Opinion

Michele Rafferty v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio

  • 915 F.3d 1087
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Feb 15, 2019
Status
Published
Author
Clay
On the bench
Clay, McKeague, Bush
Cited by
239 cases
Authority
More cited than 92.7%

holding it was clearly established in 2014 “that sexual abuse of prisoners could rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation” and finding allegations a prison guard required a female inmate to expose her breasts and masturbate on several occasions could support an Eighth Amendment claim

How later courts described this case

  • holding it was clearly established in 2014 “that sexual abuse of prisoners could rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation” and finding allegations a prison guard required a female inmate to expose her breasts and masturbate on several occasions could support an Eighth Amendment claim
  • concluding that plaintiff’s allegations that defendant demanded that she engage in sexual conduct on up to six occasions distinguished case from cases where Sixth Circuit held that less-severe episodes of sexual harassment did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation
  • holding that “it was clearly established in 2014 that ignoring known risks of harm to an inmate due to inadequate medical care, inhumane conditions of confinement, or abuse by another inmate could constitute deliberate indifference” (citing, inter alia, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 )
  • finding inmate plaintiff’s claims that the corrections officer defendant repeatedly demanded she expose her breasts and masturbate in his presence on six occasions against her will were “sufficiently serious” to implicate the Eighth Amendment

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 19a0023p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MICHELE L. RAFFERTY, ┐

Plaintiff, │

│

│

KATIE L. SHERMAN, │

Plaintiff-Appellee, > No. 17-4223

│

│

v. │

│

TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO, et al., │

│

Defendants,

│

│

CHARLES E. DRENNEN, individually and in his │

professional capacity, │

Defendant-Appellant. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown.

No. 4:16-cv-00430—Benita Y. Pearson, District Judge.

Argued: December 4, 2018

Decided and Filed: February 15, 2019

Before: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Angelica M. Jarmusz, FISHEL HASS KIM ALBRECHT DOWNEY, LLP, New

Albany, Ohio, for Appellant. Sarah Thomas Kovoor, Warren, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

Angelica M. Jarmusz, Daniel T. Downey, FISHEL HASS KIM ALBRECHT DOWNEY, LLP,

New Albany, Ohio, for Appellant. Sarah Thomas Kovoor, Warren, Ohio, for Appellee. Lauren

M. Weinstein, MOLOLAMKEN LLP, Washington, D.C., Jay R. Schweikert, CATO

INSTITUTE, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.

No. 17-4223 Rafferty, et al. v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio, et al. Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Charles Drennen appeals the decision of the district

court denying him summary judgment on Plaintiff Katie Sherman’s Eighth Amendment claim

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons stated below, this Court AFFIRMS the

district court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

Sherman was incarcerated at the Trumbull County Jail from November 18, 2013 to April

30, 2014. During Sherman’s incarceration, Drennen worked at the Trumbull County Jail as a

corrections officer. Drennen was regularly assigned to patrol the pod where Sherman lived with

Michele Rafferty, another female inmate.

Between February 1, 2014 and Sherman’s release on April 30, 2014, Drennen demanded

that Sherman expose her breasts for him to view on three or four occasions. Sherman complied

with Drennen’s demands. On one or two occasions, Sherman masturbated in Drennen’s

presence “because he asked for it.” (Sherman Dep., R. 102 at PageID #705.)

Sherman does not allege that Drennen ever touched her. And Drennen never explicitly

threatened Sherman. But Sherman was deeply disturbed by Drennen’s demands. As a result of

Drennen’s abuse, Sherman’s post-traumatic stress disorder worsened and her night terrors and

flashbacks increased in severity.

Sherman never reported Drennen to anyone in the Trumbull County Jail administration

because she felt intimidated by him; she “didn’t know what to expect” if she refused his

demands. (Id. at PageID #716.)

No. 17-4223 Rafferty, et al. v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio, et al. Page 3

B. Procedural History

Sherman and Rafferty sued Drennen and various officials from Trumbull County

(together “Defendants”), alleging Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims against

Drennen and Monell claims against the Trumbull County officials. Defendants moved for

summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendants on every claim except for Sherman’s Eighth Amendment claim against Drennen,

finding that Drennen was not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. Drennen appealed the

district court’s decision.1

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

“Congress has given this court ‘jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the

district courts.’” Miami-Luken, Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 900 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir.

2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291). “[A] denial of summary judgment is generally not a final

judgment.” Devlin v. Kalm, 630 F. App’x 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Hoover v. Radabaugh, 307 F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 2002)). “However, under

the collateral-order doctrine[,] ‘a limited set of district-court orders are reviewable’ even though

they are ‘short of final judgment.’” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 239 (6th Cir.

2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009)). A district court order denying

qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Brown v.

Chapman, 814 F.3d 436, 443–44 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–

529 (1985)). But this jurisdiction is limited; “circuit courts can review a denial of qualified

immunity only ‘to the extent that it turns on an issue of law’—the appeal cannot be from a

district court’s determination that there is a genuine dispute of material fact.” Chapman,

1In her Response Brief, Sherman argues that Drennen violated her right to bodily integrity. Sherman does

not explain where this right to bodily integrity originates. The case that Sherman relies on, Doe v. Claiborne Cty.,

103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996), involves a Fourteenth Amendment claim under the substantive component of the Due

Process Clause. Accordingly, it appears that Sherman attempts to assert a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due

process claim. But the district court dismissed all claims except for Sherman’s Eighth Amendment claim against

Drennen. And this appeal only concerns the remaining Eighth Amendment claim. Therefore, the Court will not

consider Sherman’s Fourteenth Amendment argument.

No. 17-4223 Rafferty, et al. v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio, et al. Page 4

814 F.3d at 444 (quoting Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 530). Accordingly, a defendant challenging a

district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity must

“concede the most favorable view of the facts to the plaintiff for purposes of the appeal.” Baker

v. Union Twp., 587 F. App’x 229, 232 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moldowan v. City of Warren,

578 F.3d 351, 370 (6th Cir. 2009)).

Drennen “concede[s] the most favorable view of the facts to Ms. Sherman for the

purposes of this interlocutory appeal.” (Def. Br. at 4.) Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction

under the collateral order doctrine. See Baker, 587 F. App’x at 232.

B. Standard of Review

“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on qualified immunity grounds.” Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560,

565 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Tucker v. City of Richmond, 388 F.3d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 2004)).

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). “A dispute about a material fact is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party.’” Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ., 708 F.3d 821,

825 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2002)).

When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must “view[] [the evidence] in the

light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). Further, “all

reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the non-moving party.” Moran v. Al Basit LLC,

788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. OPPCO, LLC, 219 F.3d

547, 551 (6th Cir. 2000)). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issues

of material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324–25 (1986).

No. 17-4223 Rafferty, et al. v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio, et al. Page 5

C. Analysis

1. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). As the Supreme Court has

explained, “[q]ualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public

officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials

from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id.

“The qualified immunity analysis entails two general steps, which can be considered in

any order.” Godawa v. Byrd, 798 F.3d 457, 462–63 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at

236). “First, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts

alleged show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? Second, is the right clearly

established?” Seales v. City of Detroit, 724 F. App’x 356, 359 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2006)). “To qualify as clearly

established, [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Kindl v. City of Berkley, 798 F.3d 391, 398

(6th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v.

Lewis, 779 F.3d 401, 412 (6th Cir. 2015)).

“[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of showing that an officer is not entitled to the defense

of qualified immunity.” Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016)

(citing Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015)).

2. Eighth Amendment

“The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners

from the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville,

709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 434 (6th Cir.

2011)). The Supreme Court has explained that “[a]mong ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of

No. 17-4223 Rafferty, et al. v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio, et al. Page 6

pain are those that are ‘totally without penological justification.’” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 346 (1981). “However, “[t]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’

punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical

force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1992) (internal citation omitted).

“To make out a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must satisfy both an

objective and a subjective component.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)

(citing Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1993)).

“The objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Curtin,

631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). As the Supreme Court has

stated, “not ‘every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.’”

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). Rather, the Eighth

Amendment protects prisoners only from that conduct which is “repugnant to the conscience of

mankind.” Id. at 38 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10). The objective component of the Eighth

Amendment “is a ‘contextual’ inquiry that is ‘responsive to contemporary standards of

decency.’” Curtin, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8–9). This Court has held that

the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that

mark the progress of a maturing society.” Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1227 (6th Cir. 1987)

(quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345–46). Thus, courts should interpret the Eighth Amendment “in

a flexible and dynamic manner.” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345).

The subjective component requires that the prison official act with a “sufficiently

culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson, 501

U.S. at 297). This “requirement follows from the principle that ‘only the unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at

297). In some instances, the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim is satisfied by a

showing of deliberate indifference, such as in cases concerning medical care, conditions of

confinement, or abuse perpetrated by an inmate against another inmate. See e.g., Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) and Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 2017)

(medical care); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303 and Villegas, 709 F.3d at 571 (conditions of

No. 17-4223 Rafferty, et al. v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio, et al. Page 7

confinement); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 and Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011)

(abuse perpetrated by an inmate against another inmate). In other contexts, such as when a

prisoner alleges excessive force, the subjective component requires a heightened showing that

the prison official acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)); Cordell v.

McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9).

3. Qualified Immunity Does Not Protect Drennen from Sherman’s Eighth

Amendment Claim

i. Drennen Violated Sherman’s Eighth Amendment Rights

Federal courts have long held that sexual abuse is sufficiently serious to violate the

Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the sexual abuse is perpetrated by other inmates, see

e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848–49 and Hackel, 636 F.3d at 761, or by guards, see e.g.,

Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 642 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing district court’s entry of

summary judgment for guard when the plaintiff presented evidence that guard “gratuitously

fondl[ed]” the plaintiff’s penis and testicles during a search); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936,

939–40 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that male prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment claim when he

alleged that corrections officers “forced him to perform sexually provocative acts” during a strip

search conducted in the presence of female guards); Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d

433, 439–41, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding an Eighth Amendment violation when corrections

officer forced inmate to perform drunken striptease); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1198

(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that inmate’s evidence that guard sexually assaulted her was sufficient

to prove an Eighth Amendment claim); Kent, 821 F.2d at 1228 (holding that inmate stated an

Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that female guards regularly watched him shower for

extended periods of time); Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981) (affirming jury’s

finding that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by forcing inmate to remove her

undergarments in the presence of male officers when she offered to voluntarily remove her

clothes if the male guards gave her privacy).

In light of this well-established precedent, the Court finds that Sherman has satisfied the

objective component of her Eighth Amendment claim. Drennen’s repeated demands that

No. 17-4223 Rafferty, et al. v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio, et al. Page 8

Sherman expose her breasts and masturbate are “sufficiently serious” to implicate the Eighth

Amendment under settled case law from the Supreme Court, this Circuit, and numerous other

courts of appeals. It is true that this Court has held that “isolated, brief, and not severe” instances

of sexual harassment do not give rise to Eighth Amendment violations. Jackson v. Madery,

158 F. App’x 656, 662 (6th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Maben v. Thelen,

887 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2018)). But Drennen’s sexual abuse was not “isolated, brief, and not

severe”—Sherman alleges that Drennen demanded that she engage in sexual conduct on up to six

occasions. This distinguishes Drennen’s alleged actions from cases where this Circuit has held

that less-severe episodes of sexual harassment did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation.2

Drennen argues that he did not violate the Eighth Amendment because he did not

physically touch Sherman. But this Court held nearly three decades ago that sexual abuse of

inmates can violate the Eighth Amendment even in the absence of physical touching by a

corrections officer. See Kent, 821 F.2d at 1228 (unobstructed views of inmates showering).

Other courts of appeals have reached the same conclusion. See e.g., Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d

356, 358 (7th Cir. 2015) (homophobic epithets); DeTella, 319 F.3d at 939 (ribald comments);

Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 439–41 (forced striptease). Furthermore, the abuse alleged to have

occurred in this case did not merely consist of words. It also entailed forced sexual acts. The

fact that Drennen effectuated this sexual abuse by ordering Sherman to expose her breasts and

2Drennen cites several cases to support his argument that his conduct failed to reach the requisite level of

severity. But Drennen’s conduct was more severe and/or pervasive than the conduct at issue in the cases that he

cites. See e.g., Hursey v. Anderson, No. 16-1146, 2017 WL 3528206 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2017) (unpublished) (nurse

exposed his buttocks to inmate); Ragland v. City of St. Louis, No. 12-1334, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14686 (6th Cir.

Feb. 11, 2013) (unpublished) (one instance of sexual touching); Madery, 158 F. App’x at 662 (unpublished) (one

instance of sexual touching); Violett v. Reynolds, 76 F. App’x 24 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (offering sexual

favors to inmate); Johnson v. Ward, 215 F.3d 1326 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (one instance of sexual touching

and one sexual remark). Furthermore, these cases are unpublished and therefore not binding on the Court. United

States v. Yates, 866 F.3d 723, 728 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 611 (6th Cir. 2002)).

Drennen also relies on Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1997). In that case, the Second Circuit

held that the plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that a guard squeezed his penis,

made lewd comments, and pinned him to the door in a sexual manner. Schnieder, 105 F.3d at 860–61. But Drennen

fails to mention that the Second Circuit subsequently pronounced that “the officer’s conduct in Boddie would flunk

its own test today.” Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 260 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that “conduct that might not

have been seen to rise to the severity of an Eighth Amendment violation 18 years ago may now violate community

standards of decency”).

No. 17-4223 Rafferty, et al. v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio, et al. Page 9

masturbate, rather than by touching Sherman himself, does not change the fact that Sherman was

repeatedly required to engage in sexual acts against her will.

Drennen also argues that he did not violate the Eighth Amendment because Sherman

consented to his sexual advances. This argument fails. First, as Drennen acknowledges,

“inmates are generally regarded as unable to consent to sexual relations with prison staff.” (Def.

Br. at 17.) See e.g., Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1047–49 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that

“[t]he power dynamics between prisoners and guards make it difficult to discern consent from

coercion,” acknowledging “the coercive nature of sexual relations in the prison environment,”

and holding that “when a prisoner alleges sexual abuse by a prison guard . . . the prisoner is

entitled to a [rebuttable] presumption that the conduct was not consensual.”) Second, there is a

disputed issue of material fact about whether Sherman consented. Sherman states that she only

complied because Drennen “intimidated” her. (Sherman Dep., R. 102 at PageID #716.) At this

stage, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Sherman. See Matsushita,

475 U.S. at 587. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that Sherman consented. See id.

Sherman has also satisfied the subjective component of her Eighth Amendment claim.

This Court has not determined whether deliberate indifference or the heightened malice standard

is required to satisfy the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim alleging sexual

abuse by a prison guard. But the Court need not resolve this issue at present; Sherman prevails

regardless of whether malice or the less-stringent deliberate indifference standard applies.

Obviously, Drennan could not conceivably offer a legitimate penological justification for his

repeated demands that Sherman expose herself and masturbate against her will. Thus, a jury

could conclude that Drennen acted with deliberate indifference or acted maliciously and

sadistically for the purpose of causing her harm.

Having concluded that Sherman established her Eighth Amendment claim for the

purposes of summary judgment, the Court will consider whether Sherman’s Eighth Amendment

rights were clearly established. As explained below, the Court finds that they were.

No. 17-4223 Rafferty, et al. v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio, et al. Page 10

ii. Sherman’s Eighth Amendment Rights Were Clearly Established

When Drennen made his sexual demands towards Sherman in early 2014, it was clearly

established that sexual abuse of prisoners could rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation. See e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848–49; Hively, 695 F.3d at 642; Hackel, 636 F.3d at

761; DeTella, 319 F.3d at 939–40; Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 439–41; Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1194;

Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997); Kent, 821 F.2d at 1228; Downs, 641 F.2d

at 1119. Further, it was clearly established that sexual abuse could be sufficiently severe to

implicate the Eighth Amendment even in the absence of physical touching by a guard. See Kent,

821 F.2d at 1228; DeTella, 319 F.3d at 939–40; Daskalea, 227 F.3d at 439–41. Accordingly,

when Drennen allegedly sexually abused Sherman, it was clearly established that such abuse

could violate the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment.

Furthermore, it was clearly established in 2014 that ignoring known risks of harm to an

inmate due to inadequate medical care, inhumane conditions of confinement, or abuse by another

inmate could constitute deliberate indifference. See e.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103–04 and

Krisher, 865 F.3d at 367 (medical care); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303 and Villegas, 709 F.3d at 571

(conditions of confinement); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 and Hackel, 636 F.3d at 766 (abuse

perpetrated by an inmate against another inmate). It was also clearly established that using

unnecessary force against an inmate could support a finding of malice. See e.g., Hudson,

503 U.S. at 6 and McKinney, 759 F.3d at 580. A jury could conclude that Drennen’s alleged

conduct violates either standard. Accordingly, it was clearly established that Drennen’s alleged

conduct could violate the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment.

Drennen argues that Sherman’s Eighth Amendment rights were not clearly established

because Sherman failed to identify a case with sufficiently analogous facts. But the Supreme

Court “do[es] not require a case directly on point [if] existing precedent [has] placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741

(2011) (citations omitted). Instead, the operative inquiry is “whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (citation omitted). Based on the settled precedent that existed in 2014,

a reasonable officer should have known that making repeated sexual demands of an inmate could

No. 17-4223 Rafferty, et al. v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio, et al. Page 11

violate the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the fact that Sherman failed to identify a case with

completely analogous facts does not entitle Drennen to qualified immunity. See id.

In sum, a reasonable officer in Drennen’s position would have known that repeatedly

ordering Sherman to expose her breasts and masturbate in his presence could violate her Eighth

Amendment rights. Therefore, Drennen is not entitled to qualified immunity. See id.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court AFFIRMS the district court.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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