Opinion

Alexis Martinez v. Attorney General United States

  • 906 F.3d 281
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Oct 16, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Bibas
On the bench
Hardiman, Krause, Bibas
Cited by
29 cases
Authority
More cited than 74.6%

holding that, although 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12 (b)(4) currently expressly exempts [123I]ioflupane from the list of schedule II substances, the court uses the list at the time of the defendant’s prior state conviction, which had not yet added that exclusion

How later courts described this case

  • holding that, although 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12 (b)(4) currently expressly exempts [123I]ioflupane from the list of schedule II substances, the court uses the list at the time of the defendant’s prior state conviction, which had not yet added that exclusion
  • holding that alien’s New Jersey controlled-substance offense rendered him removable under the categorical approach where, among other things, “the federal and New Jersey lists of controlled substances were identical”
  • stating that “the categorical approach directs us to compare the [drug] schedules at the time of conviction”
  • distinguishing Texas law encompassing mere offer to sell without evidence of possession or transfer as "far cry" from conviction under New Jersey possession with intent statute

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 17-3434

_______________

ALEXIS LEOPOLD MARTINEZ,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL, UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Respondent

_______________

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the

United States Department of Justice

Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA-1: A043-623-955)

Immigration Judge: Amit Chugh

_______________

Argued September 6, 2018

Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

(Filed: October 16, 2018)

_______________

Whitney W. Elliott, Esq.

Legal Aid Society

Immigration Law Unit

199 Water Street

New York, NY 10038

Melika Hadziomerovic, Esq.

George W. Kroup, Esq. [ARGUED]

William B. Michael, Esq.

Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

Counsel for Petitioner

Matthew B. George, Esq. [ARGUED]

Jane T. Schaffner, Esq.

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation

P.O. Box 878

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

We must decide whether New Jersey’s drug-trafficking law

criminalizes more conduct than the federal one. Under the cat-

egorical approach, a state-law conviction makes an alien re-

2

movable if its elements are no broader than those of a qualify-

ing federal crime. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-91

(2013). Alexis Martinez contends that he is not removable be-

cause the New Jersey drug-trafficking law of which he was

convicted is broader than its federal counterpart. First, he ar-

gues that although both laws extend to attempts, New Jersey’s

attempt law is broader because it sweeps in mere preparation

and solicitation. But both laws track the Model Penal Code,

treating some preparation and solicitations as attempts if they

are substantial steps toward a crime. So the laws are coexten-

sive.

Second, Martinez argues that New Jersey’s list of drugs in-

cludes a substance not found on the current federal list. But we

look to the lists on the date of his conviction. On that date, the

New Jersey list was no broader than the federal list. So Mar-

tinez was convicted of a controlled-substance offense, making

him removable. That crime was also an aggravated felony,

making him ineligible for cancellation of removal.

I. BACKGROUND

Martinez is a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a law-

ful permanent resident of the United States. In 2005, he and his

confederates sold one kilogram of cocaine to an undercover

detective and a cooperating witness. He was charged with four

crimes under New Jersey law: possessing cocaine, N.J. Stat.

Ann. § 2C:35-10(a)(1); possessing cocaine with intent to dis-

tribute, id. § 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(1); distributing cocaine, id.; and

conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, id.

§ 2C:5-2. For the latter three counts, the court instructed the

jury that it could convict Martinez for attempting to transfer

3

cocaine or to aid another in distributing cocaine. The jury con-

victed on all four counts, and the judge sentenced Martinez to

twenty years’ imprisonment.

In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security charged

Martinez as removable on two grounds: First, the government

claimed that Martinez’s drug-distribution convictions under

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1) & (b)(1) match the federal Con-

trolled Substances Act’s ban on drug trafficking, 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). If that is true, then Martinez was convicted of an

aggravated felony, making him removable under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). Second,

the government claimed that Martinez’s convictions relate to

federally controlled substances. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). If that

is true, then Martinez was convicted of a controlled-substance

offense, making him removable under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

The immigration judge sustained the charges. Martinez ap-

pealed, raising the arguments outlined above. The Board of Im-

migration Appeals rejected both arguments on the merits, and

Martinez petitions for review.

Because Martinez raises questions of law, we have jurisdic-

tion to review the Board’s final order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We

review de novo. Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 282 (3d Cir.

2016).

II. NEW JERSEY’S ATTEMPT LAW IS NO BROADER THAN

FEDERAL LAW

Martinez argues that he was not convicted of an aggravated

felony. Under the categorical approach, “[w]e look ‘not to the

4

facts of the particular prior case, but instead to whether the state

statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits

within the generic federal definition of a corresponding aggra-

vated felony.’ ” Id. at 278 (quoting Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at

190). We “presume that the conviction rested upon nothing

more than the least of the acts criminalized, and then determine

whether” the generic federal offense encompasses “even those

acts.” Id.

Here, Martinez’s drug-distribution convictions could have

rested on a mere attempt. And Martinez does not dispute that

the New Jersey and federal drug-distribution laws are materi-

ally identical in most respects. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1). But he contends that they

treat attempt differently.

A. Both New Jersey and federal attempt law follow the

Model Penal Code

So Martinez must show that New Jersey’s attempt law is

broader than federal attempt law. He cannot. Both jurisdictions

follow the Model Penal Code’s approach to attempts.

The Model Penal Code defines an “attempt” as a purposeful

act or omission that “constitut[es] a substantial step in a course

of conduct planned to culminate in [the] commission of the

crime.” Model Penal Code § 5.01(1)(c). It defines a “substan-

tial step” as an act that is “strongly corroborative of the actor’s

criminal purpose.” Id. § 5.01(2). It also lists seven actions that

may satisfy that requirement. Id. That list includes solicitation.

Id.

5

Federal attempt law follows that framework. Most federal

courts follow the Model Penal Code’s doctrine of attempt lia-

bility. See United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.

1988) (collecting cases from seven circuits); Ming Lam Sui v.

INS, 250 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2001) (using the Model Penal

Code’s definition of attempt under the Immigration and Na-

tionality Act). Our circuit likewise applies the Model Penal

Code’s approach to the Controlled Substances Act. United

States v. Glass, ___ F.3d ___, No. 16-2906, 2018 WL 4443889,

at *3 n.3 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2018). So we too require a “substan-

tial step toward commission of the crime” that “strongly cor-

roborat[es] the firmness of a defendant’s criminal purpose.”

United States v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 980, 985 (3d Cir. 1993).

New Jersey has adopted that definition almost verbatim by

statute. It defines attempt as a purposeful “act or omission con-

stituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to

culminate in [the] commission of the crime.” N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2C:5-1(a)(3). And a “substantial step” must be “strongly cor-

roborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.” Id. § 2C:5-1(b). It

does not include the Model Penal Code’s list of seven exam-

ples that can qualify as substantial steps, including solicitation.

But the lack of a list of illustrations makes no difference. See

State v. Sunzar, 751 A.2d 627, 632 (N.J. Super. 1999) (stating

that the omission of the Model Penal Code’s list of examples

does not prevent solicitation from amounting to attempt).

There is no daylight between the federal and New Jersey for-

mulations.

Martinez offers two responses. Neither is convincing.

6

B. New Jersey law does not reach more preparation

than federal law

Martinez first responds that New Jersey law treats more

forms of inchoate preparation for a crime as attempt than fed-

eral law does. In support, he cites State v. Fornino, 539 A.2d

301 (N.J. App. Div. 1988). In dicta, Fornino stated: “It is only

‘very remote preparatory acts’ which are excluded from the

ambit of attempt liability.” Id. at 306 (quoting 2 New Jersey

Penal Code Commentary 118 (1971)). But that was a case

about plain error. The defendant argued that the trial court

should have instructed the jury that “preparation is insufficient

. . . for an attempt.” Id. The defendant had not objected, how-

ever. So the court found only that the failure to give the instruc-

tion was not plain error. Id. It did not have occasion to affirm-

atively define attempt liability. Fornino simply noted that

“some preparation may amount to an attempt. It is a question

of degree.” Id. (quoting State v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 377

(5th Cir. 1974)). So New Jersey courts wrestle with drawing

that line, just as federal courts and the Model Penal Code do.

If Fornino left any doubt, the New Jersey Supreme Court

has since resolved it. In State v. Farrad, the court stated that

New Jersey law “distinguish[es] between mere preparation and

the substantial step requirement of an attempt.” 753 A.2d 648,

653 (N.J. 2000). Farrad held there was enough evidence of at-

tempted robbery when the defendant surveilled a restaurant,

covered his face, and walked up to the cashier with a loaded

gun. Id. at 659. That evidence “demonstrated a purpose to rob

and substantial steps that were taken toward completion of the

intended robbery.” Id. This reasoning tracks that of the Model

7

Penal Code and federal law. So the most recent explanation by

New Jersey’s highest court mirrors federal law: a substantial

step is required.

C. Both New Jersey and federal law treat some solicita-

tions as attempts

Martinez’s second, stronger response is that New Jersey at-

tempt law extends beyond federal law because New Jersey

considers solicitation to be attempt. But solicitation does not

amount to an attempt unless it is “strongly corroborative of the

actor’s criminal purpose.” State v. Sunzar, 751 A.2d 627, 632

(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999). “[M]ere solicitation, even

when unaccompanied by any other act in furtherance, can con-

stitute an attempt.” Id. (emphasis added). So not all solicita-

tions qualify. The strongly-corroborative requirement “pro-

tects against criminal liability for idle requests that are not

meant to be taken seriously.” Id. (citing Fornino, 539 A.2d at

541).

New Jersey’s approach, like that of federal law, follows the

Model Penal Code. Both federal law and the Model Penal Code

recognize that “solicitation accompanied by the requisite intent

may constitute an attempt.” United States v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,

743 F.2d 1114, 1121 (5th Cir. 1984); see, e.g., United States v.

Cornelio-Pena, 435 F.3d 1279, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 2006);

Model Penal Code § 5.01(2)(g). Our Court agrees. Glass, ___

F.3d ___, 2018 WL 4443889, at *3 n.3. So New Jersey law

tracks federal law: Solicitation may amount to an attempt when

it strongly corroborates the actor’s criminal purpose. Not all

solicitations make the cut, but some do.

8

In reply, Martinez cites several cases, but they are either

inapposite or unpersuasive. Two of them dealt with state laws

that differed materially from New Jersey’s. To start, Coro-

nado-Durazo v. INS involved a conviction for solicitation to

possess a narcotic. 123 F.3d 1322, 1323 (9th Cir. 1997). Under

Arizona law, that crime was separate from attempt and had its

own distinct requirements for physical acts and mental state.

Id. at 1324-26. It was not a subset of attempt liability.

Similarly, United States v. Ibarra-Luna involved a Texas

law encompassing a “mere offer to sell, without evidence of

possession or transfer.” 628 F.3d 712, 715-16 (5th Cir. 2010).

A mere offer to sell, without even possession of drugs, argua-

bly does not strongly corroborate the actor’s criminal purpose.

And the government even conceded that the law did not cate-

gorically match the federal Controlled Substances Act. Id. at

716. Those cases are a far cry from Martinez’s conviction for

“possess[ing] . . . with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dis-

pense, a controlled dangerous substance.” N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2C:35-5(a)(1).

Another of Martinez’s cases, United States v. Dolt, is inap-

posite as well as unpersuasive. 27 F.3d 235 (6th Cir. 1994). It

is inapposite because it rested in part on a Florida state-court

ruling “that solicitation and attempt are separate and distinct

crimes.” Id. at 239. It is unpersuasive because it concluded that,

unlike attempt, “solicitation does not require an overt act on

the part of the defendant.” Id. But as explained above, federal

attempt law follows the Model Penal Code in requiring only a

substantial step, which may include solicitation. Attempt re-

quires no overt act by the defendant himself.

9

Martinez’s strongest authority is Sandoval v. Sessions, but

it is also unpersuasive. 866 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2017). There,

the Ninth Circuit confronted an Oregon drug-delivery statute

that resembles New Jersey’s drug-trafficking law. Compare

id. at 990-91, with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1). Like New

Jersey, Oregon required a “substantial step” that is “strongly

corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.” Sandoval, 866

F.3d at 991 (quoting State v. Pollock, 73 P.3d 297, 300 (Or.

App. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 102 P.3d 684 (Or.

2004)). And, like New Jersey, Oregon allowed solicitation to

amount to attempt. Id. at 990. Yet the Ninth Circuit held that

the Oregon law was broader than federal law. “Although [it

may be] strongly corroborative of intent to commit a crime,”

the court reasoned, “offering to deliver a controlled substance

does not cross the line between preparation and attempt for

the purposes of the [federal] Controlled Substances Act.” Id.

We disagree. As explained above, federal attempt law is ex-

plicitly based on the Model Penal Code. Both provide that any

substantial step that strongly corroborates the actor’s criminal

purpose amounts to an attempt. Model Penal Code § 5.01(2).

The Model Penal Code specifies that solicitation “shall not be

held insufficient as a matter of law” if it is strongly corrobora-

tive, as we and other circuits recognize. Id. § 5.01(2)(g); see,

e.g., Glass, ___ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 4443889, at *3 n.3; Am.

Airlines, 743 F.2d at 1121.

We see no reason to reject the Model Penal Code. Our prec-

edent embraces it. Solicitation, like any number of other acts,

can amount to a federal attempt. So New Jersey attempt law is

10

no broader than federal law. Martinez’s conviction is thus an

aggravated felony, making him removable.

III. WHEN COMPARING DRUG SCHEDULES, WE LOOK TO

THE DATE OF CONVICTION

Martinez also argues that he was not convicted of a con-

trolled-substance offense. He concedes that the statute is di-

visible and that he was convicted of violating N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2C:35-5(b)(1). See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243,

2248-49 (2016). But he claims that his conviction does not nec-

essarily “relat[e] to a [federally] controlled substance” because

the New Jersey list of controlled substances is currently

broader than the federal lists. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

To be sure, the New Jersey statute criminalizes any deriva-

tive of coca leaves. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(b)(1). And fed-

eral law currently exempts [123I]ioflupane, a derivative of coca

leaves, from the lists. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4). But that ex-

emption was not in place when Martinez was convicted. See 21

C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4) (2008) (effective Dec. 10, 2007 to Aug.

29, 2009). So Martinez’s argument depends on the premise that

the present lists control, not the lists in effect when he was con-

victed.

But the categorical approach directs us to compare the

schedules at the time of conviction. In Mellouli v. Lynch, the

Court held that the petitioner’s state-law conviction did not

make him removable because, “at the time of [his] conviction,

[the state] schedules included at least nine substances not in-

cluded in the federal lists.” 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (2015) (em-

11

phasis added); accord id. at 1988. That is the reverse of Mar-

tinez’s situation. But Mellouli’s logic applies equally here, at

least where the federal drug schedules narrow after conviction.

See Doe v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 203, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2018)

(holding that the federal drug schedule “in effect at the time of

conviction” governs).

As a final point, under Chenery, we may not uphold the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision on this basis unless

the Board articulated it. Orabi v. Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 539

(3d Cir. 2014) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196

(1947)). Here, the Board’s reasoning is terse and hard to follow

on this point. Yet the Board did cite Mellouli, the key case that

specifies the date of conviction as controlling. While this rea-

soning is barely sufficient, its citation signals that the Board

looked to the date of conviction, following Mellouli’s instruc-

tion.

*****

New Jersey attempt law is coextensive with federal law.

Both require a substantial step that strongly corroborates the

actor’s criminal purpose; both hold that solicitation can count

as a substantial step. And we look to the date of Martinez’s

conviction, when the federal and New Jersey lists of controlled

substances were identical. So Martinez was convicted of a

controlled-substance offense that is an aggravated felony as

well. He is thus removable and ineligible for cancellation of

removal. We will deny his petition for review.

12

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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