The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 21 2019
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARCELLA JOHNSON, On Behalf of No. 17-17489
Herself and All Others Similarly Situated,
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-05157-EDL
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. MEMORANDUM*
ORACLE AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Elizabeth D. Laporte, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 15, 2019
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,**
District Judge.
Oracle America, Inc., in a reversal of the employer’s usual role, appeals the
district court’s order compelling arbitration in an employment dispute. Oracle
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
contends the district court should have decided whether there was an enforceable
agreement to arbitrate, and that issues related to arbitrability had not been
delegated to the arbitrator. Although issues related to contract defenses must be
decided by the district court, where a contract clearly delegates the issue of
arbitrability to the arbitrator, the arbitration provision must be enforced. See
Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2016).
In this case there were two agreements, and the one Oracle would doubtless
prefer contains a class action waiver. Both agreements, however, provided for the
applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services (“JAMS”) rules. Under those rules, issues concerning
arbitrability can be delegated to the arbitrator so long as the delegation is clear.
See Mohamed, 848 F.3d at 1209. Here, both agreements contained a clear
delegation. The district court therefore correctly ruled it was for the arbitrator to
determine which contract defined the scope of the arbitration.
Oracle first argues the district court erred because it failed to decide which
agreement the arbitrator should enforce. But neither party disputes that Agreement
1 was properly entered into by both Johnson and Oracle. And Oracle admitted in
its opposition to Johnson’s motion to compel arbitration that Agreement 1 was a
valid agreement. The district court noted there are two arbitration agreements and
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instructed Oracle that it could raise any arguments as to Agreement 2 to the
arbitrator. There is no rule, and indeed Oracle does not cite one, that supports its
argument that the district court could only compel arbitration by concluding a
single agreement existed.
Oracle also argues the district court erred because it failed to consider
Oracle’s argument that Agreement 1 was inoperative because Agreement 2 was a
novation of Agreement 1. But the issue of whether Agreement 2 is a novation of
Agreement 1 does not raise a defense to the contract’s validity that must be decided
by the district court. See Mohamed, 848 F.3d at 1209. Accordingly, whether
Agreement 2 was a novation of Agreement 1 is an issue that can be decided by the
arbitrator.
AFFIRMED.
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