Opinion

Steven Anderson v. Esco Jarnigan, Sheriff, and State of Tennessee - concurring in part and dissenting in part

Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Oct 1, 2018
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge John Everett Williams
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 5.4%

The opinion

10/01/2018

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 26, 2018

STEVE ANDERSON v. ESCO JARNIGAN, SHERIFF, AND STATE OF

TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamblen County

No. 17CR441 Alex E. Pearson, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2017-02534-CCA-R3-HC

___________________________________

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority opinion affirming the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of

the Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition on the basis that the petition fails to state a

colorable claim. However, I disagree that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial

court’s finding of direct criminal contempt.

When a defendant convicted of criminal contempt challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence, the defendant “bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of guilt on

appeal.” State v. Beeler, 387 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tenn. 2012). “A conviction will be

reversed for insufficient evidence only when the facts in the record, and any inferences

that may be drawn therefrom, are insufficient as a matter of law for a rational trier or fact

to find the accused guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

The majority concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support the habeas

corpus court’s finding of contempt because the court’s order providing that the Petitioner

referred to the court and the personnel as “a bunch of crooks” while the transcript

reflected that the Petitioner stated, “Crooks.” I cannot conclude that such an insignificant

variance rendered the evidence insufficient. The offending language in both the habeas

corpus court’s order and the transcript is the word “crooks.” The habeas corpus court

was able to observe the Petitioner’s demeanor and tone when the Petitioner used such

language. As the majority recognizes, “disrespectful, unreasonable or contemptuous

conduct” supports a finding of direct criminal contempt. See State v. Turner, 914 S.W.2d

951, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). While there is a minor discrepancy between the

transcript and the order regarding whether the Petitioner used the phrase “bunch of

crooks” or merely “Crooks,” a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt

that the Petitioner engaged in disrespectful and contemptuous conduct by referring to

court personnel as “crooks.” Based upon the confines of this court’s standard of review

on appeal, I conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the habeas corpus court’s

finding of summary criminal contempt.

The majority also holds that the habeas corpus judge failed to certify in his written

order that he personally heard the Petitioner make the statement and that the conduct

occurred in the judge’s presence as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure

42(a). However, “Tennessee courts have declined to require strict compliance with Rule

42(a)’s requirements for a written order.” In re Brown, 470 S.W.3d 433, 449 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2015). Rather, courts have held that a defendant is not entitled to relief unless the

defendant establishes harm by the “technical deficiency” or “technical omission.” State

v. Jimmy Paul Provencio, No. E2005-01253-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 3088078, at *3-4

(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2005) (holding that while “the preferred practice is certainly

to include the requisite factual detail in the order,” the defendant failed to show that he

was harmed by the “technical omission”); State v. Charles Johnson, No. E2002-02028-

CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 23094414, at *4-5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2003) (declining

to reverse the trial judge’s finding of contempt due to the trial judge’s failure to state in

its order the factual basis for the contempt and certify that the judge saw or heard the

contemptuous conduct or that the conduct occurred within the judge’s presence because

the defendant failed to establish that he was harmed by the “technical deficiency”). In the

present case, while the habeas corpus judge did not assert that he heard the Petitioner’s

remarks, such an assertion was implicit in the habeas corpus court’s order finding the

Petitioner in contempt “for saying that you all are ‘a bunch of crooks’ after the court

dismissed his habeas corpus petition.” Furthermore, the transcript demonstrates that the

Petitioner made the statements in the habeas corpus judge’s presence and that the judge

heard the conduct. The deficiency was merely the omission of this information from the

written order. See Charles Johnson, 2003 WL 23094414, at *5. The Petitioner did not

allege on appeal that the habeas corpus court’s order failed to comply with Rule 42(a)

and, therefore, failed to establish that he was harmed by any omission.

On review, we are not tasked with substituting our judgment for that of the trier of

fact but with determining whether a rational trier of fact could have found the accused

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Beeler, 387 S.W.3d at 519. Accordingly, I

respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion reversing the Petitioner’s contempt

conviction.

_____________________________________________

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, PRESIDING JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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