Opinion

United States v. Branden Holena

  • 906 F.3d 288
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Oct 10, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Bibas
On the bench
Greenaway, Restrepo, Bibas
Cited by
35 cases
Authority
More cited than 79.5%

holding that condition of supervised release that barred an offender, who used Internet to solicit sex from a minor, from accessing the Internet without prior approval of probation officer was overbroad in scope

How later courts described this case

  • holding that condition of supervised release that barred an offender, who used Internet to solicit sex from a minor, from accessing the Internet without prior approval of probation officer was overbroad in scope
  • invalidating a blanket internet ban'imposed as a' Condition a supervised release but noting that, where a defendant used the internet to solicit a child for sex, "it is almost certainly appropriate to. prevent [thernl SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 101 1947A .ti r.50 13 from using social media, chat rooms, peer-to-peer file-sharing services, a.nd. any site where he could interact with a c.hild" and to "consider the efficacy of filtering and rnonitoring softWare"
  • concluding, under an abuse of discretion standard, that computer-use conditions were contradictory and vague and raised First Amendment concerns under Packingham
  • noting that the district court can limit the defendant's First Amendment rights "with appropriately tailored conditions of supervised release" that achieve "[t]he goal of restricting [the defendant]'s internet use ... to keep him from preying on children"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 17-3537

_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

BRANDEN HOLENA,

Appellant

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 3:07-cr-00169-001)

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

_______________

Argued July 10, 2018

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO, and BIBAS,

Circuit Judges

(Filed: October 10, 2018 )

_______________

Heidi R. Freese, Esq.

Federal Public Defender for the Middle District of

Pennsylvania

Frederick W. Ulrich, Esq. [ARGUED]

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Office of Federal Public Defender

100 Chestnut Street

Suite 306

Harrisburg, PA 17101

Counsel for Appellant

David J. Freed, Esq.

United States Attorney for the Middle District of

Pennsylvania

Carlo D. Marchioli, Esq. [ARGUED]

Office of United States Attorney

228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754

220 Federal Building and Courthouse

Harrisburg, PA 17108

Francis P. Sempa, Esq.

Office of United States Attorney

235 North Washington Avenue

P.O. Box 309, Suite 311

Scranton, PA 18503

Counsel for Appellee

2

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

To protect the public, a sentencing judge may restrict a

convicted defendant’s use of computers and the internet. But

to respect the defendant’s constitutional liberties, the judge

must tailor those restrictions to the danger posed by the

defendant. A complete ban on computer and internet use “will

rarely be sufficiently tailored.” United States v. Albertson, 645

F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011). This case illustrates why.

Branden Holena was convicted of using the internet to try

to entice a child into having sex. As a condition of his

supervised release from prison, he may not possess or use

computers or other electronic communication devices. Nor

may he use the internet without his probation officer’s

approval. Restricting his internet access is necessary to protect

the public. But these restrictions are not tailored to the danger

he poses. So we will vacate and remand for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

Holena repeatedly visited an online chatroom and tried to

entice a fourteen-year-old boy to have sex. He made plans to

meet the boy. He assured the boy that his age was not a

problem, as long as the boy did not tell the police. But the

“boy” was an FBI agent. So when Holena arrived at the

3

arranged meeting spot in a park, he was arrested and charged

with attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual acts.

Holena pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to ten years’

imprisonment and a lifetime of supervised release. As a special

condition of that supervised release, he was forbidden to use

the internet without his probation officer’s approval. He had to

submit to regular searches of his computer and home. And he

had to let the probation office install monitoring and filtering

software on his computer.

After serving his prison sentence, Holena violated the terms

of his supervised release—twice. The first time, he went online

to update social-media profiles and answer emails. The second

time, he logged into Facebook without approval, then lied

about it to his probation officer. After each violation, the court

sentenced him to nine more months’ imprisonment and

reimposed the special conditions.

At Holena’s latest revocation hearing, the judge imposed

another condition, forbidding him to possess or use any

computers, electronic communications devices, or electronic

storage devices. Holena objected to this lifetime ban.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231

and 3583(e). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

We review revocation of supervised release for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Bagdy, 764 F.3d 287, 290 (3d Cir.

2014). We insist on “some evidence” that the special

4

conditions imposed are “tangibly related” to the goals of

supervised release. United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 144

(3d Cir. 2007); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). To justify special

conditions, district courts must find supporting facts. United

States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 272 (3d Cir. 2009). We

may affirm if we can “ascertain any viable basis” in the record

for the restriction. Id. (quoting Voelker, 489 F.3d at 144). Here,

we cannot.

III. THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY

TAILORED

Holena argues that the bans on computer and internet use

are both contradictory and more restrictive than necessary. We

agree. And we note that the lack of tailoring raises First

Amendment concerns.

A. The conditions are contradictory

Holena’s conditions of supervised release contradict one

another, so we cannot be sure that they fit the goals of

supervised release. We cannot tell what they forbid, nor can

Holena. So we must vacate and remand.

One condition forbids Holena to “possess and/or use

computers . . . or other electronic communications or data

storage devices or media.” App. 8 (¶ 11). But the very next

condition provides that he “must not access the Internet except

for reasons approved in advance by the probation officer.” Id.

(¶ 12). These requirements conflict. How can he use the

internet at all if he may neither possess nor use a computer or

electronic communication device?

5

Two other conditions likewise conflict with the ban. One

requires him to have monitoring software installed “on any

computer” he uses. Id. (¶ 7). The other requires him to submit

to searches of his computers. These conditions are difficult to

reconcile given his computer ban.

Nothing in the record helps us or Holena to harmonize these

contradictory conditions. Even the Government “hesitates to

discern” what the District Court meant to forbid. Appellee’s

Br. 28. And the Government admits that the ban conflicts with

several other conditions.

Even so, the Government urges us to read the probation-

officer-approval provision as an exception to the ban. But we

are not interpreting a statute. Due process requires district

courts to give defendants fair warning by crafting conditions

that are understandable. See United States v. Fontaine, 697

F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2012).

Holena cannot follow these conditions because he cannot

tell what they forbid. So we will vacate and remand.

B. The conditions are more restrictive than necessary

Section 3583(a) places “real restriction[s] on the district

court’s freedom to impose conditions on supervised release.”

United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2005).

Special conditions may not deprive the defendant of more

liberty “than is reasonably necessary” to deter crime, protect

the public, and rehabilitate the defendant. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(2); see id. § 3553(a). The same is true when district

courts alter conditions of supervised release. Id. § 3583(e)(2).

6

The scope and intrusiveness of Holena’s conditions, on this

sparse record, violate this requirement. So, on remand, the

District Court must tailor any restrictions it imposes to

Holena’s conduct and history. Id. § 3583(d)(2), (e)(2); see also

Voelker, 489 F.3d at 146. Our remand is not “limited” to

clarifying the special conditions. Appellee’s Br. 29. The

District Court should conduct another revocation hearing. At

that hearing, it should make findings to support any restrictions

it chooses to impose on Holena’s internet and computer use.

And it should ensure that Holena understands those

restrictions.

A defendant’s conduct should inform the tailoring of his

conditions. For instance, a tax fraudster may be forbidden to

open new lines of credit without approval. United States v.

Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 2016). A child molester

may be forbidden to linger near places where children

congregate. United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 575 (6th Cir.

2012). And a child-pornography collector may be forbidden to

possess pornography or visit pornographic websites. See

United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003).

So internet bans and restrictions have a role in protecting the

public from sexual predators.

Still, internet bans are “draconian,” and we have said as

much “even in cases where we have upheld them.” United

States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 408 (3d Cir. 2010). To gauge

whether an internet or computer restriction is more restrictive

than necessary, we consider three factors: the restriction’s

length, its coverage, and “the defendant’s underlying conduct.”

Id. at 405 (emphasis removed). Sometimes we also consider a

7

fourth factor: the proportion of the supervised-release

restriction to the total restriction period (including prison).

Albertson, 645 F.3d at 198. But we cannot rely on that

proportion because the numerator is a lifetime ban. So we give

the fourth factor no weight here.

Our analysis must be fact-specific. Id. We do not simply

tally the factors, nor does one factor predominate. Here, both

the length and coverage of the computer ban and internet

restriction are excessive. And they are not tailored to Holena’s

conduct.

1. Length. We are troubled that Holena’s “restrictions will

last as long as he does.” Voelker, 489 F.3d at 146. Without a

more detailed record, we cannot uphold such a “lifetime

cybernetic banishment.” Id. at 148.

We have never upheld a lifetime ban in a precedential

opinion. And we have had trouble “imagin[ing] how [a

defendant] could function in modern society given [a] lifetime

ban” on computer use. Id. But we do not suggest that a lifetime

ban could never be sufficiently tailored. And the Sentencing

Guidelines recommend the statutory maximum term (which

may be a lifetime term) of supervised release for sex crimes.

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.2(b)(2) (U.S.

Sentencing Comm’n 2016) (policy statement).

Still, we are “conscious” that “[t]he forces and directions of

the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching” that

any restrictions imposed today “might be obsolete tomorrow.”

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).

8

So the lifetime duration of the blanket ban is presumptively

excessive.

2. Scope. The computer and internet bans both sweep too

broadly. They are the “antithesis of [the] ‘narrowly tailored’

sanction[s]” we require. Voelker, 489 F.3d at 145.

The ban on using a computer “or other electronic

communications . . . device[ ] ” is particularly draconian. App. 8

(¶ 11). In Thielemann, we upheld a qualified ten-year ban, one

of the longest and most restrictive bans we have upheld yet.

575 F.3d at 278. But that ban involved some tailoring; the

defendant could still “own or use a personal computer as long

as it is not connected to the internet.” Id. (emphasis removed).

Not so here. Even under the Government’s less restrictive

reading, Holena can use no computer without his probation

officer’s approval, nor even a cellphone. These restrictions

apply even to devices that are not connected to the internet.

These limitations prevent him from doing everyday tasks, like

preparing a résumé or calling a friend for a ride. None of these

activities puts the public at risk. So the computer and

communication-devices ban is too broad.

The internet ban fares little better. It prevents Holena from

accessing anything on the internet—even websites that are

unrelated to his crime. True, the District Court did some

limited tailoring of this restriction (if one reads the

contradictory conditions as adding up to less than a blanket

ban). It imposed a monitoring requirement and let him use the

internet with his probation officer’s prior approval. Those

tweaks move the internet ban closer to the “comprehensive,

9

reasonably tailored scheme” that we require. United States v.

Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).

But the District Court gave the probation office no guidance

on the sorts of internet use that it should approve. The goal of

restricting Holena’s internet use is to keep him from preying

on children. The District Court must tailor its restriction to that

end.

On this record, we see no justification for stopping Holena

from accessing websites where he will probably never

encounter a child, like Google Maps or Amazon. The same is

true for websites where he cannot interact with others or view

explicit materials, like Dictionary.com or this Court’s website.

The District Court need not list all the websites that Holena

may visit. It would be enough to give the probation office some

categories of websites or a guiding principle.

None of this is to say that the District Court may not impose

sweeping restrictions. In appropriate cases, it may. We hold

only that, on this record, the scope of the restrictions is too

broad.

3. Conduct. Holena used the internet to solicit sex from a

minor. And he repeatedly violated the terms of his supervised

release. That conduct warrants special conditions to limit his

internet use. But we examine whether the District Court has

tailored the special conditions to protect the public from similar

crimes that Holena might commit. That tailoring is inadequate

here.

We recognize that the need to protect the public is strongest

in cases like this, when the defendant used the internet to try to

10

molest children. See Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 278; United

States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1999). Holena’s

conduct underscores that point. He solicited sex from a

(supposedly) fourteen-year-old boy. He graphically described

the sexual acts he wanted to perform. And he knew what he

was doing was wrong, but did it anyway. So there is still a

strong need to protect the public. That is particularly true

because the internet provides almost limitless opportunities to

interact with people anonymously and nearly untraceably.

Even so, Holena’s bans are not tailored to his conduct. They

apply broadly to many internet and computer uses that have

nothing to do with preying on children.

On remand, the District Court must sculpt Holena’s

restrictions to his conduct. Any restrictions it imposes must

aim to deter future crimes, protect the public, or rehabilitate

Holena. And the District Court must find facts so that we can

review whether the restrictions are informed by Holena’s

conduct and directed toward those goals.

It is almost certainly appropriate to prevent Holena from

using social media, chat rooms, peer-to-peer file-sharing

services, and any site where he could interact with a child. On

the other hand, it may not be appropriate to restrict his access

to websites where he is unlikely to encounter a child. And there

are difficult cases in between, like restricting email access. We

leave it to the District Court to make those close calls based on

the record.

But, on this record, the court may not prevent Holena from

doing everyday tasks that have migrated to the internet, like

11

shopping, or searching for jobs or housing. The same is true for

his use of websites conveying essential information, like news,

maps, traffic, or weather. Nor does this record justify banning

benign use of a computer without internet access. Absent

specific factual findings, we cannot say that forbidding Holena

to write a novel or listen to music on his computer makes the

public any safer.

In crafting Holena’s restrictions, the District Court should

also consider the availability and efficacy of filtering and

monitoring software. See Voelker, 489 F.3d at 150; United

States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2006)

(upholding a complete internet ban because the defendant

could disable monitoring software). Special conditions should

involve “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary” for its ends. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). So if software

or another measure (like limiting Holena’s computer or

internet use to the confines of the probation office) can achieve

the goals of supervised release, then that is preferable to an

outright ban. In any event, the court must create enough of a

record to ground its findings and enable our review.

On remand, the District Court should also consider whether

Holena may be allowed a cellphone. It should consider whether

he can safely be allowed a smartphone with monitoring

software installed. Alternatively, it may wish to permit a non-

internet-connected phone, perhaps with text messaging that is

monitored or disabled. Along the same lines, many other

devices are connected to the internet, ranging from gaming

devices to fitness trackers to smart watches. We leave all such

determinations to the District Court.

12

C. The conditions raise First Amendment concerns

Section 3583’s tailoring requirement reflects constitutional

concerns. Conditions of supervised release may not restrict

more liberty than reasonably necessary, including

constitutional liberty. So district courts must “consider the First

Amendment implications” of their conditions of supervised

release. Voelker, 489 F.3d at 150. Conditions that restrict

“fundamental rights must be ‘narrowly tailored and . . . directly

related to deterring [the defendant] and protecting the public.’ ”

United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting

Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128). And a condition is “not ‘narrowly

tailored’ if it restricts First Amendment freedoms without any

resulting benefit to public safety.” Id. at 266.

Here, both Holena’s computer ban and internet ban limit an

array of First Amendment activity. And none of that activity is

related to his crime. Thus, many of the restrictions on his

speech are not making the public safer.

The Supreme Court recently struck down a North Carolina

law banning sex offenders from using social-media websites.

Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738. Because the parties did not

mention Packingham in their opening briefs, ordinarily we

would not reach the issue. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176,

182 (3d Cir. 1993). But we asked for supplemental briefing on

Packingham’s import here. And, because we are remanding,

we think it appropriate to offer guidance on how Packingham

informs the shaping of supervised-release conditions.

The District Court can limit Holena’s First Amendment

rights with appropriately tailored conditions of supervised

13

release. Defendants on supervised release enjoy less freedom

than those who have finished serving their sentences. See

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001); United

States v. Rock, 863 F.3d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2017). But, as we

have noted, these restrictions must be tailored to deterring

crime, protecting the public, or rehabilitating the defendant.

Under Packingham, blanket internet restrictions will rarely be

tailored enough to pass constitutional muster.

Here, even under Packingham’s narrower concurrence, the

bans fail. They suffer from the same “fatal problem” as North

Carolina’s restriction on using social media. Packingham, 137

S. Ct. at 1741 (Alito, J., concurring). Their “wide sweep

precludes access to a large number of websites that are most

unlikely to facilitate the commission of a sex crime against a

child.” Id. So on remand, the District Court must also take care

not to restrict Holena’s First Amendment rights more than

reasonably necessary or appropriate to protect the public.

D. The sentence was procedurally reasonable

Finally, we note briefly that the sentence is procedurally

reasonable because it is consistent with United States v. Booker

and its progeny. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The District Court

correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines range. It allowed

the parties to argue for whatever sentence they deemed

appropriate. It considered all of the § 3553(a) factors. And it

sufficiently explained its reasoning on the record. See Gall v.

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-51 (2007); see also United

States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2018).

14

*****

Holena poses a danger to children, so the District Court

may, and should, limit his liberty accordingly. But his

supervised release must still be tailored to the danger that he

poses. Holena’s current conditions fail that test. They

contradict one another. They also sweep too broadly,

preventing him from reading the news or shopping online. And

they limit his First Amendment freedoms beyond what is

reasonably necessary or appropriate. We do not see how they

are reasonably tailored to further the goals of supervised

release, especially protecting the public. So we will vacate his

sentence and remand for a new revocation hearing.

15

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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