Opinion

James Randall v. Philadelphia Law Department

  • 919 F.3d 196
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Mar 20, 2019
Status
Published
Author
Bibas
On the bench
Smith, Chagares, Bibas
Cited by
60 cases
Authority
More cited than 83.6%

explaining the continuing violation doctrine is triggered “when a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice” and thus, “so long as the last act [in] the continuing practice falls within the limitations period . . . the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred” (alteration and omission in original, citations and internal quotation marks omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • explaining the continuing violation doctrine is triggered “when a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice” and thus, “so long as the last act [in] the continuing practice falls within the limitations period . . . the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred” (alteration and omission in original, citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
  • stating that the continuing violations doctrine “postpone[s] the running of the statute of limitations . . . when a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice”
  • holding that criminal proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor when the state dropped charges against him
  • "This doctrine applies 'when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice.' " (citation omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 18-2303

_______________

JAMES RANDALL,

Appellant

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT;

JOHN MOUZON, Philadelphia Police Officer Badge

#5293;

LEON MCKNIGHT, Philadelphia Police Officer Badge

#6630

_______________

On Petition from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No: 2:18-cv-01541)

District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on January 25, 2019

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, and CHAGARES and

BIBAS, Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 20, 2019)

_______________

Michael I. McDermott, Esq.

18th Floor

121 South Broad Street

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellant

Jennifer MacNaughton, Esq.

Andrew Pomager, Esq.

City of Philadelphia

Law Department

1515 Arch Street

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellees

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

______________

BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

When a defendant commits a continuing violation of the

law, the limitations period starts running from the defendant’s

last act, not from when the effects of that violation end. Here,

the defendants arrested and prosecuted James Randall in Phil-

adelphia for drug and weapons crimes. As a result of that pros-

ecution, New Jersey and Delaware County, Pennsylvania,

lodged detainers against Randall for violating his probation. So

he remained in those jurisdictions’ custody until December

2015. But the defendants’ last act was in August 2015, when

they dropped the charges and sent Randall to New Jersey.

So the clock started to run on Randall’s Section 1983 mali-

cious-prosecution claim in August 2015. And that clock ran out

2

in August 2017. But Randall filed this suit in December

2017—four months too late. So we will affirm the District

Court’s dismissal of this suit as untimely.

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2013, Philadelphia police found drugs, a gun,

and money in an apartment that they thought was Randall’s. So

the police arrested Randall, and the Philadelphia District At-

torney’s Office charged him with drug and weapons crimes.

But it dropped all the charges on August 24, 2015.

This was not the end of Randall’s time in custody. When he

was arrested in Philadelphia, he was already on probation in

both New Jersey and Delaware County, Pennsylvania. And

when they heard about his arrest, both those jurisdictions is-

sued detainers for him. So after dropping the charges, Pennsyl-

vania released Randall into New Jersey’s custody. He re-

mained in custody, first in New Jersey and then in Delaware

County, until December 24, 2015.

On December 26, 2017, Randall sued the Philadelphia Law

Department and the Philadelphia police officers who had ar-

rested him. His amended complaint alleged several Section

1983 claims and Pennsylvania tort claims. The defendants

moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The Dis-

trict Court granted the motion, dismissing Randall’s claims

with prejudice as time-barred.

Randall appeals only the dismissal of his Section 1983 ma-

licious-prosecution claim. We review that dismissal de novo.

Conrad v. Pa. State Police, 902 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2018).

3

II. RANDALL’S SUIT WAS UNTIMELY

Randall claims that his suit was timely because the contin-

uing-violation doctrine delayed the start of the limitations pe-

riod until his ultimate release. We disagree.

Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Rather, it borrows the underlying state’s statute

of limitations for personal-injury torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549

U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Pennsylvania, that period is two years.

42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(1), (7) (2014).

But when a Section 1983 claim accrues is a matter of fed-

eral law. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. And federal law holds that

a malicious-prosecution claim accrues when criminal proceed-

ings end in the plaintiff’s favor. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477, 489 (1994). For Randall, that happened in August 2015,

when Pennsylvania dropped the charges against him. So he had

until August 2017 to file his suit unless something delayed or

tolled the statute of limitations.

Randall claims that the continuing-violation doctrine post-

poned the running of the statute of limitations. This doctrine

applies “when a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing

practice.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters &

Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991). In such

cases, “so long as the last act [in] the continuing practice falls

within the limitations period . . . the court will grant relief for

the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred.”

Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).

Here, even after Pennsylvania dropped the charges against

Randall, he remained detained. He argues that this detention

4

was part of a continuing practice by the defendants. So, he says,

his limitations period did not begin to run until his release on

December 24, 2015. If that is right, then his suit was timely.

Under the Federal Rules, he filed on the last possible day: De-

cember 24, 2017, was a Sunday; December 25 was a legal hol-

iday; and he sued on December 26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

But the continuing-violation doctrine focuses on continuing

acts, not effects. Cowell, 263 F.3d at 293. In other words, the

doctrine relies on a defendant’s continuing acts, not a plain-

tiff’s continuing injury. Here, New Jersey and Delaware

County detained Randall past August 2015. But New Jersey

and Delaware County are not defendants. No defendant de-

tained Randall beyond August 2015.

Nor does it matter that Randall’s arrest and prosecution

were but-for causes of his continued detention in New Jersey

and Delaware County. Continued detention was an effect of his

Philadelphia arrest and prosecution, not an act (or omission in

the face of a duty to act) by any defendant. And he has not

alleged that the defendants somehow enrolled New Jersey or

Delaware County as their agents in detaining him. So that de-

tention did not trigger the continuing-violation doctrine.

To be clear, our holding is about the timeliness of Randall’s

case, not its merits. For the continuing-violation doctrine is a

timeliness rule, not a merits rule. His continued detention could

be relevant to liability or damages; we need not decide that.

But it has no bearing on his suit’s timeliness.

5

*****

Randall’s malicious-prosecution claim accrued in August

2015, when Pennsylvania dropped the charges against him.

The defendants did nothing after that date that could delay the

start of the limitations period. So the limitations period expired

in August 2017. Randall filed his suit after that. Because his

suit was untimely, we will affirm.

6

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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