reviewing dismissal under § 1915A(b)(2) under de novo standard
How later courts described this case
- reviewing dismissal under § 1915A(b)(2) under de novo standard
- “To establish a denial of procedural due process, a party must show substantial prejudice.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 17-20706 Document: 00514785760 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/08/2019
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 17-20706 FILED
Summary Calendar January 8, 2019
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
TROY DANIEL THOELE,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
MARC HAMLIN; TRAVIS BRYAN, III,
Defendants-Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:17-CV-2337
Before REAVLEY, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Troy Daniel Thoele, Texas prisoner # 1784662, filed a civil rights
complaint, naming as defendants Brazos County District Court Clerk Marc
Hamlin and state District Judge Travis Bryan, III. Thoele contended that the
defendants violated his right to due process in relation to his state habeas
applications. He demanded an award of damages and declaratory and
injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous and
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Case: 17-20706 Document: 00514785760 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/08/2019
No. 17-20706
because it asserted claims against parties who are immune from suit. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
“This court’s precedent is inconsistent as to whether a § 1915A(b)(1)
dismissal is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion.” Morris v. McAllester,
702 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 2012). We need not resolve the issue because
Thoele’s appeal fails even on de novo review. See id.; see also Perez v. United
States, 481 F. App’x 203, 206 (5th Cir. 2012) (reviewing dismissal under
§ 1915A(b)(2) under de novo standard).
Thoele has not shown that the district court erred in determining that
Judge Bryan is absolutely immune from suit. See Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279,
284 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-67, 362
(1978). Nor has he shown that the district court erred in holding that it lacked
authority to grant his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. See Moye
v. Clerk, DeKalb Cnty. Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973);
Dickerson v. Guste, 932 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991).
In addition, Thoele contends that the district court erred in concluding
that clerk of court Hamlin was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity rather than
qualified immunity. We do not reach this question but will affirm on other
grounds. See McGruder v. Will, 204 F.3d 220, 222 (5th Cir. 2000).
Thoele’s claim is that Hamlin violated his right to procedural due process
by violating state law in failing to carry out an administrative function in his
state habeas cases. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has denied those
habeas cases on their merits. Accordingly, Thoele cannot show that he was
prejudiced by Hamlin’s alleged errors and omissions. See Keough v. Tate Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 748 F.2d 1077, 1083 (5th Cir. 1983) (“To establish a denial of
procedural due process, a party must show substantial prejudice.”). The
judgment is AFFIRMED.
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