Opinion

Anthony Sansone v. Megan Brennan

  • 917 F.3d 975
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Mar 6, 2019
Status
Published
Author
Barrett
On the bench
Kanne, Rovner, Barrett
Nature of suit
civil
Cited by
81 cases
Authority
More cited than 90.5%

noting that “cooperation in an interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation” 1s “[r]elevant to” whether the employer “failed to reasonably accommodate [the plaintiff's] disability,” not to whether the plaintiff “was a qualified individual with a disability”

How later courts described this case

  • noting that “cooperation in an interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation” 1s “[r]elevant to” whether the employer “failed to reasonably accommodate [the plaintiff's] disability,” not to whether the plaintiff “was a qualified individual with a disability”
  • “While the interactive process is important, it is a means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather than an end in itself. And because the process is not an end in itself, an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing to take part in it.”
  • “the ‘interactive process’ is . . . a means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather than an end in itself” so “an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing to take part in it”
  • arguments not raised and supported are forfeited

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632

ANTHONY SANSONE,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:13-cv-03415 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge,

and Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019

____________________

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Tony Sansone, who is confined to

a wheelchair, needs a parking place with room to deploy his

van’s wheelchair ramp. For years, the Postal Service, his

employer, provided him one. But in 2011, it took that spot

away and failed to provide him with a suitable replacement.

Sansone then retired and sued the Service under the

Rehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his disability.

2 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632

A jury returned a verdict in his favor and Sansone recovered

compensatory damages, as well as back and front pay.

The Service asks us to vacate the district court’s judgment

because of two jury instructions: one about an employee’s

obligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a

reasonable accommodation and the other about how the jury

should evaluate the Service’s expert witness. We hold that the

district court did not err with respect to the former, but its

instruction about the expert was both wrong and prejudicial.

The Service also appeals the district court’s award of back and

front pay, but it forfeited that argument by failing to raise it

below.

I.

Anthony Sansone began his thirty-year career at the Postal

Service in 1981. He was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in

1991, and, 8 years later, the disease put him in a wheelchair.

The Service gave him a reserved space near the loading docks,

where there was room to deploy his van’s wheelchair ramp.

That arrangement lasted until 2011, when the plant manager,

Ruby Branch, asked Sansone to stop parking there.

Sansone was greatly upset by Branch’s decision. He

viewed it as arbitrary; Branch told him that it was driven by

safety concerns. She offered Sansone two other options: to

park in one of the handicapped spots in front of the building

or her own reserved space in the back of the building. Neither

met his needs. Branch’s reserved space, like most of the

handicapped spots, didn’t provide enough room to deploy

his van’s passenger-side ramp, and the few handicapped

spots that had enough room were usually taken. In addition,

the spots in the back of the building (like Branch’s spot)

Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 3

would require him to travel in his wheelchair along a busy

truck route in the dark. So with the permission of his direct

supervisor, Chuck von Rhein, Sansone continued to park in

his usual place while waiting for a solution to the problem.

Two weeks later, Sansone emailed the maintenance

manager, LaShawn Jacobs, for an update on his parking

situation. Jacobs reiterated what Branch had said before: that

Sansone must park in one of the proposed spaces. Sansone

then sought help from Stephen Grieser, chair of the Postal

Service district’s Reasonable Accommodation Committee,

who told Sansone that he would start the process of

identifying a reasonable accommodation for him.

A few days later, Branch noticed Sansone’s van parked

near the loading docks. She told Jacobs to inform Sansone that

he should move it or risk having it towed. When Jacobs

relayed the message, Sansone panicked, started to experience

chest pain, and left work. He worried that if his van had been

towed, he would have been stranded at work because he

needed the van to load his wheelchair. The next day he went

to see a doctor because he was still experiencing panic attacks.

The doctor recommended that he stay home until the

situation was rectified and prescribed medication to help him

deal with the stress.

After another two weeks passed, Grieser sent Sansone a

letter asking him to provide medical information about his

“condition and the specific limitations that it imposes” so that

he could address Sansone’s parking situation. The letter

exacerbated Sansone’s frustration because in his view, it

sought information that the Service already knew—that he

had multiple sclerosis and was confined to a wheelchair.

Sansone did not provide Grieser with the redundant medical

4 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632

information. Instead, he asked von Rhein, his supervisor, to

tell Grieser to stop pursuing the parking issue because by that

point, the stress of the situation had rendered Sansone unable

to go back to work at the Service no matter where he parked.

He filed for disability retirement, which the Office of

Personnel Management granted.

Sansone then sued the Service under the Rehabilitation

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq., for constructive discharge and

failure to accommodate. The district court granted the

Service’s summary judgment motion on the constructive

discharge claim, but it denied both parties’ motions for

summary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. The

case proceeded to trial, and Sansone won $300,000 in

compensatory damages.

After the verdict came in, the district court addressed

Sansone’s equitable claim for back and front pay. It awarded

him $828,774—an amount covering the period between the

date of his termination and January 20, 2023, the date on

which he would have retired.

The Service presses three arguments on appeal, one

related to the merits of Sansone’s “failure to accommodate”

claim and the other two related to damages.

II.

To succeed on his failure to accommodate claim under 29

U.S.C. § 794, Sansone had to prove that (1) he was a qualified

individual with a disability, (2) the Service was aware of his

disability, and (3) the Service failed to reasonably

accommodate his disability. King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d

Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 5

598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008). 1 Relevant to—and sometimes

determinative of—the third element is the employer and

employee’s respective cooperation “in an interactive process

to determine a reasonable accommodation.” Baert v. Euclid

Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). The Service

contends that the district court erroneously instructed the jury

about the consequences of an employee’s failure to cooperate

in this “interactive process.”

Some background on this “interactive process” is

necessary to understand the Service’s objection to the jury

instruction. While the “interactive process” is important, it is

a means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather

than an end in itself. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d

1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997). And because the process is not an

end in itself, an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing

to take part in it. For example, “[f]ailure to engage in this

‘interactive process’ cannot give rise to a claim for relief … if

the employer can show that no reasonable accommodation

was possible.” Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.

2000). Nor will it give rise to a claim against an employer who

reasonably accommodated the employee. Rehling v. City of

Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The ADA seeks

to ensure that qualified individuals are accommodated in the

workplace, not to punish employers who, despite their failure

to engage in an interactive process, have made reasonable

accommodations.”). But when a reasonable accommodation

was possible and the employer did not offer it, the third

1

“[T]o determine whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated in the

employment context, we refer to the provisions and standards of the

[Americans with Disabilities Act].” Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806,

810–11 (7th Cir. 2005); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).

6 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632

element of a “failure to accommodate” claim turns on the

“interactive process” requirement. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005). In that event,

“responsibility will lie with the party that caused the

breakdown.” Id. at 805. According to the Service, this is where

the district court went awry.

The Service insists that the court erroneously instructed

the jury that it could render a verdict for Sansone even if he

was at fault for the breakdown of the interactive process. Over

the Service’s objection, the court instructed the jury as

follows:

Once an employer is aware of the employee’s

disability and an accommodation has been

requested, the employer must discuss with the

employee whether there is a reasonable

accommodation that will permit him to perform

his job. Both the employer and the employee

must cooperate in the interactive process in

good faith. Neither party can win this case

solely because the other did not cooperate in

that process in the way that the party believed

appropriate, but you may consider whether a

party cooperated in that process when deciding

whether a reasonable accommodation existed.

The Service argues that telling the jury that “neither party can

win this case solely because the other did not cooperate” is

inconsistent with Sears, which says that “when an employer

takes an active, good-faith role in the interactive process, it

will not be liable if the employee refuses to participate or

withholds essential information.” 417 F.3d at 806.

Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 7

The Service’s argument distorts the jury instruction by

focusing exclusively on the opening few words of a longer

sentence. Read out of context, the cherry-picked words state

that the jury cannot treat one party’s failure to cooperate as

outcome-determinative. That is inconsistent with Sears. Read

in context, however, they make a different and entirely

uncontroversial point: that the jury cannot evaluate the

sufficiency of one party’s cooperation according to the

expectations of the other. (“Neither party can win solely

because the other did not cooperate in that process in the way

that the party believed appropriate … .” (emphasis added)). In

other words, the Service’s belief that Sansone did not

cooperate did not mean that he did not cooperate—and vice

versa. That is plainly correct.

In sum, the Service would have a point if the court had

told the jury that Sansone could win even if he shut down the

interactive process. Unfortunately for the Service, however,

that is not what the court said.

III.

The Service’s next argument concerns its expert witness,

Dr. Diana Goldstein, who offered an opinion on the cause of

Sansone’s emotional distress, an issue relevant to

compensatory damages. On cross-examination, Sansone’s

lawyer asked Goldstein if she had read the Service’s brief in

support of its summary judgment motion in the course of

preparing her report. She said that she had, and Sansone’s

lawyer pressed: “To get your understanding of the facts you

read the Postal Service’s Statement of Material Facts in

support of its motion for summary judgment, correct?”

Goldstein replied:

8 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632

I wouldn’t agree with that statement. I would

say that it helps me understand the story, but I

get my facts about what Mr. Sansone is claiming

in turn—by way of emotional distress and

changes in physical symptoms by meeting with

him, by reviewing objective records, et cetera.

But I do like to have context and so I always

review the records just to get a sense of what the

whole story is.

She added that as part of that context, she had also read

Sansone’s complaint, his answers to interrogatories, and his

deposition. Sansone’s lawyer asked whether she had read the

brief opposing the Service’s motion for summary judgment or

the district court’s decision denying the motion, and

Goldstein said that she had not.

Shortly thereafter, Goldstein responded to a question

about whether she had read the deposition of plant manager

Ruby Branch by explaining that, although she had, she did

not view it “as relevant to [her] role in assessing Mr. Sansone’s

emotional distress claim.” The court interjected: “Wait just a

minute. But you thought that the brief in support of a motion

for summary judgment which was denied, that was relevant

to your opinion?” When Goldstein answered, “I always read

those,” the court interrupted, “I am not asking what you

always do. I am asking, in this case you felt that that is

relevant to your rendition of an opinion, a lawyer’s argument

in connection with this case which was unsuccessful.”

Goldstein replied, “No. I just like to know what is going on

with the case.” The court later admonished counsel that

giving Goldstein the summary judgment motion was a “flat-

out violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”

Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 9

The court hammered that position home in its jury

instructions. In evaluating Goldstein’s opinion, it told the

jurors that they should keep in mind that

[S]he had been provided by counsel for the

Postal Service with a copy of the Postal Service’s

argument that had been made earlier in the case

in support of an unsuccessful motion to prevent

the case from going to trial on the premise that

there were no genuine issues of material fact

that called for consideration by a jury. That is a

document that presents the Postal Service’s

version of the facts and of the legal arguments

that they sought to support that motion. It was

inappropriate for that information to be

provided to the opinion witness. And that

inappropriateness was amplified by the failure

of the Postal Service’s counsel to provide her

with the successful argument that had been

made by Sansone’s lawyer in opposition to the

motion and, more importantly, by the failure of

Postal Service’s counsel to provide her with the

Court’s opinion that rejected the motion.

It should be added, though, that Sansone’s

counsel is also at fault. Why? For not having

raised the matter before this Court well in

advance of trial because the teaching of the

Supreme Court is that the trial judge serves as

what they call the gatekeeper in ruling on

whether it is or is not proper for any specific

proposed opinion witness to be allowed to

present his or her testimony to a fact-finding

10 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632

jury for its consideration. And that matter came

before you, just as it came before me, solely at

the end of the case.

Now with all of that said, you may consider

what has been set forth in this instruction that I

have composed in explaining the determination

called for in the first paragraph of the

instruction, that is, give the testimony of each of

the witnesses whatever weight you think it

deserves, considering the reasons for the

opinion, the witness’ qualifications and all of

the other evidence in the case.

The Service contends that this instruction erroneously invited

the jury to disregard Goldstein’s opinion.

The Service is right. Contrary to the court’s belief, the

Service did not commit a “flat-out violation of Federal Rule of

Evidence 703” by giving Goldstein its summary judgment

motion. Rule 703 does not govern the information that experts

can have; it governs the information on which they can base

their opinions. It allows experts to rely on inadmissible facts

or data in forming an opinion so long as “experts in the

particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts

or data in forming an opinion on the subject.” FED. R. EVID.

703.

If Goldstein had relied on the summary judgment motion

in forming her opinion, the court would have had to

determine whether experts in her field “reasonably rely” on

summary judgment motions in assessing someone’s

emotional distress—and presumably they don’t. But

Goldstein expressly stated that she did not rely on the

Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 11

summary judgment motion in forming her opinion. She read

the summary judgment motion—along with Sansone’s

complaint and answers to interrogatories—solely to get

context about the case. She based her opinion on the facts that

she got from Sansone and his medical records. So long as

those are the kinds of facts and data on which experts in her

field reasonably rely—and presumably they are—her opinion

satisfied Rule 703. Any suggestion that Goldstein was biased

in favor of the Service could be explored on cross—as Sansone

was doing before the court seized sua sponte on the illusory

Rule 703 issue.

The district court thus erred when it told the jury that the

Service had acted inappropriately by giving Goldstein the

summary judgment motion and suggesting that it would

have excluded her testimony had it learned about the issue

earlier. Even so, “a new trial is required only if the flawed

instruction could have confused or misled the jury causing

prejudice to the complaining party.” Doornbos v. City of

Chicago, 868 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2017). Sansone says that the

Service was not prejudiced because Goldstein testified that

she didn’t rely on the summary judgment motion, the court

permitted the jury to consider her testimony, and the

instruction emphasized that Sansone was also to blame for

not raising the issue earlier.

None of those things blunted the effect of the district

court’s erroneous instruction, which all but told the jury that

it shouldn’t trust anything that Goldstein had said. This not

only misled the jury but also invaded the jury’s function in

assessing witness credibility. See Stollings v. Ryobi Tech., Inc.,

725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that although the

district court serves as gatekeeper, “[t]he jury must still be

12 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632

allowed to play its essential role as the arbiter of the weight

and credibility of expert testimony”). At the very least, the

instruction left the jury unsure what to make of Goldstein’s

testimony. See Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th

Cir. 2013) (explaining that a party is prejudiced by jury

instructions when the “jury was likely to be misled or

confused” by them); Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th

Cir. 1995) (“Under these circumstances, it would be

imprudent for us to determine that the lack of sufficient

guidance in the instructions did not contribute significantly

to the jury’s conclusion.”).

The prejudice was particularly acute given what had

happened earlier in the trial. See Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v.

Ashton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An

erroneous jury instruction could not prejudice [a party] unless

considering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the

evidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the

applicable law.”). The court interrupted the cross-

examination of Goldstein to admonish her, expressing

incredulity that she had read the summary judgment motion.

See United States v. El-Bey, 873 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2017)

(explaining that a trial judge has great influence on the jury

and that any statement made about a witness carries great

weight). The instructions therefore invited the jury to act on

the skepticism that the court had already sowed.

In short, the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial.

But because Goldstein’s testimony went solely to

compensatory damages, we remand for a new trial on that

issue only. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d

1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).

Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 13

IV.

The Service’s final argument is that the court erred by

awarding Sansone equitable relief in the form of back and

front pay for the time after he retired. It contends that

constructive discharge is required for equitable relief; because

Sansone was never actively or constructively discharged, it

says, he does not qualify.

Sansone argues that the Service waived this argument by

failing to raise it below. What he means to say, however, is

that the Service forfeited this argument. See Hamer v.

Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017)

(“The terms waiver and forfeiture—although often used

interchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not

synonymous.”). Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known

right. United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (7th Cir.

2016). Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to make an

argument because of accident or neglect. Id. at 1045. That’s

what Sansone says that the Service did here.

The Service insists that it raised this argument—that

Sansone failed to prove actual or constructive discharge and

thus could not receive back or front pay—in its damages brief

to the district court. This is wishful thinking. The damages

brief focused on two things: (1) errors that the court made

based on the evidence at trial and (2) why Sansone’s award

should be offset by his retirement benefits. And the sole legal

citation in the entire brief went to the offset issue. Indeed, only

one sentence in the analysis section of its brief mentioned that

Sansone chose to retire. Read in isolation, that reference might

gesture toward a lack of actual or constructive discharge—but

the rest of that sentence continued the brief’s focus on

offsetting damages with Sansone’s retirement benefits. The

14 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632

very best we can say—and it is a stretch—is that the Service

raised the “general issue” in its damages brief. Avoiding

forfeiture requires more. See Domka v. Portage Cty., Wis., 523

F.3d 776, 783 n.11 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a party cannot

raise an issue for the first time on appeal when it raised only

the “general issue” below).

***

We VACATE the judgment and REMAND for a new trial

on the damages issue. We AFFIRM it with respect to the

Service’s liability, the award of back and front pay, and the

award of attorneys’ fees and expenses. 2

2

Because we affirm the judgment as to the Service’s liability, Sansone remains

entitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

5(k); cf. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health

and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (“In designating those parties

eligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term ‘prevailing

party,’ a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines

‘prevailing party’ as ‘[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless

of the amount of damages awarded.’” (alteration in original))

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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