Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

RIMINI STREET, INC., ET AL. v. ORACLE USA, INC.,

ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–1625. Argued January 14, 2019—Decided March 4, 2019

A jury awarded Oracle damages after finding that Rimini Street had

infringed various Oracle copyrights. After judgment, the District

Court also awarded Oracle fees and costs, including $12.8 million for

litigation expenses such as expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury

consulting. In affirming the $12.8 million award, the Ninth Circuit

acknowledged that it covered expenses not included within the six

categories of costs that the general federal statute authorizing dis-

trict courts to award costs, 28 U. S. C. §§1821 and 1920, provides may

be awarded against a losing party. The court nonetheless held that

the award was appropriate because the Copyright Act gives federal

district courts discretion to award “full costs” to a party in copyright

litigation, 17 U. S. C. §505.

Held: The term “full costs” in §505 of the Copyright Act means the costs

specified in the general costs statute codified at §§1821 and 1920.

Pp. 3–12.

(a) Sections 1821 and 1920 define what the term “costs” encom-

passes in subject-specific federal statutes such as §505. Congress

may authorize awards of expenses beyond the six categories specified

in the general costs statute, but courts may not award litigation ex-

penses that are not specified in §§1821 and 1920 absent explicit au-

thority. This Court’s precedents have consistently adhered to that

approach. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S.

437; West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83; Ar-

lington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291. The

Copyright Act does not explicitly authorize the award of litigation ex-

penses beyond the six categories specified in §§1821 and 1920, which

do not authorize an award for expenses such as expert witness fees,

2 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.

Syllabus

e-discovery expenses, and jury consultant fees. Pp. 3–6.

(b) Oracle’s counterarguments are not persuasive. First, Oracle

argues that the word “full” authorizes courts to award expenses be-

yond the costs specified in §§1821 and 1920. The term “full” is an ad-

jective that means the complete measure of the noun it modifies. It

does not, therefore, alter the meaning of the word “costs” in §505.

Rather, “full costs” are all the “costs” otherwise available under the

relevant law.

Second, Oracle maintains that the term “full costs” in the Copy-

right Act is a historical term of art that encompasses more than the

“costs” listed in §§1821 and 1920. Oracle argues that Congress im-

ported the meaning of the term “full costs” from the English copy-

right statutes into the Copyright Act in 1831. It contends that the

1831 meaning of “full costs” allows the transfer of all expenses of liti-

gation, beyond those specified in any costs schedule, and overrides

anything that Congress enacted in the Fee Act of 1853 or any subse-

quent costs statute. Courts need not, however, undertake extensive

historical excavation to determine the meaning of costs statutes. See

Crawford Fitting Co., 482 U. S., at 445. In any event, Oracle has not

shown that the phrase “full costs” had an established meaning in

English or American law that covered more than the full amount of

the costs listed in the applicable costs schedule. Case law since 1831

also refutes Oracle’s historical argument.

Third, Oracle advances a variety of surplusage arguments. Accord-

ing to Oracle, after Congress made the costs award discretionary in

1976, district courts could award any amount of costs up to 100 per-

cent, and so Rimini’s reading of the word “full” now adds nothing to

“costs.” Because Congress would not have intended “full” to be sur-

plusage, Oracle contends, Congress must have employed the term

“full” to mean expenses beyond the costs specified in §§1821 and

1920. But even if the term “full” lacked any continuing significance

after 1976, the meaning of “costs” did not change. Oracle’s interpre-

tation would also create its own redundancy problem by rendering

the second sentence of §505—which covers attorney’s fees—largely

redundant because §505’s first sentence presumably would already

cover those fees. Finally, Oracle’s argument, even if correct, over-

states the significance of statutory surplusage and redundancy. See,

e.g., Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 385. Pp. 6–11.

879 F. 3d 948, reversed in part and remanded.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–1625

_________________

RIMINI STREET, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

ORACLE USA, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[March 4, 2019]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Copyright Act gives federal district courts discretion

to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation. 17

U. S. C. §505. In the general statute governing awards of

costs, Congress has specified six categories of litigation

expenses that qualify as “costs.” See 28 U. S. C. §§1821,

1920. The question presented in this case is whether the

Copyright Act’s reference to “full costs” authorizes a court

to award litigation expenses beyond the six categories of

“costs” specified by Congress in the general costs statute.

The statutory text and our precedents establish that the

answer is no. The term “full” is a term of quantity or

amount; it does not expand the categories or kinds of

expenses that may be awarded as “costs” under the gen-

eral costs statute. In copyright cases, §505’s authorization

for the award of “full costs” therefore covers only the six

categories specified in the general costs statute, codified at

§§1821 and 1920. We reverse in relevant part the judg-

ment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

2 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

I

Oracle develops and licenses software programs that

manage data and operations for businesses and non-profit

organizations. Oracle also offers its customers software

maintenance services.

Rimini Street sells third-party software maintenance

services to Oracle customers. In doing so, Rimini com-

petes with Oracle’s software maintenance services.

Oracle sued Rimini and its CEO in Federal District

Court in Nevada, asserting claims under the Copyright

Act and various other federal and state laws. Oracle

alleged that Rimini, in the course of providing software

support services to Oracle customers, copied Oracle’s

software without licensing it.

A jury found that Rimini had infringed various Oracle

copyrights and that both Rimini and its CEO had violated

California and Nevada computer access statutes. The jury

awarded Oracle $35.6 million in damages for copyright

infringement and $14.4 million in damages for violations

of the state computer access statutes. After judgment, the

District Court ordered the defendants to pay Oracle an

additional $28.5 million in attorney’s fees and $4.95 mil-

lion in costs; the Court of Appeals reduced the latter

award to $3.4 million. The District Court also ordered the

defendants to pay Oracle $12.8 million for litigation ex-

penses such as expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury

consulting.

That $12.8 million award is the subject of the dispute in

this case. As relevant here, the U. S. Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s $12.8

million award. The Court of Appeals recognized that the

general federal statute authorizing district courts to

award costs, 28 U. S. C. §§1821 and 1920, lists only six

categories of costs that may be awarded against the losing

party. And the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the

$12.8 million award covered expenses not included within

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 3

Opinion of the Court

those six categories. But the Court of Appeals, relying on

Circuit precedent, held that the District Court’s $12.8

million award for additional expenses was still appropri-

ate because §505 permits the award of “full costs,” a term

that the Ninth Circuit said was not confined to the six

categories identified in §§1821 and 1920. 879 F. 3d 948,

965−966 (2018).

We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement in the

Courts of Appeals over whether the term “full costs” in

§505 authorizes awards of expenses other than those costs

identified in §§1821 and 1920. 585 U. S. ___ (2018). Com-

pare 879 F. 3d, at 965–966; Twentieth Century Fox Film

Corp. v. Entertainment Distributing, 429 F. 3d 869 (CA9

2005), with Artisan Contractors Assn. of Am., Inc. v. Fron-

tier Ins. Co., 275 F. 3d 1038 (CA11 2001); Pinkham v.

Camex, Inc., 84 F. 3d 292 (CA8 1996).

II

A

Congress has enacted more than 200 subject-specific

federal statutes that explicitly authorize the award of

costs to prevailing parties in litigation. The Copyright Act

is one of those statutes. That Act provides that a district

court in a copyright case “in its discretion may allow the

recovery of full costs by or against any party other than

the United States or an officer thereof.” 17 U. S. C. §505.

In the general “costs” statute, codified at §§1821 and

1920 of Title 28, Congress has specified six categories of

litigation expenses that a federal court may award as

“costs,”1 and Congress has detailed how to calculate the

——————

1 The six categories that a federal court may award as costs are:

“(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

“(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily

obtained for use in the case;

“(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;

4 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

amount of certain costs. Sections 1821 and 1920 in es-

sence define what the term “costs” encompasses in the

subject-specific federal statutes that provide for an award

of costs.

Sections 1821 and 1920 create a default rule and estab-

lish a clear baseline against which Congress may legislate.

Consistent with that default rule, some federal statutes

simply refer to “costs.” In those cases, federal courts are

limited to awarding the costs specified in §§1821 and

1920. If, for particular kinds of cases, Congress wants to

authorize awards of expenses beyond the six categories

specified in the general costs statute, Congress may do so.

For example, some federal statutes go beyond §§1821 and

1920 to expressly provide for the award of expert witness

fees or attorney’s fees. See West Virginia Univ. Hospitals,

Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 89, n. 4 (1991). Indeed, the

Copyright Act expressly provides for awards of attorney’s

fees as well as costs. 17 U. S. C. §505. And the same

Congress that enacted amendments to the Copyright Act

in 1976 enacted several other statutes that expressly

authorized awards of expert witness fees. See Casey, 499

U. S., at 88. But absent such express authority, courts

may not award litigation expenses that are not specified in

§§1821 and 1920.

Our precedents have consistently adhered to that ap-

proach. Three cases illustrate the point.

In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., the ques-

——————

“(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any

materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;

“(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;

“(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of inter-

preters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation

services under section 1828 of this title.” 28 U. S. C. §1920.

In addition, §1821 provides particular reimbursement rates for wit-

nesses’ “[p]er diem and mileage” expenses.

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 5

Opinion of the Court

tion was whether courts could award expert witness fees

under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 54(d) authorizes an award of “costs” but does not

expressly refer to expert witness fees. 482 U. S. 437, 441

(1987). In defining what expenses qualify as “costs,”

§§1821 and 1920 likewise do not include expert witness

fees. We therefore held that the prevailing party could not

obtain expert witness fees: When “a prevailing party seeks

reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses, a

federal court is bound by the limit of §1821(b), absent

contract or explicit statutory authority to the contrary.”

Id., at 439.

In Casey, we interpreted 42 U. S. C. §1988, the federal

statute authorizing an award of “costs” in civil rights

litigation. We described Crawford Fitting as holding that

§§1821 and 1920 “define the full extent of a federal court’s

power to shift litigation costs absent express statutory

authority to go further.” 499 U. S., at 86. In accord with

Crawford Fitting, we concluded that §1988 does not au-

thorize awards of expert witness fees because §1988 sup-

plies no “ ‘explicit statutory authority’ ” to award expert

witness fees. 499 U. S., at 87 (quoting Crawford Fitting,

482 U. S., at 439).

In Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy,

we considered the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act, which authorized an award of costs. The question

was whether that Act’s reference to “costs” encompassed

expert witness fees. We again explained that “costs” is “ ‘a

term of art that generally does not include expert fees.’ ”

548 U. S. 291, 297 (2006); see also Taniguchi v. Kan Pa-

cific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 573 (2012). We stated:

“[N]o statute will be construed as authorizing the taxation

of witness fees as costs unless the statute ‘refer[s] explic-

itly to witness fees.’ ” Murphy, 548 U. S., at 301 (quoting

Crawford Fitting, 482 U. S., at 445).

Our cases, in sum, establish a clear rule: A statute

6 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

awarding “costs” will not be construed as authorizing an

award of litigation expenses beyond the six categories

listed in §§1821 and 1920, absent an explicit statutory

instruction to that effect. See Murphy, 548 U. S., at 301

(requiring “ ‘explici[t]’ ” authority); Casey, 499 U. S., at 86

(requiring “ ‘explicit’ ” authority); Crawford Fitting, 482

U. S., at 439 (requiring “explicit statutory authority”).

Here, the Copyright Act does not explicitly authorize the

award of litigation expenses beyond the six categories

specified in §§1821 and 1920. And §§1821 and 1920 in

turn do not authorize an award for expenses such as ex-

pert witness fees, e-discovery expenses, and jury consult-

ant fees, which were expenses encompassed by the District

Court’s $12.8 million award to Oracle here. Rimini argues

that the $12.8 million award therefore cannot stand.

B

To sustain its $12.8 million award, Oracle advances

three substantial arguments. But we ultimately do not

find those arguments persuasive.

First, although Oracle concedes that it would lose this

case if the Copyright Act referred only to “costs,” Oracle

stresses that the Copyright Act uses the word “full” before

“costs.” Oracle argues that the word “full” authorizes

courts to award expenses beyond the costs specified in

§§1821 and 1920. We disagree. “Full” is a term of quantity

or amount. It is an adjective that means the complete

measure of the noun it modifies. See American Heritage

Dictionary 709 (5th ed. 2011); Oxford English Dictionary

247 (2d ed. 1989). As we said earlier this Term: “Adjec-

tives modify nouns—they pick out a subset of a category

that possesses a certain quality.” Weyerhaeuser Co. v.

United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___

(2018) (slip op., at 8).

The adjective “full” in §505 therefore does not alter the

meaning of the word “costs.” Rather, “full costs” are all

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 7

Opinion of the Court

the “costs” otherwise available under law. The word “full”

operates in the phrase “full costs” just as it operates in

other common phrases: A “full moon” means the moon, not

Mars. A “full breakfast” means breakfast, not lunch. A

“full season ticket plan” means tickets, not hot dogs. So

too, the term “full costs” means costs, not other expenses.

The dispute here, therefore, turns on the meaning of the

word “costs.” And as we have explained, the term “costs”

refers to the costs generally available under the federal

costs statute—§§1821 and 1920. “Full costs” are all the

costs generally available under that statute.

Second, Oracle maintains that the term “full costs” in

the Copyright Act is a historical term of art that encom-

passes more than the “costs” listed in the relevant costs

statute—here, §§1821 and 1920. We again disagree.

Some general background: From 1789 to 1853, federal

courts awarded costs and fees according to the relevant

state law of the forum State. See Crawford Fitting, 482

U. S., at 439−440; Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-

ness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247−250 (1975). In 1853,

Congress departed from that state-focused approach. That

year, Congress passed and President Fillmore signed a

comprehensive federal statute establishing a federal

schedule for the award of costs in federal court. Crawford

Fitting, 482 U. S., at 440; 10 Stat. 161. Known as the Fee

Act of 1853, that 1853 statute has “carried forward to

today” in §§1821 and 1920 “ ‘without any apparent intent

to change the controlling rules.’ ” Crawford Fitting, 482

U. S., at 440. As we have said, §§1821 and 1920 provide a

comprehensive schedule of costs for proceedings in federal

court.

Now some copyright law background: The term “full

[c]osts” appeared in the first copyright statute in England,

the Statute of Anne. 8 Anne c.19, §8 (1710). In the United

States, the Federal Copyright Act of 1831 borrowed the

phrasing of English copyright law and used the same

8 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

term, “full costs.” Act of Feb. 3, 1831, §12, 4 Stat. 438–

439. That term has appeared in subsequent revisions of

the Copyright Act, through the Act’s most recent substan-

tive alterations in 1976. See Act of July 8, 1870, §108, 16

Stat. 215; Copyright Act of 1909, §40, 35 Stat. 1084; Copy-

right Act of 1976, §505, 90 Stat. 2586.

Oracle argues that English copyright statutes awarding

“full costs” allowed the transfer of all expenses of litiga-

tion, beyond what was specified in any costs schedule.

According to Oracle, Congress necessarily imported that

meaning of the term “full costs” into the Copyright Act in

1831. And according to Oracle, that 1831 meaning over-

rides anything that Congress enacted in any costs statute

in 1853 or later.

To begin with, our decision in Crawford Fitting ex-

plained that courts should not undertake extensive histor-

ical excavation to determine the meaning of costs statutes.

We said that §§1821 and 1920 apply regardless of when

individual subject-specific costs statutes were enacted.

482 U. S., at 445. The Crawford Fitting principle elimi-

nates the need for that kind of historical analysis and

confirms that the Copyright Act’s reference to “full costs”

must be interpreted by reference to §§1821 and 1920.

In any event, Oracle’s historical argument fails even on

its own terms. Oracle has not persuasively demonstrated

that as of 1831, the phrase “full costs” had an established

meaning in English or American law that covered more

than the full amount of the costs listed in the applicable

costs schedule. On the contrary, the federal courts as of

1831 awarded costs in accord with the costs schedule of

the relevant state law. See id., at 439−440; Alyeska Pipe-

line, 421 U. S., at 250. And state laws at the time tended

to use the term “full costs” to refer to, among other things,

full cost awards as distinguished from the half, double, or

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 9

Opinion of the Court

treble cost awards that were also commonly available

under state law at the time.2 That usage accorded with

the ordinary meaning of the term. At the time, the word

“full” conveyed the same meaning that it does today:

“Complete; entire; not defective or partial.” 1 N. Webster,

An American Dictionary of the English Language 89

(1828); see also 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English

Language 817 (1773) (“Complete, such as that nothing

further is desired or wanted; Complete without abate-

ment; at the utmost degree”). Full costs did not encom-

pass expenses beyond those costs that otherwise could be

awarded under the applicable state law.

The case law since 1831 also refutes Oracle’s historical

argument. If Oracle’s account of the history were correct,

federal courts starting in 1831 presumably would have

interpreted the term “full costs” in the Copyright Act to

allow awards of litigation expenses that were not ordinarily

available as costs under the applicable costs schedule. But

Rimini points out that none of the more than 800 available

copyright decisions awarding costs from 1831 to 1976—

that is, from the year the term “full costs” first appeared

in the Copyright Act until the year that the Act was last

significantly amended—awarded expenses other than

those specified by the applicable state or federal law. Tr. of

Oral Arg. 7. Oracle has not refuted Rimini’s argument on

that point. Oracle cites no §505 cases where federal courts

awarded expert witness fees or other litigation expenses of

the kind at issue here until the Ninth Circuit’s 2005 deci-

sion adopting the interpretation of §505 that the Ninth

Circuit followed in this case. See Twentieth Century Fox,

——————

2 See, e.g., 1 Laws of Pa., ch. DCXLV, pp. 371, 373 (1810) (“full costs”

and “double costs”); 2 Rev. Stat. N. Y., pt. III, ch. X, Tit. 1, §§16, 25

(1836) (“full,” “double,” and “treble” costs); Rev. Stat. Mass., pt. III, Tit.

VI, ch. 121, §§4, 7, 8, 11, 18 (1836) (“one quarter,” “full,” “double,” and

“treble” costs).

10 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

429 F. 3d 869.

In light of the commonly understood meaning of the

term “full costs” as of 1831 and the case law since 1831,

Oracle’s historical argument falls short. The best inter-

pretation is that the term “full costs” meant in 1831 what

it means now: the full amount of the costs specified by the

applicable costs schedule.

Third, Oracle advances a variety of surplusage argu-

ments. Oracle contends, for example, that the word “full”

would be unnecessary surplusage if Rimini’s argument

were correct. We disagree. The award of costs in copy-

right cases was mandatory from 1831 to 1976. See §40, 35

Stat. 1084; §12, 4 Stat. 438–439. During that period, the

term “full” fixed both a floor and a ceiling for the amount

of “costs” that could be awarded. In other words, the term

“full costs” required an award of 100 percent of the costs

available under the applicable costs schedule.

Oracle says that even if that interpretation of “full costs”

made sense before 1976, the meaning of the term “full

costs” changed in 1976. That year, Congress amended the

Copyright Act to make the award of costs discretionary

rather than mandatory. See §505, 90 Stat. 2586. Accord-

ing to Oracle, after Congress made the costs award discre-

tionary, district courts could award any amount of costs up

to 100 percent and so Rimini’s reading of the word “full”

now adds nothing to “costs.” If we assume that Congress

in 1976 did not intend “full” to be surplusage, Oracle

argues that Congress must have employed the term “full”

to mean expenses beyond the costs specified in §§1821 and

1920.

For several reasons, that argument does not persuade

us.

To begin with, even if the term “full” lacked any continu-

ing significance after 1976, the meaning of “costs” did not

change. The term “costs” still means those costs specified

in §§1821 and 1920. It makes little sense to think that

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 11

Opinion of the Court

Congress in 1976, when it made the award of full costs

discretionary rather than mandatory, silently expanded

the kinds of expenses that a court may otherwise award as

costs in copyright suits.3

Moreover, Oracle’s interpretation would create its own

redundancy problem by rendering the second sentence of

§505 largely redundant. That second sentence provides:

“Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may

also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing

party as part of the costs.” 17 U. S. C. §505. If Oracle

were right that “full costs” covers all of a party’s litigation

expenditures, then the first sentence of §505 would pre-

sumably already cover attorney’s fees and the second

sentence would be largely unnecessary. In order to avoid

some redundancy, Oracle’s interpretation would create

other redundancy.

Finally, even if Oracle is correct that the term “full” has

become unnecessary or redundant as a result of the 1976

amendment, Oracle overstates the significance of statutory

surplusage or redundancy. Redundancy is not a silver

bullet. We have recognized that some “redundancy is

‘hardly unusual’ in statutes addressing costs.” Marx v.

General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 385 (2013). If one

possible interpretation of a statute would cause some

redundancy and another interpretation would avoid re-

dundancy, that difference in the two interpretations can

supply a clue as to the better interpretation of a statute.

But only a clue. Sometimes the better overall reading of

the statute contains some redundancy.

——————

3 Rimini further suggests that “full” still has meaning after 1976 be-

cause the statute gives the district court discretion to award either full

costs or no costs, unlike statutes that refer only to “costs,” which allow

courts to award any amount of costs up to full costs. In light of our

disposition of the case, we need not and do not consider that argument.

12 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

* * *

The Copyright Act authorizes federal district courts to

award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation. That

term means the costs specified in the general costs stat-

ute, §§1821 and 1920. We reverse in relevant part the

judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand the case

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.