City of Escondido v. Emmons

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CITY OF ESCONDIDO, CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v. MARTY

EMMONS

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–1660. Decided January 7, 2019

PER CURIAM.

The question in this qualified immunity case is whether

two police officers violated clearly established law when

they forcibly apprehended a man at the scene of a reported

domestic violence incident.

The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, shows the following. In April 2013, Escondido

police received a 911 call from Maggie Emmons about a

domestic violence incident at her apartment. Emmons

lived at the apartment with her husband, her two chil-

dren, and a roommate, Ametria Douglas. Officer Jake

Houchin responded to the scene and eventually helped

take a domestic violence report from Emmons about inju-

ries caused by her husband. The officers arrested her

husband. He was later released.

A few weeks later, on May 27, 2013, at about 2:30 p.m.,

Escondido police received a 911 call about another possible

domestic disturbance at Emmons’ apartment. That 911

call came from Ametria Douglas’ mother, Trina Douglas.

Trina Douglas was not at the apartment, but she was on

the phone with her daughter Ametria, who was at the

apartment. Trina heard her daughter Ametria and Mag-

gie Emmons yelling at each other and heard her daughter

screaming for help. The call then disconnected, and Trina

Douglas called 911.

Officer Houchin again responded, along with Officer

Robert Craig. The dispatcher informed the officers that

two children could be in the residence and that calls to the

2 ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS

Per Curiam

apartment had gone unanswered.

Police body-camera video of the officers’ actions at the

apartment is in the record.

The officers knocked on the door of the apartment. No

one answered. But a side window was open, and the

officers spoke with Emmons through that window, at-

tempting to convince her to open the door to the apart-

ment so that they could conduct a welfare check. A man

in the apartment also told Emmons to back away from the

window, but the officers said they could not identify the

man. At some point during this exchange, Sergeant Kevin

Toth, Officer Joseph Leffingwell, and Officer Huy Quach

arrived as backup.

A few minutes later, a man opened the apartment door

and came outside. At that point, Officer Craig was stand-

ing alone just outside the door. Officer Craig told the man

not to close the door, but the man closed the door and tried

to brush past Officer Craig. Officer Craig stopped the

man, took him quickly to the ground, and handcuffed him.

Officer Craig did not hit the man or display any weapon.

The video shows that the man was not in any visible or

audible pain as a result of the takedown or while on the

ground. Within a few minutes, officers helped the man up

and arrested him for a misdemeanor offense of resisting

and delaying a police officer.

The man turned out to be Maggie Emmons’ father,

Marty Emmons. Marty Emmons later sued Officer Craig

and Sergeant Toth, among others, under Rev. Stat. §1979,

42 U. S. C. §1983. He raised several claims, including, as

relevant here, a claim of excessive force in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. The suit sought money damages for

which Officer Craig and Sergeant Toth would be personally

liable. The District Court held that the officers had prob-

able cause to arrest Marty Emmons for the misdemeanor

offense. The Ninth Circuit did not disturb that finding,

and there is no claim presently before us that the officers

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 3

Per Curiam

lacked probable cause to arrest Marty Emmons. The only

claim before us is that the officers used excessive force in

effectuating the arrest.

The District Court rejected the claim of excessive force.

168 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (SD Cal. 2016). The District

Court stated that the “video shows that the officers acted

professionally and respectfully in their encounter” at the

apartment. Id., at 1275. Because only Officer Craig used

any force at all, the District Court granted summary

judgment to Sergeant Toth on the excessive force claim.

Applying this Court’s precedents on qualified immunity,

the District Court also granted summary judgment to

Officer Craig. According to the District Court, the law did

not clearly establish that Officer Craig could not take

down an arrestee in these circumstances. The court ex-

plained that the officers were responding to a domestic

dispute, and that the encounter had escalated when the

officers could not enter the apartment to conduct a welfare

check. The District Court also noted that when Marty

Emmons exited the apartment, none of the officers knew

whether he was armed or dangerous, or whether he had

injured any individuals inside the apartment.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial

on the excessive force claims against both Officer Craig

and Sergeant Toth. 716 Fed. Appx. 724 (CA9 2018). The

Ninth Circuit’s entire relevant analysis of the qual-

ified immunity question consisted of the following: “The

right to be free of excessive force was clearly established at

the time of the events in question. Gravelet-Blondin v.

Shelton, 728 F. 3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013).” Id., at 726.

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to

Sergeant Toth, and vacate and remand as to Officer Craig.

With respect to Sergeant Toth, the Ninth Circuit offered

no explanation for its decision. The court’s unexplained

reinstatement of the excessive force claim against Ser-

geant Toth was erroneous—and quite puzzling in light of

4 ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS

Per Curiam

the District Court’s conclusion that “only Defendant Craig

was involved in the excessive force claim” and that Em-

mons “fail[ed] to identify contrary evidence.” 168 F. Supp.

3d, at 1274, n. 4.

As to Officer Craig, the Ninth Circuit also erred. As we

have explained many times: “Qualified immunity attaches

when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly estab-

lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reason-

able person would have known.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584

U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (per curiam) (slip op., at 4) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see District of Columbia v.

Wesby, 583 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018); White v. Pauly, 580

U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) (per curiam).

Under our cases, the clearly established right must be

defined with specificity. “This Court has repeatedly told

courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high

level of generality.” Kisela, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4)

(internal quotation marks omitted). That is particularly

important in excessive force cases, as we have explained:

“Specificity is especially important in the Fourth

Amendment context, where the Court has recognized

that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to deter-

mine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive

force, will apply to the factual situation the officer

confronts. Use of excessive force is an area of the law

in which the result depends very much on the facts of

each case, and thus police officers are entitled to qual-

ified immunity unless existing precedent squarely

governs the specific facts at issue. . . .

“[I]t does not suffice for a court simply to state that

an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive

force, deny qualified immunity, and then remit the

case for a trial on the question of reasonableness. An

officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly estab-

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 5

Per Curiam

lished right unless the right’s contours were suffi-

ciently definite that any reasonable official in the de-

fendant’s shoes would have understood that he was

violating it.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (quotation

altered).

In this case, the Court of Appeals contravened those

settled principles. The Court of Appeals should have

asked whether clearly established law prohibited the

officers from stopping and taking down a man in these

circumstances. Instead, the Court of Appeals defined the

clearly established right at a high level of generality by

saying only that the “right to be free of excessive force”

was clearly established. With the right defined at that

high level of generality, the Court of Appeals then denied

qualified immunity to the officers and remanded the case

for trial. 716 Fed. Appx., at 726.

Under our precedents, the Court of Appeals’ formulation

of the clearly established right was far too general. To be

sure, the Court of Appeals cited the Gravelet-Blondin case

from that Circuit, which described a right to be “free from

the application of non-trivial force for engaging in mere

passive resistance. . . .” 728 F. 3d, at 1093. Assuming

without deciding that a court of appeals decision may

constitute clearly established law for purposes of qualified

immunity, see City and County of San Francisco v.

Sheehan, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015), the Ninth Circuit’s

Gravelet-Blondin case law involved police force against

individuals engaged in passive resistance. The Court of

Appeals made no effort to explain how that case law pro-

hibited Officer Craig’s actions in this case. That is a prob-

lem under our precedents:

“[W]e have stressed the need to identify a case where

an officer acting under similar circumstances was

held to have violated the Fourth Amendment. . . .

While there does not have to be a case directly on

6 ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS

Per Curiam

point, existing precedent must place the lawfulness of

the particular [action] beyond debate. . . . Of course,

there can be the rare obvious case, where the unlaw-

fulness of the officer’s conduct is sufficiently clear

even though existing precedent does not address simi-

lar circumstances. . . . But a body of relevant case law

is usually necessary to clearly establish the an-

swer . . . .” Wesby, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court of Appeals failed to properly analyze whether

clearly established law barred Officer Craig from stopping

and taking down Marty Emmons in this manner as Em-

mons exited the apartment. Therefore, we remand the

case for the Court of Appeals to conduct the analysis re-

quired by our precedents with respect to whether Officer

Craig is entitled to qualified immunity.

The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of

the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and vacated in

part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.