Opinion

Hansen v. Dep't of Homeland SEC.

  • 911 F.3d 1362
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Dec 28, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Stoll
On the bench
O'Malley, Chen, Stoll
Cited by
18 cases
Authority
More cited than 79.7%

noting our re- quirement that “the penalty selected be reasonable when considered against the relevant [Douglas] factors” (quoting Brennan v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 787 F.2d 1559, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986))

How later courts described this case

  • noting our re- quirement that “the penalty selected be reasonable when considered against the relevant [Douglas] factors” (quoting Brennan v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 787 F.2d 1559, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986))
  • declining to address a harmful procedural error claim not raised before the administrative judge in a case concerning a removal for a positive drug test
  • first citing Pope v. U.S. Postal Service, 114 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1997); and then citing Hale v. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 772 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
  • declining to address a Fourth Amendment claim not raised before the Board

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

JEFFREY A. HANSEN,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

Respondent

______________________

2017-2584

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection

Board in No. DE-0752-17-0076-I-1.

______________________

Decided: December 28, 2018

______________________

MICHAEL J. KATOR, Kator, Parks, Weiser & Harris

P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, argued for petitioner. Also

represented by DANIEL R. CLARK; JEREMY D. WRIGHT,

Austin, TX.

DOUGLAS G. EDELSCHICK, Commercial Litigation

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also

represented by LISA L. DONAHUE, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN,

JR., JOSEPH H. HUNT; MILI R. SMITH, Office of the Associ-

ate Chief Counsel, United States Customs and Border

Protection, Chicago, IL.

2 HANSEN v. DHS

DEBRA A. D’AGOSTINO, The Federal Practice Group

Worldwide Service, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae

Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Associa-

tion.

______________________

Before O’MALLEY, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

STOLL, Circuit Judge.

Following a positive drug test, the Department of

Homeland Security removed Jeffrey Hansen from his

position as an Information Technology Specialist for U.S.

Customs and Border Protection. The Merit Systems

Protection Board affirmed the agency’s decision.

Mr. Hansen now appeals, arguing that the Board improp-

erly assigned him the burden of proving that he inadvert-

ently ingested marijuana, that it erred in finding his

position was subject to random drug testing, and that

even if it was subject to such testing, he lacked required

notice of that fact.

We hold that intent is not an element of the charged

conduct and that the Board properly required Mr. Hansen

to introduce rebuttal evidence to counter the govern-

ment’s showing of nexus and choice of penalty. We also

determine that substantial evidence supports the Board’s

finding that Mr. Hansen’s position was designated for

random drug testing. Because Mr. Hansen’s remaining

arguments are either unpersuasive or waived, we affirm

the Board.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Hansen’s supervisor directed him to report for a

random drug test. He did so, but failed, testing positive

for marijuana. J.A. 99. Mr. Hansen never contested the

accuracy of the test result, J.A. 103, but he contended that

he had not knowingly used marijuana, averring that he

HANSEN v. DHS 3

had “never used any illegal substance and was shocked

when [he] got this call,” J.A. 102.

After failing the drug test, Mr. Hansen submitted a

letter to the agency. In it, he posited that he had inad-

vertently consumed drug-laced brownies at a barbeque a

few days before his failed test. J.A. 100. Mr. Hansen

claimed that a friend-of-a-friend’s neighbor, a stranger to

him, had hosted the barbeque. Upon failing the drug test,

Mr. Hansen explained, he informed his friends that he

had “tested positive and would probably lose [his] job,”

and he then learned that some unknown person “at the

[barbeque] thought it would be funny to bring [marijuana-

laced] brownies.” Id.

Shortly after Mr. Hansen submitted his letter, the

agency issued a Notice of Proposed Removal, explaining

that “[t]he use of an illegal drug, such as marijuana,

stands in direct conflict with the principles of law en-

forcement, the mission of the Agency, and the public’s

trust.” J.A. 25. Mr. Hansen then submitted a second

letter of explanation, maintaining that he had inadvert-

ently consumed marijuana in brownies at the barbeque.

He provided an affidavit from the lifelong friend who had

invited him, who stated that although “an attendee did

indeed bring ‘pot brownies,’” “neither I nor my friends

that invited us knew.” J.A. 107. Neither Mr. Hansen nor

his friend identified the person who had provided the

brownies or who had the hosted the barbeque.

The deciding official gave Mr. Hansen’s explanation

and evidence “significant consideration” but found it

unconvincing. J.A. 19–20. She noted that the only evi-

dence that marijuana-laced brownies were even available

at the barbeque came from Mr. Hansen’s friend—whose

only knowledge derived from a phone call with the un-

named host. She emphasized that Mr. Hansen did not

provide “any evidence from either the person who pur-

portedly brought the brownies, or from the host” or even

4 HANSEN v. DHS

“a statement from anyone else who either knew that the

brownies contained marijuana or who did not know, but

felt the effect of the drug.” J.A. 20. And she questioned

how, although Mr. Hansen stated that he did not drink

alcohol and preferred to avoid even prescribed medica-

tions, he “experienced no behavioral or physiological

effects of the drug.” Id. The deciding official thus sus-

tained a charge of “positive test for illegal drug use—

marijuana,” and removed Mr. Hansen from his position.

Mr. Hansen then appealed to the Board.

Before the Board, Mr. Hansen submitted additional

details regarding the barbeque. He reported that the

backyard barbeque took place in early April in Minnesota,

where the temperature was in the 30s. Mr. Hansen

stated that while at the barbeque, he consumed a brat-

wurst outside, then briefly entered the host’s home, ate

two unlabeled, frosted brownies in quick succession, and

then rejoined the party. Mr. Hansen also revealed that

though he felt no immediate effects from the brownies,

later that evening he felt tired and suffered an upset

stomach, which he attributed to the bratwurst, and the

next day, he called in sick to work.

After reviewing the evidence, the Board affirmed the

agency’s removal decision. After first concluding that

Mr. Hansen was subject to random drug testing, the

Board held that the government had “met its burden of

showing, by preponderant evidence” that Mr. Hansen had

committed the charged misconduct, discipline was war-

ranted, and the penalty was reasonable. J.A. 13. The

Board acknowledged that inadvertent ingestion would be

relevant to its decision, if shown. But it determined that

Mr. Hansen, not the government, bore the “burden of

showing such inadvertent ingestion,” reasoning that

Mr. Hansen held the relevant facts and that past cases

declining to penalize inadvertent drug use implicitly

relied on findings that the employee had proven inadvert-

ent use. J.A. 9–10.

HANSEN v. DHS 5

Considering the evidence of inadvertence introduced

by Mr. Hansen, the Board found that he failed to “pre-

sent[] sufficient proof of inadvertent ingestion to warrant

interfering” with the agency’s removal decision. J.A. 10.

The Board explained that Mr. Hansen relied on “third-

hand hearsay” to support his story and had not supplied

“statements from the hosts, other attendees who observed

the presence of the brownies, or the individuals who

brought the brownies,” or even evidence confirming that

he ate brownies. J.A. 11. It further noted that though

Mr. Hansen claimed fatigue and upset stomach after

consuming the brownies, he attributed those ailments to

marijuana consumption only after the deciding official

expressed skepticism regarding his lack of symptoms.

Even accepting that marijuana consumption might pro-

duce the symptoms Mr. Hansen belatedly reported, the

Board credited expert testimony that fatigue and upset

stomach might occur for many other reasons. It therefore

concluded that the government had met its burden, “in

significant part” because Mr. Hansen did not prove his

inadvertent ingestion theory. J.A. 13. Mr. Hansen ap-

peals, and we have jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and

its fact findings for substantial evidence. See Campbell v.

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 27 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

We may reverse the Board only if its decision is

“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-

wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without

procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having

been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evi-

dence.” Cobert v. Miller, 800 F.3d 1340, 1347–48

(Fed. Cir. 2015).

I

We first consider whether the Board properly held the

government to its burden of proof. Before removing an

6 HANSEN v. DHS

employee, the government must prove by preponderant

evidence that: (1) the charged misconduct occurred,

(2) there is a nexus between what the employee did and

disciplining the employee to promote the efficiency of the

service, and (3) the particular penalty is reasonable. See

Pope v. U.S. Postal Serv., 114 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir.

1997); see also Hale v. Dep’t of Transp., 772 F.2d 882, 885

(Fed. Cir. 1985). The burden of proof never shifts from

the government, but once the government presents evi-

dence tending to establish each of these elements, “the

burden of going forward with evidence to rebut that

showing necessarily shifts to the employee, who is in the

best position to present explanatory evidence to counter

that showing.” Schapansky v. Dep’t of Transp., 735 F.2d

477, 482 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Allred v. Dep’t of Health

& Human Servs., 786 F.2d 1128, 1131–33 (Fed. Cir. 1986)

(sustaining removal where employee failed to rebut nexus

and failed to rebut reasonableness of penalty). Taking

into account all of the facts and circumstances, the Board

must then determine whether the government has met its

burden. See Schapansky, 735 F.2d at 482–83.

Extrapolating from cases in which this court and the

Board have reversed removal where an employee inad-

vertently ingested drugs, Mr. Hansen argues that by

requiring him to show inadvertent ingestion, the Board

misplaced the burden of proof. Pet’r’s Br. 2, 9–10.

Mr. Hansen assumes that intent is either an element of a

“positive test” charge or a fact the government must prove

to show a nexus between the misconduct and the efficien-

cy of the service or to prove the reasonableness of a par-

ticular penalty. We disagree. The government had no

need to prove intent to establish that Mr. Hansen com-

mitted misconduct warranting removal.

Mr. Hansen’s undisputedly positive test result suf-

ficed to prove the charge of “positive test for illegal drug

use—marijuana.” Under agency policy, a positive drug

test suffices to find illegal drug use and constitutes mis-

HANSEN v. DHS 7

conduct. See J.A. 50, 89. As the Board found, under that

policy, the government need only show a positive drug

test to sustain a “positive test” charge. See J.A. 7–8.

Though Mr. Hansen might prefer that the agency adopt a

different policy, he does not challenge (and we do not

decide), the existing policy’s permissibility. See J.A. 103;

see also Baird v. Dep’t of the Army, 517 F.3d 1345, 1351

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting without deciding that an agency

“may be free to adopt and enforce . . . [a] policy pursuant

to which any [testing designated position] employee who

refuses to submit to or fails a drug test, will be removed”).

We thus decline his invitation to “inject[] an intent re-

quirement” into the charged misconduct. See King v.

Frazier, 77 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 1

Similarly, the government did not need to prove in-

tent to establish that Mr. Hansen’s misconduct impacted

the efficiency of the service or that it reasonably removed

him. Mr. Hansen agrees that “illegal drug use by a [Cus-

toms and Border Protection] employee is in direct conflict

with the principles of law enforcement, the mission of the

agency and the public’s trust.” J.A. 103 (emphasis added).

And though the Board must consider any evidence of

1 We emphasize, however, that, unlike here, where

intent is an element of the misconduct charged, the gov-

ernment must prove intent. See Chauvin v. Dep’t of the

Navy, 38 F.3d 563, 565–66 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (sustaining

“unauthorized possession” charge but finding government

failed to prove “attempted removal” charge because it

failed to show intent, “an important element of proof in an

‘attempt’ charge”); King v. Nazelrod, 43 F.3d 663, 665–66

(Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining government must prove

intent for theft charge because “one of the elements of

theft is the intent to permanently deprive the owner of

possession”).

8 HANSEN v. DHS

inadvertence in its reasonableness inquiry as part of the

analysis mandated by Douglas v. Veterans Administra-

tion, 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (1981), it does not follow that it is the

government’s burden to introduce evidence of intent to

prove reasonableness. “We have not required that each

and every factor of the twelve Douglas factors be consid-

ered. We have only required that the penalty selected be

reasonable when considered against the relevant factors.”

Brennan v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 787 F.2d

1559, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also Jones v. U.S. Postal

Serv., 502 F. App’x 930, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (affirming

penalty and noting “the absence of malicious intent does

not make the penalty unreasonable”); Balouris v. U.S.

Postal Serv., No. 2008-3147, 2009 WL 405827, at *2

(Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 2009) (affirming penalty where

“[r]egardless of his intent, [employee] struck [co-worker]

on a public street”).

The absence of intent may be relevant to rebut the

government’s assertion of nexus or reasonableness in

some circumstances. In Torres v. Department of Justice,

343 F. App’x 610 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the Board credited a

removed employee’s evidence showing that he did not

know that injections provided by his trainer contained

illegal steroids. Id. at 613. We held that the government

failed to carry its ultimate burden to prove nexus, ex-

plaining “[i]t does not promote the efficiency of the service

for an agency to remove an employee . . . [who] did not

know the substance . . . [he used] was a controlled sub-

stance.” Id. Similarly, in cases in which the Board has

found that an employee inadvertently ingested a con-

trolled substance, it has reversed agency penalties, hold-

ing that “the penalty of removal is unreasonable and that

the maximum reasonable penalty is no penalty at all.”

See, e.g., McNeil v. Dep’t of Justice, 117 M.S.P.R. 533,

539–40 (M.S.P.B. 2012). But, as we have previously

explained, the burden of introducing evidence showing

that, in the circumstances of a particular case, the

HANSEN v. DHS 9

charged conduct would not impact the efficiency of the

service or the proposed penalty is unreasonable rests with

the employee. See Schapansky, 735 F.2d at 482; cf. Frey

v. Dep’t of Labor, 359 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

(applying same two-step framework to analysis of removal

for failure to accept reassignment). Contrary to

Mr. Hansen’s argument, this “requirement for coming

forward with evidence does not shift the overall burden of

proof.” See, e.g., Anderson v. Dep’t of Transp., 827 F.2d

1564, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

We read the Board’s opinion as properly applying this

framework in the context of this case. Having found that

the government had introduced sufficient proof to estab-

lish that Mr. Hansen committed the conduct with which

he was charged, the Board considered whether his evi-

dence of inadvertent ingestion rebutted the government’s

assertion of a nexus between the charged conduct and the

efficiency of the service, or otherwise undermined the

reasonableness of the penalty. See J.A. 8–13. The Board

concluded that Mr. Hansen’s evidence of inadvertent use

was weak and, thus, inadequate to undermine the gov-

ernment’s showing of nexus or the reasonableness of the

penalty imposed. We find no arbitrariness, abuse, or

other error in the Board’s conclusion that Mr. Hansen

failed to persuasively rebut the government’s showing of

nexus or its choice of penalty. 2 Mr. Hansen supported his

2 The Board suggested that Mr. Hansen needed to

prove his theory of inadvertent ingestion by preponderant

evidence. J.A. 13. The quantum of rebuttal evidence

necessary may depend on the quality of the government’s

case—“[i]t may be that little countering evidence would

be required, where, for example, the prima facie case was

minimally supported.” Schapansky, 735 F.2d at 482. We

do not decide in this case precisely how much more evi-

10 HANSEN v. DHS

theory of inadvertent ingestion only with “third-hand

hearsay”—his longtime friend’s statement that the barbe-

que host had stated that an unnamed attendee had

brought unmarked marijuana-laced brownies to the

barbeque. J.A. 11. Besides Mr. Hansen, no one testified

that they had even seen the brownies. And though

Mr. Hansen later reported some symptoms consistent

with marijuana ingestion, he did so only after the decid-

ing official explained that she had discredited his version

of events, in part, because she found it “highly questiona-

ble” that he did not report any “behavioral or physiologi-

cal effects” from eating marijuana-laced brownies.

J.A. 20. Further, an expert testified that the symptoms

Mr. Hansen reported were not necessarily caused by

marijuana—inadvertently ingested or otherwise. See

J.A. 12. We therefore affirm the Board’s ruling that on

the entire record, the government bore its burden of

establishing not only that the charged conduct occurred,

but that nexus existed and that the penalty was a reason-

able one. See J.A. 13.

II

We next consider whether the Board erred in finding

that Mr. Hansen was properly ordered to undergo random

drug testing. Drug testing constitutes a search, and the

Fourth Amendment limits an agency’s ability to subject

its employees to drug testing. See Nat’l Treasury Employ-

ees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989). To pass

constitutional muster, testing must be reasonable. See

Holton v. Dep’t of the Navy, 884 F.3d 1142, 1146 (Fed. Cir.

2018). Customs and Border Patrol imposes random drug

testing on employees in “testing designated positions.”

dence Mr. Hansen needed to provide, however, because

the Board correctly found the minimal evidence he ad-

duced insufficient.

HANSEN v. DHS 11

Mr. Hansen does not challenge the general reasonable-

ness of this policy. See J.A. 103 (“I am not disputing the

[agency] policy for random drug tests . . . .”). Instead,

Mr. Hansen urges that, absent a specific testing designa-

tion, the agency may not reasonably conduct random drug

tests. He thus asserts that because the government failed

to show that he occupied a testing designated position,

requiring him to undergo a drug test violated his Fourth

Amendment rights.

We need not decide whether, absent a specific desig-

nation, the agency might permissibly have tested

Mr. Hansen. The Board found that Mr. Hansen occupied

a position subject to random drug testing, and we hold

that substantial evidence supports that fact finding. See

J.A. 6–7. The agency’s “Drug-Free Federal Workplace

Program” handbook lists employees with “access to the

Customs Law Enforcement Automated Systems” as

testing designated, J.A. 32, 34, 58, and evidence offered

by the government indicated that Mr. Hansen’s position

required access to such systems, see J.A. 123–27.

Mr. Hansen attacks this evidence, Pet’r’s Br. 28–33, but

our sole inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports

the Board’s finding. It does, and we do not reweigh evi-

dence.

For the first time on appeal, Mr. Hansen now also

argues that his test violated his Fourth Amendment

rights because there was “no conceivable basis upon

which [he] could have ascertained that he was subject to

testing.” Pet’r’s Br. 26–27. He asserts “there must be

some objective basis upon which a reasonable employee

would be able to ascertain that he was subject to testing.

Otherwise, testing would be arbitrary and not reasona-

ble.” Pet’r’s Br. 26–27, 33–37. Mr. Hansen previously

argued that the government’s failure to introduce his

notice of testing designation proved that he was not

subject to random drug testing. But before the Board,

despite being represented by counsel, Mr. Hansen did not

12 HANSEN v. DHS

allege that any lack of notice rendered his test constitu-

tionally impermissible. Accordingly, we decline to ad-

dress the argument in the first instance. See Solorio v.

United States, 483 U.S. 435, 451 n.18 (1987) (declining to

address Fifth Amendment argument not previously

raised); In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

(declining to hear constitutional challenge not raised

before agency); Oral Arg. at 18:03–14, 27:10–15,

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

17-2584.mp3. For the same reason, we do not reach

Mr. Hansen’s argument that the agency violated internal

policies requiring written notice prior to testing. See

5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(1) (identifying “harmful error in the

application of the agency’s procedures” as an affirmative

defense); J.A. 110 (“Appellant does not raise any affirma-

tive defenses . . . .”).

CONCLUSION

Having found the parties’ remaining arguments un-

persuasive, we affirm the Board’s decision.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.