Opinion

CALVIN SCOTT MCDONALD v. STATE OF FLORIDA

  • 264 So. 3d 202
Court
District Court of Appeal of Florida
Filed
Feb 13, 2019
Status
Published
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 54.5%

holding that defendant’s conviction for robbery with deadly weapon constituted fundamental error where defendant was charged with robbery with firearm

How later courts described this case

  • holding that defendant’s conviction for robbery with deadly weapon constituted fundamental error where defendant was charged with robbery with firearm

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CALVIN SCOTT MCDONALD,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-3323

[February 13, 2019]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm

Beach County; Glenn D. Kelley, Judge; L.T. Case No.

502015CF005205AXX.

Antony P. Ryan, Regional Counsel, and Richard G. Bartmon, Assistant

Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel,

West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph D.

Coronato, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

Calvin McDonald appeals his conviction and sentence for one count of

robbery with a deadly weapon and one count of attempted robbery with a

deadly weapon. Because Appellant stands convicted of crimes for which

he was not charged, we reverse.

Appellant was accused of robbing one individual and attempting to rob

another individual in a store parking lot while brandishing the barrel of a

firearm. Shortly after fleeing from the scene, Appellant was apprehended

by police and identified as the perpetrator by one of the victims.

The firearm allegedly used during the commission of the crimes was never

retrieved. Based on the information provided by the victims, the State

charged Appellant with one count of robbery with a firearm and one count

of attempted robbery with a firearm contrary to section 775.087(2)(a)1.,

Florida Statutes. The State did not charge Appellant with robbery or

attempted robbery with a deadly weapon.

The matter ultimately proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, one of

Appellant’s theories of defense was that he did not possess or use a real

firearm during the alleged robbery and attempted robbery and that what

the victims observed was a BB gun. To dispel this defense, the State

presented the testimony of both victims which established the following.

On the night of the incident, the victims were approached by Appellant

in the parking lot of a Walmart. After engaging in conversation, Appellant

leaned against the victims’ vehicle, placed his hand underneath his shirt,

mumbled “do you see what’s in my hand,” and demanded cash. When

both victims looked down towards Appellant’s hand, they saw the barrel

of a black firearm. The remainder of the firearm was hidden underneath

Appellant’s shirt. Both victims testified that the object Appellant was

holding appeared to be a real firearm. Specifically, one of the victims

testified that she was somewhat familiar with firearms and that the object

in Appellant’s hand was not a BB gun as it did not have a red tip. The

other victim testified that he was very familiar with firearms and that he

automatically recognized the object in Appellant’s hand as being a black

automatic or semi-automatic hand gun.

During the charge conference, the parties agreed that the jury

instructions and verdict form would include the following interrogatories

for sentencing enhancement purposes 1:

If you find the defendant guilty of the crime of robbery [or

attempted robbery], you must further determine beyond a

reasonable doubt if “in the course of committing the robbery

[or attempted robbery]” the defendant:

1. carried some kind of weapon;

2. carried a deadly weapon;

3. carried a firearm; and/or

4. actually possessed a firearm.

The jury ultimately found Appellant guilty of robbery and attempted

robbery, however selected “no” to the questions of whether Appellant

carried or actually possessed a firearm in the course of committing the

offenses and “yes” to the question of whether Appellant carried a deadly

weapon in the course of committing the offenses. Consistent with the

jury’s verdict, the court entered a judgment of guilt adjudicating Appellant

guilty of one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, a first degree felony

1 The State initially sought imposition of an enhanced sentence under section

775.087, Florida’s 10-20-Life statute.

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punishable by life, and one count of attempted robbery with a deadly

weapon, a second degree felony. Appellant did not object to, or otherwise

challenge, the judgment of guilt.

At the ensuing sentencing hearing, the trial court found that Appellant

qualified as a prison releasee reoffender (“PRR”). As required under section

775.082(9)(a)3., Florida Statutes, the court sentenced Appellant to life in

prison on the robbery with a deadly weapon conviction and fifteen years

in prison on the attempted robbery with a deadly weapon conviction to run

concurrent with the life sentence.

On appeal, Appellant argues that his convictions for the uncharged

offenses of robbery with a deadly weapon and attempted robbery with a

deadly weapon constitute fundamental error and must be reduced to

robbery and attempted robbery with a weapon. We agree.

It is well established that “[d]ue process prohibits an individual from

being convicted of an uncharged crime” and that “[v]iolation of this

prohibition constitutes fundamental error.” Morgan v. State, 146 So. 3d

508, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014); see also Falstreau v. State, 326 So. 2d 194,

195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (recognizing that a conviction for an uncharged

crime constitutes fundamental error unless the conviction is for a crime

that is “(1) a lesser degree of the crime charged, (2) an attempt to commit

the crime charged, (3) necessarily included in the crime charged, or (4)

included within the allegations of the accusatory pleading and shown by

the proofs”).

The holding in Davis v. State, 235 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2018) is instructive.

The defendant in that case was charged in two separate cases with one

count of robbery with a firearm. Id. at 321. As in the instant case, the

State in Davis did not charge the defendant with robbery with a deadly

weapon. Id. In both cases, evidence was presented that the object used

to commit the crimes was either a real firearm or a BB gun replica of a

firearm. Id. The juries in both cases found that the defendant did not

possess a firearm as alleged in the information and instead found him

guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon, an offense which the juries were

instructed was a lesser-included offense of the crime charged. Id.

Citing to Jaimes v. State, 51 So. 3d 445, 448 (Fla. 2010) for the

proposition that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of due process that a

defendant may not be convicted of a crime that has not been charged by

the state,” the court held that the defendant’s convictions for the

uncharged offense of robbery with a deadly weapon could not stand. Id.

In so holding, the court observed that robbery with a deadly weapon is not

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a lesser-included offense of robbery with a firearm; rather, robbery with a

weapon is the next immediate lesser-included offense of robbery with a

firearm. Id. The court nonetheless concluded that because the evidence

in both trials established that the object the defendant used during the

robberies was, if not a firearm, a replica of a firearm which the juries

clearly found to be a weapon, the evidence was sufficient to sustain

convictions for robbery with a weapon. Id. Accordingly, the proper remedy

was to reduce the defendant’s convictions from robbery with a deadly

weapon to robbery with a weapon. Id. at 322.

In the present case, as in Davis, it is undisputed that the State did not

charge Appellant with robbery or attempted robbery with a deadly weapon

and that the offenses of robbery or attempted robbery with a deadly

weapon are not lesser-included offenses of the charged crimes.

Accordingly, Appellant’s convictions for robbery and attempted robbery

with a deadly weapon cannot stand. Id. at 321. Because the evidence

presented at trial established that, if not a firearm, the object Appellant

used during the robbery and attempted robbery was a BB gun which the

jury clearly found to be a weapon, the evidence is sufficient to sustain

convictions for robbery and attempted robbery with a weapon. Id.

Consistent with Davis, we reverse and remand for entry of a corrected

judgment adjudicating Appellant guilty of robbery and attempted robbery

with a weapon. Id. at 322.

The State acknowledges the holding in Davis but nonetheless

maintains that the instant case is distinguishable because the verdict form

did not list robbery or attempted robbery with a deadly weapon as lesser-

included offenses but rather as sentencing enhancements. This argument

has no merit. Regardless of the reason why the uncharged crimes were

listed on the verdict form, the fact remains that Appellant stands convicted

of crimes for which he was not charged and which are not lesser-included

offenses of the charged crimes.

Appellant also argues that he was unconstitutionally sentenced as a

PRR because the trial court judge, rather than the jury, made the predicate

findings for PRR status. We reject this argument without further

comment. See Chavis v. State, 247 So. 3d 9, 10 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018);

Chapa v. State, 159 So. 3d 361, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Appellant will,

however, need to be resentenced on the robbery with a weapon conviction.

This is because section 775.082 only provides for a PRR life sentence for a

felony punishable by life. § 775.082(9)(a)3.a., Fla. Stat. (2015). For any

other felony in the first degree, the statute provides that the defendant

must be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty years.

§ 775.082(9)(a)3.b., Fla. Stat. Robbery with a weapon is a felony of the

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first degree not punishable by life. § 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015).

Accordingly, Appellant must be resentenced to a legal sentence in

accordance with section 775.082(9)(a)3.b.

Reversed and remanded for a corrected judgment and resentencing.

GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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