor called the

Jonesborough police and Officer Jonathan Peace (“Officer Peace”) arrived and placed

Appellant under arrest for blocking the roadway. The criminal charges against Appellant

were later dismissed.

As a result of these events, Appellant filed suit against Officer Peace, the Town of

Jonesborough, the mayor of Jonesborough, and Appellant’s neighbor, Derrick Sumner,1

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (“district court”)

on March 16, 2017. Essentially, Appellant averred that his arrest was part of a larger

political conspiracy and was a consequence of Appellant’s outspoken criticism of the

mayor of Jonesborough. According to Appellant, Officer Peace lacked probable cause to

arrest Appellant; moreover, Appellant alleged that he was injured by Officer Peace

during the handcuffing process in that the handcuffs were unnecessarily tight and caused

the Appellant to suffer nerve damage in his hands. Appellant averred that as a result, he

was forced to undergo surgery and now suffers from ongoing issues with his hands.

Appellant’s federal claims against the Town of Jonesborough and Officer Peace

were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Appellant alleged various

violations of his constitutional rights sounding in unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution,

and First Amendment retaliation. A claim of excessive force was brought against Officer

Peace only. Appellant also pleaded various state law claims such as false arrest and

imprisonment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, and negligence under the

Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). With regard to the negligence

claims under the GTLA, Appellant asserted that the Town of Jonesborough was directly

liable for its failure to train and supervise Officer Peace in proper handcuffing procedure,

as well as being vicariously liable for Officer Peace’s negligence in injuring Appellant. In

response, Officer Peace filed a motion for summary judgment in the district court,

arguing that qualified immunity shielded him from liability as to all claims.

1

The claims against Mr. Sumner and the mayor of Jonesborough were dismissed with prejudice

prior to the disposition of the claims against Officer Peace and the Town of Jonesborough, and neither the

mayor nor Mr. Sumner is a party to this appeal.

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On March 2, 2018, the district court entered a memorandum opinion granting

Officer Peace’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Appellant failed to offer

sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the claims against

Officer Peace. As such, all claims against Officer Peace were dismissed with prejudice.

Moreover, the district court concluded that several counts alleged against the Town of

Jonesborough were predicated upon the behavior of Officer Peace, and as such the

district court sua sponte determined that those counts should be dismissed with prejudice

as well. In so ruling, the district court pointed out that “an award of damages against a

municipality is not authorized when a jury has already concluded that no individual

officer inflicted an underlying constitutional harm.” Accordingly, the district court held

that because “no reasonable jury could find that [Officer] Peace violated [Appellant’s]

constitutional rights” with regard to Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution,

and First Amendment retaliation claims, Appellant’s complaint should likewise be

dismissed with prejudice. Thereafter, the only remaining count was Appellant’s GTLA

negligence claim against the Town of Jonesborough, over which the district court

declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. As such, that claim was dismissed

without prejudice by the district court.

Appellant then refiled his suit against the Town of Jonesborough (hereinafter

“Appellee”) in the Circuit Court of Washington County (“trial court”) on March 20,

2018. Therein, Appellant alleged that per 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitation on

Appellant’s state law negligence claim was tolled by the filing of the original complaint

in the district court, and that Appellant’s complaint to the trial court was therefore

timely.2 As to the substantive allegations, Appellant asserted that Appellee should be held

liable under the GTLA, specifically Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-205, “for

its direct negligence and for the direct negligence of its employees acting within the

2

28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides, in relevant part, that

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided

otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original

jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims

that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or

intervention of additional parties.

* * *

(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for

any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or

after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is

pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a

longer tolling period.

There is no dispute that Appellant’s complaint in state court was timely under this statute.

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course and scope of [his] employment.” In Appellant’s view, Appellee was directly liable

for breaching the standard of care “in training and supervising its employees in how to

make lawful arrests free of violence and . . . in the use and application of handcuffs.”

Appellant also asserted that Appellee should be held vicariously liable under section 29-

20-205 “because of the negligence of Officer Peace in the effectuation of the arrest of

[Appellant].”

Appellee responded with a motion to dismiss on April 26, 2018. Therein, Appellee

urged that Appellant’s action was barred in its entirety by the GTLA’s “civil rights”

exception, found at section 29-20-205(2). In support, Appellee pointed out that

Appellant’s negligence claim and his federal civil rights claims arose out of the same

cause of action, and that the allegations in Appellant’s second complaint were identical to

the allegations in the first complaint. As such, Appellee asserted that it retained

sovereign immunity under the GTLA by virtue of section 29-20-205(2), because the

negligence claim was, in essence, a claim that Appellee had violated Appellant’s civil

rights.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered a written order dismissing all of

Appellant’s claims on August 13, 2018. In its order, the trial court noted that “[a] review

of [Appellant’s] federal lawsuit and comparison to his current Complaint in state court

reveals that his negligence claims arise from the same set of facts upon which he alleged

that his constitutional and civil rights had been violated.” Accordingly, the trial court

concluded that the “‘civil rights exception’ to the removal of sovereign immunity under

the GTLA bars the plaintiff’s negligence claims against [Appellee].” Appellant’s

complaint was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety, and a timely notice of appeal was

filed with this Court on August 21, 2018.

Issue Presented

The parties have raised only a single issue for review: Whether the trial court erred

in dismissing Appellant’s state law negligence claim on the basis that the ‘civil rights

exception’ found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-205(2) was applicable and

preserved Appellee’s sovereign immunity.

Standard of Review

This case was decided on a motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss “challenges

‘only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the strength of the plaintiff’s proof or

evidence.’” Phillips v. Montgomery Cty., 442 S.W.3d 233, 237 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting

Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn.

2011)). The defendant “‘admits the truth of all the relevant and material allegations

contained in the complaint, but . . . asserts that the allegations fail to establish a cause of

action.’” Id. (quoting Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 426). Our determination is based on the

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pleadings alone. Id. We review the trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss de novo

with no presumption of correctness. Id. (citing Cullum v. McCool, 432 S.W.3d 829, 832

(Tenn. 2013)).

Discussion

In the present case, the single dispute on appeal centers on the application of a

subsection of the GTLA, found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-205(2), and

whether Appellant’s negligence claim arises from “civil rights” such that the subsection

is applicable. Accordingly, a brief overview of the GTLA is beneficial here.

The GTLA provides, in relevant part, that “all governmental entities shall be

immune from suit for any injury which may result from the activities of such

governmental entities wherein such governmental entities are engaged in the exercise and

discharge of any of their functions, governmental or proprietary.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-

20-201(a); see also Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 79 (Tenn. 2001)

(“[T]he General Assembly enacted the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act . . . to

codify the general common law rule that all governmental entities shall be immune from

suit[.]”).The GTLA also provides, however, that removal of governmental immunity is

appropriate under certain circumstances. For example, Tennessee Code Annotated

section 29-20-205 provides that immunity from suit “is removed for injury proximately

caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee within the scope of his

employment[.]” Thus, a plaintiff who has allegedly suffered an injury at the hands of a

negligent government employee acting in the scope of his or her employment may bring

suit against the relevant government entity.

Nonetheless, section 29-20-205 also goes on to provide for specific circumstances

under which immunity is preserved. As is relevant to this case, section 29-20-205(2)

explains that immunity is not removed where “the injury arises out of: false

imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus from a court, false arrest, malicious prosecution,

intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract

rights, infliction of mental anguish, invasion of right of privacy, or civil rights[.]” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2) (emphasis added). Consequently, this Court has previously

held that where the “underlying acts which [a plaintiff] alleges to be negligent . . . [are]

predicated on intentional tortious conduct involving the violation of [the plaintiff’s] civil

rights” by government employees, the “‘civil rights exception’ in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-

20-205(2)” is applicable. Jackson v. Thomas, No. M2010-01242-COA-R3-CV, 2011

WL 1049804, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2011) (citing Campbell v. Anderson Cty.,

695 F.Supp.2d 764, 778 (E.D. Tenn. 2010)).

As stated above, the dispute here centers on whether Appellant’s GTLA claim

arises from the alleged violation of his civil rights. Appellant asserts that his action in the

trial court sounds in negligence, rather than civil rights. Indeed, the complaint avers that

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Appellee is directly negligent for its failure to train and supervise Officer Peace and that

Appellee is vicariously liable for the actions of Office Peace in arresting Appellant. In

support, Appellant points out that the “well-pleaded complaint rule makes the plaintiff

the master of the claim[,]” and that the allegations in the second complaint “are very

specific that they concern negligent acts and not anything related to the alleged civil

rights violations.” Appellant also points out that the “[f]ederal [c]ourt specifically found .

. . that there was no ‘civil rights’ violations.” Accordingly, Appellant urges that section

29-20-205(2) does not apply to his state court action and that Appellee’s immunity is

removed.

On balance, Appellee argues that because Appellant’s negligence claim is

premised on the same factual allegations that underpinned Appellant’s civil rights claims

in the district court, section 29-20-205(2) indeed applies to Appellant’s state law

negligence claim. Specifically, Appellee urges that it was not necessary for Appellant to

have explicitly alleged civil rights violations in his state court complaint, noting that

nothing in the GTLA “requires this Court to ignore the fact that [Appellant] filed a

federal district court complaint alleging civil rights claims and negligence claims based

on the same facts.” Appellee also urges that “any removal of sovereign immunity is to be

strictly construed[,]” and that we “must apply the interpretation [of the statute] that

preserves sovereign immunity.” (emphasis in original). Further, Appellee points out that

the vast majority of the case law addressing the civil rights exception supports a different

interpretation of section 29-20-205(2) than the one now urged by Appellant. Having

reviewed the record and the relevant case law, we must agree that the greater weight of

authority favors Appellee’s interpretation of section 29-20-205(2).

Indeed, our research reveals that this Court has addressed the civil rights exception

previously; while Appellant’s position is not completely lacking in support, Appellant

cites only one Tennessee case that squarely buttresses his construction of section 29-20-

205(2). Other Tennessee cases, however, decide the issue differently, and the federal

courts of Tennessee have consistently applied the civil rights exception in 29-20-205(2)

in the stricter manner urged by Appellee. Because much of the parties’ dispute on appeal

stems from the differing applications of section 29-20-205(2), an overview of the relevant

case law is helpful.

We begin with Tennessee cases addressing the civil rights exception. This Court

was faced with a highly analogous scenario in Jackson v. Thomas, No. M2010-01242-

COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1049804 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2011). There, the plaintiff

brought suit in state court against the Circuit Court Clerk of Jackson County as well as

Jackson County itself after the clerk issued an invalid warrant for the plaintiff and the

plaintiff was arrested. Id. at *1. The plaintiff’s claims included civil rights violations

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various intentional torts and a negligence claim under

the GTLA. Id. With regard to the negligence claim, the trial court granted the defendants’

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motion to dismiss on the basis that the county retained immunity under the GTLA. Id. at

*2. In doing so, the trial court concluded the following:

[T]his Court finds that Jackson County has immunity from suit under the

[GTLA] on [p]laintiff’s statutory and common law tort claims. In this case,

[p]laintiff claims that, as a result of the County’s negligent supervision of

[the county clerk], she was subjected to false imprisonment, false arrest,

abuse of process, invasion of the right to privacy, defamation of character

(libel), fraud, and malicious prosecution. Additionally, [p]laintiff claims

that, as a result of these acts, she suffered emotional distress. However,

pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2), the County retains its

sovereign immunity for injuries that arise out of the foregoing intentional

torts.

Id. at *5. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court, noting that because the GTLA claim

“ar[ose] out of the assertion that her civil rights were violated[,]” the civil rights

exception in section 29-20-205(2) applied. Id. at *7. This Court has come to the same

conclusion in at least one other case. See Lankford v. City of Hendersonville, No.

M2016-02041-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1559971, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2018)

(“[W]e note that [the plaintiff’s] negligence claim arose from the same set of facts upon

which he claimed that his constitutional rights had been violated. For this reason, the civil

rights exception provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-205(2) would apply, and

the City would retain immunity against the negligence claim as well.”).

We reached a different result in Parker v. Henderson Cty., No. W2009-00975-

COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 377044 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2010). In Parker, the plaintiff

filed suit in both state and federal court after he was shot by a Lexington City police

officer during the execution of a search warrant. Id. at *2. The plaintiff’s federal

complaint included claims based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims of

negligence, assault and battery, and false arrest. Id. Like the present case, the federal

court dismissed the plaintiff’s civil rights claim, but declined to exercise jurisdiction over

the state law claims. Id. With regard to the complaint filed contemporaneously in state

court, the plaintiff alleged in part that the City of Lexington and Henderson County were

negligent in supervising the officer who shot the plaintiff. Id. Following a bench trial, the

trial court dismissed the claims against Henderson County, but found the city liable for

negligence, agreeing that the sergeant in charge of executing the search warrant “was

negligent in failing to properly supervise” the officer who shot the plaintiff. Id. at *23.

On appeal, the city argued that section 29-20-205(2) shielded it from liability

because the plaintiff’s “injury arose during a violation of his civil rights.” Id. at *4.

Indeed, the city asserted that it was “immune from liability . . . because [the plaintiff’s]

claims, in essence, derive from a violation of his federal civil rights.” Id. In a single

paragraph of analysis, this Court rejected the city’s argument, stating that “[the plaintiff] .

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. . has neither pleaded nor argued in the present proceeding that the City or its officers

violated his federal civil rights.” Id. at *5. Accordingly, because the plaintiff filed a

separate, contemporaneous negligence suit in state court, there was “no basis for this

Court to conclude that [the plaintiff’s] injury arose out of a violation of his federal civil

rights.” Id.

Consequently, there appears to be some conflict in how this Court has applied

section 29-20-205(2) in the past. As Appellee points out, however, the federal courts of

Tennessee have consistently held that when a plaintiff asserts claims, including

negligence claims, against a governmental entity “in the context of a civil rights case,

[the] alleged injuries arise out of ‘civil rights’” and the entity is thereby entitled to

immunity from suit pursuant to the civil rights exception. Campbell v. Anderson County,

695 F.Supp.2d 764, 778 (E.D. Tenn. 2010). In that vein, the precedent of the federal

courts is analogous to Jackson, and weighs against Parker and Appellant’s position.

For example, in Campbell, the plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court naming

Anderson County, the Anderson County sheriff’s office, as well as several sheriff’s

deputies as defendants. 695 F.Supp.2d at 770. She alleged that a reserve deputy working

for the sheriff’s office sexually assaulted her in the course of a transport and that as such,

the defendants deprived her of her civil rights through their policy and custom of

allowing reserve officers to transport female domestic violence victims without

supervision. Id. at 771. In conjunction with her constitutional claims, the plaintiff’s state

law claims included false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

assault and battery, and negligent supervision and training. Id. at 776. The federal court

dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice after the defendants moved for

summary judgment. Id. at 777–78. In addressing the state law claims against the county,

the court noted that the county could not be held liable for the intentional torts of its

employee, and that there was no proof in the record showing that the county was

negligent in hiring, training, or supervising the reserve officer who allegedly assaulted the

plaintiff. Id. Importantly, the Campbell court noted that even if the record had contained

evidence of the county’s direct negligence in hiring, training, or supervising the officer,

the civil rights exception in section 29-20-205(2) would nonetheless shield the county

from liability:

Campbell’s tort claims of false imprisonment, assault and battery,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence brought against

the County under Tennessee law are predicated on the alleged violation of

her civil rights by [the reserve officer]. The contention that [the reserve

officer] committed false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress clearly arise out of and directly flow from

the allegations that he deprived Campbell of her civil rights by sexually

assaulting her. Because Campbell asserts her claims against the County in

the context of a civil rights case, her alleged injuries arise out of “civil

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rights” and the County is entitled to immunity from suit on these claims

pursuant to the “civil rights” exception in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2).

Id. at 778. Accordingly, although the Campbell court alluded to the possibility that a

direct claim against the county for negligent hiring, training, or supervision could be

viable under certain circumstances, the court proceeded to point out that the civil rights

exception would nonetheless apply and immunity under the GTLA would thus be

preserved.

The Campbell holding was reiterated in Howard v. Knox County, Tennessee, No.:

3:15-CV-6-TAV-CCS; No.: 3:15-CV-98-TAV-CCS, 2016 WL 9455169 (E.D. Tenn.

Sept. 7, 2016), in which several plaintiffs brought suit against Knox County after

allegations arose that a school teacher was physically abusing special education students.

The claims alleged were, inter alia, violations to the minor plaintiffs’ Fourteenth

Amendment right to bodily integrity, and state law negligence claims against Knox

County grounded in the hiring, training, placement, retention, and supervision of the

allegedly abusive teacher. Id. at *3. Knox County moved to dismiss all of the negligence

claims against it, arguing that “the action is in essence one seeking to vindicate an injury

arising out of civil rights and thus it falls within the category of negligence claims for

which the []GTLA preserves absolute sovereign immunity[.]” Id. at *10. In response, the

plaintiffs proffered essentially the same argument as Appellant in the present case—that

“the negligence claim - based on Knox County’s hiring, and failing to train, an

underqualified teaching assistant - can be distinguished from plaintiffs’ claim for

violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to bodily integrity . . . [because] the

decision to hire an under-qualified applicant and failure to train the same differ factually

and temporally from the teacher’s subsequent unconstitutional act.” Id. (record citations

omitted).

The district court agreed with Knox County and dismissed all of the negligence

claims against it with prejudice. Id. at *12, 22. In doing so, the district court discussed the

interplay of negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims with the civil rights

exception found in section 29-20-205(2):

This Court has previously held that it is fair and reasonable to

interpret the plain language of the TGTLA as meaning that civil rights

claims - claims that arise under the federal civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. §

1983, and the United States Constitution - are a type of intentional tort for

which counties retain absolute sovereign immunity. See Hale [v. Randolph,

No. 1:02-CV-334], 2004 WL 1854179, at *46, 51 (“The city has immunity

from suit under TGTLA for the negligent acts or omission of its employees

if the injury arises out of the torts specified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-

205(2).”). . . . Applying the above standard, the Court finds that plaintiffs’

common law negligent hiring and training claim cannot survive because the

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claim is in essence one for vindication of an injury arising from civil rights.

. . . While plaintiffs might be correct that hiring and training [the teacher]

constitutes an “independent act[ ] of negligence” distinct from [the

teacher’s] subsequent violation of plaintiffs’ civil rights, simultaneous

inclusion of the municipal liability claim against Knox County and

reference to the County’s hiring, placement, training, retention, and

supervision of [the teacher] as examples of municipal policy inextricably

tether the claim to the vindication of a “civil rights” injury.

Id. at *1112 (internal citations omitted). As such, the Howard court determined that

because the plaintiffs’ common law negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims

were “inextricably” linked to their civil rights claims, the civil rights exception in 29-20-

205(2) barred the negligence claims. Id. at *11. Federal courts in Tennessee have

followed similar reasoning to reach the same result in a number of cases. See Dillingham

v. Millsaps, 809 F.Supp.2d 820, 852 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (dismissing with prejudice the

plaintiff’s negligent training and supervision claim where the allegations stemmed from

“nothing more than [a] civil rights claim[,]” and the negligence claim was “still based

upon an underlying claim of ‘excessive force.’”); Johnson v. City of Memphis, 617 F.3d

864, 871 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to

amend where plaintiff sought to add a state law negligence claim, and noting that because

“plaintiff’s claim regarding the [defendant’s] negligence arises out of the same

circumstances giving rise to [plaintiff’s] civil rights claim under § 1983[,]” immunity

would be preserved and the proposed amendment was thus futile); Lundy v. Knox

County, Tennessee, No. 3:13-CV-588-TAV-HBG, 2014 WL 1491235, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.

Apr. 15, 2014) (“Here, defendants’ alleged torts were committed solely in the context of

plaintiff’s claim for violation of his civil rights and constitutional rights. Therefore, the

Court finds that these claims fall under the civil rights exception to the limited waiver of

immunity under the GTLA.”).

Returning to the present case, we are persuaded that Appellant’s suit in the trial

court is predicated on allegations that Appellee violated his civil rights. As an initial

matter, we note that plaintiff’s characterization of the claims in his complaint is not

dispositive of this issue. In the context of applying the proper statute of limitations, we

have expressly held that courts must look to the gravamen of the claim to determine the

proper limitations period, rather than the characterization of the claim by the plaintiff. See

generally Benz-Elliott v. Barrett Enterprises, LP, 456 S.W.3d 140, 147 (Tenn. 2015)

(quoting Whaley v. Perkins, 197 S.W.3d 665, 670 (Tenn. 2006)) (“It is oft-recited law in

this State that to determine the governing statute of limitations, a court must ascertain the

‘gravamen of the complaint.’”). The same is no less true in the context of determining

whether a governmental entity retains immunity under the GTLA. See Justice v.

Anderson Cty., 955 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming dismissal of

plaintiff’s claim on the basis of immunity after determining that the gravamen of the

claim sounded in intentional misrepresentation, rather than in contract as characterized by

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the plaintiff). Thus, in order to determine whether immunity bars Appellant’s claim, we

must determine “the substantial point, the real purpose, or the object” of his action. Benz-

Elliott, 456 S.W.3d at 148 (citing Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of

Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 457 (Tenn. 2012)).

To be sure, the premise of Appellant’s state lawsuit is that Appellant was injured

by the manner in which Officer Peace handcuffed and arrested Appellant.3 Likewise, the

direct complaints against Appellee result from Appellant’s allegation that the excessive

handcuffing was the result of Appellee’s failure to properly train and supervise Officer

Peace. As we perceive it, these allegations sound squarely in civil rights. Indeed, the term

“civil rights” in section 29-20-205(2) has been construed “‘as including claims arising

under the federal civil rights laws and the U.S. Constitution.’” Jackson, 2011 WL

1049804, at *6 (quoting Bettis v. Pearson, No. 1:04-CV-112, 2007 WL 2426404, at *11

(E.D. Tenn. Aug. 21, 2007)); see also Campbell, 695 F.Supp.2d at 778 (“This court

construes the term ‘civil rights’ in § 29-20-205(2) as meaning and including claims

arising under the federal civil rights laws, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States

Constitution.”). Further, it is well-settled that “excessively forceful or unduly tight

handcuffing is a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment” and that “freedom

from excessively forceful or unduly tight handcuffing is a clearly established right[.]”

Courtwright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 51819 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing

Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 61314 (6th Cir. 2015); Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509

F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also Jackson v. Lubelan, 675 F.App’x. 497, 500 (6th

Cir. 2016) (“[H]andcuffing someone so tightly that the handcuffs themselves cause injury

is indeed a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment[.]”). It is likewise

well-established that “a governmental entity can be held liable under § 1983 for its failure

to properly train and supervise its employees.” Hale, 2004 WL 1854179, at *11; see also

Parker v. Henderson Cty., Tennessee, 450 F.Supp.2d 842, 851 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (“A

plaintiff may bring an action for inadequate police supervision under § 1983.”).

Accordingly, the injuries Appellant alleges to have suffered stem from well-established

civil rights, regardless of how Appellant chose to characterize those claims in his state

action. See Dillingham, 809 F.Supp.2d at 852 (dismissing with prejudice the plaintiffs’

negligent training and supervision claim where the allegations stemmed from “an

underlying claim of ‘excessive force.’”).

3

For instance, Appellant’s state court complaint avers the following:

If trained properly, Officer Peace would have properly applied the handcuffs so

that [Appellant] would not be injured by Officer Peace’s negligent conduct in the use and

application of the handcuffs. . . . Officer Peace breached the standard of care in the

application of the handcuffs because he placed them on too tight, failed to see if they

were too tight, failed to double-lock them so as to cause them to tighten, and failed to

loosen them after complaints from [Appellant].

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Finally, we are likewise unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that because the

district court dismissed Appellant’s federal claims at the summary judgment stage, there

were no civil rights violations, and section 29-20-205(2) is thereby inapplicable.

Appellant asserts in his brief that “the [f]ederal [c]ourt specifically found, based on the

[d]efendants [m]otions, that there were no ‘civil-rights’ violations.” Respectfully, we

disagree. Nothing in the language of section 29-20-205(2) indicates that there must be an

express finding that a civil rights violation occurred in order for the exception to apply.

Indeed, immunity offered by section 29-20-205 is broad, preserving immunity for

negligence claims so long as the “injury arises out of . . . civil rights.” Tenn. Code Ann. §

29-20-205(2). Here, there is no dispute that Appellant originally claimed that his injuries

arose from violations of his civil rights; moreover, the district court explicitly

acknowledged that “excessively forceful or unduly tight handcuffing is a constitutional

violation[.]” As such, the district court never concluded that the injuries alleged by

Appellant did not sound in civil rights; rather, the district court simply concluded that

Appellant failed to put forth sufficient evidence at the summary judgment stage to

proceed with his action.4 Moreover, none of the cases discussed herein indicate that

section 29-20-205(2) requires the claimant to be successful in his or her civil rights claim

in order for the civil rights exception to apply to corresponding state law claims. As such,

Appellant’s argument in this regard is simply without basis.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court was correct in finding that

section 29-20-205(2) was applicable to Appellant’s suit and preserved governmental

4

Specifically, with regard to the excessive force claim involving the handcuffing, the district

court concluded that an essential element of Appellant’s claim was lacking. This type of claim requires

the “ plaintiff [to] offer sufficient evidence to identify a genuine issue of material fact that (1) he

complained the handcuffs were too tight; (2) the officer ignored those complaints; and (3) the plaintiff

experienced ‘some physical injury’ resulting from the handcuffing.” Getz v. Swoap, 833 F.3d 646, 654

(6th Cir. 2016) (citing Morrison v. Bd. of Trustees of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009)). In

the present case, the district court determined that the excessive force claim could not survive because

Appellant failed to show that material facts were in dispute as to the second prong:

[I]t is undisputed that once [Appellant] voiced his complaint, Officer Peace did

not ignore it. Rather, he asked [Appellant] additional questions in order to determine

whether the cuffs were cutting off his circulation. But instead of answering Peace’s

inquiry—and potentially obtaining quicker relief—Cochran simply told him to “head

on”. . . . [Appellant] cannot shut down Officer Peace’s inquiry as to the tightness of the

handcuffs and then sue Officer Peace for ignoring his complaint regarding the tightness

of the handcuffs. . . . Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to [Appellant],

the Court finds that Cochran has not offered sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether Officer Peace ignored his complaints. Because this element

is necessary to state a claim for excessive force and the corresponding claim for assault

and battery, Peace’s motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Counts 2 and 6

Accordingly, the district court’s order reflects that the Appellant’s proof as to the excessive force

claim was lacking, not that the claim itself was not an alleged civil rights violation.

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immunity as to Appellee. Although Appellant chose to file his second complaint under

“the guise of negligence, this strategy fails.” Jackson, 2011 WL 1049804, at *7 (citing

Campbell, 695 F.Supp.2d at 778). Importantly, our holding today is in keeping with the

well-established principle that “statutes permitting suits against the State must be strictly

construed.” Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795, 80910 (Tenn. 2015); see

also Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 83 (“[A]s the legislature created [the GTLA] in derogation

of the common law . . . the Act must be strictly construed.”) (citing Lockhart ex rel.

Lockhart v. Jackson-Madison Cty. Gen. Hosp., 793 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990));

Hughes v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., 340 S.W.3d 352, 361 (Tenn.

2011) (quoting Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W. 3d 853, 858 (Tenn. 2001)) (“The GTLA’s waiver

of immunity is ‘narrowly confined in its scope.’”). Keeping in mind that a strict

construction approach to the GTLA “has been expressly incorporated into the Act[,]” we

think it prudent, under these circumstances, to follow the greater weight of authority and

embrace the application of section 29-20-205(2) that preserves immunity. Hughes, 340

S.W.3d at 361 (citing Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 399 (Tenn. 1995)). The present

case arose based upon the allegations that Officer Peace was unlawfully aggressive in

arresting Appellant, and that Appellee should be held responsible. As such, the

“underlying act” of purported negligence at issue here, aggressive handcuffing, is clearly

“predicated on intentional tortious conduct involving the violation of [Appellant’s] civil

rights by [an employee]” of Appellee. Id. Accordingly, based on the facts and

circumstances in this particular case, this Court “sees no reason why the [Appellee]

should not have immunity from suit under the ‘civil rights’ exception in Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 29-20-205(2).” Id.

Conclusion

The order of the Circuit Court of Washington County granting the Town of

Jonesborough’s motion to dismiss is hereby affirmed, and this cause is hereby remanded

for proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant,

Dwayne Cochran, for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

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