The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 11 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
K.J.P., a minor, individually, by and through No. 17-56256
their mother, Loan Thi Minh Nguyen; et al.,
D.C. No.
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 3:15-cv-02692-H-MDD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF SANTEE; et al.,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; et al.,
Defendants.
K.J.P., a minor, individually, by and through No. 17-56257
their mother, Loan Thi Minh Nguyen; et al.,
D.C. No.
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 3:15-cv-02692-H-MDD
v.
DEAN ALLEN, Sheriff's Department
deputy (#4591); et al.,
Defendants-Appellants,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
and
SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT; et al.,
Defendants.
K.J.P., a minor, individually, by and through No. 17-56260
their mother, Loan Thi Minh Nguyen; et al.,
D.C. No.
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 3:15-cv-02692-H-MDD
v.
LAKESIDE FIRE PROTECTION
DISTRICT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
CITY OF SANTEE; et al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 7, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and DORSEY,** District
Judge.
**
The Honorable Jennifer A. Dorsey, United States District Judge for
the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
2
The County of San Diego, San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, City of
Santee, Lakeside Fire Protection District, and individual Sheriff’s Department
deputy and paramedic defendants appeal the district court’s denial of their motions
for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. We remand for further
proceedings.
We have jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction over this
appeal. Allen v. Meyer, 755 F.3d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 2014). Where, as here, a
district court denies summary judgment on a qualified immunity defense, our
jurisdiction depends on whether the appeal presents “purely legal issues.”
Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir. 2000); see Johnson v. Jones,
515 U.S. 304, 311, 313–18 (1995). In this context, we “have jurisdiction to decide
whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity . . . .” Isayeva v. Sacramento
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2017). Because there appear to be
numerous factual disputes, we ordinarily might conclude that we lack jurisdiction
to determine whether the district court correctly denied the motions for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. However, here, the district court was
required to “carefully examine the specific factual allegations against each
individual defendant (as viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff),”
Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1287, and it failed to do so.
3
The district court did not conduct an individualized assessment of the
conduct of each of the various defendants in their myriad roles. Rather than
“examine the specific factual allegations against each individual defendant,” id.,
the district court concluded that the plaintiffs had raised triable issues of fact
regarding whether the aggregate conduct of the twelve deputies constituted
excessive force, and the aggregate conduct of the deputies and the seven
paramedics constituted an unconstitutional denial of medical care. Beyond a few
specific details regarding Sheriff’s Deputies Janae Krull, Marcos Collins, and Billy
Tennison, the district court did not address any individual defendant’s personal
conduct.
Because the district court did not individually evaluate each defendant’s
specific actions and omissions to determine whether that conduct violated clearly
established rights, we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
On remand, the district court shall, in the first instance, make an individualized
determination of whether summary judgment based on qualified immunity may be
proper as to each defendant.
Pursuant to General Order 4.5(e), each party shall bear its own costs.
REMANDED.
4