United States v. Stitt

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. STITT

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–765. Argued October 9, 2018—Decided December 10, 2018*

Respondents Victor J. Stitt and Jason Daniel Sims were each convicted

in federal court of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18

U. S. C. §922(g)(1). The sentencing judge in each case imposed the

mandatory minimum 15-year prison term that the Armed Career

Criminal Act requires for §922(g)(1) offenders who have at least three

previous convictions for certain “violent” or drug-related felonies,

§924(e)(1). The Act defines “violent felony” to mean, among other

things, “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year . . . that . . . is burglary.” §924(e)(2)(B). Respondents’ prior

convictions were for violations of state burglary statutes—a Tennes-

see statute in Stitt’s case and an Arkansas statute in Sims’ case—

that prohibit burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted

or is customarily used for overnight accommodation. In both cases,

the District Courts found that the state statutory crimes fell within

the scope of the federal Act’s term “burglary.” The relevant Court of

Appeals in each case disagreed, vacated the sentence, and remanded

for resentencing.

Held:

1. The term “burglary” in the Armed Career Criminal Act includes

burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is custom-

arily used for overnight accommodation. Pp. 4–8.

(a) In deciding whether an offense qualifies as a violent felony

under the Act, the categorical approach first adopted in Taylor v.

United States, 495 U. S. 575, requires courts to evaluate a prior state

conviction by reference to the elements of the state offense, rather

——————

* Together with No. 17–766, United States v. Sims, on certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

2 UNITED STATES v. STITT

Syllabus

than to the defendant’s behavior on a particular occasion. A prior

state conviction does not qualify as generic burglary under the Act

where “the elements of [the relevant state statute] are broader than

those of generic burglary.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. ___,

___. Taylor, which specifically considered the statutory term “burgla-

ry” and defined the elements of generic burglary as “an unlawful or

unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other struc-

ture, with intent to commit a crime,” 495 U. S., at 598, governs and

determines the outcome here. Pp. 4–5.

(b) The state statutes at issue here fall within the scope of Tay-

lor’s definition of generic burglary. Congress intended that definition

to reflect “the generic sense in which the term [was] used in the crim-

inal codes of most States” when the Act was passed. 495 U. S., at

598. And at that time, a majority of state burglary statutes covered

vehicles adapted or customarily used for lodging. Congress also

viewed burglary as an inherently dangerous crime that “creates the

possibility of a violent confrontation” between the offender and an oc-

cupant or someone who comes to investigate. Id., at 588. An offender

who breaks into a mobile home, an RV, a camping tent, or another

structure or vehicle that is adapted or customarily used for lodging

creates a similar or greater risk of violent confrontation. Although

the risk of violence is diminished if the vehicle is only used for lodg-

ing part of the time, the Court finds no reason to believe that Con-

gress intended to make a part-time/full-time distinction. Respond-

ents also argue that the vehicles covered here are analogous to the

nontypical structures and vehicles that Taylor, Mathis, and other

cases described as falling outside the scope of generic burglary, but

none of those prior cases presented the question whether generic

burglary includes structures or vehicles that are adapted or custom-

arily used for overnight use. Pp. 5–8.

2. Sims’ case is remanded for further proceedings. His argument

that Arkansas’ residential burglary statute is too broad to count as

generic burglary because it also covers burglary of “a vehicle . . .

[w]here any person lives,” Ark. Code Ann. §5–39–101(1)(A), rests in

part upon state law, and the lower courts have not considered it.

Those courts remain free to determine whether Sims properly pre-

sented that argument and, if so, to decide the merits. Pp. 8–9.

No. 17–765, 860 F. 3d 854, reversed; No. 17–766, 854 F. 3d 1037, va-

cated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2018) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 17–765 and 17–766

_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

17–765 v.

VICTOR J. STITT, II

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

17–766 v.

JASON DANIEL SIMS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[December 10, 2018]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Armed Career Criminal Act requires a federal

sentencing judge to impose upon certain persons convicted

of unlawfully possessing a firearm a 15-year minimum

prison term. The judge is to impose that special sentence

if the offender also has three prior convictions for certain

violent or drug-related crimes. 18 U. S. C. §924(e). Those

prior convictions include convictions for “burglary.”

§924(e)(2)(B)(ii). And the question here is whether the

statutory term “burglary” includes burglary of a structure

or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for

overnight accommodation. We hold that it does.

I

The consolidated cases before us involve two defendants,

2 UNITED STATES v. STITT

Opinion of the Court

each of whom was convicted in a federal court of unlaw-

fully possessing a firearm in violation of §922(g)(1). The

maximum punishment for this offense is typically 10 years

in prison. §924(a)(2). Each offender, however, had prior

state burglary convictions sufficient, at least potentially,

to require the sentencing judge to impose a mandatory 15-

year minimum prison term under the Armed Career Crim-

inal Act. That Act, as we have just said, requires an en-

hanced sentence for offenders who have at least three

previous convictions for certain “violent” or drug-related

felonies. §924(e)(1). Those prior felonies include “any

crime” that is “punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year” and that also

“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of

another; or

“(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that pre-

sents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an-

other.” §924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

The question here concerns the scope of the statutory word

“burglary.”

The relevant prior convictions of one of the unlawful

firearms offenders, Victor J. Stitt, were for violations of a

Tennessee statute that defines “[a]ggravated burglary” as

“burglary of a habitation.” Tenn. Code Ann. §39–14–

403(a) (1997). It further defines “[h]abitation” to include:

(1) “any structure, including . . . mobile homes, trailers,

and tents, which is designed or adapted for the overnight

accommodation of persons,” and (2) any “self-propelled

vehicle that is designed or adapted for the overnight ac-

commodation of persons and is actually occupied at the

time of initial entry by the defendant.” §§39–14–

401(1)(A), (B) (emphasis added).

The relevant prior convictions of the other unlawful

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

Opinion of the Court

firearms offender, Jason Daniel Sims, were for violations

of an Arkansas statute that prohibits burglary of a “resi-

dential occupiable structure.” Ark. Code Ann. §5–39–

201(a)(1) (Michie 1997). The statute defines “[r]esidential

occupiable structure” to include:

“a vehicle, building, or other structure:

“(A) [w]here any person lives; or

“(B) [w]hich is customarily used for overnight accom-

modation of persons whether or not a person is actually

present.” §5–39–101(1) (emphasis added).

In both cases, the District Courts found that the state

statutory crimes fell within the scope of the word “bur-

glary” in the Armed Career Criminal Act and consequently

imposed that statute’s mandatory sentence enhancement.

In both cases, the relevant Federal Court of Appeals held

that the statutory crimes did not fall within the scope of

the word “burglary,” vacated the sentence, and remanded

for resentencing. See 860 F. 3d 854 (CA6 2017) (en banc)

(reversing panel decision to the contrary); 854 F. 3d 1037

(CA8 2017).

The Government asked us to grant certiorari to consider

the question “[w]hether burglary of a nonpermanent or

mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight

accommodation can qualify as ‘burglary’ under the Armed

Career Criminal Act.” Pet. for Cert. in No. 17–765, p. i;

Pet. for Cert. in No. 17–766, p. i. And, in light of uncer-

tainty about the scope of the term “burglary” in the lower

courts, we granted the Government’s request. Compare

860 F. 3d, at 862–863; 854 F. 3d, at 1040; United States v.

White, 836 F. 3d 437, 446 (CA4 2016); United States v.

Grisel, 488 F. 3d 844 (CA9 2007) (en banc), with Smith v.

United States, 877 F. 3d 720, 724 (CA7 2017), cert. pend-

ing, No. 17–7517; United States v. Spring, 80 F. 3d 1450,

1462 (CA10 1996).

4 UNITED STATES v. STITT

Opinion of the Court

II

A

The word “burglary,” like the word “crime” itself, is

ambiguous. It might refer to a kind of crime, a generic

crime, as set forth in a statute (“a burglary consists of

behavior that . . . ”), or it might refer to the way in which

an individual offender acted on a particular occasion (“on

January 25, Jones committed a burglary on Oak Street in

South San Francisco”). We have held that the words in

the Armed Career Criminal Act do the first. Accordingly,

we have held that the Act requires us to evaluate a prior

state conviction “in terms of how the law defines the of-

fense and not in terms of how an individual offender might

have committed it on a particular occasion.” Begay v.

United States, 553 U. S. 137, 141 (2008). A prior state

conviction, we have said, does not qualify as generic bur-

glary under the Act where “the elements of [the relevant

state statute] are broader than those of generic burglary.”

Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op.,

at 19). The case in which we first adopted this “categorical

approach” is Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575 (1990).

That case, which specifically considered the statutory term

“burglary,” governs here and determines the outcome.

In Taylor, we did more than hold that the word “bur-

glary” refers to a kind of generic crime rather than to the

defendant’s behavior on a particular occasion. We also

explained, after examining the Act’s history and purpose,

that Congress intended a “uniform definition of burglary

[to] be applied to all cases in which the Government seeks”

an enhanced sentence under the Act. Id., at 580–592. We

held that this uniform definition includes “at least the

‘classic’ common-law definition,” namely, breaking and

entering a dwelling at night with intent to commit a fel-

ony. Id., at 593. But we added that it must include more.

The classic definition, by excluding all places other than

dwellings, we said, has “little relevance to modern law

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2018) 5

Opinion of the Court

enforcement concerns.” Ibid. Perhaps for that reason, by

the time the Act was passed in 1986, most States had

expanded the meaning of burglary to include “structures

other than dwellings.” Ibid. (citing W. LaFave & A. Scott,

Substantive Criminal Law §§8.13(a)–(f) (1986)).

In addition, the statute’s purpose, revealed by its lan-

guage, ruled out limiting the scope of “burglary” to espe-

cially serious burglaries, e.g., those having elements that

created a particularly serious risk of physical harm. If

that had been Congress’s intent, adding the word “bur-

glary” would have been unnecessary, since the (now-invalid)

residual clause “already include[d] any crime that ‘in-

volves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.’ ” Taylor, 495 U. S., at 597

(quoting 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii)); see Johnson v. United

States, 576 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) (slip op., at 5–10)

(holding residual clause unconstitutionally vague). We

concluded that the Act’s term “burglary” must include

“ordinary,” “run-of-the-mill” burglaries as well as aggra-

vated ones. Taylor, 495 U. S., at 597. And we defined the

elements of generic “burglary” as “an unlawful or unprivi-

leged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other struc-

ture, with intent to commit a crime.” Id., at 598.

B

The relevant language of the Tennessee and Arkansas

statutes falls within the scope of generic burglary’s defini-

tion as set forth in Taylor. For one thing, we made clear

in Taylor that Congress intended the definition of “bur-

glary” to reflect “the generic sense in which the term [was]

used in the criminal codes of most States” at the time the

Act was passed. Ibid. In 1986, a majority of state bur-

glary statutes covered vehicles adapted or customarily used

for lodging—either explicitly or by defining “building” or

“structure” to include those vehicles. See, e.g., N. H. Rev.

Stat. Ann. §635:1 (1974) (prohibiting burglary of an

6 UNITED STATES v. STITT

Opinion of the Court

“[o]ccupied structure,” defined to include “any structure,

vehicle, boat or place adapted for overnight accommoda-

tion of persons”); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§164.205, 164.215,

164.225 (1985) (prohibiting burglary of a “building,” de-

fined to include “any booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft or other

structure adapted for overnight accommodation of per-

sons”); see also ALI, Model Penal Code §§220.0(1), 221.1(1)

(1980) (defining “ ‘occupied structure’ ” for purposes of

burglary as “any structure, vehicle or place adapted for

overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on

business therein, whether or not a person is actually

present”); Appendix, infra (collecting burglary statutes

from 1986 or earlier that covered either vehicles adapted

or customarily used for overnight accommodation or a

broader class of vehicles).

For another thing, Congress, as we said in Taylor,

viewed burglary as an inherently dangerous crime because

burglary “creates the possibility of a violent confrontation

between the offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some

other person who comes to investigate.” 495 U. S., at 588;

see also James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192, 203 (2007).

An offender who breaks into a mobile home, an RV, a

camping tent, a vehicle, or another structure that is

adapted for or customarily used for lodging runs a similar

or greater risk of violent confrontation. See Spring, 80

F. 3d, at 1462 (noting the greater risk of confrontation in a

mobile home or camper, where “it is more difficult for the

burglar to enter or escape unnoticed”).

Although, as respondents point out, the risk of violence

is diminished if, for example, a vehicle is only used for

lodging part of the time, we have no reason to believe that

Congress intended to make a part-time/full-time distinc-

tion. After all, a burglary is no less a burglary because it

took place at a summer home during the winter, or a

commercial building during a holiday. Cf. Model Penal

Code §221.1, Comment 3(b), p. 72 (burglary should cover

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2018) 7

Opinion of the Court

places with the “apparent potential for regular occupancy”).

Respondents make several additional arguments. Re-

spondent Stitt argues that the Tennessee statute is too

broad even under the Government’s definition of generic

burglary. That is so, Stitt contends, because the statute

covers the burglary of a “structure appurtenant to or

connected with” a covered structure or vehicle, a provision

that Stitt reads to include the burglary of even ordinary

vehicles that are plugged in or otherwise appurtenant to

covered structures. Tenn. Code Ann. §39–14–401(1)(C).

Stitt’s interpretation, however, ignores that the “appurte-

nant to” provision extends only to “structure[s],” not to the

separate statutory term “vehicle[s].” Ibid. We therefore

disagree with Stitt’s argument that the “appurtenant to”

provision sweeps more broadly than generic burglary, as

defined in Taylor, 495 U. S., at 598.

Respondents also point out that in Taylor, Mathis, and

other cases, we said that burglary of certain nontypical

structures and vehicles fell outside the scope of the federal

Act’s statutory word “burglary.” See, e.g., Taylor, 495

U. S., at 599 (noting that some States “define burglary

more broadly” than generic burglary by, for example,

“including places, such as automobiles and vending ma-

chines, other than buildings”). And they argue that the

vehicles covered here are analogous to the nontypical

structures and vehicles to which the Court referred in

those cases. Our examination of those cases, however,

convinces us that we did not decide in either case the

question now before us.

In Taylor, for example, we referred to a Missouri break-

ing and entering statute that among other things crimi-

nalized breaking and entering “any boat or vessel, or

railroad car.” Ibid. (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. §560.070 (1969);

emphasis added). We did say that that particular provi-

sion was beyond the scope of the federal Act. But the

statute used the word “any”; it referred to ordinary boats

8 UNITED STATES v. STITT

Opinion of the Court

and vessels often at sea (and railroad cars often filled with

cargo, not people), nowhere restricting its coverage, as

here, to vehicles or structures customarily used or adapted

for overnight accommodation. The statutes before us, by

using these latter words, more clearly focus upon circum-

stances where burglary is likely to present a serious risk

of violence.

In Mathis, we considered an Iowa statute that covered

“any building, structure, . . . land, water or air vehicle, or

similar place adapted for overnight accommodation of

persons [or used] for the storage or safekeeping of any-

thing of value.” Iowa Code §702.12 (2013). Courts have

construed that statute to cover ordinary vehicles because

they can be used for storage or safekeeping. See State v.

Buss, 325 N. W. 2d 384 (Iowa 1982); Weaver v. Iowa, 949

F. 2d 1049 (CA8 1991). That is presumably why, as we

wrote in our opinion, “all parties agree[d]” that Iowa’s

burglary statute “covers more conduct than generic bur-

glary does.” Mathis, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5). The

question before us was whether federal generic “burglary”

includes within its scope a burglary statute that lists

multiple, alternative means of satisfying one element,

some of which fall within Taylor’s generic definition and

some of which fall outside it. We held, in light of the

parties’ agreement that the Iowa statute covered some

“outside” behavior (i.e., ordinary vehicles), that the statute

did not count as a generic burglary statute. But for pre-

sent purposes, what matters is that the Court in Mathis

did not decide the question now before us—that is, whether

coverage of vehicles designed or adapted for overnight

use takes the statute outside the generic burglary defini-

tion. We now decide that latter question, and, for the

reasons we have stated, we hold that it does not.

III

Respondent Sims argues that Arkansas’ residential

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2018) 9

Opinion of the Court

burglary statute is too broad to count as generic burglary

for a different reason, namely, because it also covers bur-

glary of “a vehicle . . . [i]n which any person lives.” See

supra, at 3. Sims adds that these words might cover a car

in which a homeless person occasionally sleeps. Sims’

argument rests in part upon state law, and the lower

courts have not considered it. As “we are a court of re-

view, not of first view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709,

718, n. 7 (2005), we remand the Arkansas case to the

lower courts for further proceedings. Those courts remain

free to determine whether Sims properly presented the

argument and to decide the merits, if appropriate.

We reverse the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals. We vacate the judgment of the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceed-

ings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

10 UNITED STATES v. STITT

Opinion

Appendix of the of

to opinion Court

the Court

APPENDIX

Alaska Stat. §§11.46.300, 11.46.310, 11.81.900(b)(3)

(1989) (effective 1978); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§13–

1501(7)–(8), 13–1507, 13–1508 (1978); Ark. Code Ann.

§§41–2001(1), 41–2002 (Michie 1977); Cal. Penal Code

Ann. §§459, 460 (West 1970); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§18–4–

101(1)–(2), 18–4–202, 18–4–203 (1978); Conn. Gen. Stat.

Ann. §§53a–100(a), 53a–101, 53a–103 (1985 Cum. Supp.);

Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§222(1), 824, 825 (1979); Fla.

Stat. Ann. §§810.011(2), 810.02 (1976); Ga. Code Ann.

§16–7–1(a) (1984); Idaho Code Ann. §18–1401 (1979); Ill.

Comp. Stat., ch. 38, §19–1 (West 1985); Iowa Code

§§702.12, 713.1 (1985); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§21–3715, 21–

3716 (1988) (effective 1970); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:62

(West 1974 Cum. Supp.); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A,

§§2(10), 2(24), 401 (1983); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 266,

§16A (West 1970); Mont. Code Ann. §§45–2–101(40), 45–

6–204 (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §205.060 (1986); N. H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. §635:1 (1974); N. J. Stat. Ann. §§2C:18–1,

2C:18–2 (West 1982); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§30–16–3, 30–16–

4 (2018) (effective 1978); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2909.01,

2911.11, 2911.12 (Lexis 1982); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §1435

(1983); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§164.205, 164.215, 164.225 (1985);

Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 18, §§3501, 3502 (Purdon 1973); S. D.

Codified Laws §§22–1–2(49), 22–32–1, 22–32–3, 22–32–8

(1988) (effective 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. §39–3–406 (1982);

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§30.01, 30.02 (West 1989) (effective

1974); Utah Code Ann. §§76–6–201(1), 76–6–202 (1978);

W. Va. Code Ann. §61–3–11 (Lexis 1984); Wisc. Stat. Ann.

§943.10(1) (West 1982).