Opinion

K. D. v. Downingtown Area School Distri

  • 904 F.3d 248
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Sep 18, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Bibas
On the bench
Greenaway, Restrepo, Bibas
Cited by
58 cases
Authority
More cited than 84.7%

holding that the school district provided the student with a FAPE where, among other things, it revised the student’s IEP to replace one reading program with three other “research-based programs that provide phonics and reading comprehension instruction”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the school district provided the student with a FAPE where, among other things, it revised the student’s IEP to replace one reading program with three other “research-based programs that provide phonics and reading comprehension instruction”
  • explaining our Court of Appeals’s standard—which requires schools to develop a Plan “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s intellectual potential and individual abilities”—comports with the Supreme Court’s standard in Endrew F. (quoting Ridley, 680 F.3d at 269 )
  • explaining a student’s “slow progress does not prove that her [Plans] were deficient” and noting “[w]e may not rely on hindsight to second-guess an educational program that was reasonable at the time”
  • noting that a child’s “slow progress [did] not prove that her IEPs 3 This question was framed slightly differently elsewhere in the hearing officer’s order. Specifically, the hearing officer asked “whether or not the IEP provided [to Student], was not only reasonable, but whether or not it enabled the child to make progress.” (Doc. 20-1 at 19). were deficient.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 17-3065

_______________

K.D., by and through her parents, Theresa and Jonathan Dunn;

THERESA DUNN AND JONATHAN DUNN, individually,

Appellants

v.

DOWNINGTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00165)

District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel

_______________

Argued June 19, 2018

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO, and BIBAS,

Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 18, 2018)

_______________

Catherine M. Reisman, Esq. [ARGUED]

Judith A. Gran

Sarah E. Zuba

Reisman Carolla & Gran

19 Chestnut Street

Haddonfield, NJ 08033

Counsel for Appellants

Kevin A. Golembiewski, Esq.

David Berney

Berney & Sang

1628 John F. Kennedy Boulevard

8 Penn Center, Suite 1000

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Ellen M. Saideman, Esq.

Selene Almazan-Altobelli

7 Henry Drive

Barrington, RI 02806

Counsel for Amici Curiae Council of Parent Attorneys

and Advocates, Education Law Center, New Jersey

Special Education Practitioners, and National Center

for Learning Disabilities in Support of Appellants

Robert M. Abrahams, Esq.

Schulte Roth & Zabel

919 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022

2

Eric A. Bensky, Esq.

Schulte Roth & Zabel

1152 15th Street, NW

Suite 850

Washington, DC 20005

Counsel for Amici Curiae Former Officials of the

Department of Education, National Center for Youth

Law, Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health

Law, and Disability Rights Network of Pennsylvania in

Support of Appellants

Karl A. Romberger, Jr., Esq. [ARGUED]

Sweet Stevens Katz & Williams

331 East Butler Avenue

P.O. Box 5069

New Britain, PA 18901

Counsel for Appellee

Mark G. Morford, Esq.

Kevin M. McKenna, Esq.

Nicole D. Snyder, Esq.

Sarah B. Dragotta, Esq.

Latsha Davis & McKenna

350 Eagleview Boulevard

Suite 100

Exton, PA 19341

Counsel for Amici Curiae 21st Century Cyber Charter

School, Agora Cyber Charter School, Arts Academy

Charter School, Chester Community Charter School,

Collegium Charter School, New Foundations Charter

School, PA Distance Learning Charter School, Penn-

sylvania Leadership Charter School, and Pennsylvania

Virtual Charter School in Support of Appellee

3

Craig D. Ginsburg, Esq.

Anne E. Hendricks, Esq.

Levin Legal Group

1800 Byberry Road

1301 Masons Mill Business Park

Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006

Counsel for Amici Curiae Pennsylvania School Boards

Association in Support of Appellee

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

When schools use their expertise to address each child’s

distinct educational needs, we must give their judgments ap-

propriate deference. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas

Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001-02 (2017). The In-

dividuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) “requires an

educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to

make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circum-

stances.” Id. at 1001. But we may not “substitute [our] own

notions of sound educational policy for those of the school au-

thorities which [we] review.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). Our precedents already accord with the Supreme

Court’s guidance in Endrew F., so we continue to apply them.

Under both Endrew F. and our precedents, Downingtown Area

School District followed the law in educating K.D. So we will

affirm.

4

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

1. Kindergarten and testing. K.D. attended public school

in the Downingtown Area School District from preschool

through the first semester of third grade. Halfway through kin-

dergarten, Downingtown assigned an Instructional Support

Team to monitor K.D.’s educational progress and give her ex-

tra support.

After kindergarten, over the summer of 2012, K.D., her par-

ents, and her teachers completed a battery of tests. The psy-

chologist found that K.D. had a low-average IQ (87) and At-

tention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). K.D. scored

below average in early reading skills, basic reading, total read-

ing, writing, and math, and average in oral language. She could

not read any common grade-level sight words nor the oral-

reading passages. In writing letters of the alphabet, she scored

in the first percentile. She scored much lower than average on

executive function, and struggled with impulsivity and organi-

zation.

2. The first IEP. After completing these tests, Downing-

town offered K.D. an individualized education program (IEP)

in 2012, at the start of first grade. It set measurable goals for

letter naming, letter sounds, writing, rhyming, reading compre-

hension, math, and on-task behavior. The program’s specially

designed instructions provided for audiobooks, extra time for

tests and quizzes, a quiet place to take tests, and using visual

5

images and thinking aloud to promote recall of text. It also pro-

vided for three hours of learning-support instruction every

school day.

3. First grade. K.D. started first grade. She spent part of

her time with the regular teacher and part with her special ed-

ucation teacher, Ms. Smith. Ms. Smith was unhappy with

K.D.’s progress in naming and sounding out letters, so she

changed K.D.’s homework and sent home a packet of stories

to help her improve. Because K.D.’s visual and motor skills

were lagging, Downingtown asked for an occupational-therapy

screening. And to keep K.D. from regressing over the summer,

the school changed the first IEP, arranging for three hours of

academic support, three days per week, during July.

4. The second IEP. The summer before second grade, in

2013, Downingtown developed K.D.’s second IEP. It in-

creased her baselines for letter naming, letter sounds, reading

comprehension, writing, and math calculation. Her goals for

writing letters, rhyming, math facts, and on-task behavior re-

mained unchanged. Downingtown added “an evidence based

multi sensory reading and writing program” for two and a half

hours. JA 98. It retained her supplemental learning support and

extended-school-year services.

5. Summer before second grade. K.D.’s parents were dis-

satisfied with K.D.’s summer schooling. They asked about test-

ing K.D. for dyslexia and dysgraphia, and about the Wilson

reading program for struggling readers. Ms. Smith replied that

school psychologists do not diagnose those conditions, but of-

fered to put them in touch with the school psychologist any-

6

way. She also said that Downingtown did not (yet) offer Wil-

son before middle school, but that K.D. would receive a similar

program geared toward elementary-school students.

6. Second grade and updating the second IEP. Just as K.D.

started second grade, Downingtown switched to the Wilson

program for kindergarteners through third graders. K.D. mas-

tered 4 of 11 units in Wilson’s Level 1 by the end of second

grade. Downingtown also updated K.D.’s second IEP to reflect

the results of her occupational-therapy evaluation.

7. The third IEP. At the end of second grade, in 2014,

Downingtown developed K.D.’s third IEP, for third grade. Re-

flecting K.D.’s progress, it increased her goals or baselines for

letter naming, reading, writing, comprehension, and on-task

behavior. And it kept her occupational-therapy goals and spe-

cially designed instruction.

K.D.’s parents were dissatisfied with the new IEP, so they

met with school officials to discuss it. They did not reject it

after the meeting, so the IEP took effect. They also hired Ms.

Smith to tutor K.D. over the summer, while K.D. continued in

the school’s extended-school-year program.

8. Dr. Kelly’s independent evaluation. In July 2014, K.D.’s

parents hired Dr. Karen Kelly to do a neuropsychological eval-

uation. Dr. Kelly diagnosed K.D. with dyslexia, ADHD,

“mathematics disorder, . . . organizational deficits, memory im-

pairment, [and] executive function[ ] impairments.” JA 192.

She also found that K.D. was reading below first-grade level.

Beyond diagnosing K.D., Dr. Kelly criticized Downing-

town’s programming. She stated that K.D.’s poor achievement

7

showed that K.D. could not benefit from the school’s program,

evidencing the school’s “global disregard for this level of im-

pairment.” JA 191. K.D.’s parents did not immediately notify

Downingtown of the evaluation.

9. Third grade and updating the third IEP. To prepare for

third grade, Downingtown tested K.D. again. She had ad-

vanced in all aspects of reading and writing. It also tested her

vision and found that she qualified for vision services. Two

months after the fact, K.D.’s parents told Downingtown that

Dr. Kelly had evaluated K.D. and that they had hired an edu-

cational advocate.

Downingtown met with K.D.’s parents to discuss the up-

coming school year. It then performed more evaluations, added

vision services, and offered a one-on-one aide. K.D.’s parents

rejected the aide, for fear that it would make K.D. stand out.

The latest IQ test showed that K.D.’s IQ had risen into the av-

erage range.

Downingtown presented K.D.’s parents with the IEP as

modified. They checked both the boxes for approving and for

disapproving the IEP. They did not explain which parts they

disliked, but expressed both hope for progress and concern

about how appropriate her programming was.

10. The fourth IEP and withdrawal. In the middle of third

grade, Downingtown’s team met again. Based on their own and

Dr. Kelly’s evaluations, as well as K.D.’s progress, Downing-

town increased her goals for writing and on-task behavior. It

added new goals for math, reading fluency, and reading com-

prehension. It added an hour of direct math instruction, forty-

8

five minutes of direct writing instruction, and fifty-five

minutes of “multisensory reading instruction” per day, all in

“evidence based” programs. JA 104. Downingtown also took

Dr. Kelly’s advice to replace Wilson with “SRA/Corrective

Reading and FastForward,” two other “research-based pro-

grams that provide phonics and reading comprehension in-

struction.” Id.

In December 2014, midway through third grade, Downing-

town offered K.D.’s parents the new program. But they re-

jected it, withdrew K.D., and placed her in private school.

B. Procedural History

1. The administrative hearing. K.D.’s parents filed a com-

plaint with Pennsylvania’s Office of Dispute Resolution, seek-

ing reimbursement for private-school tuition. They argued that

Downingtown had denied K.D. a free appropriate public edu-

cation under the IDEA. They also alleged that, by not ade-

quately addressing K.D.’s needs, Downingtown had discrimi-

nated against K.D. based on her disability, in violation of the

Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA).

The administrative officer found that the IEPs were ade-

quate and that Downingtown had provided K.D. with a free ap-

propriate public education. Because the officer decided the

case before Endrew F., he applied the Third Circuit’s mean-

ingful-benefit test. See Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260,

268 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining meaningful-benefit test). He

found that Downingtown remained aware of K.D.’s slow pro-

gress and kept trying to improve her programming in response

9

to K.D.’s performance and Dr. Kelly’s report. And while it re-

peated some goals, Downingtown “did not simply hand out the

same IEP year after year,” but repeated foundational skills

where needed to address “the challenge of teaching even fun-

damental skills to [K.D.].” JA 115. Downingtown had ex-

plained clearly why it chose the programs it did and how they

addressed K.D.’s needs.

The officer disagreed with Dr. Kelly’s criticisms of Down-

ingtown. He found that Downingtown had acted reasonably in

giving the Wilson program time to work and in pursuing occu-

pational therapy and vision services. He held that all the IEPs

were “reasonably calculated to provide a meaningful educa-

tional benefit to [K.D.] when they were issued.” JA 116. So he

rejected the claims based on the IDEA. The ADA and Rehabil-

itation Act claims rested on the same theory as the IDEA claim,

so the officer rejected those claims as well.

2. The District Court. K.D.’s parents then filed a complaint

in District Court, bringing the same three claims. K.D. v.

Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., No. 16-0165, 2016 WL

4502349, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2016). They moved to sup-

plement the administrative record with new evidence, includ-

ing AIMSweb reports comparing K.D. with her peers, Down-

ingtown’s interrogatory answers, and a Wilson program

teacher’s manual. Id. at *2-3.

The District Court denied the motion. It reasoned that the

ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims rested on the same grounds

as their IDEA claim, that the new evidence was only minimally

relevant, and that K.D.’s parents should have introduced the

evidence before the hearing officer. Id.

10

On cross-motions for judgment on the administrative rec-

ord, the District Court granted judgment for Downingtown.

K.D. v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., No. 16-0165, 2017 WL

3838653, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2017). Because Endrew F.

came down before it decided the case, the District Court first

held that Endrew F. “simply confirm[ed] the standard that has

been used in the Third Circuit for years.” Id. at *7 n.7. It went

on to apply Endrew F. alongside our precedents, holding that

“the IEPs contained meaningful changes” and that “in light of

her circumstances, K.D. made appropriate and meaningful pro-

gress.” Id. at *8-9 (capitalization removed).

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

and 1343. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. DISCUSSION

Downingtown complied with the IDEA. It gave K.D. a free

appropriate public education by developing tailored IEPs. And

though K.D.’s parents claim disability discrimination under the

ADA and Rehabilitation Act, their theory is indistinguishable

from their IDEA claim. So all three claims fail together.

A. Downingtown complied with the IDEA

First, K.D.’s IDEA claim fails. K.D.’s parents argue that

the Supreme Court, in Endrew F., implicitly overruled the

Third Circuit’s meaningful-benefit test. And they argue that

under Endrew F., Downingtown did not do enough with its

IEPs to provide a free and appropriate public education. But

Endrew F. did not overrule our precedent. And their claim fails

under Supreme Court and Third Circuit decisions.

11

Whether Endrew F. implicitly overruled Third Circuit prec-

edent is a question of law, which we review de novo. Ridley,

680 F.3d at 268. Whether an IEP is appropriate is a question of

fact, which we review for clear error. Id.

1. Endrew F. did not overrule Third Circuit precedent. In

Endrew F., the Tenth Circuit had read the IDEA to require only

that students make “merely . . . more than de minimis” progress.

Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 798

F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s

standard, not ours. See 137 S. Ct. at 1000-01. On the contrary,

Endrew F.’s language parallels that of our precedents.

The Court held that the IDEA “requires an educational pro-

gram reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress

appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Id. at 1001.

That language mirrors our longstanding formulation: the edu-

cational program “must be reasonably calculated to enable the

child to receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the

student’s intellectual potential and individual abilities.” Ridley,

680 F.3d at 269 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Our test requires an educational program “likely to produce

progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Like our precedents, Endrew F. treated a child’s intellectual

abilities and potential as among the most important circum-

stances to consider. 137 S. Ct. at 999. And we have contrasted

our standard with that applied by the Tenth Circuit: “the provi-

sion of merely more than a trivial educational benefit does not

meet the meaningful benefit requirement . . . .” L.E. v. Ramsey

12

Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quota-

tion marks omitted); see also T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of

Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] satisfactory IEP

must provide significant learning and confer meaningful bene-

fit.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). So we see no conflict

between Endrew F. and our precedent.

2. K.D.’s IEPs were reasonably calculated to enable her to

make appropriate progress. The IDEA required Downingtown

to work with K.D.’s parents to develop IEPs that “aim[ed] to

enable [K.D.] to make progress.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.

Those aims must be “reasonably calculated” and formulated

“in light of the child’s circumstances.” Id. Downingtown did

so.

Downingtown had significant foundational work to do with

K.D. She had ADHD, vision problems, and poor motor skills.

She was quite challenged in perceptual reasoning and pro-

cessing speed. Her reading, writing, and math skills were well

below average. And she suffered from dyslexia and mathemat-

ics disorder. Given her impairments and circumstances, the

District Court did not clearly err in finding that “this kind of

fragmented progress could reasonably be expected.” 2017 WL

3838653, at *12.

i. IEPs must be reasonable, not ideal. Though her par-

ents argue otherwise, K.D.’s slow progress does not prove that

her IEPs were deficient. “Any review of an IEP must appreci-

ate that the question is whether the IEP is reasonable, not

whether the court regards it as ideal.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at

999 (emphasis in original). “The IEP must aim to enable the

child to make progress.” Id. (emphasis added). We may not

13

rely on hindsight to second-guess an educational program that

was reasonable at the time.

While courts can expect fully integrated students to ad-

vance with their grades, they cannot necessarily expect the

same of less-integrated students. As Endrew F. explained, “for

a child fully integrated in the regular classroom, an IEP typi-

cally should . . . be reasonably calculated to enable the child to

achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.” 137

S. Ct. at 999 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Dis-

trict Court found that K.D. was not fully integrated into the

regular classroom. 2017 WL 3838653, at *2-3, *12. Instead,

she received supplemental learning support for much of the

day. So there is no reason to presume that she should advance

at the same pace as her grade-level peers.

Still, K.D.’s parents seek to extend the presumption beyond

fully integrated students. They point to a regulatory guidance

letter from the Department of Education’s Office of Special

Education and Rehabilitative Services. It states: “Research has

demonstrated that children with disabilities who struggle in

reading and mathematics can successfully learn grade-level

content and make significant academic progress when appro-

priate instruction, services, and supports are provided.” U.S.

Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Ltr., at 1 (Nov. 16, 2015). It

also instructs that “the annual goals . . . should be sufficiently

ambitious to help close the gap” between the child’s current

and grade-level achievements. Id. at 5.

K.D.’s parents overread the letter. The letter sets forth re-

search and aspirational goals, which may be helpful for some

children. But while it aspires to “close the gap,” it does not

14

specifically require grade-level goals for children who are not

and cannot be fully integrated into regular classrooms. It never

mentions a presumption. Nor does it suggest that all (or even

most) disabled children can advance at a grade-level pace.

Even if the letter could be read as relevant, it would neither

bind nor persuade us. Guidance letters do not enjoy Chevron

deference. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-

87 (2000) (discussing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.

837 (1984)). And this guidance letter does not address the

IDEA’s language, let alone parse it. The IDEA contemplates

educational programs tailored to “how the child’s disability af-

fects the child’s involvement and progress in the general edu-

cation curriculum.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(aa). Rather

than presuming grade-level advancement, the Act requires re-

visions to education programs “as appropriate to address any

lack of expected progress toward the annual goals and in the

general education curriculum, where appropriate.” Id.

§ 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii), (ii)(I) (emphases added).

Because the letter neither “thorough[ly] . . . consider[s]” nor

“valid[ly] . . . reason[s]” about the meaning of the statute, we

find it unpersuasive on this issue. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323

U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

ii. Downingtown reviewed and revised the IEPs to keep

them appropriately rigorous. K.D.’s slow progress does not

prove that her IEPs were not challenging enough or updated

enough. The hearing officer found that Downingtown did not

simply repeat educational programs. The District Court agreed.

The Court also rejected Dr. Kelly’s assertion that K.D. was not

making meaningful progress. 2017 WL 3838653, at *9-12. We

15

defer to both sets of findings on appeal. See S.H. v. State-Op-

erated Sch. Dist. of the City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d

Cir. 2003) (treating the hearing officer’s factual findings as

“prima facie correct”); Ridley, 680 F.3d at 268 (reviewing the

District Court’s findings for clear error).

Both the hearing officer and the District Court found that

Downingtown was willing and able to review and revise K.D.’s

IEPs throughout her education. After K.D.’s parents notified

Downingtown of Dr. Kelly’s evaluation and recommendations,

Downingtown responded within a week. It scheduled a meet-

ing, sought more assessments, and offered a one-on-one aide.

And it developed a fourth IEP, which incorporated many of Dr.

Kelly’s recommendations, including adopting a new reading

program.

Finally, K.D.’s parents advance arguments not made below.

They claim that Downingtown did not offer K.D. an IEP for

2015. And, at oral argument, they asserted that K.D.’s IEPs

were not intense enough and did not strike the right balance

between regular and special education. But “[a]bsent excep-

tional circumstances, this Court will not consider issues raised

for the first time on appeal.” Del. Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446

F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2006). We see no exceptional reason to

excuse their failure. And in any event, Downingtown offered

K.D. a fourth IEP in December 2014, which would have run

for almost all of 2015.

In sum, the District Court did not err in finding that Down-

ingtown set appropriately challenging goals for K.D.

16

B. No basis to supplement the record

Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in rejecting

irrelevant and cumulative evidence. D.K. v. Abington Sch.

Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2012). Though the AIMS-

web evidence charted K.D.’s progress on school-district

benchmarks, the administrative record already contained am-

ple evidence of how K.D. compared to her peers. Downing-

town’s interrogatory answers add no facts to what is elsewhere

in the record. And K.D.’s parents should have introduced the

Wilson teacher’s manual earlier, before the hearing officer.

They gave no good reason for not doing so.

C. No disability discrimination under the ADA or Re-

habilitation Act

K.D.’s parents also assert disability discrimination under

the Rehabilitation Act and ADA. They allege that Downing-

town did not use “appropriate research-based interventions” to

“teach a student like K.D. to read.” Appellants’ Br. 45. Though

they deny it, their allegations simply repackage those underly-

ing the IDEA claim. So the District Court properly rejected

these claims when it rejected the IDEA claim.

*****

K.D.’s parents understandably want only the best opportu-

nities for their daughter. But Downingtown followed the law

by individualizing her education programs to help her make

progress appropriate to her circumstances. So we will affirm

the District Court’s judgment in favor of Downingtown.

17

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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