State of Tennessee v. Taylor Satterfield

01/08/2019

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 30, 2018

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TAYLOR SATTERFIELD

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County

No. 294056 Don W. Poole, Judge

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No. E2017-02207-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant-Appellant, Taylor Satterfield, was indicted by the Hamilton County

Grand Jury for first degree premediated murder, tampering with evidence, and unlawful

possession of a deadly weapon. He then filed a motion to suppress his statement to

police, which was denied. After the State dismissed the tampering with evidence and

weapon charges, the Defendant’s case proceeded to a jury trial on the first degree murder

charge, and he was convicted of the lesser included offense of second degree murder and

sentenced to twenty-two years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the

trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement; (2) the evidence is

insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) he received an excessive sentence. We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE

OGLE and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Steve E. Smith, District Public Defender (on appeal) and Theodore A. Engel, III (at trial

and on appeal) and Coty Wamp (at trial), Assistant District Public Defenders, for the

Defendant-Appellant, Taylor Satterfield.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior

Counsel; Neal Pinkston, District Attorney General; and Cameron Williams and Andrew

Coyle, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

This case concerns the fatal shooting of the victim, Keiara Patton, who was the

girlfriend and mother of two of the Defendant’s children. The day of the shooting, the

Defendant was apprehended and charged in this case.

Suppression Hearing. On March 24, 2016, the Defendant filed a motion to

suppress any and all statements he gave to police. The Defendant claimed that the police

subjected him to an unlawful interrogation, used coercive techniques, failed to employ

mandated procedural safeguards, and failed to stop questioning the Defendant when the

law so required. The Defendant also claimed that the defective interrogation led to his

providing an involuntary statement because his will was overborne by the actions of the

police.

At the March 28, 2016 suppression hearing, Investigator Matthew Puglise of the

Chattanooga Police Department testified that on May 13, 2014, he heard a radio dispatch

that a shooting had occurred at 804 West 13th Street. When he arrived at the scene, the

victim, who had sustained a gunshot wound to the head, had already been transported to

Erlanger Hospital, where she later died. Investigator Puglise was informed that the

Defendant, the victim’s boyfriend, was a possible suspect because he had left the scene

shortly after the shooting. While at the scene, Investigator Puglise spoke to two women

in the apartment complex’s leasing office, who said they heard gunshots, saw the

Defendant run to a Dodge Durango parked on Grove Street, and observed the Defendant

placing something on the passenger side of that vehicle.

Investigator Puglise said he and Investigator Kenny Burnette approached this

Dodge Durango and searched the surrounding area. Moments later, Investigator Burnette

observed a gun that had been hidden underneath a sewer drain near the Durango, and he

collected this gun as evidence.

Investigator Puglise said he later learned that the Dodge Durango belonged to

Breasia Hubbard. Shortly thereafter, Hubbard arrived on the scene and consented to a

search of the Durango. Investigator Puglise said Hubbard told him that she had given the

Defendant permission to drive her vehicle after he had dropped her off at Howard High

School. Investigator Puglise said that a BOLO, or “be on the lookout” call, was placed

for the Defendant and that the Defendant was later apprehended at the hospital and

transported to the police station to be interviewed.

Investigator Puglise said he and Officer Kendra Adams were present during the

Defendant’s interview. The Defendant was not handcuffed during the interview.

Investigator Puglise read the Defendant his constitutional rights, and the Defendant

initialed each line indicating that he understood each of his constitutional rights.

Investigator Puglise then read the Rights Waiver Form and had the Defendant read this

form. He asked the Defendant if he had any questions about the Rights Waiver Form

before having the Defendant sign this form. He confirmed that the Defendant appeared

to understand the Rights Waiver Form. Investigator Puglise said that the Defendant did

not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or any other substance during the

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interview. He said he did not threaten or coerce the Defendant and did not withhold any

“creature comforts” during the interview.

After the Defendant signed the Rights Waiver Form at 11:43 a.m., Investigator

Puglise and Officer Adams signed the form. Thereafter, the Defendant gave a statement

that was audio/video recorded. This recording was played during the suppression

hearing.

The recording of the interview shows that the Defendant initially told Investigator

Puglise he did not know what happened to the victim. He said he had not come home the

night before, and the victim had told him that the next time he did not come home, she

was going to kick “all [his] s[--]t out.” On May 13, 2014, the Defendant went to the front

door of the victim’s apartment and called her name, but she never answered. The

Defendant said he walked upstairs, and when he saw the victim lying on the floor, he ran

outside. As he was running down the steps, the Defendant saw Breasia Hubbard’s

mother and told her something was wrong and asked her to help him and help the victim

because she had been shot. He said he later called 9-1-1 from his neighbor’s phone.

The Defendant said that a short time later, his sister picked him up and took him to

the hospital. He denied that he and the victim had argued that day and claimed that he

had not seen or talked to the victim prior to seeing her lying on the floor.

After the Defendant gave the first part of his statement, he asked Officer Adams

and Investigator Puglise about the victim’s medical condition, and Investigator Puglise

told him that the victim had not passed away.

Investigator Puglise left the interview room, and when he returned a short time

later, he informed the Defendant that he had just received news that the victim had died.

The Defendant pulled his shirt over his face, pushed his chair back, and began crying.

The Defendant then pushed himself out of his chair and began stomping his feet. Then

Investigator Puglise, Officer Adams, and the Defendant had the following conversation:

Investigator Puglise: Listen man, I need you to help. You got to sit

up and help me, man. We’ll get over it.

The Defendant: Oh.

Investigator Puglise: Listen, listen, the quicker we can—

The Defendant: That’s my girl.

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Investigator Puglise: Listen, the quicker we can do this, the quicker

we can find out who did this. Who would do

this to her?

The Defendant: I don’t know the f[--]k who did it, I’m going to

f[--]k everybody, though.

Investigator Puglise: Sit down.

The Defendant: I’m going to f[--]k everybody.

Investigator Puglise: Sit down. What time did you get there? Look

at me.

The Defendant: I don’t know what time.

Investigator Puglise: What time did you drop your girl off at the

school?

The Defendant: I don’t even know anymore.

Investigator Puglise: Come on, sit, let’s get this over with.

The Defendant: That my girl, bro, you don’t understand, bro,

my girl, bro.

Officer Adams: We got to talk to you so we can find out who

did this, okay?

The Defendant: Anybody can did it, I don’t know the f[--]k

who, anybody, everybody did, I don’t know f[--

]k, brother. That’s my girl, bro. Oh, Kei[a]ra,

you ain’t do me like this, bro. You didn’t leave

me, bro. You didn’t leave, bro. You got to be

strong, bro. You got to be strong, bro.

Investigator Puglise: How many kids you got with her? How many

children you have?

[The Defendant is crying]

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Investigator Puglise: All right. I’m going to give you some time and

I’ll come back. You hear me? I’m going to

give you a little bit of time, all right? But we’ve

got to get—listen.

The Defendant: I rather get it out of the way, bro.

Investigator Puglise: You want to get it out of the way? All right.

Come here and sit down.

Officer Adams: And then you can vent, okay? Just talk to him

and answer his questions and then you can vent.

The Defendant: Y’all don’t understand, that’s my girl. I’ve

known her five years, since I was 15 years old,

bro.

Investigator Puglise: Okay. We need to figure out as much

information for me right now and then let you

get out of here. Come on. Sit. Sit here and

let’s finish this up. I know it’s hard, man, I feel

for you.

Investigator Puglise continued interviewing the Defendant, and the Defendant said he

was the first person to find the victim. He denied hearing any fighting or commotion

prior to discovering the victim. Investigator Puglise left the interview room.

When Investigator Puglise returned, the Defendant said that when he walked up

the stairs to the victim’s apartment, he saw blood and ran out the door and fell on the

ground outside. He said that his belongings were outside the victim’s apartment. He

explained that the victim and Breasia Hubbard had talked and informed him that he had

to pick one of them and if he did not, they were going to “kick [his] stuff out.” The

Defendant denied having a gun or firing a gun that day and asserted that he did not have a

gun because he had just come from court when he found the victim. The Defendant also

denied that he ran back to the Dodge Durango before trying to reenter the victim’s

apartment. Investigator Puglise and Officer Adams left the interview room, and the

Defendant began crying again before getting his emotions under control.

When Officer Adams returned to the interview room, the Defendant had the

following exchange with her:

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The Defendant: Can you tell me my girl alive?

Officer Adams: What?

The Defendant: Can you tell me my girl alive?

Officer Adams: I’d like to tell you that, but she’s not.

The Defendant: No.

[The Defendant begins to cry again].

The Defendant: My girl. What I supposed to do, what I

supposed to do?

Officer Adams: You got to hang in there for your kids.

The Defendant: I don’t even. You don’t understand.

Officer Adams: Tell us everything you know so we can find

who did it.

The Defendant: I done told you everything. I don’t know what

the f[--]k happened to tell nobody, I don’t know

what to tell nobody.

Officer Adams: Can’t think of anything else?

The Defendant: What to tell you? What you want me to tell

you. Just tell me that, what you want me to tell

you?

Officer Adams: What all you know. The truth and what all you

know.

The Defendant: Well, what do you want me to know, I mean

what do you want me to tell you?

Officer Adams: Everything you know, the truth.

The Defendant: Do you saying I’m lying to you?

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Officer Adams: No, I’m not saying you’re lying, you just, I’m

saying you just say the truth and everything you

know.

The Defendant: You don’t understand. Listen to me, listen to

me, I’m going to tell you the honest to God

truth. If I—I’m going to tell you this, if I knew

who did this, I’m going to tell you this the God

honest truth, I going to tell you, I don’t know

who did it, but even if I did, I wouldn’t, plus,

the fact, killed my girl, bro.

I don’t know, man, I feel like I’m going crazy, I

don’t f[--]king know. My girl, my momma, my

homies, everybody dying. My friend, he died,

all f[--]king (unintelligible), just buried him last

month. My momma gone, guy I look up like

my dad, like my big brother, he got killed. I

done lost five people in two years and I’m the

only one here. I don’t know what God trying to

tell me though.

Officer Adams: Well, you got to hang in there for your kids.

The Defendant: Look at this, though, my kids, like I’m a good

dad and all, but like I’m a child myself. I feel

like I’m a child my dang old self. So who am I

to fight, I don’t even know how to take care of

my own kids. I can’t even take care of like my

dang old self, (unintelligible).

[Investigator Puglise enters the interview room]

Investigator Puglise: Hey, that SUV, that brown one, it’s a Dodge,

2000 Dodge Durango.

[Investigator Puglise’s phone rings, and he leaves the interview room]

Officer Adams: You got to tell everything you know and the

truth, okay? For your kids.

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The Defendant: I done told everything, but I can’t tell no more.

What you want me to tell you, that what I’m

asking like, you saying, like?

Officer Adams: No, I’m just telling you[,] you need to tell

everything you know. If you, why would

somebody want to hurt her?

The Defendant: I already just told you, somebody did that to my

girl, then they coming for me, my girl don’t

mess with nobody, I already said that. My girl

don’t mess with nobody, so if they come for

me, they were trying to kill me. I’ll say it was

me. I don’t do nothing, so if they coming for

me, you got to be coming for my money.

People think I got money. See how I dress? I

got Jordans on, I just got, I’m flash. I never

have nothing in my life, I struggled all my life,

and when I got my money, I bought me

whatever I want.

Officer Adams: Just tell him all that, or just answer his

questions.

When Investigator Puglise returned to the interview room, the Defendant denied

owning a black Springfield .40 caliber handgun. The Defendant said that the last time he

talked to the victim in person was the day before when he was at her apartment. At that

point during the interview, Investigator Puglise’s cell phone rang, and he answered it.

While he was on the phone, he informed the Defendant that the police had found the gun

he placed behind the Dodge Durango, which was the same gun the Defendant used to

shoot the victim in the head. Investigator Puglise asked the Defendant, “Do you want to

say why you shot her?” The Defendant replied, “I already knew this was going to

happen. I want to tell the truth.”

Investigator Puglise asked the Defendant if he shot her out of passion, and the

Defendant answered, “There wasn’t no passion.” The Defendant told Investigator

Puglise that he pretended that he was going to kill himself because he did not want to

leave the victim’s apartment, and the victim grabbed the gun, causing it to discharge.

The Defendant said that when the gun fired, the victim was trying to keep him from

shooting himself. He asserted that he did not stay with the victim after she was shot

because he did not want his children to see the victim. The Defendant stated that there

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were knives on the kitchen floor because the victim believed he was going to hurt her and

was attempting to protect herself. He said he was wearing a button-up shirt at the time of

the shooting because he had just been at court. At that point, Investigator Puglise left the

interview room, and the Defendant acknowledged that he was responsible for killing the

victim. He said that although the victim “did come at [him],” there was no reason for her

to be shot. Another officer collected the white t-shirt the Defendant was wearing, and the

Defendant lay down on the floor.

When Investigator Puglise returned to the interview room, the Defendant sat in his

chair. Officer Adams told the Defendant to tell Investigator Puglise what he had just told

her. The Defendant then gave the following statement:

When I came in the house, my girl, we was arguing, (inaudible).

She basically just, I’m through, running (phonetically). F[--]k this s[--]t,

man. I already had the gun in my hand, walking around, because that what

I do when we were arguing. And she will say, just stay, you don’t need to

be going out there like that at night. So she starts freaking out, she grabs

her two knives out the drawer. I’m like, oh s[--]t. I was like, all right, I’m

fixing to go, I’m fixing to go. She took my s[--]t, she throwing it out,

everything out. She grabbed her key because she knew I’d grab her keys

and I still got to come in.

She had the knife, she like, f[--]k this s[--]t, now get the f[--]k out,

get the f[--]k out. I didn’t think she was going to stab me, though. She

charged at me with the two knives and I was standing on the side of the

stove, I stepped back like, dang, hold on, hold on. So I closed the door,

closed, and she swung, swung, and then boom.

The Defendant said he was standing in the doorway, and he was attempting to shut the

door so the victim could not leave. When the victim charged him with a knife in each

hand, he “leaned back” and when the victim swiped the gun, “it went off,” even though

he never had his finger on the gun’s trigger. After the gun went off, the Defendant said

he “flipped out” and hoped that the bullet had “missed her.” He said he went outside, and

broke down. Eventually, his brother went inside the victim’s apartment. When his

brother came out, he told the Defendant to get his kids and go.

After the recording of the interview was played, Investigator Puglise resumed his

testimony at the suppression hearing. He said that after the Defendant gave this

statement, he charged him with criminal homicide, aggravated assault, tampering with

evidence, and unlawful possession of a weapon. Investigator Puglise acknowledged that

the Defendant became very upset when he discovered that the victim had passed away.

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On April 1, 2016, the trial court entered a written order denying the motion to

suppress. In it, the court made the following findings, in pertinent part:

The Court understands the defendant to contend that, despite an

initially valid waiver of rights, his statements are involuntary because post-

waiver police commands effectively negated the waiver and exploited his

visible distress, overbearing his will. The Court agrees that the initial

waiver of rights was valid. It was voluntary, being as free from coercion as

possible, and intelligent.

The Court, however, respectfully disagrees that, thereafter, the

police overbore the defendant’s will. The defendant’s distress did not

prevent him from denying knowledge of the shooter. Even when police

became confrontational, they did not coerce him by making promises or

threats. Their directions to sit and exhortations to “hang in there for your

kids” were more in the nature of efforts to encourage the defendant to

collect himself.

Nor does any misrepresentation about the victim’s condition or the

gun render the defendant’s statement involuntary or unintelligent.

Trial. At the July 19-22, 2016 trial, Officer Jeff Kirk with the Chattanooga Police

Department testified that on May 13, 2014, he received a radio dispatch that shots had

been fired in an apartment in the College Hill Courts complex at 803 West 13th Street

Court. When he arrived at this address, Officer Kirk observed a stack of clothes outside

the back door. He walked up the stairs, and when he entered the apartment, he saw the

victim lying on the kitchen floor with EMS attending to her. The victim was lying in an

“L-shaped, fetal position” with her face and knees toward the front door. Although the

victim was alive, she was bleeding profusely and was attempting to breathe. He noticed

two knives on the floor near the front door of the apartment and saw that the stove had

been moved out of place. Officer Kirk said he never saw the Defendant inside the

victim’s apartment.

Huguette Ciza, a student at Sewanee, testified that she had heard of the victim,

who lived in the apartment next door, but did not know her personally. Although Ciza

did not know the Defendant, she had seen him living in the apartment with the victim.

Ciza said that on the morning of May 13, 2014, she was reading in her living room

when she heard the Defendant and the victim having an argument, which lasted

approximately five minutes. She was unable to hear exactly what they said, but she could

tell that their voices were raised, and the argument ended when she heard a single

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“popping sound.” Because she had never heard a gunshot before, she did not know

whether the sound was a gun being discharged or a firecracker being set off. After

hearing this sound, Ciza looked out her window and saw the Defendant, who was holding

a small gun and “looked very worried.” The Defendant was repeatedly screaming, “My

girl, my girl.”

When Ciza saw the Defendant with the gun, she knew that something bad had

happened. She opened her door slightly and could see that the victim’s door was open

and that there was a substantial amount of blood inside the victim’s apartment. When the

Defendant began screaming, people began to gather outside to help, and Ciza ran

downstairs to allow them to come inside the building. After Ciza opened the door to let

these people in, the Defendant ran upstairs to the victim’s apartment to see what was

going on and then ran back down the stairs, and Ciza never saw him again. Ciza then

called 9-1-1.

Sherill Jones, the leasing representative for the College Hill Courts apartments,

testified that on the morning of May 13, 2014, she observed a young African-American

male with shoulder-length dreadlocks running back and forth from the center of West

13th Street toward Grove Street. The first time she saw this man run past, he was

wearing a plaid or checked button-front shirt; however, when he ran past her a second

time, he was wearing only a white sleeveless undershirt. She saw this man run to the

passenger side of a tan or bronze Dodge Durango SUV, but she was unable to see what

he was doing. Jones said she became aware that something bad had happened because

just after she saw the young African-American man run by, she heard people screaming

that someone had been shot, and individuals began calling and coming into the leasing

office. Later, Jones suggested that the police look for evidence in the sewer drain on the

passenger side of the Dodge Durango because this was the area in which the young

African-American man had gone.

Kimberly Bell, who worked at the College Hill Courts apartments, said that she

did not know the victim but knew the Defendant because he was a distant relative. On

May 13, 2014, Bell became aware that something had happened at one of the apartments

because she heard people screaming and thought she heard that someone had been shot in

the leg. Bell and Kevin Stubblefield, another apartment employee, went to check on

what had happened, and as they were walking to the scene of the disruption, they ran into

the Defendant. The Defendant was screaming and crying and repeatedly saying that

someone had shot his girl. She described the Defendant as “extremely hysterical.”

Bell asked the Defendant what happened, and the Defendant said, “Well, d[--]n,

they shot my bitch.” She asked where the victim was, and the Defendant pointed toward

the victim’s apartment. Stubblefield headed up the stairs to the victim’s apartment, and

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Bell followed behind him. As Bell began climbing the stairs, Stubblefield immediately

turned around and walked back down. When Bell asked him what had happened,

Stubblefield told her he was not going inside the victim’s apartment.

Bell proceeded up the stairs to the victim’s apartment. When she entered the

victim’s kitchen, Bell saw the victim lying on the floor with a set of keys clenched in her

hands. Bell immediately stopped because she could see that the victim, who had been

shot in the head, was taking heavy breaths. Bell observed that the refrigerator had been

moved into a “catty-corner” position and that the stove had been pulled out from the wall.

She knew that the victim was not going to live because her brains were no longer inside

her head.

Bell vaguely recalled seeing a knife but did not think it was out of place because

she and the victim were in the kitchen. She said an older lady was standing in the kitchen

when she arrived. Bell asked this lady if there were children in the apartment, and the

lady replied that the children’s father had taken them out of the apartment. Shortly

thereafter, the older lady left, and an EMT arrived and told Bell to leave the apartment.

Bell admitted that she did not initially tell the police about the victim clutching the set of

keys; however, she said she discussed this particular fact with the people in the leasing

office and later told the police that the victim had keys in her hand. Bell said, “[W]hat

stood out the most in my mind [wa]s the fact this girl had keys clenched in her hands, like

whatever had transpired, you was not getting her keys.”

Breasia Hubbard testified that the Defendant was the father of her three-year-old

child. Hubbard said she had known the Defendant for four years and knew the victim

because the Defendant and the victim had two children together. She was familiar with

the College Hill Courts apartments because her mother lived in that complex.

Hubbard said that the Defendant spent the night of May 12, 2014, at her house and

rode with her to her high school around 9:30 a.m. the morning of May 13, 2014. Once

they arrived at her school, the Defendant told Hubbard that he was going home to his

residence at 12th and Holly Street in Highland Park and drove away in her Dodge

Durango. Hubbard said that a short while later, her mother called to check on her

because she had heard that someone had been shot at the victim’s apartment and had seen

Hubbard’s Dodge Durango parked near the victim’s apartment. Upon hearing this news,

Hubbard left school and rode with her aunt to the victim’s apartment, where she saw her

Dodge Durango parked near the College Hill Courts apartments. When she arrived at the

scene, the police questioned her about the shooting. Approximately three hours later, the

police gave her permission to take her SUV, and she used her spare key to drive it home.

Hubbard said that after the Defendant drove off in her car from the high school, she did

not see him again until he was arrested.

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Hubbard stated that she talked to the victim on Mother’s Day, which was a couple

of days before the shooting. That night, Hubbard texted the Defendant’s phone, and the

victim replied to the text, and Hubbard realized that the Defendant was with the victim.

After she and the victim texted back and forth several times, Hubbard called the victim.

During this phone conversation, Hubbard and the victim argued and then finally

discussed the fact that they were tired of the Defendant dating them both. Hubbard said

the victim told her that she had bought two knives and that she was going to stab the

Defendant “so maybe he’ll act right.” The victim said she hid these knives under her

mattress; however, Hubbard did not believe the victim would actually stab the Defendant.

Hubbard said that a detective interviewed her at the College Hill Courts

apartments because her vehicle was involved in the case. At the time, she knew that the

victim had been shot but did not know that the Defendant was a suspect. Hubbard lied to

the police when she told them that she and the Defendant were not romantically involved

and that the Defendant had not spent the night of May 12, 2014 with her. She also lied to

the police when she told them that she and the victim had talked on Sunday night and that

they had discussed positive things, including what the victim and the Defendant had done

with the kids on Valentine’s Day. Hubbard said she never informed the police that the

victim had told her she was buying knives so she could stab the Defendant. She said she

lied to the police because she did not want to be involved in the shooting.

Joseph Montijo, a crime scene investigator with the Chattanooga Police

Department, testified that he went to the hospital to photograph and document the

victim’s injuries. Upon arriving there, he observed that the victim had sustained a

gunshot wound to the right side of her head, which caused the victim’s brain matter to

come out of her skull. The victim had been placed on a breathing apparatus, and the

bedsheet around her was soaked in blood. He also noticed that blood was coming out of

the victim’s nose and mouth. Investigator Montijo took pictures of the victim’s injuries,

collected her blood-soaked clothes, and collected gunshot residue samples from her

hands. After the Defendant was taken into custody, Investigator Montijo photographed

and fingerprinted him, took a buccal swab for DNA testing, collected the Defendant’s

white t-shirt, and collected gunshot residue samples from the Defendant’s hands. He said

that the photographs he took showed that the Defendant did not have any visible injuries.

Gregory Mardis, a crime scene investigator with the Chattanooga Police

Department, testified that on May 13, 2014, he photographed the crime scene after the

victim had been transported to the hospital. He specifically took photographs of two

kitchen knives, a bullet fragment, and a set of keys that were on the kitchen floor. He

noted that the kitchen knives had blood spatter on the handles. Investigator Mardis said

that only one shell casing was found, and this casing was jammed into the ejection port

for the Springfield .40 caliber handgun recovered. He stated that after photographing and

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collecting the evidence at the crime scene, he went to the medical examiner’s office to

collect a projectile that was recovered from the victim’s body, as well as jewelry,

biological samples, a DNA sample, scalp hair, and fingernail clippings from the victim.

James Kenneth Metcalfe, M.D., the Hamilton County chief medical examiner and

an expert in forensic pathology, testified that he performed the victim’s autopsy. Dr.

Metcalfe opined that the victim’s probable cause of death was a gunshot wound to the

head and that the victim’s manner of death was homicide. Dr. Metcalfe said he compared

the photographs where the TBI had conducted test patterns of the suspect firearm with the

photographs from the victim’s autopsy and opined that the muzzle of this handgun was

approximately two feet from the victim’s gunshot wound. He also stated that because of

the similarity between the droplets of blood on the knives and the droplets of blood on the

floor at the crime scene, he believed that the two knives were already lying on the floor at

the time the victim was shot. Dr. Metcalfe opined that blood got underneath one of the

knives when someone, either the EMS workers or the victim, pressed down on the knife,

which made it come in contact with blood that was on the floor.

Officer Adams testified that she was one of the first two officers to arrive at the

scene before the EMS workers arrived. When she entered the victim’s apartment, she

observed the victim lying on the kitchen floor. The victim had blood in her face and hair,

and blood was pooled around her body. Later, Officer Adams was told to go to Erlanger

Hospital because a large crowd of individuals had gathered there to be close to the victim.

She then was told that the Defendant was a suspect in the victim’s murder and that she

needed to locate him. Officer Adams drove to the hospital, and when the Defendant

arrived there, she told him that he needed to come with her and that while he was not

under arrest, she needed to place him in handcuffs for her safety and for his own safety.

She said the Defendant was cooperative and upset and seemed very concerned about the

victim. She transported him to the police station to meet with Investigator Puglise.

Officer Adams said she was present when the Defendant gave his statement to

Investigator Puglise and acknowledged that the Defendant was upset and crying during

the interview. She noted that while the Defendant was hysterical at certain times during

the interview, at other times he was calm. Officer Adams also recalled the Defendant

lying on the floor on one occasion and then standing up during the interview.

Investigator Puglise provided testimony at trial that was similar to his testimony at

the suppression hearing. He stated that when he got to the crime scene, it had been

secured, and the victim had been transported to the hospital. He approached the front

door of the victim’s apartment and observed two large pools of blood. He said it

appeared that there had been some kind of struggle in the kitchen because the stove had

been pulled out and the refrigerator had been moved. He next talked to two witnesses at

the scene, Sherill Jones and Kimberly Bell. Jones informed him that she had seen the

- 14 -

Defendant running back and forth to a Dodge Durango that was parked on Grove Street.

Jones added that if the Defendant had hidden a gun anywhere, it was probably behind the

Durango.

Investigator Puglise walked over to the Durango and noticed the sewer drain.

Moments later, Investigator Burnette spotted a Springfield .40 caliber semiautomatic

handgun in the drain, and this gun was collected as evidence. While Investigator Puglise

was on the scene, he discovered that the Defendant and the victim had been arguing that

morning and that the Defendant had been seen outside the victim’s apartment holding a

handgun.

Investigator Puglise stated that the Defendant’s interview began at 11:43 a.m.

Although the Defendant was initially handcuffed, Investigator Puglise told Officer

Kendra Adams to remove the handcuffs for the interview. Investigator Puglise read the

Defendant his constitutional rights from the Chattanooga Police Department’s Miranda

Waiver Form, and then he gave the Defendant the opportunity to read these rights. He

told the Defendant that if he had any questions, he could ask them. He said the

Defendant appeared to understand his rights and initialed each sentence indicating that he

understood each of his rights. Investigator Puglise said the Defendant also appeared to

understand the last section of the form, which was the waiver of rights. At the time of the

interview, the Defendant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or any other

substance. Investigator Puglise said the Defendant verbally agreed to waive his rights

before signing the waiver form. Thereafter, Investigator Puglise and Officer Adams

signed this form. The audio/video recording of the Defendant’s interview was played for

the jury. During the interview, the Defendant provided several different explanations as

to what happened to the victim. Investigator Puglise acknowledged that the Defendant

got visibly upset at different points during the interview.

Alex Broadhag, a special agent with the TBI and an expert in firearms, testified

that the bullet retrieved from the victim’s body during the autopsy had been fired through

the barrel of the Springfield .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun that was found at the

crime scene. He stated that he examined the Springfield handgun and observed that a

fired cartridge case, which should have been ejected from the weapon, was lodged in the

ejection port causing a condition known as “stovepipe.” He said that this “stovepipe”

condition could occur if the handgun was dirty, which prevented the slide from coming

back fully, or if the shooter did not hold his hand in a rigid manner when shooting, or if

there was bad ammunition, or if the weapon had not been properly lubricated

.

Agent Broadhag said that the Springfield .40 caliber handgun had three safeties—a

trigger safety, a firing pin safety, and a grip safety. He said that in order to fire this

handgun, the trigger safety and the grip safety had to be deactivated at the same time,

- 15 -

which meant that the operator would have to press down on the grip safety and pull the

trigger fully to the rear in order to fire the gun. He also said that the gun had a firing pin

safety, which prevented the gun from firing unless the trigger was pulled. Agent

Broadhag explained that a gun with a hair trigger takes less than one pound of pressure to

fire and that the Springfield .40 caliber handgun did not have a hair trigger because it

required 5.75 pounds of pressure to be applied to the trigger in order for it to fire. He

said that he test-fired the Springfield .40 caliber handgun and that it operated properly.

He also asserted that there was nothing wrong with the handgun’s safety features.

Quanmesha Satterfield, the Defendant’s sister, testified that on May 13, 2014, she

drove to the College Hill Courts apartments after someone notified her that something

had happened to her brother. When she arrived, she saw the Defendant sitting in the

middle of a field and crying. Ms. Satterfield1 could not recall what the Defendant was

wearing at the time, but she stated that he did not have a gun. As she put the Defendant’s

two children in the car, the Defendant kept saying, “[M]y girl, my girl.” A short time

later, the Defendant asked Ms. Satterfield to drive him to the hospital. During their car

ride, the Defendant was “distraught, just crying” and finally told her that the victim had

been injured and that he needed to go to the emergency room to make sure she was okay.

Ms. Satterfield said that a few days before the shooting, she saw the victim, who

explained her frustration with the Defendant dating her and Breasia Hubbard. During this

conversation, the victim said that the Defendant needed to choose who he was going to be

with and that she was going to stab him if he didn’t choose her.

The Defendant testified in his own behalf. Although he admitted that he had shot

the victim, he denied murdering her. He stated that at the time of the shooting, he was a

high school graduate and was twenty years old. The Defendant said he and the victim

had been dating for five-and-a-half years and had two children together at the time of the

shooting. The Defendant said he began dating Breasia Hubbard in 2012 while he was

still dating the victim. Hubbard became pregnant with his child the first month they

started dating, and Hubbard later discovered that he was also dating the victim.

Approximately five or six months into Hubbard’s pregnancy, the victim realized that he

was dating Hubbard, and neither the victim nor Hubbard were happy with this situation.

On Mother’s Day, May 11, 2014, the Defendant spent the first part of the day with

Hubbard and the rest of the day with the victim. He also spent the night of May 11, 2014,

with the victim. The next day, May 12, 2014, the Defendant and the victim discussed

1

We have used the title “Ms.” here to distinguish Quanmesha Satterfield from the Defendant,

Taylor Satterfield. We have not used titles with the other witnesses for the purpose of efficiency, and we

intend no disrespect to these individuals.

- 16 -

their relationship, and the victim informed him that he would have to choose between her

and Hubbard. The victim also told him that if he did not come home, she “would kick

[his] stuff out.” The night of May 12, the Defendant dropped his son off at the victim’s

apartment and told the victim that he was spending the night at his aunt’s house because

he had to be in court the next morning. Despite his statement to the victim, the

Defendant took a cab to Hubbard’s home and spent the night with her so that she could

take him to court the following morning.

On the morning of May 13, 2014, Hubbard drove the Defendant to court. When

the Defendant realized that he had arrived too early, he called Hubbard and told her to

pick him up. Hubbard picked him up in her Dodge Durango, and then the Defendant

drove the Durango to Hubbard’s school, where he dropped her off. The Defendant then

drove Hubbard’s vehicle to the College Hill Courts apartments so he could talk to the

victim. When he got there, he parked the Durango away from the victim’s apartment so

she would not see that he was driving Hubbard’s vehicle and would not realize he had

spent the night with Hubbard.

The Defendant said that the victim was cleaning her apartment when he arrived.

He walked into her apartment, sat on the couch, and told her about going to court. The

victim talked to him but gave him very short responses and appeared to be upset and

frustrated. When he asked her what was wrong, the victim shrugged and said nothing

was wrong. When the Defendant continued to ask her what was wrong, the victim

informed him that she knew he had been with Hubbard. The Defendant just shrugged

and laughed. When the victim continued to talk about his relationship with Hubbard, the

Defendant decided to get a shirt and leave the victim’s apartment.

The Defendant said that two or three weeks prior, he had brought his clothes from

his aunt’s house and had left them in the victim’s kitchen because he did not feel like

taking them upstairs. His clothes were in a plastic tote with a lid, and he had placed a

gun inside this tote. When the Defendant walked into the kitchen to get his shirt, he

noticed that the plastic tote was gone, and he asked the victim what she had done with his

belongings. The victim reminded him that she had told him she was going to put his

belongings out of her house.

At that point, the Defendant walked outside to see if his belongings were still

there. He found his clothes and the gun and went back inside the house. As he walked

back up the steps to the victim’s apartment, the Defendant was holding a bottle of

Gatorade in his right hand and the gun in his left hand.

The Defendant said that when he got to the top of the steps, the victim told him to

“get the f[--]k out” and began charging him with a knife in each hand. The Defendant

- 17 -

said he tried to shield himself and step back and then heard the gun go off. At the time

that the gun fired, the victim was two to three feet away from him. Because the

Defendant believed the victim was going to stab him, he reacted by stepping back,

shielding himself, and putting his hands up to block her. He said that when he raised his

hands up to shield himself, he heard the gun go off and saw the victim fall back. After

the gun fired, the Defendant panicked, ran outside, and asked for help. The Defendant

thought he had shot the victim but was hoping the bullet had missed her. He ran down

the back steps of the apartment and asked people for help. At that point, the Defendant

was still holding the gun in his hand. He realized that people were looking at him, so he

walked to the Durango and set the gun in a nearby sewer drain because he was “scared

and didn’t know what was going on.” He said he was “in a panic” and “just wanted to go

back there and just be with [the victim] while she [was] right there.” The Defendant said

he “didn’t want to be on the scene with a gun while the police pull[ed] up or anything like

that.”

The Defendant returned to the victim’s apartment and made sure that someone had

called the paramedics. At the time, he was crying and continuing to ask people to help

him. When someone told him to make sure that his children were out of the apartment,

he attempted to open the back door to the victim’s apartment but it had locked behind

him. He began knocking on the door, and a neighbor let him into the building. He

walked up the stairs to the victim’s apartment, and several people followed behind him.

When he got to the victim’s apartment, he saw the victim lying on the floor and

knew that she had been shot. He walked upstairs, saw that his daughter had already been

taken elsewhere, and picked up his son. He went downstairs, walked out the front door to

avoid the kitchen, and took his son to his sister-in-law’s apartment in the same complex.

Shortly thereafter, his sister arrived and took him and the children to the hospital, where

he stayed for ten minutes until an officer placed him in handcuffs and took him to the

police station to be interviewed.

The Defendant acknowledged that he had lied to the police several times during

his interview. He said that the first lie was when he told the police that he went to the

victim’s apartment and found her dead. He said his second lie was when he told the

officers that the victim grabbed the gun as he was trying to commit suicide, and it went

off . Finally, the Defendant said he told the police a story similar to what he had testified

to at trial; however, he acknowledged that this third version also contained some lies. He

said he lied to Investigator Puglise because he was “scared” and “was in a panic.”

Although he admitted to telling these lies, the Defendant asserted that his trial testimony

about the shooting was the truth. He maintained that he never intended to shoot and kill

the victim.

- 18 -

Sentencing. At the September 12, 2016 sentencing hearing, the State entered the

Defendant’s presentence investigation report as an exhibit. William Atwell, a K-9 officer

with the Chattanooga Police Department, testified that in February 2013, he received

reports of drug sales at the Defendant’s home, and based on these reports, obtained a

search warrant for this residence. On February 24, 2013, Officer Atwell executed the

search warrant. When he and the other officers entered the home, the Defendant

attempted to leave through the back door. The officers detained him in a laundry room

and placed him in handcuffs. As Officer Atwell and the other officers walked with the

Defendant to the front of the residence, they observed a large amount of marijuana on the

Defendant’s bed, and the Defendant admitted that this marijuana belonged to him. The

Defendant also admitted that a small amount of marijuana on the dresser belonged to

him.

Officer Atwell said that the amount of marijuana on the Defendant’s bed was

enough to qualify as a resale amount. He also noted that paraphernalia and baggies were

found in the Defendant’s bedroom. Officers also found a .38 caliber handgun underneath

the Defendant’s bed, and the Defendant offered that he had just sold a .357 handgun. A

digital scale was also found in the Defendant’s bedroom. Officer Atwell said the

Defendant was ultimately charged regarding the marijuana and the firearm.

Amy Smart, the victim’s mother, testified that in April 2013, the victim was living

at home with her. Smart said that around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. one night, she received a call

from the victim, who was very upset. The victim and her children were crying, and the

victim told her that the Defendant was beating on the door, the wall, and the window in

an attempt to get inside Smart’s home. The victim said she had told the Defendant to

leave, but he refused. Before Smart and the victim ended their phone conversation,

Smart heard a window break, and the victim informed her that the Defendant had broken

the front window. Smart immediately made a U-turn and returned home. When she

arrived, she observed broken glass from her front window inside and outside her home

and noted that the Defendant was no longer there. Smart said she and the victim

immediately called the police, and the victim gave a statement about the incident. Smart

later banned the Defendant from coming to her home.

Smart also detailed an incident that occurred during Christmastime in 2011 when

the victim’s and Defendant’s daughter was five months old. She said the Defendant and

the victim were arguing, and the Defendant called Smart’s phone and told her that if she

did not give him his daughter’s car seat, he would shoot her and the victim.

Smart said that on May 13, 2014, she was the first person to arrive at the hospital

after the victim was shot and that the Defendant did not arrive at the hospital with the

children until an hour-and-a-half later. When Smart was told that the victim passed

- 19 -

away, she said she felt like she “wanted to die too.” Smart said, “It’s hurtful that [the

victim] didn’t have to be taken at all. . . . I’m looking at her kids every day, plus me and

[the victim] spent 20 years every day together.” She said that the victim’s son had to see

a counselor because of his mother’s death and that the victim’s daughter talked about her

mother dying all the time.

Quanmesha Satterfield, the Defendant’s sister, testified that she and her brother

were raised in the same household and that her brother did not have a father figure in his

life until he was older. Ms. Satterfield stated that their mother passed away when her

brother was seventeen years old and that he took her death “the hardest because he was

the baby.” She said her brother was “a good person,” was a great father, and took care of

his children every day. She added that she would help her brother when he got released

from prison and that her brother’s aunts and uncles, cousin, and grandmother would also

help support the Defendant upon his release.

Sheree Lomnick, the Defendant’s cousin, testified that the Defendant was “a great

father” who spent a lot of time with his children. Lomnick described the Defendant as

“loving, caring, sweet, smart” and said she would support the Defendant whenever he

was released from prison.

The Defendant made an allocution, stating that he “want[ed] to take full

responsibility for [his] actions” and wanted to “apologize to both families and everyone

who’s been hurt by this mistake.” He also apologized to his children. The Defendant

asked that the trial court take into consideration the fact that he had three children, two of

whom had already lost their mother, when determining the length of his sentence.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the court found that a sentence close

to the maximum in the range was appropriate. It then sentenced the Defendant to twenty-

two years for his second degree murder conviction.

Following sentencing, the Defendant filed a timely motion and amended motion

for new trial, which were denied. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a timely notice of

appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Denial of Motion to Suppress. The Defendant argues that the trial court erred

in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police. While the Defendant

acknowledges that Investigator Puglise advised him of his Miranda rights at the

beginning of the interview, he claims Investigator Puglise and Officer Adams

undermined this warning through their later statements to him. The Defendant also

- 20 -

claims that his emotional state at the time of his statement renders most, if not all, of his

statement involuntary. The State counters that the interview was not coercive and that

although the Defendant was upset after learning of the victim’s death, his will was not

overborne. We agree with the State.

A trial court’s findings of fact at a suppression hearing are binding on an appellate

court unless the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 528

(Tenn. 2014); State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). “Questions of credibility

of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the

evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” Odom, 928 S.W.2d

at 23. The prevailing party in the trial court “is entitled to the strongest legitimate view

of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and

legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” Id.; see Bell, 429 S.W.3d at

529. Despite the deference given to trial court’s findings of fact, this court reviews the

trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo with no presumption of

correctness. State v. Montgomery, 462 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Tenn. 2015) (citing State v.

Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001)); State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 900 (Tenn.

2008) (citing State v. Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311, 315 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Yeargan, 958

S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997)). When evaluating the correctness of a trial court’s ruling

on a motion to suppress, this court may consider not only the proof offered at the

suppression hearing but also the evidence presented at trial. State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d

22, 35 (Tenn. 2014); State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Tenn. 2012).

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment, states that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Similarly, the

Tennessee Constitution provides “that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall

not be compelled to give evidence against himself.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. This right

against self-incrimination gives criminal defendants the right to remain silent. State v.

Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 191 (Tenn. 2016) (citing State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 52

(Tenn. 2014)).

A. Whether Officers Undermined Miranda Warning. While the Defendant

acknowledges that Investigator Puglise advised him of his Miranda rights at the

beginning of the interview, he claims that when he became distraught and seemed

reluctant to continue answering questions, Investigator Puglise and Officer Adams

“pressed [him] by repeatedly instructing [him] to answer their questions,” thereby

undermining the prior Miranda warning. Referencing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 613

(2004) and its progeny, the Defendant asserts that if pre-warning actions of law

enforcement can deprive the Miranda warning of meaning, then post-warning actions of

law enforcement can be even more injurious to the procedural safeguards contained

- 21 -

within Miranda. He asserts the officers’ statements were not merely misleading or

confusing but were in direct conflict with the rights outlined in Miranda because if “the

police can give a Miranda warning[] and then tell the Defendant that he must answer their

questions, then the warning itself is devoid of all meaning.”

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the United States Supreme

Court created procedural safeguards to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.

Miranda compels law enforcement to warn an individual prior to a custodial interrogation

that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used

against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an

attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for

him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Id. at 479. The opportunity to exercise the aforementioned rights must be afforded to the

individual throughout the interrogation. Id. After these warnings are given and an

opportunity to exercise these rights afforded, the person being questioned may knowingly

and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement to

law enforcement. Id. If the individual invokes his or her right to remain silent, the

interrogation must cease. Id. at 473-74. However, an individual who seeks to invoke his

right to remain silent must do so unambiguously. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370,

381-82 (2010); Davidson, 509 S.W.3d at 192 (citing Dotson, 450 S.W.3d at 53).

In Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381, the United States Supreme Court noted that while

that it “has not yet stated whether an invocation of the right to remain silent can be

ambiguous or equivocal, . . . there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for

determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the

Miranda right to counsel[.]” The court then concluded that respondent’s prolonged

silence in response to police questioning did not constitute an unambiguous invocation of

the right to remain silent. Id. at 381-82. The court recognized that the respondent never

said that “he wanted to remain silent” or that “he did not want to talk with the police” and

held that if he had “made either of these simple, unambiguous statements, he would have

invoked his “‘right to cut off questioning.’” Id. at 382 (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423

U.S. 96, 103 (1975)).

We conclude that the Defendant’s reliance on Seibert and its progeny is

misplaced. In Seibert, the United States Supreme Court held that “when Miranda

warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are

likely to mislead and ‘depriv[e] a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to

understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.’” Seibert,

542 U.S. at 613-14 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986)); see State v.

- 22 -

Dailey, 273 S.W.3d 94, 108-09 (Tenn. 2009) (concluding that the Defendant’s second

confession was inadmissible because the late Miranda warnings, which were given after

the Defendant’s initial unwarned confession, were not effective to inform him that he had

an opportunity to remain silent). In contrast to Seibert and Dailey, the Defendant in this

case was given Miranda warnings prior to the beginning of his interview, and no coercive

police activity occurred prior to him receiving the Miranda warnings. Accordingly, any

claim that the Defendant was misled or deprived of knowledge essential to understanding

his rights is unpersuasive.

The Rights Waiver Form informed the Defendant that he had the right to remain

silent, that he had the right to an attorney, and that he had the right to have an attorney

present during questioning. This form also advised him that if he decided to answer

questions without an attorney, then he had the right to stop answering questions at any

time. The record shows that Investigator Puglise read the Rights Waiver Form to the

Defendant, and the Defendant initialed each of his rights before signing the Rights

Waiver Form. The recording of the interview shows that the Defendant never refused to

be interviewed, requested an attorney, or unambiguously invoked his right of silence

before or during the interview. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial

court held that the officers’ statements to the Defendant were not coercive. After

considering the evidence, we agree with the trial court and conclude that the officers’

statements did not negate or undermine the Miranda warnings given prior to the start of

the Defendant’s interview.

B. Whether Statement was Involuntary. The Defendant also argues that even if

the Miranda warning requirement was followed, his statement was involuntary and,

therefore, inadmissible. Referencing the Climer factors for evaluating the voluntariness

of a statement, the Defendant argues that his young age and his mental health weigh

against a finding that his statement was voluntary. See State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537,

568 (Tenn. 2013). In particular, he asserts that he was twenty years old at the time of the

interview, which gave him the benefit of far fewer life experiences than most people, and

that his mental health had been severely compromised by the news that the victim had

just died. The Defendant emphasizes that a review of the video recording of his

statement shows that he was “severely distraught, crying, and repeatedly uttering, ‘My

girl, my girl.’” While acknowledging that age and mental health are just two of many

factors to be considered under Climer, the Defendant asserts that the weight of these two

factors, especially his mental health, shows that “his confession was not the product of a

rational, intentional act.”

Because “coerced confessions are inherently unreliable,” only voluntary

confessions are admissible. Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 567. In order for a statement to be

voluntary, it “‘must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by

- 23 -

any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper

influence.’” State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Tenn. 1980) (quoting Bram v. United

States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)).

Whether a confession is involuntary is a question of fact. State v. Willis, 496

S.W.3d 653, 695 (Tenn. 2016) (citing State v. Sanders, 452 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tenn.

2014)). The State has the burden of establishing the voluntariness of a confession by a

preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing Sanders, 452 S.W.3d at 305). “The test of

voluntariness for confessions under article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution is broader

and more protective of individual rights than the test of voluntariness under the Fifth

Amendment.” State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996); accord State v.

Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 815 (Tenn. 2014).

“The due process voluntariness test is distinct from Miranda.” Davidson, 509

S.W.3d at 189 (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35 (2000); Mincey

v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the

voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession

a product of coercion.” Id. (citing Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 815). The voluntariness test

requires this court to assess the psychological impact on the accused and to evaluate the

legal significance of the accused’s reaction. Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412

U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). When determining whether a confession was made voluntarily,

this court must examine the totality of the circumstances, including the “characteristics of

the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id. (citing Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434).

These circumstances include:

“[T]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the

extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and

prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the

accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to

the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary

delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession;

whether the accused was injured[,] intoxicated[,] or drugged, or in ill health

when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food,

sleep[,] or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused;

and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse.”

Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (quoting State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Tenn.

1996)).

At the time that the Defendant gave his statement to police, he was twenty years

old and had graduated from high school. The Defendant was familiar with the criminal

- 24 -

justice system because, at the time of his interview, he had already been convicted of

possession of a controlled substance, simple possession of less than one-half ounce of

marijuana, and possession of a handgun while under the influence. Investigator Puglise

informed the Defendant of his Miranda rights by reading the statement of rights and the

Rights Waiver Form prior to the start of the interview. The Defendant initialed each right

and signed the form indicating that he understood his rights and was voluntarily waiving

them in order to provide a statement to police. The audio/video recording of the

Defendant’s interview shows that he was not intoxicated, impaired, injured, physically

abused, threatened, or deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention. The recording does

not show that the questioning was prolonged or that the Defendant was detained for an

excessive period of time before giving his statement. When Investigator Puglise offered

to give the Defendant time in order to get his emotions under control after learning of the

victim’s death, the Defendant told him that he would rather get the interview out of the

way.

We agree with the trial court’s findings that the Defendant’s will was not

overborne by the actions of the police. We also agree with the court that the Defendant’s

distress did not prevent him from initially denying any knowledge of the shooter, that the

officers did not coerce the Defendant by making promises or threats, and that Officer

Adams’ exhortations to “hang in there for your kids” were given for the purpose of

helping the Defendant get his emotions under control rather than for the purpose of

coercion. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the Defendant was

advised of his right to counsel and right to remain silent, that he understood these rights,

and that he voluntarily waived these rights before giving his statement to police. Because

the record fully supports the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion, the Defendant

is not entitled to relief on this issue.

II. Insufficiency of the Evidence. The Defendant also contends that the

evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder. He claims

that no rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he did

not act in self-defense. He also claims that even if he failed to prove that he acted in self-

defense, no rational trier of fact could have lawfully convicted him of any crime more

serious than voluntary manslaughter. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to

sustain the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder, and we agree.

When this court evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the State is

entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that

may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011)

(citing State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn. 2010)). “Because a verdict of guilt

removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the criminal

defendant bears the burden on appeal of showing that the evidence was legally

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insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.” State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn.

2009) (citing State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)). When evaluating the

sufficiency of the convicting evidence, this court must determine “‘whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).

Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence,

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686,

691 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998). The standard of

review for sufficiency of the evidence “‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon

direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011)

(quoting Hanson, 279 S.W.3d at 275). The jury as the trier of fact must evaluate the

credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses’ testimony, and

reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn.

2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)). Moreover,

the jury determines the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and the inferences

to be drawn from this evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent

with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury. Dorantes,

331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006)). When

considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this court “neither re-weighs the evidence nor

substitutes its inferences for those drawn by the jury.” Wagner, 382 S.W.3d at 297

(citing State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)).

Second degree murder is defined as “[a] knowing killing of another,” T.C.A. § 39-

13-210(a)(1), and is a result-of-conduct offense, State v. Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49, 69 (Tenn.

2015). Therefore, as relevant in this case, a person acts knowingly “when the person is

aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” T.C.A. § 39-11-302(b).

The Defendant first contends that no rational jury could have concluded beyond a

reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. Tennessee Code Annotated section

39-11-611(b), which was in effect at the time of the offense, states, in pertinent part:

(1) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in unlawful

activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to

retreat before threatening or using force against another person when and to

the degree the person reasonably believes the force is immediately

necessary to protect against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful

force.

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(2) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in unlawful

activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to

retreat before threatening or using force intended or likely to cause death or

serious bodily injury, if:

(A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of

death or serious bodily injury;

(B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily

injury is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time; and

(C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.

T.C.A. § 39-11-611(b) (Supp. 2012). “The State carries the burden of proving that the

defendant did not act in self-defense.” State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tenn. 2001)

(citing State v. Belser, 945 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)). The jury, as the

trier of fact, determines whether the defendant acted in self-defense. State v. Dooley, 29

S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citing State v. Goode, 956 S.W.2d 521, 527

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)). It is within the jury’s prerogative to reject a claim of self-

defense. Goode, 956 S.W.2d at 527.

The Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial supports his self-

defense claim. He asserts that his testimony at trial was that the victim charged him with

a knife in each hand when the shooting occurred. The Defendant asserts that his own

testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the shooting is corroborated by the

testimony from multiple witnesses that knives were lying on the floor in the kitchen after

the shooting, by the testimony of Breasia Hubbard and Quanmesha Satterfield that the

victim said she intended to stab him, by evidence that the fired cartridge case became

lodged in the ejection port of the handgun, and by testimony from Alex Broadhag that an

improper firing grip was a common cause of this firing malfunction. He claims that this

evidence supports his self-defense claim by suggesting that the shooting was “hurried”

and “without time [for him] to obtain a proper grip on the handgun” rather than “an

intentional, deliberate act.”

Despite the Defendant’s claim, we conclude that other proof presented at trial

established that the Defendant did not act in self-defense when he shot the victim. At

trial, Kimberly Bell testified that when she entered the victim’s apartment, she observed

the victim on the floor clutching a set of keys in her hands. In addition, Gregory Mardis

testified that the knives on the victim’s kitchen floor had blood spatter on the handles,

which weighs against a finding of self-defense. Finally, Dr. Metcalfe testified that

because of the similarity between the droplets of blood on the knives and the droplets of

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blood on the floor at the crime scene, he believed that the knives were already lying on

the floor when the victim was shot. The jury, by its verdict, rejected the Defendant’s

claim that he shot the victim in self-defense and accredited the State’s version of the

facts. Because a decision regarding self-defense is within the province of the jury, the

Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

The Defendant also argues that he should have been convicted of voluntary

manslaughter, rather than second degree murder. He claims the proof at trial established

that he and the victim were engaged in a heated argument and that he shot the victim in a

state of passion produced by adequate provocation. He notes that appliances in the

kitchen were in disarray, that his own belongings had been thrown on the back porch, and

that he was severely distraught after the shooting. He claims that this evidence

establishes that their argument had risen to a level causing him, a reasonable person, to

behave in an irrational manner. We recognize that the jury heard and rejected this

argument at trial, and we will not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence in this case.

Wagner, 382 S.W.3d at 297. Consequently, the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this

issue.

The evidence presented at trial showed that the victim had previously informed the

Defendant that if he did not come home, she would throw his belongings out of their

home. The night before the victim’s murder, the Defendant spent the night with Breasia

Hubbard. When he returned to the victim’s house the next day, the victim told him to get

out of her home and had already thrown his clothes outside, which angered the

Defendant. He retrieved his gun from outside and returned to the victim’s apartment,

where they argued. Then the Defendant, while standing two to three feet from the victim,

fatally shot the victim in the head. Given this evidence, a rational jury could have found

the Defendant guilty of second degree murder. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence

is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder.

III. Excessive Sentence. Lastly, the Defendant maintains that the trial court

abused its discretion when it imposed an excessive sentence for his second degree murder

conviction. He contends that the trial court gave no weight to the mitigating factor of his

youth, gave insufficient weight to the mitigating factors regarding his substantial family

support, the loss of his mother, and the absence of his father, and gave too much weight

to the enhancement factors in this case, particularly his criminal behavior with firearms.

The State counters that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it imposed a

within-range sentence that complied with the purposes and principles of the sentencing

act. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a twenty-

two-year sentence.

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At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it was

considering all the proof at trial, including that the victim was “killed by a gunshot, that

she was the mother of two children, [and] that she was the girlfriend of this defendant.”

The court also said it was considering the information in the presentence report, the

testimony and statements from different individuals, and the allocution given by the

Defendant. The court properly held that the Defendant was a Range I offender and that

his sentencing range was fifteen to twenty five years with a release eligibility of 100%.

See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210, 40-35-112(a)(1).

The trial court then applied the “catch-all” mitigating factor because the Defendant

had a supportive family, the Defendant had no father when he was growing up, the

Defendant’s children would have no father because of the crime he committed, and the

Defendant’s mother died while he was a minor. See id. § 40-35-113(13). While the

court gave some weight to the fact that the Defendant had a supportive family, the court

gave little weight to the other mitigating circumstances.

The trial court then made the following statement regarding the Defendant’s

association with guns:

[T]he roadmap I see . . . in regard to [the Defendant] is a continual

involvement with guns and . . . that really bothers me. Guns with the

testimony of Officer Atwell. Guns—five days before this happened [the

Defendant] was convicted of having guns. So you can kind of chart it that

people who concern themselves with guns over and over and over again

may result in something happening like [what] tragically happened in this

courtroom from which all these family members are suffering. So sadly

you can see those things getting ready to occur.

The court then applied several enhancement factors. The court applied

enhancement factor (1), that the Defendant had a previous history of criminal convictions

or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range, and

gave this factor great weight. See id. § 40-35-114(1) (Supp. 2013). The court observed

that the Defendant had a history of criminal behavior that involved vandalism, theft,

possession of drugs, and possession of guns. The court also noted that the Defendant had

a history of criminal convictions because he had received three misdemeanor convictions

for possession of a controlled substance, simple possession of less than one-half ounce of

marijuana, and possession of a handgun while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Moreover, the court recognized that on July 28, 2013, the Defendant had been charged

with simple possession of marijuana and possession of a handgun while under the

influence and on May 8, 2014, just five days before the victim’s murder, the Defendant

had been convicted of both of these offenses.

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The trial court applied enhancement factor (9), that the Defendant possessed or

employed a firearm during the commission of the offense, because he used a firearm to

the commit the second degree murder offense. See id. § 40-35-114(9) (Supp. 2013). The

court also applied enhancement factor (13), because the Defendant was released on

probation five days before murdering the victim in this case. See id. § 40-35-114(13)

(Supp. 2013). With regard to the Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, the court noted

that the Defendant had never worked. After considering all the mitigating and

enhancement factors applicable in this case, the court noted that a sentence close to the

maximum in the range was appropriate. It then sentenced the Defendant to a twenty-two-

year sentence for his second degree murder conviction.

Initially, we note that the 2005 amendments to the sentencing act “served to

increase the discretionary authority of trial courts in sentencing.” State v. Bise, 380

S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). In light of this broader discretion, “sentences should be

upheld so long as the statutory purposes and principles, along with any applicable

enhancement and mitigating factors, have been properly addressed.” Id. at 706. The

amendments to the sentencing act also “rendered advisory the manner in which the trial

court selects a sentence within the appropriate range, allowing the trial court to be guided

by—but not bound by—any applicable enhancement or mitigating factors when adjusting

the length of a sentence.” Id. Because of this broader discretion,

a trial court’s misapplication of an enhancement or mitigating factor does

not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial court wholly departed

from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005. So long as there are other reasons

consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing, as provided by

statute, a sentence imposed by the trial court within the appropriate range

should be upheld.

Id. Accordingly, this court reviews a trial court’s sentencing determinations under “an

abuse of discretion standard of review, granting a presumption of reasonableness to

within-range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and

principles of our Sentencing Act.” Id. at 707.

Pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the sentencing act, a trial court must consider

the following when determining a defendant’s specific sentence:

(1) The evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing;

(2) The presentence report;

(3) The principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing

alternatives;

(4) The nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved;

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(5) Evidence and information offered by the parties on the mitigating

and enhancement factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114;

(6) Any statistical information provided by the administrative office of

the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in

Tennessee; and

(7) Any statement the defendant wishes to make in the defendant’s own

behalf about sentencing.

T.C.A. § 40-35-210(b). The defendant has the burden of showing the impropriety of the

sentence on appeal. Id. § 40-35-401(d), Sentencing Comm’n Cmts. The trial court shall

impose “a sentence justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense[.]” Id. §

40-35-102(1). The court must consider the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation or

treatment. Id. §§ 40-35-102,-103. In addition, the court must impose a sentence “no

greater than that deserved for the offense committed” and “the least severe measure

necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” Id. §§ 40-35-

103(2), (4).

In challenging his sentence, the Defendant argues that the trial court gave

insufficient weight to his mitigating factors and too much weight to the enhancement

factors, particularly his history of criminal behavior. He asserts that if the court had

started from the bottom of the applicable sentencing range and had properly weighed the

enhancement and mitigating factors, he would have received a shorter sentence. See id.

§§ 40-35-210(c)(1), (2).

As we noted, the trial court is guided by, but not bound by, any applicable

enhancement or mitigating factors when imposing a sentence, and we will not disturb a

trial court’s sentence unless the court wholly departed from the purposes and principles

of the Sentencing Act. See Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. The record shows that the trial

court carefully considered the evidence as well as the proposed enhancement and

mitigating factors. Although the Defendant claims the trial court gave insufficient weight

to his mitigating factors, the trial court considered these mitigating factors prior to

imposing a sentence in this case. The court also articulated its reasoning in applying each

mitigating and enhancement factor and the weight it gave to each factor.

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in sentencing the Defendant to twenty-two years in confinement. The evidence

presented, the nature of the criminal conduct involved, and the trial court’s application of

enhancement factors (1), (9), and (13) provide a sufficient basis for the trial court’s

imposition of a within-range, twenty-two-year sentence. Because the record establishes

that the trial court properly considered the purposes and principles of sentencing as well

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as the applicable mitigating and enhancement factors, we uphold the Defendant’s twenty-

two-year sentence.

CONCLUSION

Based on the aforementioned authorities and reasoning, the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

____________________________________

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE

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