Sharon Louie v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED

regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 04 2019, 10:41 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Daniel Hageman Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

Matthew S. Koressel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Sharon Louie, February 4, 2019

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-1856

v. Appeal from the Marion Superior

Court

State of Indiana, The Hon. Clayton A. Graham,

Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G07-1801-CM-1030

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1856 | February 4, 2019 Page 1 of 5

Case Summary

[1] In July of 2018, the trial court sentenced Sharon Louie following her conviction

for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”). The

trial court sentenced Louie to four days of incarceration to be followed by 361

days of probation, stating in open court that Louie would not be required to pay

any probation fees. The trial court also issued several documents, some of

which indicated that Louie would pay no probation fees and others of which

indicated that she would pay $340.00 in probation fees. Louie contends that

the record establishes that the trial court did not intend to impose any probation

fees, while the State argues the opposite. Because we agree with Louie, we

remand with instructions to revise the record as necessary to reflect the

imposition of no probation fees.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 10, 2018, the trial court found Louie guilty of Class A misdemeanor

OWI and sentenced her to 365 days of incarceration, with 361 days suspended

to probation. Louie was also assessed a $200.00 statutory countermeasure fee

and $185.50 in court costs. After Louie indicated that she had already

completed an Advocates Against Impaired Driving (“AAID”) destructive

decision panel class and alcohol evaluation and treatment (“AET”), the trial

court stated that Louie would not be assessed a $400.00 alcohol/drug services

fee unless it turned out that she had not, in fact, completed the services. The

trial court also stated,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1856 | February 4, 2019 Page 2 of 5

Ms. Louie will be permitted to go to non-reporting probation

once it is verified that she’s completed her AAID Destructive

Decision Panel class, her alcohol evaluation and treatment, and

she pays her Court costs in the amount of $185.50.

[….]

So she’s not going to be assessed a probation fee.

How soon can you pay your Court costs, ma’am,

assuming that you’ve done everything else that you say that

you’ve done, because that’s going to determine certain probation

fees.

Tr. Vol. II p. 56.

[3] Also on July 10, 2018, the trial court issued several post-hearing orders and

documents. The trial court’s hand-written minutes from the bench trial made

no mention of probation fees, indicating that “PROB becomes non-reporting

after AAID & AET completed & pmt of court costs[.]” Conf. App. Vol. II 59.

Moreover, the probation order did not order the payment of any probation fees,

with the spaces on the form for their entry left blank. Other portions of the

record, however, do seem to indicate the imposition of $340.00 in probation

fees, contradicting the trial court’s statement at sentencing. Specifically, the

chronological case summary, sentencing order, and order on fees and costs

listed probation fees totaling $340.00.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Both parties acknowledge the inconsistencies regarding the imposition of

probation fees on Louie. Louie argues that the record, as a whole, indicates

that the trial court did not intend to impose probation fees and asks us to vacate

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1856 | February 4, 2019 Page 3 of 5

any portions of the record indicating otherwise. The State argues that the

record supports the opposite conclusion, i.e., that the trial court intended to

impose probation fees. “Generally, sentencing determinations are within the

trial court’s discretion.” McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ind. 2007).

“We review the trial court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of that discretion.”

Id. “An abuse of discretion has occurred when the sentencing decision is

‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the

court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn

therefrom.’” Id. (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)). “The

approach employed by Indiana appellate courts in reviewing sentences in non-

capital cases is to examine both the written and oral sentencing statements to

discern the findings of the trial court.” McElroy, 865 N.E.2d at 589. “Rather

than presuming the superior accuracy of the oral statement, we examine it

alongside the written sentencing statement to assess the conclusions of the trial

court.” Id. “This Court has the option of crediting the statement that

accurately pronounces the sentence or remanding for resentencing.” Id. We

conclude that the record supports Louie’s interpretation of it.

[5] At sentencing, the trial court unequivocally stated on the record that Louie was

“not going to be assessed a probation fee.” Tr. Vol. II p. 56. Despite some

contradictory indications in documents generated thereafter, much of the

documentary record, including the trial court’s handwritten minutes from the

bench trial and the probation order, is consistent with the trial court’s oral

statement. In our view, the trial court’s handwritten minutes are especially

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1856 | February 4, 2019 Page 4 of 5

compelling evidence of its intent, as they could not have been simply copied

and pasted onto the page. As for the documents that are inconsistent with the

trial court’s statement (which could, for the most part, be described as

“boilerplate”), we are confident that they represent clerical errors. Given the

trial court’s unequivocal statement at sentencing and the documents consistent

with it, we conclude that it is a true reflection of the trial court’s intent. We

remand with instructions to revise the record as necessary to reflect the initial

imposition of no probation fees. See Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 446 (Ind.

1999) (“Based on the unambiguous nature of the trial court’s oral sentencing

pronouncement, we conclude that the [inconsistent] Abstract of Judgment and

Sentencing Order contain clerical errors and remand this case for correction of

those errors.”).1

[6] We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.

1

That said, it seems just as clear to us that the trial court intended its initial non-imposition of probation fees

to be conditioned on Louie’s prompt payment of court costs and resulting qualification for non-reporting

probation. This intent is indicated by the trial court’s question to Louie about when she would be able to pay

her court costs, “because that’s going to determine certain probation fees.” Tr. Vol. II p. 56. Put another

way, while Louie was not ordered to pay any probation fees initially, the trial court left open the possibility

that she could be ordered to pay probation fees if she does not pay her court costs and qualify for non-

reporting probation. We do not wish our decision to be understood as tying the trial court’s hands regarding

the possible imposition of probation fees in the future.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1856 | February 4, 2019 Page 5 of 5