Opinion

State v. Brown

  • 2018 Ohio 4742
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Nov 27, 2018
Status
Published
On the bench
Horton
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 6.5%

The opinion

[Cite as State v. Brown, 2018-Ohio-4742.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 17AP-455

v. : (C.P.C. No. 14CR-4083)

Earl G. Brown, Jr., : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on November 27, 2018

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and

Barbara A. Farnbacher, for appellee.

On brief: Earl G. Brown, Jr., pro se.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

HORTON, J.

{¶ 1} Earl G. Brown, Jr. is appealing from the trial court's refusal to allow him to

withdraw his guilty pleas to possession of cocaine as a felony of the first degree and as a

misdemeanor of the first degree. He assigns four errors for our consideration:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN

REFUSING TO CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

ON THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA,

DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND

ABUSED ITS DISRETION IN REFUSING TO GRANT

RELIEF BASED UPON APPELLANT'S DEMONSTRATION

OF INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL AND THE PREJUDICE

RESULTING FROM SUCH INEFFECTIVENESS.

No. 17AP-455 2

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS

EACH OF THE GROUNDS FOR RELIEF AND THE

EVIDENCE SET FORTH IN THE MOTION, DEPRIVING

APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW

WHEN IT FAILED [TO] ADDRESS DEFENDANT-

APPELLANT PERSONALLY TO DETERMINE THAT

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO

CONFRONTATION KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND

INTELLIGENTLY.

{¶ 2} Brown sold a significant amount of cocaine to an undercover narcotics

officer. This led to his being indicted on the felony possession charge with a major drug

offender specification. His counsel arranged a plea bargain which eliminated the major

drug offender specification for which he could have received an additional six years of

incarceration. Brown also had a separate felony possession charge reduced to a

misdemeanor. The pleas occurred in January 2015.

{¶ 3} More than two years later, Brown sought to set aside his guilty pleas, despite

the requirements of Crim.R. 32.1. Crim.R. 32.1 reads:

A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be

made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest

injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment

of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her

plea.

{¶ 4} The trial court overruled his motion to vacate the pleas, leading to this

appeal.

{¶ 5} Brown had the benefit of a very favorable plea bargain. Setting aside that

plea bargain might actually harm him, not help him. There is no basis for an assertion

that the pleas should be set aside to avoid a manifest injustice.

{¶ 6} For a brief time, the law in Ohio was unsettled as to the bulk amount of

controlled substances. The Supreme Court of Ohio changed the law on that issue for a

brief time and then changed it back. See State v. Gonzales, 150 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-

Ohio-8319 ("Gonzales I"), and State v. Gonzales, 150 Ohio St.3d 276, 2017-Ohio-777

("Gonzales II"). Any argument Brown had about the bulk amount of cocaine in his case

was undone by Gonzales II.

No. 17AP-455 3

{¶ 7} Turning to the specific assignments of error, Brown never had a reasonable

argument that he had suffered a manifest injustice as a result of his conviction of lesser

charges. He avoided greater charges. No evidentiary hearing was required.

{¶ 8} The first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 9} Brown's trial counsel was actually quite effective in working out a plea

bargain which avoided exposure to six more years of incarceration for the sale of a

significant amount of cocaine to an undercover police officer. Proof of guilt was not going

to be difficult.

{¶ 10} The second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 11} Because Brown never even approached clearing the bar set by Crim.R. 32.1,

the trial court judge did not need to address all the allegations set forth in Brown's motion

to vacate his pleas.

{¶ 12} The third assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 13} The original plea proceedings were properly conducted. Brown had an

opportunity to complain in the trial court at the time he entered his pleas. Brown had an

opportunity to appeal the acceptance of his guilty pleas. He did nothing. He has no basis

to complain over two years later.

{¶ 14} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 15} Having overruled Brown's four assignments of error, the judgment of the

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

TYACK, J., concurs.

DORRIAN, J., concurs in judgment only.

_________________

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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