Exnicios v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 17-1424C

Filed: August 24, 2018

Reissued: September 11, 20181

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **

*

ADAM L. EXNICIOS, *

Plaintiff, * Military Pay Act; Motion to Dismiss;

* Cross-Motions for Judgment on the

v. * Administrative Record; Waiver;

* Justiciability; Unlawful Command

UNITED STATES, * Influence; Due Process.

Defendant. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **

John B. Wells, Law Office of John B. Wells, Slidell, LA.

Daniel K. Greene, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant. With him were

Steven J. Gillingham, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Robert E.

Kirschman, Jr., Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, and Chad A. Readler, Acting

Assistant Attorney General. Of counsel was Yolanda McCray Jones, United States Army

Litigation Division, Military Personnel Branch, Washington, D.C.

OPINION

HORN, J.

Plaintiff is a former Foreign Area Officer in the United States Army (Army) who was

discharged from the Army on August 28, 2014, with an honorable characterization of

service. On March 7, 2014, a Field Board of Inquiry recommended that plaintiff be

eliminated from the Army based on misconduct and substandard performance of duty

with a general, under honorable conditions, characterization of service. On July 10, 2014,

an Army Board of Review for Eliminations (Board of Review) recommended that plaintiff

be eliminated from the Army based on misconduct and substandard performance of duty

with an honorable characterization of service. On August 6, 2014, the “Deputy Assistant

1 This opinion was issued under seal on August 24, 2018. The parties were given the

opportunity to propose redactions to the court. No redactions were proposed. Plaintiff

stated that “the currently sealed opinion contains no materials that should be redacted

before the opinion is publicly issued,” and defendant also stated that “the currently sealed

opinion contains no materials that should be redacted before the opinion is publicly

issued.” The opinion, therefore, is unsealed and issued for publication.

Secretary (Army Review Boards)” (Deputy Assistant Secretary) approved the Board of

Review’s recommendation that plaintiff be involuntarily eliminated from the Army based

on misconduct and substandard performance of duty with an honorable characterization

of service. On August 28, 2014, the Army discharged plaintiff after approximately sixteen

years of military service. On October 3, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint in the above-

captioned case, asserting that the Army’s decision to separate plaintiff was arbitrary and

capricious and was subject to unlawful command influence. In plaintiff’s cross-motion for

judgment on the administrative record, plaintiff also alleges the Army’s elimination

proceedings deprived plaintiff of due process, the Field Board of Inquiry improperly

considered evidence, and one of the Army’s bases for elimination was improper.

FINDINGS OF FACT

In 1998, plaintiff graduated from Louisiana State University and Agricultural and

Mechanical College with a Bachelor of Arts degree. On August 6, 1998, plaintiff was

appointed to serve as a Reserve Commissioned Officer in the Army and was assigned to

the Army’s Field Artillery Corps. On April 2, 1999, plaintiff states that he completed “the

Field Artillery Officer Basic Course,” which qualified him to “perform the duties of Platoon

Leader, Fire Direction Officer, and Company Fire Support Officer.” Plaintiff states that he

was required to maintain a Secret security clearance as a Field Artillery Officer. On March

1, 2002, plaintiff was promoted to the rank of Captain, and, on February 1, 2008, plaintiff

was promoted to the rank of Major.

In 2008, the Army began training plaintiff as a Foreign Area Officer. According to

defendant, “[f]oreign area officers are commissioned officers who are ‘regionally-focused

experts in political military operations with advance [sic] language skills, cultural

understanding, and the ability to advise senior military and civilian strategic decision-

makers’ on a variety subjects pertinent to the specific region on which the officer is

focused.” (quoting Foreign Area Officer Branch, UNITED STATES ARMY (Oct. 13 2017),

https://www.hrc.army.mil/officer/foreign%20area%20officer%20branch). Plaintiff states,

“[a]s a FAO [Foreign Area Officer], Exnicios was considered to be a political-military

expert in the assigned area,” which plaintiff indicates was Eurasia. As a Foreign Area

Officer, plaintiff and defendant state that plaintiff was required to maintain a Top Secret

security clearance with eligibility to access Sensitive Compartmented Information.

According to plaintiff, as part of his security clearance process, plaintiff completed a

government form SF-86 questionnaire for a national security position, which “required

Exnicios disclose any foreign nationals with whom he had ‘close and/or continuing

contact.’” Plaintiff states he “underwent training on the reporting requirement,” and that

plaintiff’s understanding was “the requirement was geared towards the time that he

assumed his FAO [Foreign Area Officer] duties in Moscow.”

In 2011, plaintiff graduated from Columbia University with a master’s degree in

international affairs. On January 10, 2012, when plaintiff “was pending assignment to

DAO [Defense Attaché Office] Moscow with a flight scheduled for 11 Jan 2012,” an Agent

from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) interviewed plaintiff. According to the DIA

Agent’s Report dated January 17, 2012 (DIA Agent’s Report), on January 4, 2012, a

confidential source had informed investigators at the DIA that plaintiff had made

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unreported contact with a Ukrainian female “during a US Army training course from Jan

2011 to Apr 2011.” The DIA Agent’s Report indicates that plaintiff had not disclosed his

contact with the Ukrainian female during an interview with DIA on June 7, 2011. The DIA

Agent’s Report indicates that plaintiff “passed a DIA issued Counterintelligence scope

polygraph examination on 27 May 2011” before his June 7, 2011 interview.

During the January 10, 2012 interview, plaintiff disclosed that he had had

unreported contact with two separate women, both of whom plaintiff identified as being

Ukrainian. According to the DIA Agent’s Report, plaintiff stated he had unreported contact

with a Ukrainian woman named Okasana,2 who was a Ukrainian national who worked for

the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when plaintiff was in Foreign Area Officer training

in Germany in 2008. During his Foreign Area Officer training, plaintiffs’ entire seminar,

including plaintiff and Okasana, went on a trip to Washington, D.C. Plaintiff stated that he

and Okasana separated from their seminar during the trip to Washington, D.C. and went

on a shopping trip in Tyson’s Corner, Virginia, where Okasana tried on and modeled

dresses for plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, denied any intimate contact with Okasana while

on the seminar trip in Washington, D.C. After plaintiff’s seminar, plaintiff, and Okasana

returned from Washington, D.C. to Germany, plaintiff and Okasana attended an “official

function” at the Community Club at the Marshall Center in Germany. Plaintiff “advised

that at the official function, HE became intoxicated and kissed” Okasana. (capitalization

in original). Plaintiff’s friend’s wife witnessed plaintiff kiss Okasana and “threatened to tell

SUBJECT’s [plaintiff’s] wife of the incident.” (capitalization in original). The next day,

plaintiff stated that he told his wife about the incident at the Community Club, and,

“explained to HIS wife that he had a ‘crush’ on [Okasana].” (capitalization in original).

Plaintiff “advised that HE felt a strong emotional bond with HER.” (capitalization in

original). Plaintiff, however, “denied that HE and [Okasana] had any intimate relations

other than the one kiss which they shared at the official function in Germany.”

(capitalization in original). Plaintiff also stated that he informed Okasana that he “was

truthful with HIS wife,” that Okasana “was upset HE wasn’t more secretive about their

relationship” (capitalization in original) and plaintiff indicated that, subsequently, Okasana

began dating one of their classmates. According to plaintiff, he did not maintain

Okasana’s contact information and Okasana did not attempt to contact him after their

seminar ended in December 2008. Plaintiff “advised that HE did not report HIS contact

with [Okasana] during HIS security interview with the DAC-4 Investigations Division in

2 Defendant redacted from the administrative record the names of the two Ukrainian

women plaintiff had unreported contact with who are discussed throughout the court’s

opinion. Neither plaintiff nor defendant use the names of the two women in their cross-

motions for judgment on the administrative record, although, in defendant’s reply,

defendant uses “Ms. Black” and “Ms. Richards” as “aliases for the names of the two

Ukrainian women.” In plaintiff’s complaint, however, plaintiff provides the names of the

two Ukrainian women. In order to differentiate between the two Ukrainian women, the

court uses the first names of the two women, which are Okasana and Yuliya, and the

opinion will be issued under seal, with an opportunity for the parties to propose redactions

before the opinion is publically issued.

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Jun 2011 because HE wanted to ‘disassociate’ HIMSELF from the situation. HE did not

want it to affect HIS job and HIS family.” (capitalization in original).

During the January 10, 2012 interview, plaintiff also “admitted to being in contact

with a Ukrainian female circa Spring 2011.” Plaintiff stated that the other Ukrainian woman

plaintiff met in the spring of 2011 was named Yuliya, and that plaintiff met Yuliya when

they both were attending graduate school at Columbia University.3 Plaintiff indicated to

the DIA Agent that he and Yuliya were in the “same seminar” from January 2010 to

December 2010, and, in December 2010, plaintiff and Yuliya, who plaintiff indicated “was

an attractive female,” went to dinner. Plaintiff and Yuliya “had a long dinner and many

drinks” and “shared personal conversation,” and plaintiff “asked her questions about why

she was not married.” Plaintiff also indicated that he discussed his family and told Yuliya

that “HE did not want to ‘screw up’ with HIS wife/family.” (capitalization in original). Plaintiff

denied having any intimate contact with Yuliya and claimed that the only physical contact

he had with Yuliya “was a hug goodbye after the dinner.” Plaintiff stated that he and Yuliya

remained “friends” on Facebook, and that his last contact with Yuliya was in the spring of

2011 when they discussed “summer plans.” Plaintiff stated that he believed he had

informed Yuliya that he was going to be traveling to Russia for work during the upcoming

summer. The DIA Agent requested that plaintiff complete an Unofficial Foreign Contact

Report “in order to document HIS contact with [Yuliya] since they were still Facebook

‘friends’,” which plaintiff did complete.4 (capitalization in original). In the Unofficial Foreign

Contact Report, plaintiff indicated that Yuliya’s citizenship was “Ukraine,” his relationship

with Yuliya was “[f]riend,” and that his last telephonic, written, or email contact was an

“email via facebook on summer plans.” In response to a question that asked “IS THIS A

CLOSE OR CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP? (if yes, explain),” plaintiff wrote “was

continuous as of spring 2011 — could continue in future.” (capitalization in original).

Additionally, during plaintiff’s January 10, 2012 interview with the DIA Agent,

plaintiff indicated that, during his Foreign Area Officer training, he traveled to countries in

his area of responsibility for in-country immersion, including Ukraine and Russia. While in

Ukraine, plaintiff stated that he went to “gentlemen’s clubs on a couple different

occasions.” Plaintiff asserted that he did not engage “in any intimate relations with the

women, although HE did receive lap dances from the exotic dancers at the clubs.”

(capitalization in original). Plaintiff “denied ever going to gentlemen’s club while HE was

in Russia.” (capitalization in original).

Also on January 10, 2012, plaintiff provided to DIA a written “Voluntary Sworn

Statement,” which indicated that the Voluntary Sworn Statement was “[r]egarding either

3 As discussed below, plaintiff contends that Yuliya is a naturalized United States citizen,

and, therefore, is not a foreign national. Plaintiff, however, identified Yuliya as “Ukrainian”

during his January 10, 2012 interview, and, in his complaint and cross-motion for

judgment on the administrative record, refers to Yuliya as “Ukrainian” and as being “of

Ukrainian descent.”

4Plaintiff did not complete an Unofficial Foreign Contact Report regarding his contact with

Okasana, who plaintiff met while in Foreign Area Officer training in 2008.

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close or continuous contact with foreign nationals” and recounted many of the details

discussed in the DIA Agent’s Report. In his Voluntary Sworn Statement, plaintiff wrote

that he had “close contact with [Okasana] a Ukrainian between September to November

of 2008” and their contact “became at first professionally and then personally close, at

times the behavior was both provacitive [sic] and flirtatious.” Plaintiff also indicated that

he did not disclose his contact with Okasana during his security interview with DIA during

the summer of 2011 because plaintiff “had generally dismissed the event from memory, I

had ceased contact with [Okasana], and the juvenile aspects of it made it difficult to

broach.” Regarding plaintiff’s contact with Yuliya, who was a classmate of plaintiff’s at

Columbia University, plaintiff wrote “[t]he conversations were more personal, there was

no physical contact. For several months in the Spring of 2011 we coresponded [sic]

through Facebook, our last correspondence was in Spring of 2011.”

Two days after plaintiff’s January 10, 2012 interview with the DIA Agent, on

January 12, 2012, plaintiff underwent a “specific issue polygraph examination” with a

Polygraph Examiner from DIA.5 The specific issue polygraph examination “dealt with the

issue of sexual intercourse with Ukrainian women since HE’d been married (which

SUBJECT denied).” (capitalization in original). Prior to the start of the polygraph

examination, plaintiff provided additional details regarding Okasana, who plaintiff had

“denied” having “any intimate relations [with] other than the one kiss which they shared

at the official function in Germany” during his January 10, 2012 interview. Plaintiff stated

that, when his seminar was on a trip to Washington, D.C., Okasana had modeled dresses

for him in Tyson’s Corner “in a provocative manner,” and, after the shopping trip, plaintiff

and Okasana went to dinner in Virginia where they “held hands under the table and

expressed their feelings for each other.” Plaintiff also stated he and Okasana kissed

during dinner and during a cab ride back to their hotel. Plaintiff stated that he and Okasana

each went to their own hotel rooms upon arriving at their hotel, and plaintiff denied having

engaged in any other sexual acts with Okasana during the Washington, D.C. trip. Plaintiff

indicated that he was “trying to keep the relationship secret from HIS classmates and

instructors” and had “learned how HE was potentially vulnerable and exploitable.”

(capitalization in original). Subsequently, the DIA Polygraph Examiner administered

plaintiff’s specific issue polygraph examination. The DIA Polygraph Examiner asked

plaintiff, “[s]ince you were married, have you had sexual intercourse with any Ukrainian

women?” and “[h]ave you had any form of oral sex with any Ukrainian national since you

were married?” The DIA Polygraph Examiner created a polygraph examination report

dated January 12, 2012 (DIA Polygraph Examiner’s Report), which stated, “[o]n January

12, 2012, Subject [plaintiff] did not complete the referenced examination with no

reportable information developed. This examination is predicated on a request from DAC-

4 Investigations Division (ID), referencing SUBJECT’s [plaintiff’s] failure to reveal contact

with foreign nationals, specifically Ukrainian women outside his marriage.” (capitalization

in original). The DIA Polygraph Examiner’s Report also stated that “[n]o additional

5 The DIA Agent who conducted plaintiff’s January 10, 2012 interview did not administer

plaintiff’s January 12, 2012 polygraph examination, but the DIA Agent’s Report did

provide details regarding the January 12, 2012 polygraph examination. The January 12,

2012 polygraph examination was administered by a different DIA employee, whose title

was “Polygraph Examiner.”

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polygraph testing is anticipated at this time,” and that “Subject did not complete this

Specific-Issue examination, and Deception was Indicated.” (capitalization in original). The

DIA Polygraph Examiner’s Report did not indicate why plaintiff “did not complete” the

polygraph examination.

Plaintiff’s General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand

On April 2, 2012, slightly less than three months after plaintiff’s January 10, 2012

interview and January 12, 2012 polygraph examination, Major General Stephen G.

Fogarty of the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command issued plaintiff a

general officer memorandum of reprimand (GOMOR). The pertinent portion of the

GOMOR stated:

You are hereby reprimanded for violations of Army Regulation [AR] 380-

67.[6]

Leaders in the United States Military are expected to exemplify the highest

ethical and professional standards as embodied in our Army Values.

Leaders are expected to be able to read, understand, and follow

regulations, directions, and orders of those appointed over them. You have

failed to follow Army Regulations and failed to be forthcoming in

relationships that directly impact your ability to continue to serve in your

current capacity. You failed to inform the investigating agent about your

close, personal relationships with two separate foreign national women,

neither of which are your wife. You also admit to not informing your wife of

the latter relationship, which you attest is not intimate, yet you still maintain

connections through social media networks and communicate professional

travel arrangements. Your failure to notify the appropriate servicing security

office of close, intimate, or continuous communication or connection with a

foreign national can raise questions about your reliability, trustworthiness

and ability to protect classified information.

Major General Fogarty stated in the GOMOR that he intended to file the GOMOR in

plaintiff’s official military personnel file in accordance with AR 600-37 (2012), which sets

forth policies and procedures related to the placement of unfavorable information about

Army personnel in individual official personnel files. See AR 600-37, ¶ 1-1. Major General

Fogarty also stated in the GOMOR that he would consider a response from plaintiff before

6 The purpose of AR 380-67 (2012) is to ensure “access to classified information and

assignment to sensitive positions are clearly consistent with the interests of national

security.” AR 380-67, ¶ 1-1. The court cites to the versions of the Army Regulations that

were in effect at the time the relevant event occurred. See Dolan v. United States, 91

Fed. Cl. 111, 118 (2010) (“The Army regulations in effect at the date of plaintiff's

discharge, not those currently in effect, are dispositive in this case.” (citing Chambers v.

United States, 417 F.3d 1218, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“As an initial matter, we note that

the Army regulations in effect at the time of Chambers’ discharge in 1970, rather than

current regulations, guide our analysis.”))).

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making a final decision and informed plaintiff that plaintiff could seek legal assistance from

a Legal Assistance Officer or private civilian counsel.

Plaintiff submitted a response to the GOMOR on April 11, 2012, in which plaintiff

argued that he did not violate Army Regulations, asserted that he did not intentionally

conceal information, and requested that Major General Fogarty reconsider the GOMOR.

Plaintiff contended that there “are systemic problems that led to this situation” and stated

“AR 380-67 is over two decades old.[7] Allied nations are still considered to be

antagonists, and it concerns itself with written letters when we are in the era of social

media, it is anachronistic in an era of globalized travel and communication.” Plaintiff also

stated that the “subsequent interview [with DIA] on the other hand seems to have a great

interest in the most simple of contacts and social media sites.” According to plaintiff’s

response to the GOMOR, “in the future, other junior Foreign Area Officers will find

themselves in similar situations.” Additionally, plaintiff noted that he had informed his

Army supervisor of the incident with Okasana at the Community Club in 2008 and stated

that he “was counseled and the case was closed.”

On April 16, 2012, Major John Frick sent plaintiff an email message stating that

“LTC [Lieutenant Colonel] Rayburn and I spoke with LTC Cozzens about your response

to the GOMOR. I understand LTC Cozzens plans to contact you about re-thinking your

reply.” Major Frick also stated that he “strongly suggest[s]” that plaintiff listen to LTC

Cozzens and recommended that plaintiff provide a two paragraph response to the

GOMOR, in which plaintiff should “acknowledge your guilt and apologize for its effect on

DIA and the Army” and request that the GOMOR be filed in plaintiff’s local file. Major Frick

asserted that, “[w]hen it comes to GOMORs, no one cares when the officer uses his

response as a rebuttal – seriously no one,” and that plaintiff’s “current response is likely

to at least annoy the LTG; potentially it might piss her off.” Major Frick concluded his email

message by stating “I’m in your corner – so please trust me on this.” On April 17, 2012,

plaintiff replied to Major Frick’s email message and indicated that he had spoken to LTC

Cozzens on April 16, 2012, who informed plaintiff that he had twenty-four hours to

consider his “response/tone, without going into the same details you [Major Frick]

provided.” Plaintiff indicated in his email message that he was pleased with his current

response to the GOMOR and had received advice from legal counsel regarding how to

proceed. Plaintiff also indicated that he had informed LTC Cozzens that he did not need

the twenty-four hours to reconsider his response to the GOMOR, and that LTC Cozzens

should proceed with filing plaintiff’s April 11, 2012 response to the GOMOR. Plaintiff

concluded his email message to Major Frick by stating, “[i]n any case, I appreciate your

advise [sic], as you have been the only one in this process to be absolutely candid with

me.” That same day, Major Frick replied to plaintiff’s email message and stated “I don’t

7 The version of AR 380-67 that plaintiff was reprimanded for violating was established

on September 9, 1988. As of April 2012, when plaintiff received the GOMOR, AR 380-67

had only been updated once since September 9, 1988, which occurred in August 2011

when there was a rapid action revision of AR 380-67 that made administrative changes

to AR 380-67 and implemented the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010. See AR

380-67 (2012). The Army, however, updated AR 380-67 on January 24, 2014, which is

the version remaining in effect today. See AR 380-67 (2018).

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want to go against legal counsel – because I am obviously not a lawyer. Good luck in the

whole thing and please let me know where they decide to file it.”

On April 30, 2012, Colonel Michael J. Bochna issued a memorandum with a

subject of “Commander’s Recommendations on Filing Determination,” in which Colonel

Bochna recommended the GOMOR be placed in plaintiff’s official military personnel file.

Colonel Bochna asserted that plaintiff had failed to take responsibility for his actions and

continued to dispute the facts and the investigators’ judgment “despite the fact that most

of the evidence against him was obtained from his own sworn statements and interviews.”

Colonel Bochna stated that plaintiff’s response to the GOMOR indicated plaintiff “clearly

did not take this to heart and instead chose to dispute some of the facts and to question

the very policies he violated.” On May 10, 2012, after reviewing plaintiff’s response and

Colonel Bochna’s recommendation, Major General Fogarty directed that the GOMOR be

placed in plaintiff’s official military personnel file.

On January 14, 2014, plaintiff petitioned the Department of the Army Suitability

Board (DAESB) to remove the GOMOR from his official military personnel file. Plaintiff

contended that the Army had failed to follow the required procedures for issuing a

GOMOR, the GOMOR process was not conducted in an objective manner, that plaintiff

“was provided ineffective counsel,” and that plaintiff did not violate AR 380-67 because

his contacts with Okasana and Yuliya were not reportable conduct. On June 26, 2014,

the DAESB, by unanimous vote, determined “[t]he evidence presented does not clearly

and convincingly establish that the document under consideration is untrue or unjust, and

as a result, the presumption of regularity applies” and denied plaintiff’s petition. The

DAESB explained that, “[a]fter a thorough review of the appellant’s official record, the

evidence submitted by the appellant in support of his appeal, and the circumstances

surrounding the GOMOR incidents, the appellant has failed to provide clear and

convincing evidence that the GOMOR is untrue or unjust.”

Revocation of Plaintiff’s Security Clearance

Approximately two months after Major General Fogarty directed that the GOMOR

be placed in plaintiff’s official military personnel file, the United States Army Central

Personnel Security Clearance Facility (USA CCF) informed plaintiff by memorandum

dated July 16, 2012, which was titled “Intent to Revoke Sensitive Compartmented

Information (SCI) Access Eligibility and Security Clearance,” that it had “made a

preliminary decision to revoke your SCI access eligibility and security clearance due to

information in the Statement of Reasons.” The USA CCF’s “Statement of Reasons,” which

recounted many of the details involving the two Ukrainian women plaintiff discussed

during his January 10, 2012 interview with the DIA and January 12, 2012 polygraph

examination, identified information that the USA CCF asserted led to security concerns.

Specifically, regarding Yuliya, plaintiff’s classmate from Columbia University, the

Statement of Reasons stated that plaintiff “admitted to continuing contact with this foreign

national via Facebook online, disclosing your future travel abroad for work.” Regarding

Okasana, the Ukrainian woman plaintiff met while in Germany in 2008, the Statement of

Reasons stated that plaintiff “had a relationship with a classmate, a Ukrainian female,

whom [sic] worked for the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs” and “established a strong

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bond of affection towards her,” and that plaintiff had indicated that he “did not report this

contact in June 2011 because you wanted to ‘disassociate’ yourself from the situation.

You did not want this to affect your job or family.” The Statement of Reasons also noted

that plaintiff “did not successfully complete” the specific issue polygraph examination

administered by DIA on January 12, 2012.

The Statement of Reasons identified “FOREIGN INFLUENCE” and “PERSONAL

CONDUCT” as the applicable personnel security guidelines plaintiff had violated.

(capitalization in original). The Foreign Influence Guideline provides, in part:

Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual

has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or

induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a

way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by

any foreign interest.

See 32 C.F.R. § 147.4 (2012). The Personal Conduct Guideline provides, in part:

Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or

unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions

about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect

classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful

and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other

failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.

See 32 C.F.R. § 147.7 (2012). The USA CCF’s July 16, 2012 memorandum stated that,

“[i]f you respond, submit your signed and dated response and supporting material to this

headquarters through command channels within 60 days of receipt of this memorandum.”

On September 11, 2012, plaintiff submitted a response to the USA CCF’s July 16,

2012 memorandum, in which plaintiff denied having been under foreign influence

because, according to plaintiff, he was not “bound” to any foreign individual. Regarding

the issue of personal conduct, plaintiff “admit[ted] to showing poor judgment in regards to

my actions in November of 2008,” but argued that “[t]his was an isolated incident.” Plaintiff

also stated in his September 11, 2012 response that he had no intention of misleading

DIA investigators, and that he was “under significant stress” during the January 10, 2012

interview and neglected some details he had forgotten or had failed to recognize as

salient. Plaintiff concluded his September 11, 2012 response by stating, “[i]n the totality

of the circumstances, I believe the facts of this case, mitigating circumstances, my prior

record of service and potential for further service should reasonably outweigh these

causes of concern that would result in a judgment to revoke my security clearance.”

By memorandum dated November 14, 2012, which was titled “Determination of

Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Access Eligibility/Security Clearance

Ineligibility,” the USA CCF informed plaintiff that, after reviewing his response, “[w]e have

revoked your SCI access eligibility and security clearance.” According to the USA CCF’s

November 14, 2012 memorandum, plaintiff’s response had failed to mitigate the security

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concerns, and plaintiff’s “failure to report, when required, association with foreign

nationals after acknowledgement of training and your omission/concealment of pertinent

details leaves you vulnerable to exploitation, pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.”

The USA CCF’s memorandum also informed plaintiff that he had

the opportunity to appeal this determination in one of two ways - either

directly to the U.S. Army Personnel Security Appeals Board (PSAB) - or -

through a personal appearance before the Defense Office of Hearings and

Appeals (DOHA). For either option selected, the US Army PSAB will make

the final decision on your appeal.

On January 15, 2013, plaintiff appealed the USA CCF’s decision to revoke his SCI access

eligibility and security clearance to an administrative judge with the DOHA.

During a hearing before the DOHA administrative judge, plaintiff and three

witnesses provided testimony, and plaintiff submitted eight documents as exhibits.

Plaintiff’s exhibits included two email messages allegedly sent by Yuliya, the Ukrainian

woman plaintiff had been in contact with during his time at Columbia University in 2011,

to plaintiff’s “representative” in the hearing before the DOHA administrative judge. In the

first email message, dated February 6, 2013, Yuliya states that “I am a student at

Columbia University and was a classmate of Adam Exnicios. I am a US [sic] citizen.” In

the second email message, which was dated February 8, 2013 and submitted to the

DOHA administrative judge after the conclusion of the January 15, 2013 hearing, Yuliya

stated “I am glad to hear that the hearing went well for Adam. I have been [sic] naturalized

in July 2010. I, please, ask you not to contact me on this matter again.” In a decision

issued on April 24, 2013, the DOHA administrate judge determined that plaintiff was not

subject to foreign influence because Yuliya was a naturalized United States citizen at the

time of their interactions, and plaintiff was not required to report his interactions with Yuliya

because she was a “U.S. citizen.” Notwithstanding that plaintiff had identified Yuliya as a

Ukrainian national during plaintiff’s January 10, 2012 interview with the DIA Agent and

completed an Unofficial Foreign Contact Report on January 10, 2012 that stated Yuliya’s

citizenship was “Ukraine,” the administrative judge stated that plaintiff “only knew Ms.

[Yuliya] as a fellow student,” and “[h]e had no reason to conclude that she was a foreign

national.” The administrative judge also concluded that plaintiff’s “‘relationship’” with

Okasana, the Ukrainian woman plaintiff interacted with in 2008 in Germany, “was

fleeting,” that plaintiff had subsequently distanced himself from Okasana, and that plaintiff

had shown contrition. The administrative judge concluded, “[i]n light of Appellant’s

[plaintiff’s] highly credible testimony and witnesses, I find that Appellant mitigated both

foreign influence and personal conduct security concerns with persuasive testimony,

witnesses, and documents. I recommend that the PSAB [United States Army Personnel

Security Appeals Board] reverse USA CCF’s action revoking Appellant’s access to SCI

and security clearance.”

The United States Army Personnel Security Appeals Board, however, did not

follow the administrative judge’s recommendation and denied plaintiff’s appeal of the USA

CCF’s decision to revoke plaintiff’s access eligibility to Sensitive Compartmented

Information and security clearance by memorandum dated June 26, 2013. The June 26,

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2013 memorandum stated that the United States Army Personnel Security Appeals Board

had convened to consider plaintiff’s appeal, and that the United States Army Personnel

Security Appeals Board’s decision

was based upon your failure to mitigate the following concerns addressed

by the U.S. Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF):

Personal Conduct and Foreign Influence. The Board has found your

behavior to be inconsistent with the adjudicative guidelines as outlined in

Appendix 8, DoD [Department of Defense] 5200.2R, “DoD Personnel

Security Program,” used to determine eligibility for a security clearance or

access to classified information; and ICD 704 [Intelligence Community

Directive], Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing

Eligibility for Access to SCI. This decision is final and completes your due

process.

The United States Army Personnel Security Appeals Board also stated that plaintiff could

request reconsideration one year from the date of its June 26, 2013 memorandum.

Plaintiff’s Elimination Proceedings

Prior to the United States Army Personnel Security Appeals Board’s denial of

plaintiff’s appeal on June 26, 2013, by memorandum dated February 13, 2013, the United

States Army Human Resources Command informed plaintiff that plaintiff needed to show

cause for retention because it was initiating elimination proceedings against plaintiff

“under the provisions of Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(b) [(2013)],

because of misconduct, moral or professional dereliction.”8 The United States Army

Human Resources Command indicated it was eliminating plaintiff based on the following

“specific reasons” for elimination: “a. Substantiated derogatory activity resulting in a

General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand dated 2 April 2012 (Encl 1), which was filed

in your Official Military Personnel File. b. Conduct unbecoming an officer as indicated by

the above-referenced item.” (capitalization in original). The United States Army Human

Resources Command informed plaintiff that he could seek the assistance of an officer

from the Judge Advocate General Corps or private counsel, and that plaintiff could submit

a “rebuttal with all supporting documentation to show how you have either successfully

overcome the reason for the Show Cause Proceeding or a statement explaining your past

actions/behavior,” submit his resignation in lieu of elimination, or request a hearing before

a Field Board of Inquiry. Plaintiff elected to request a hearing before a Field Board of

Inquiry.

Following the United States Army Personnel Security Appeals Board’s June 26,

2013 denial of plaintiff’s appeal of USA CCF’s decision to revoke his SCI access eligibility

and security clearance, on July 15, 2013, Colonel Danial Pick, a Commander from the

8 AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(b), provided that elimination action will be initiated for

“[m]isconduct, moral or professional dereliction, or in the interests of national security”

and provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of such conduct. See AR 600-8-24, ¶ 4-

2(b).

11

Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, issued a memorandum notifying

plaintiff of an additional, third basis supporting the Army’s elimination proceedings against

plaintiff. The July 15, 2013 memorandum provided that an “additional basis for elimination

has arisen under Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2 (a)(10) [(2013)],

substandard performance of duty. You are hereby notified to show cause for retention on

active duty under AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(a)(10) substandard performance of duty,

due to the permanent revocation of your security clearance.”9 The July 15, 2013

memorandum also requested that plaintiff show cause for retention and provided plaintiff

with an opportunity to submit a written statement and evidence in rebuttal, resign in lieu

of elimination, or request a hearing before a Field Board of Inquiry. In plaintiff’s response

to the July 15, 2013 memorandum, plaintiff again requested an appearance before a Field

Board of Inquiry.

A Field Board of Inquiry convened on March 7, 2014, at 9:00 a.m. to address the

three asserted bases for plaintiff’s elimination.10 Plaintiff “was present during all open

9 The regulation at AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(a)(10), provided that, “[w]hen no medical

problems exist, and an officer has two consecutive failures of the APFT [Army physical

fitness test],” elimination action will be initiated for substandard performance of duty.

Colonel Pick’s July 15, 2013 memorandum does not indicate how the revocation of

plaintiff’s SCI security clearance and access eligibility impacted plaintiff’s ability to pass

the APFT. Indeed, a document in plaintiff’s “Army Military Human Resource Record”

indicates that plaintiff passed his most recent APFT on November 22, 2013. The

regulation at AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(b)(10) (2013), however, indicated that initiation

of elimination proceedings for “[m]isconduct, moral or professional dereliction, or in the

interests of national security” is appropriate when there has been “final denial or

revocation of an officer’s Secret security clearance by appropriate authorities acting

pursuant to DODD [Department of Defense Directive] 5200.2-R and AR 380-67 [(2013)].”

During the July 2, 2018 oral argument, counsel of record for defendant stated that the

citation to AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(a)(10), was a “typo.” Counsel of record for

defendant stated:

They could have done either of two. He [Colonel Pick] could have left the

10 off and just left it as 4-2(a) because that would be substandard

performance of duty. And it’s not a stretch to think if you lose your clearance,

you’ve failed to live up to that expectation. He could have said 4-2(b)(10),

which is the loss of your secret security clearance. So it’s either of those

two.

The court, however, notes that both the Field Board of Inquiry, Board of Review, and

Deputy Assistant Secretary found that plaintiff’s loss of his security clearance constituted

substandard performance of duty under AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(a).

10The purpose of a Field Board of Inquiry is “to give the officer a fair and impartial hearing

determining if the officer will be retained in the Army.” AR 600-8-24, ¶ 4-6(a) (2014). The

Field Board of Inquiry “establishes and records the facts of the Respondent’s alleged

12

sessions of the board with his counsel and was afforded full opportunity to cross-examine

adverse witnesses, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to testify in person either

sworn or unsworn.” When the President of the Field Board of Inquiry convened the Field

Board of Inquiry, the President “inquired if any member desires a recess further study or

review [sic] any matters. No members desired to recess.” The President of the Field Board

of Inquiry informed plaintiff “of his rights and privileges, including the right to full access

to the records of the hearings and all documentary evidences (excluding classified

documents)” and “the right to challenge for cause any members of the board.” At the time,

plaintiff “indicate[d] he desires a record of the proceedings” and did not challenge any of

the Members of the Field Board of Inquiry for cause. The President of the Field Board of

Inquiry noted that “the records in this case disclose no grounds for challenging any

member for cause. There are no reasons why any members would not be able to hear

the evidence submitted by the respondent and make a fair and impartial determination in

the case.”

The Field Board of Inquiry then received evidence from the government and from

the plaintiff. Plaintiff submitted thirteen exhibits to the Field Board of Inquiry, and the

government submitted ten exhibits to the Field Board of Inquiry, which included both the

DIA Agent’s Report and the DIA Polygraph Examiner’s Report. The government also

submitted as an exhibit to the Field Board of Inquiry plaintiff’s official military personnel

file containing plaintiff’s Officer Evaluation Reports, which plaintiff states is “replete with

narratives of his superb actions in the Field Artillery.”

During the Field Board of Inquiry’s hearing, two government witnesses testified,

including the DIA Agent who had conducted plaintiff’s January 10, 2012 interview

regarding his alleged unreported foreign contacts and Angelica Seivwright, who stated

that “I work for the US Army Garrison here at DLI; Director of Plans, Training, Mobilization

and Security. . . . My office manages background investigations and security clearances

of personnel assigned to DLI.” The plaintiff called nine witnesses who provided testimony,

as further discussed below, including plaintiff, plaintiff’s father, plaintiff’s wife, plaintiff’s

supervisor in the Army as of March 2014, two Army Colonels who knew plaintiff from

when plaintiff attended the Marshall Center in Germany in 2008, an Army Major who knew

plaintiff from when they were in training together at the Marshall Center, an individual

from Senator David Vitter’s office who “just want[ed] to express to the board that the

senator has some concerns on how some of this was handled,” and an Army Major who

stated “I am a close friend of MAJ [Major] Exnicios.” The DIA Agent testified that, during

plaintiff’s January 10, 2012 interview, plaintiff “documented” Yuliya as a Ukrainian citizen,

not as a United States citizen, and stated that “[c]ontinuing contact is two occasion [sic]

and maintaining that contact; it is ongoing, such as emailing or face booking.” The second

government witness stated that plaintiff’s security clearance was “revocated [sic] at all

levels; he currently does not have any level of clearance,” but that plaintiff could reapply

for reconsideration of his security clearance status in one year. Several of the witnesses

called by plaintiff also indicated that plaintiff did not currently possess a valid security

clearance. The second government witness and three of the witnesses called by plaintiff,

misconduct, substandard performance of duty, or conduct incompatible with military

service.” Id.

13

including plaintiff, provided testimony regarding the DOHA administrative judge’s

recommendation that plaintiff’s security clearance should not be revoked.

Additionally, two witnesses called by plaintiff specifically stated during the Field

Board of Inquiry’s hearing that they thought plaintiff should be retained by the Army, and

eight witnesses called by plaintiff, including plaintiff, gave testimony indicating that plaintiff

was a valuable asset to the Army. Plaintiff and plaintiff’s father, whose title in the

summarized transcript of the proceedings before the Field Board of Inquiry was listed as

“COL JAG Corp, US Army Reserve (Retired),” also testified before the Field Board of

Inquiry that, in their opinion, the two Ukrainian women did not qualify as reportable

contacts. Plaintiff called Colonel Todd Brown, who operated the Foreign Area Officer

training program plaintiff attended in Germany in 2008, as a witness. Colonel Brown

stated that he brought plaintiff “in for questioning” in 2008 when plaintiff “became very

friendly with one of the female students and other students had noticed.” Colonel Brown

stated that plaintiff “admitted that he had had more than a professional relationship with

a female; had kissed her at least once, but had not engage [sic] in any other physical

contact.” Colonel Brown stated that he “counseled him [plaintiff] formally in writing” and

placed the “counseling in his local file. It wasn’t going to be part of his permanent record.”

Colonel Brown also testified that he “wasn’t aware of any other behavior of that kind,” and

that plaintiff had great potential and was an excellent student. In an Officer Evaluation

Report completed by Colonel Brown after he had counseled plaintiff, which was included

in the record before the Field Board of Inquiry, Colonel Brown stated that plaintiff “is in

the top 4 of 10 foreign area officers I senior rate” and marked a box on plaintiff’s Officer

Evaluation Report that indicated “OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE, MUST PROMOTE.”

(capitalization in original). At 1:30 p.m., the Field Board of Inquiry closed for deliberations

in private.

At 2:00 p.m., the Field Board of Inquiry reconvened. The Field Board of Inquiry

then announced its findings and recommendation as follows:

FINDINGS

The board, having carefully considered the evidence before it, finds:

The allegation of misconduct under AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2b [(2014)],

specifically that substantiated derogatory activity resulted in a General of

Memorandum of Reprimand dated 2 April 2012, being file [sic] in your

Official Military Personnel File, is supported by a preponderance of the

evidence and does warrant elimination.

The allegation of misconduct under AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2b,

specifically you engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer as related to the

above referenced event, in the notification of proposed separation, is

supported by a preponderance of the evidence and does warrant

elimination.

14

The allegation of substandard performance of duty under AR 600-8-24,

paragraph 4-2a [(2014)], specifically, that action has been taken, and your

final appeal of that action denied, by appropriate authorities to permanently

revoke your security clearance, in the notification of proposed separation,

is supported by a preponderance of the evidence and does warrant

elimination.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the above findings, the board recommends that MAJ Adam L.

Exnicios, be:

Eliminated from the United States Army with a general (under honorable

conditions) characterization of service.

(capitalization in original).

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center informed plaintiff by

memorandum dated March 20, 2014 that the Field Board of Inquiry had recommended

plaintiff’s elimination from military service. On March 30, 2014, plaintiff submitted a letter

of appeal to the General Officer Show Cause Authority (GOSCA),11 Colonel Pick, who

was the Commander of the Defense Language Institute and who had informed plaintiff of

the additional, third basis supporting the Army’s elimination proceedings by memorandum

dated July 15, 2013. In his letter of appeal, plaintiff requested Colonel Pick to “thoroughly

review the results of the Board of Inquiry both in regard to the recommendation to

eliminate me from the Army before being allowed to request reconsideration of my

security clearance in June of 2014, and in regard to the character of discharge

recommended.” Plaintiff also requested Colonel Pick “specifically read the findings of the

Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals” and stated that he had not intended to violate

any reporting requirements. Also on March 30, 2014, plaintiff submitted an appellate brief

to the Board of Review. In his appellate brief, plaintiff requested that the Board of Review

“render a decision of retention in the US Army.” Plaintiff provided a “brief outline of the

factual circumstances” and argued that the GOMOR was factually inaccurate and that the

“minimal standard for the issuance of a GOMOR requires an ‘objective decision by

competent authority’. It is my position that the process was not in any manner objective.”

According to plaintiff’s appellate brief, “[n]either of these two individuals [Okasana and

Yuliya] was [sic] reportable under the applicable AR.” Plaintiff concluded his appellate

brief to the Board of Review by stating “I do not believe the recommendation of the Board

can be supported by the facts in this matter or the evidence presented to the Board.”

On April 4, 2014, Colonel Pick, however, recommended approval of the Field

Board of Inquiry’s recommendation of elimination. In his April 4, 2014 memorandum,

11 When a Field Board of Inquiry recommends elimination, a GOSCA reviews the Field

Board of Inquiry’s recommendation and provides a recommendation of approval or

disapproval of the Field Board of Inquiry’s recommendation. See AR 600-8-24, Table

4-1 (2014).

15

Colonel Pick also stated “[t]he BOI [Board of Inquiry] recommends the officer’s service

upon discharge be characterized as General (Under Honorable Conditions). I recommend

the officer’s service upon discharge be characterized as Honorable.”

Subsequently, a three-member Board of Review convened on July 10, 2014, at

11:14 a.m., to review the Field Board of Inquiry’s recommendation of elimination of

plaintiff.12 The Recorder of the Board of Review stated:

Elimination action in this case was initiated by the Commanding General

United States Army Human Resources Command based on AR 600-8-24,

paragraph 4-2b, because of misconduct, moral or professional dereliction.

Specifically, substantiated derogatory activity resulted in the filing of a

General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, dated 2 April 2012, in Major

Exnicios’ Official Military Personnel File. The reprimand reflects that Major

Exnicios failed to inform the agent investigating his security clearance of his

close personal relationships with two separate foreign national women,

neither of whom was his wife. He also failed to inform his wife of these

relationships and continued to maintain the connections through social

media and to communicate his professional travel arrangements. His failure

to notify the appropriate servicing security office of these contacts raised

questions about his reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect

classified information. This elimination action was supplemented with

additional grounds for elimination by the General Officer Show Cause

Authority (GOSCA), Commander, Defense Language Institute Foreign

Language Center, based on AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(a)(10) due to

substandard performance of duty due to the permanent revocation of Major

Exnicios’ security clearance.

The Record of the Board of Review also stated that plaintiff was authorized to wear:

Among other decorations . . . the: Bronze Star Medal; Army Commendation

Medal (4th award); Army Achievement Medal; National Defense Service

Medal; Kosovo Campaign Medal with Bronze Service Star; Afghan

Campaign Medal with Campaign Star; Global War on Terrorism Service

Medal; Humanitarian Service Medal; Army Service Ribbon; Overseas

Service Ribbon (2nd award); and the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty

Organization] Medal.

The Recorder of the Board of Review discussed the Field Board of Inquiry’s

findings and recommendation that plaintiff be discharged from the Army under general

conditions, as well as the GOSCA’s approval of the Field Board of Inquiry’s findings, and

the GOSCA’s recommendation that plaintiff be discharged under honorable conditions.

12 A Board of Review reviews the case of an Army officer recommended for elimination

by a Field Board of Inquiry and makes a recommendation to the Secretary of the Army or

his designee regarding whether the Army should retain the officer. AR 600-8-24, ¶ 4-17(a)

(2014). “Appearance by the respondent (or counsel) is not authorized.” Id.

16

Additionally, each member of the Board of Review indicated that they had previously

reviewed the proceedings of the Field Board of Inquiry, and the Recorder submitted to

the Board of Review “for consideration of this Board the report of the proceedings of the

Board of Inquiry [(Report of Proceedings)].” “[A]ll items offered (whether or not received)

or considered as evidence,” a written copy of the testimony of each witness, and the

findings of the Field Board of Inquiry were included in the Report of Proceedings.

(emphasis in original).

The Board of Review then closed for deliberation and vote by “secret written

ballot.” When the Board of Review reconvened, the Board of Review stated:

The Army Board of Review for Eliminations, having reviewed the records of

this case, in closed session and by secret written ballot, finds: The

Government has established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

 The allegation of misconduct under AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2b,

specifically that substantiated derogatory activity resulted in a General

Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, dated 2 April 2012, being filed in

Major Exnicios’ Official Military Personnel File is supported;

 The allegation of misconduct under AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2b,

specifically that Major Exnicios engaged in conduct unbecoming an

officer as related to the above referenced event, in the notification of

proposed separation, is supported; and

 The allegation of substandard performance of duty under AR 600-8-24,

paragraph 4-2a, specifically, that action has been taken and his final

appeal of that action denied by appropriate authorities to permanently

revoke his security clearance, in the notification of proposed separation

is supported.

The Board of Review recommended plaintiff “be eliminated from the United States Army

with an Honorable characterization of service,” rather than “General (Under Honorable

Conditions),” as recommended by the Field Board of Inquiry.

On August 4, 2014, a document titled “Memorandum from the Legal Section” was

prepared for the Deputy Assistant Secretary’s Review. The Background section of the

Memorandum from the Legal Section provided:

MAJ Exnicios has about 16 years of AFS. In April 2012, MAJ Exnicios was

issued a GOMOR for violating AR 380-67 by failing to report his close

contacts with two foreign national women to his servicing security office and

for not being forthcoming regarding those contacts in the course of

interviews with the agent investigating his fitness to hold a security

clearance. Although, MAJ Exnicios argues the women were not actually

foreigners, but rather naturalized citizens of the United States, the facts and

circumstances surrounding at least one of the relationships revealed that

17

he, a married man, held hands, kissed and flirted with one of the women

over dinner and was seen kissing this same woman in public on a separate

occasion as witnessed by the wife of a fellow officer. HRC initiated

elimination in February 2013.

The Memorandum from the Legal Section also noted that the Field Board of Inquiry had

recommended a general discharge, the GOSCA had recommended an honorable

discharge, and the Board of Review had recommended an honorable discharge. A Senior

Legal Advisor from the Legal Office then recommended that plaintiff be honorably

discharged.13

By memorandum dated August 6, 2014, by order of the Secretary of the Army, the

Deputy Assistant Secretary approved the Board of Review’s recommendation to

involuntarily eliminate plaintiff from the Army. The Deputy Assistant Secretary’s August

6, 2014 memorandum provided:

1. On 7 March 2014, a Board of Inquiry recommended Major Exnicios be

involuntarily eliminated from the United States Army based on both

misconduct and moral or professional dereliction, and substandard

performance of duty, with a General (Under Honorable Conditions)

characterization of service.

2. On 10 July 2014, a Department of the Army Board of Review for

Eliminations recommended Major Exnicios be involuntarily eliminated

13 In its cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record, plaintiff argues that “it is

the normal practice to prepare briefing sheets, usually one or two pages, for the review

of the final decision maker, the Deputy Assistant Secretary. No such briefing paper was

included in the Administrative Record. . . . The lack of this briefing paper offends due

process.” On May 8, 2018, the court issued an Order instructing defendant to submit to

the court “briefing sheets” as described by defendant, if any existed. On May 15, 2018,

defendant submitted to the court the Memorandum from the Legal Section, which

defendant states “contains the information that would be included in what we believe Mr.

Exnicios refers to as a ‘briefing sheet.’” Defendant also states:

We also understand that the legal office considers such memoranda to be

protected from public disclosure by either the deliberative process privilege

or attorney-client privilege, and for this reason, these memoranda as a

matter of course are not included in either the records of the discharge

proceedings or Mr. Exnicios’s Army Military Human Resources Records,

which are the two sets of records that constitute the administrative record

that we filed with the Court. Government counsel was unaware of these

practices when it reviewed the administrative record for completeness

before filing it with the Court. Given the Court’s particular interest in this

document and the document’s mostly summary content, to the extent that

any privilege exists over this document, the Government will not assert it for

the purposes of this case.

18

from the United States Army based on both misconduct and moral or

professional dereliction, and substandard performance of duty, with an

Honorable characterization of service.

3. I approve the Board of Review’s recommendations to involuntarily

eliminate Major Exnicios from the United States Army based on both

misconduct and moral or professional dereliction (Army Regulation 600-

8-24, paragraph 4-2b), and substandard performance of duty (Army

Regulation 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2a), with an Honorable

characterization of service.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

(capitalization in original). According to a document titled “CERTIFICATE OF RELEASE

OR DISCHARGE FROM ACTIVE DUTY,” on August 28, 2014, plaintiff was discharged

from the Army with an honorable characterization of service. (capitalization in original).

On October 16, 2016, plaintiff states that he requested that the Army convene a

Special Board pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1558 (2012) to review the decision of the Field

Board of Inquiry.14 According to plaintiff, the Army denied plaintiff’s request for a Special

Board because 10 U.S.C. § 1558 does not apply to the decision of a Field Board of

Inquiry.

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his complaint in the above-captioned case on October 3, 2017. In his

complaint in this court, plaintiff alleges the Army’s decision to discharge plaintiff from the

Army was arbitrary and capricious because “there was found to be no relationship [sic]

Exnicios and the Ukrainian woman, and because the Ukrainian-American was a U.S.

citizen who did not qualify as a foreign contact.” Plaintiff also asserts, without any further

explanation, that the decision to discharge plaintiff “was subject to unlawful command

influence, which resulted in the decision to discharge Exnicios in lieu of transfer.” Plaintiff

requests that this court restore plaintiff “to active duty, as either a Foreign Area Officer or

as a field artillery officer, and payment of income retroactive to his date of discharge,”

14 A Special Board is:

[A] board that the Secretary of a military department convenes under any

authority to consider whether to recommend a person for appointment,

enlistment, reenlistment, assignment, promotion, retention, separation,

retirement, or transfer to inactive status in a reserve component instead of

referring the records of that person for consideration by a previously

convened selection board which considered or should have considered that

person.

10 U.S.C. § 1558.

19

which occurred on August 28, 2014. Plaintiff also requests that he be “returned to active

duty in the grade Major (O-4) effective August 28, 2014,” the GOMOR and all references

to plaintiff’s discharge from the Army be removed from his military record, and the court

award plaintiff attorney’s fees. According to plaintiff, this court has jurisdiction over his

complaint pursuant to the Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204 (2012).

On February 2, 2018, defendant filed the administrative record, as well as a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (2018) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal

Claims (RCFC), or, in the alternative, a motion for judgment on the administrative record

under RCFC 52.1 (2018). In its motion, defendant states that “we do not challenge that

the Court possesses jurisdiction over his [plaintiff’s] claim.” Defendant, however, argues

that plaintiff has failed to present a justiciable controversy because “it is well settled that

a challenge to the merits of a service secretary’s discretionary decision does not present

a justiciable controversy.” Additionally, defendant argues that, “[a]lthough it does not

appear that Mr. Exnicios is asserting this theory [unlawful command influence] as a claim

for relief, to the extent that the Court construes Mr. Exnicios’s complaint as doing so, that

claim, too, should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)” because the complaint does not

contain allegations that could establish a claim for improper command influence.

Alternatively, defendant asserts that this court should grant its motion for judgment on the

administrative record because the administrative record establishes that the Army’s

decision to eliminate plaintiff was procedurally sound and supported by substantial

evidence.

On April 4, 2018, plaintiff filed an opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss and

a motion for judgment on the administrative record and cross-motion for judgment on the

administrative. Plaintiff argues that his claim is justiciable because “[j]udicial review is

always appropriate when a military decision is arbitrary and capricious.” Plaintiff contends

that the actions of the Field Board of Inquiry, Army Board of Review, and Deputy Assistant

Secretary15 were arbitrary and capricious because they did not consider reassigning

plaintiff as a Field Artillery Officer, did not consider the “rehabilitation” of plaintiff, and

prematurely eliminated plaintiff before plaintiff could reapply for his security clearance.

Plaintiff also argues the decisions of the Field Board of Inquiry, Army Board of Review,

and Deputy Assistant Secretary were not supported by substantial evidence. According

to plaintiff, “all evidence” pointed to retention of plaintiff and the DIA Polygraph Examiner’s

Report should not have been considered when determining whether to eliminate plaintiff.

Additionally, plaintiff contends the GOMOR and additional, third basis for elimination

regarding revocation of plaintiff’s security clearance were “facially defective.” Plaintiff

further alleges that the actions of the Field Board of Inquiry, Army Board of Review, and

Deputy Assistant Secretary violated plaintiff’s due process rights, and that the “entire

process” was tainted by unlawful command influence.

15 In plaintiff’s cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record, plaintiff

interchangeably uses “the Secretary” and “the Deputy Assistant Secretary” when referring

to the Deputy Assistant Secretary’s August 6, 2014 decision to approve the Board of

Review’s recommendation to involuntarily eliminate plaintiff from the Army.

20

On May 22, 2018, defendant filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss or, in

the alternative, motion for judgment on the administrative record and a response in

opposition to plaintiff’s cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record. In its May

22, 2018 motion, defendant again argues that plaintiff’s complaint has not established a

justiciable controversy, and that the Army’s decision to eliminate plaintiff was supported

by substantial evidence. Defendant also argues that plaintiff’s additional arguments that

were not raised before the Field Board of Inquiry or in plaintiff’s appellate brief to the

GOSCA, which, according to defendant, include plaintiff’s arguments relating to the DIA’s

polygraph examination, retention of plaintiff’s security clearance, unlawful command

influence, and due process, are waived because “the scope of the Court’s review is limited

to the issues Mr. Exnicios presented to the military during his discharge proceedings.”

On June 12, 2018, plaintiff submitted a reply in support of the cross-motion for

judgment on the administrative record, in which plaintiff reiterates that the Army’s actions

were arbitrary and capricious, tainted by unlawful command influence, and deprived

plaintiff of due process. Plaintiff also reasserts that both the GOMOR and plaintiff’s notice

of an additional, third basis of elimination were “facially defective” and further argues that

“the arguments in the cross-motion were not waived” because “the government has

invoked and misapplied the doctrine of waiver.” Subsequently, on July 2, 2018, the court

heard oral argument in the above-captioned case.

DISCUSSION

In examining what must be pled in order to state a claim, a plaintiff need only state

in the complaint “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” RCFC 8(a)(2) (2018); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007). The United States Supreme Court has stated:

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not

need detailed factual allegations, [Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)]; Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d

247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994), a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of

his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, see

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts

“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation”). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (hereinafter Wright &

Miller) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a

statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable

right of action”), on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint

are true (even if doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,

534 U.S. 506, 508, n.1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327

(1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a

judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations”); Scheuer v. Rhodes,

21

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it

appears “that a recovery is very remote and unlikely”) . . . . [W]e do not

require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 570 (footnote and other citations omitted;

omissions in original); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57, 570); Frankel v. United States, 842 F.3d 1246,

1249 (Fed. Cir. 2016); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1157 (Fed.

Cir. 2014); Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g

en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2014); Kam-Almaz v. United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed.

Cir. 2012) (“The facts as alleged ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even

if doubtful in fact).’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)); Totes-Isotoner

Corp. v. United States, 594 F.3d 1346, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 830

(2010); Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir.) (“In order to avoid

dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege facts ‘plausibly suggesting

(not merely consistent with)’ a showing of entitlement to relief.” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,

561 U.S. 1006 (2010); Cambridge v. United States, 558 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

(“[A] plaintiff must plead factual allegations that support a facially ‘plausible’ claim to relief

in order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim.” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570)); Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir.) (“The factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. This does

not require the plaintiff to set out in detail the facts upon which the claim is based, but

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570)), reh’g denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 937

(2009); Christen v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 226, 229 (2017); Christian v. United States,

131 Fed. Cl. 134, 144 (2017); Vargas v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 226, 232 (2014);

Fredericksburg Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 244, 253 (2013),

aff’d, F. App’x 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Peninsula Grp. Capital Corp. v. United States, 93

Fed. Cl. 720, 726-27 (2010), appeal dismissed, 454 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Legal

Aid Soc’y of New York v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 285, 292, 298 n.14 (2010).

When deciding a case based on a failure to state a claim, the court “must accept

as true the factual allegations in the complaint.” Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar, 660

F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(“In addition, when ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true

all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555-56 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002))));

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (“Moreover, it is well established that, in

passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the

subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint

should be construed favorably to the pleader.”), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), recognized by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190

(1984); Harris v. United States, 868 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Call Henry,

Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United

22

States, 464 F.3d 1325, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Samish Indian Nation v. United States,

419 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d

1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538

U.S. 906 (2003).

Justiciability

In plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff alleges that the “decision to discharge Exnicios from

the Army was arbitrary and capricious.” Defendant argues that plaintiff’s complaint must

be dismissed for failure to state a claim because plaintiff’s complaint fails to present a

justiciable claim. Defendant contends that plaintiff’s complaint “takes issue only with the

merits of the ‘discretionary decision’ by the Secretary to approve the recommendation by

the Board of Review that Mr. Exnicios should be eliminated from the Army.” According to

defendant, “‘the merits of a decision committed wholly to the discretion of the military are

not subject to judicial review,’ although allegations that an applicable procedure was not

followed ‘may present a justiciable controversy.’” (quoting Adkins v. United States, 68

F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original)).

Plaintiff, however, asserts that his claims are justiciable because “[j]udicial review

is always appropriate when a military decision is arbitrary and capricious.” Plaintiff,

without citation to any tests or standards applicable to plaintiff’s elimination proceedings

before the Field Board of Inquiry, Board of Review, or Deputy Assistant Secretary, argues,

“[i]n the instant case, there are identifiable and measurable tests and standards

promulgated by the Secretary, which are subject to judicial review.” 16 Plaintiff argues that

“[d]efendant’s justiciability argument can prevail, if at all, only if they can show that the

matter at hand is recognized as a political question,” which, according to plaintiff,

“defendant cannot show.” In its reply, defendant argues that “the Court should disregard

the section of his [plaintiff’s] brief related to justiciability” because plaintiff cites to case

law which does not support plaintiff’s position.

“In the military arena, because of the admonition against court interference with

military matters, see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94, 73 S. Ct. 534, 97 L. Ed. 842

(1953), justiciability is an especially appropriate inquiry.” Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d

1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Adkins v. United States, 68 F.3d at 1322 (quoting

Murphy v. United States, 993 F.2d 871, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1993))); see also Houghtling v.

United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 149, 157 (2013); Strickland v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 684,

698 (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit repeatedly has

emphasized the duty of the court, in cases concerning military personnel and benefits, to

be mindful of the import of the doctrine of justiciability, i.e., whether the dispute is one

within the competency of the court.”), subsequent determination, 73 Fed. Cl. 631 (2006).

16 Plaintiff states that “[t]he gravamen of this case, however, is not whether or not the

military improperly revoked his access to TS (SCI) for that question clearly is non-

justiciable.” (citing Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988)). During the July 2, 2018

oral argument, counsel of record for plaintiff stated that the revocation of a security

clearance is “non-reviewable” and “that’s why we are not here to say revocation of the top

secret/SCI was wrong, because that is non-justiciable.”

23

Justiciability depends on whether “‘the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its

breach judicially determined, and . . . protection for the right can be judicially molded.’”

Adkins v. United States, 68 F.3d at 1322 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198

(1962)); see also Murphy v. United States, 993 F.2d at 872; Lippmann v. United States,

127 Fed. Cl. 238, 243 (2016); Volk v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 313, 324-25 (2013).

Accordingly, a “controversy is ‘justiciable’ only if it is ‘one which the courts can finally and

effectively decide, under tests and standards which they can soundly administer within

their special field of competence.’” Voge v. United States, 844 F.2d 776, 780 (Fed. Cir.

1988) (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev’d on other

grounds, 360 U.S. 474 (1959)); see also Lippman v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. at 243

(quoting Voge v. United States, 844 F.2d at 780); Miglionico v. United States, 108 Fed.

Cl. 512, 520-21 (2012) (citations omitted).

“The general rule is that the determination of who is fit for military service is

committed to the Executive branch.” Lee v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 530, 540 (1995)

(citing Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 982 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also Orloff v. Willoughby,

345 U.S. at 93 (“[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army.”); Heisig v. United

States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“It is equally settled that responsibility for

determining who is fit or unfit to serve in the armed services is not a judicial province; and

that courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the military departments when

reasonable minds could reach differing conclusions on the same evidence.” (footnotes

omitted)); Taylor v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 54, 58 (1995). The United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recognized “there are ‘thousands of [ ] routine

personnel decisions regularly made by the services which are variously held

nonjusticiable or beyond the competence or the jurisdiction of courts to wrestle with.’”

Murphy v. United States, 993 F.2d at 873 (alteration in original) (quoting Voge v. United

States, 844 F.2d at 780); see also Antonellis v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 112, 115

(2012) (citation omitted), aff’d, 723 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The United States Court

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also has “consistently recognized that, although the

merits of a decision committed wholly to the discretion of the military are not subject to

judicial review, a challenge to the particular procedure followed in rendering a military

decision may present a justiciable controversy.” Adkins v. United States, 68 F.3d at 1323

(emphasis in original) (citing Murphy v. United States, 993 F.2d at 873; and Dodson v.

Dep’t of Army, 988 F.2d 1199, 1207 n.7, reh’g denied (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also Miller v.

United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 772, 781 (2015) (quoting Adkins v. United States, 68 F.3d at

1323). Judicial review, therefore, is appropriate when “the Secretary’s discretion is limited,

and Congress has established ‘tests and standards’ against which the court can measure

his conduct.” Murphy v. United States, 993 F.2d at 873 (citing Sargisson v. United States,

913 F.2d 918, 922 (Fed. Cir. 1990); and Voge v. United States, 844 F.2d at 780); see

also Adkins v. United States, 68 F.3d at 1323 (citing Murphy v. United States, 993 F.2d

at 873); Houghtling v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. at 157 (citing Murphy v. United States,

993 F.2d at 873); Antonellis v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. at 115 (quoting Murphy v.

United States, 993 F.2d at 873); Taylor v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 58 (citing Murphy

v. United States, 993 F.2d at 873). “Even when that discretion is unlimited, however, the

military is ‘bound to follow its own procedural regulations if it chooses to implement

some.’” Houghtling v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. at 157 (quoting Murphy v. United States,

993 F.2d at 873); see also Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

24

(“A court may decide whether the military has complied with procedures set forth in its

own regulations because those procedures by their nature limit the military’s discretion.”

(citation omitted)).

Plaintiff in the case before this court specifically challenges the recommendation

of the Field Board of Inquiry, the recommendation of the Board of Review, and the

decision of Deputy Assistant Secretary to eliminate plaintiff from the service as arbitrary

and capricious and asserts that the decisions of the Field Board of Inquiry, Board of

Review, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary were not supported by substantial evidence.

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (2012):

Subject to such limitations as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe, the

Secretary of the military department concerned shall prescribe, by

regulation, procedures for the review at any time of the record of any

commissioned officer (other than a commissioned warrant officer or a

retired officer) of the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, or

Regular Marine Corps to determine whether such officer shall be required,

because his performance of duty has fallen below standards prescribed by

the Secretary of Defense, to show cause for his retention on active duty.

Section 1181(b) of Title Ten of the United States Code provides that the “Secretary of the

military department concerned” may also prescribe such procedures “because of

misconduct, because of moral or professional dereliction, or because his retention is not

clearly consistent with the interests of national security, to show cause for his retention

on active duty.” The Secretary of the military department concerned shall convene Boards

of Inquiry “at such times and places as the Secretary may prescribe to receive evidence

and make findings and recommendations as to whether an officer who is required under

section 1181 of this title to show cause for retention on active duty should be retained on

active duty.” 10 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012). “A board of inquiry shall give a fair and impartial

hearing to each officer required under section 1181 of this title to show cause for retention

on active duty,” and, “[i]f a board of inquiry determines that the officer has failed to

establish that he should be retained on active duty, it shall recommend to the Secretary

concerned that the officer not be retained on active duty.” Id. § 1182(b)-(c). “The Secretary

of the military department concerned may remove an officer from active duty if the

removal of such officer from active duty is recommended by a board of inquiry convened

under section 1182 of this title.” Id. § 1184 (2012). If, however, “a board of inquiry

determines that the officer has established that he should be retained on active duty, the

officer’s case is closed.” Id. § 1182(d).

Department of Defense Instruction 1332.30 (2014) and AR 600-8-24 (2014) both

provide guidance regarding the procedures afforded to an Army officer facing involuntary

elimination. Department of Defense Instruction 1332.30, the subject of which is

“Separation of Regular and Reserve Commissioned Officers,” applies to all military

departments and “[e]stablishes DoD policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides

procedures governing separation of regular and reserve commissioned officers.” Dep’t of

25

Def. Instruction 1332.30 ¶¶ 1(b), 2(a) (2014).17 Similarly, AR 600-8-24, titled: “Officer

Transfers and Discharges,” “provides principles of support, standards of service, policies,

tasks, rules, and steps governing all work required to support officer transfers and

discharges.” AR 600-8-24, ¶ 1-1. Chapter 4 of AR 600-8-24 governs elimination of officers

in the Army. See AR 600-8-24, ¶ 4-1. The regulation at AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-1,

provides:

An officer is permitted to serve in the Army because of the special trust and

confidence the President and the nation have placed in the officer’s

patriotism, valor, fidelity, and competence. An officer is expected to display

responsibility commensurate to this special trust and confidence and to act

with the highest integrity at all times. However, an officer who will not or can

not maintain those standards will be separated.

Id. ¶ 4-1(a).

The regulation at AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2, titled: “Reasons for elimination,”

states, “[w]hile not all inclusive, when one of the following or similar conditions exist,

elimination action may be or will be initiated as indicated below for– a. Substandard

performance of duty. . . . b. Misconduct, moral or professional dereliction, or in the

interests of national security.” See also Dep’t of Def. Instruction 1332.30, Encl. 2 (listing

substandard performance of duty and acts of misconduct or moral or professional

dereliction as reasons for separation). AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(a) and paragraph 4-

2(b), each provide non-exhaustive lists of examples of what constitutes substandard

performance of duty and misconduct and moral or professional dereliction. Pursuant to

AR 600-8-24, Table 4-1, “[o]nly applicable reasons as outlined in paragraph 4–2 [of AR

600-8-24] that can be supported by specific factual allegations and evidence may be the

basis for elimination.”

When an officer appears before a Field Board of Inquiry, the Field Board of Inquiry

“is to give the officer a fair and impartial hearing determining if the officer will be retained

in the Army” and establish “the facts of the Respondent’s alleged misconduct,

substandard performance of duty, or conduct incompatible with military service.” AR 600-

8-24, ¶ 4-6(a). Pursuant to AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-6:

Based upon the findings of fact established by its investigation and recorded

in its report, the board then makes a recommendation for the officer’s

disposition, consistent with this regulation. The Government is responsible

to establish, by preponderance of the evidence, that the officer has failed to

maintain the standards desired for their grade and branch or that the

17The court cites to and analyzes the 2014 version of Department of Defense Instruction

1332.30 because the Field Board of Inquiry was convened in 2014 and plaintiff was

discharged in 2014. Department of Defense Instruction 1332.30 was updated on March

31, 2017. See Dep’t of Def. Instruction 1332.30 (2017). The relevant portions of

Department of Defense Instruction 1332.30 as applicable to plaintiff’s elimination

proceeding in 2014, however, were unaffected by the March 31, 2017 update.

26

officer’s Secret-level security clearance has been permanently denied or

revoked by appropriate authorities acting pursuant to DODD 5200.2-R and

AR 380-67. In the absence of such a showing by the Government, the board

will retain the officer.

Id. The Field Board of Inquiry must make “a separate finding (including a brief statement)

on each factual allegation and reason for involuntary separation. The [Field] Board [of

Inquiry] will render findings of fact, supported by a preponderance of the evidence, that

describe specific relevant conduct by the Respondent in sufficient detail to support the

Board’s recommendation.” Id. ¶ 4-15(b)(2); see also Dep’t of Def. Instruction 1332.30,

Encl. 3 ¶ 3(c) (“The Board of Inquiry makes findings on each reason for separation and

recommends whether a respondent should be retained in the military service. . . . The

Board of Inquiry’s findings must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.”

(emphasis added)). If the Field Board of Inquiry recommends retention of an officer, the

officer’s elimination proceedings will be closed. AR 600-8-24, Table 4-1; see also Dep’t

of Def. Instruction, Encl. 3 ¶ 4(1).

If the Field Board of Inquiry recommends that an officer be eliminated from the

Army, the officer’s case will be referred to a Board of Review. AR 600-8-24, ¶ 4-17(a).

“The Board of Review, after thorough review of the records of the case, will make

recommendations to the Secretary of the Army or his designee as to whether the officer

should be retained in the Army.” Id. If the Board of Review recommends retention of an

officer, the officer’s case will be closed. Id. ¶ 4-17(c)(1). If, however, the Board of Review

recommends elimination of the officer, the Board of Review’s “recommendation will be

transmitted to the Secretary of the Army or his designee, who makes the final decision.”

Id. ¶ 4-17(c)(2).

In the above-captioned case, the United States Army Human Resources

Command stated that it was initiating elimination proceedings for two reasons against

plaintiff “under the provisions of Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(b),

because of misconduct, moral or professional dereliction.” Plaintiff’s elimination

proceedings later were supplemented with an additional basis for elimination “under Army

Regulation (AR) 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2 (a)(10), substandard performance of duty.”

Department of Defense Instruction 1332.30 and AR 600-8-24 both required that the Field

Board of Inquiry make findings on each basis for separation, and that the Field Board of

Inquiry’s findings be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See AR 600-8-24,

¶¶ 4-6(a), 4-15(b)(2); Dep’t of Def. Instruction 1332.30, Encl. 3 ¶ 3(c). Specifically, under

AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-6, the government was responsible for establishing, by a

preponderance of the evidence, “that the officer has failed to maintain the standards

desired for their grade and branch or that the officer’s Secret-level security clearance has

been permanently denied or revoked by appropriate authorities acting pursuant to DODD

5200.2-R and AR 380-67.” AR 600-8-24, ¶ 4-6(a). If the government could not meet its

burden under AR 600-8-24, then AR 600-8-24 required that “the board will retain the

officer.” Id. Army Regulation 600-8-24, therefore, limited the discretion of the Field Board

of Inquiry and required the Field Board of Inquiry to retain plaintiff if the Army did not

support its bases for elimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Because AR 600-

8-24 provides procedures and standards pursuant to which the Field Board of Inquiry

27

must operate when reviewing the recommendation to eliminate plaintiff, plaintiff’s claim

that his elimination proceeding was conducted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and

was not supported by substantial evidence is justiciable and reviewable by this court. See

Murphy v. United States, 993 F.2d at 873 (“A court may appropriately decide whether the

military followed procedures because by their nature the procedures limit the military’s

discretion. The court is not called upon to exercise any discretion reserved for the military,

it merely determines whether the procedures were followed by applying the facts to the

statutory or regulatory standard.”); see also Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d at 1177 (“A

court may decide whether the military has complied with procedures set forth in its own

regulations because those procedures by their nature limit the military’s discretion.”

(citation omitted)).

Waiver

In addition to challenging the manner and merits of the Army’s decision to

discharge plaintiff, and arguing that the Army should have retained plaintiff, in plaintiff’s

April 4, 2018 cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record, plaintiff argues: (1)

that the Field Board of Inquiry improperly considered the Polygraph Examiner’s Report

regarding plaintiff’s January 12, 2012 polygraph examination; (2) that the additional, third

basis regarding the revocation of plaintiff’s security clearance was “facially defective” and

that “[t]he record does not show that Exnicios lost his Secret clearance;” (3) that the

elimination proceedings were tainted by unlawful command influence because Major

Frick’s email messages to plaintiff indicate that LTC Cozzens “pressure[d]” Major Frick to

alter his response to the GOMOR and because Colonel Pick, the GOSCA, signed the

additional, third basis for elimination and appointed the Members of the Field Board of

Inquiry, which plaintiff asserts indicated Colonel Pick’s “desire to see Exnicios separated”

to the Members of the Field Board of Inquiry; (4) that the Army did not provide plaintiff

with due process because plaintiff did not receive adequate notice of the bases for

elimination and plaintiff was not permitted to cross-examine the Polygraph Examiner or

the individual that provided the anonymous tip to DIA regarding plaintiff’s alleged

unreported foreign contacts; and (5) that the GOMOR was inaccurate and “should not

have been presented to the BOI.”

Defendant argues that plaintiff has waived several of these claims by not

presenting his claims to the Board of Inquiry or raising his claims in “his appellate brief to

his commanding officer.”18 Defendant asserts that, in his motion for judgment on the

administrative record, plaintiff

raises the following issues: (1) objections related to the polygraph

examination the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) administered on

18 When discussing what defendant identifies as plaintiff’s “appellate brief to his

commanding officer,” defendant cites to a page range in the administrative record that

includes plaintiff’s March 30, 2014 letter of appeal, which is addressed to “Colonel D.

Pick,” and plaintiff’s March 30, 2014 appellate brief to the Board of Review, which is

addressed to the “Board of Review.”

28

January 12, 2012;[19] (2) he retained his secret security clearance, and he

therefore could have been retained; (3) a claim of unlawful command

influence;[20] (4) his due process rights were violated; and (5) he would have

been retained if the Army had weighed the evidence properly.

According to defendant, with the exception of the last issue regarding the weight of the

evidence, plaintiff did not raise any of the issues now identified in his motion for judgment

on the administrative record in his “discharge proceedings,” and, therefore, plaintiff

waived judicial review of those four issues “because the Court’s review is limited to the

issues Mr. Exnicios presented to the military during his discharge proceedings.”

Defendant argues that “a plaintiff waives judicial review of a known objection that he failed

to raise during administrative proceedings,” and that “the waiver doctrine applies to bar

judicial review of objections that a plaintiff failed to make in proceedings before a BOI.”

Defendant, in an attempt to support its position that a plaintiff waives judicial review of an

objection that is not raised in a proceeding before a Board of Inquiry, cites Snakenberg v.

United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 809, 813 (1988), and Waller v. United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 908,

461 F.2d 1273, 1277 (1972), as examples of cases in which an argument has not been

raised before a Board of Inquiry and has been deemed waived.

Plaintiff argues that, “[w]hile there are some instances when waiver applies in the

administrative arena, they do not apply here” because “Exnicios did not seek the

permissive remedy of a correction board. Had he done so, the government’s argument

concerning waiver might make more sense. Since he chose not to do so, however, the

[waiver] doctrine does not apply.” According to plaintiff:

The government then tries to bootstrap their waiver theory by referring to

Snakenberg v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 809, 813 (1988) for the proposition

that issues not presented to a board of inquiry are waived. Again the

defendant is wrong. As a threshold matter, this was another military

correction board case. Id. at 812. Additionally, Snakenberg, held that the

19 Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s argument regarding the polygraph examination

contains three arguments: the polygraph examination report (part of

Government exhibit 3 admitted into evidence by the BOI) should not have

been considered during the discharge proceedings, the Army failed to

provide the raw polygraph data to Mr. Exnicios, and the Army should have

made available for cross-examination during the BOI proceedings the

persons involved in administering the polygraph examination and

interpreting its results.

20 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for unlawful command

influence. In his complaint, plaintiff baldly states that “[t]he decision to discharge Exnicios

was subject to unlawful command influence, which resulted in the decision to discharge

Exnicios in lieu of transfer.” Plaintiff, however, tries to provide some additional details

supporting his unlawful command influence claim in his cross-motion for judgment on the

administrative record.

29

introduction of certain evidence was waived because there was no

objection. Id. at 813. Snakenberg did not address whether issues not

presented to a correction board waived review by a later court. There is no

authority allowing this Court to extend the more limited Snakenberg holding.

The same holds true for the other case cited by the government, which dealt

with the admission of evidence, not issues, claims or causes of action.

Waller v. United States, 461 F.2d 1273, 1277 (Ct. Cl. 1972).

(footnote omitted).

“It is well established that military correction boards provide a ‘permissive

administrative remedy’ for wrongful discharge and that ‘an application to a correction

board is therefore not a mandatory prerequisite to filing a Tucker Act suit challenging the

discharge.’” Klingenschmitt v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 163, 182 (2014) (quoting

Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted)), aff’d,

623 F. App’x 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Doyle v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 285, 311,

599 F.2d 984, 1000 (“[W]e have never held that a petition to the Correction Board is a

mandatory administrative remedy . . . .” (citation omitted)), amended sub nom. In re Doyle,

220 Ct. Cl. 326, 609 F.2d 990 (1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 982 (1980)). In situations in

which a plaintiff seeks relief from a military corrections board “and later brings suit in court,

any argument not previously raised before the corrections board is waived.” Parks v.

United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 677, 680 (2016) (citing Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991,

998 (Fed. Cir. 2006); and Doyle v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 285, 599 F.2d 984); see also

Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (concluding that judicial

review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the administrative record

conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act); Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d at

999 (determining that plaintiff waived his argument of ineffective counsel in front of the

United States Court of Federal Claims because he failed to raise the issue in the first

instance with the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records); Murakami v.

United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the United States Court

of Federal Claims correctly concluded that plaintiff waived his argument concerning his

father’s constructive travel restriction by not first raising the argument with the

administrative agency); Spellissy v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 274, 283 (2012) (“When

a service member chooses first to petition a military correction board, the Court of Federal

Claims’ review is limited to the administrative record.” (citations omitted)); Shaw v. United

States, 100 Fed. Cl. 259, 260 (2011) (“Matters not presented to the ABCMR [Army Board

for Correction of Military Records] are considered to be waived.” (citing Metz v. United

States, 466 F.3d at 998)); Prochazka v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 481, 497 (2009) (“As

a general rule, failure to present an issue before a correction board waives a later raised

claim.” (citing Doyle v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 285, 599 F.2d 984)); Neutze v. United

States, 88 Fed. Cl. 763, 774-75 (2009) (“In evaluating a Board decision, the court may

not consider new arguments not raised before the Board.” (citing Sanders v. United

States, 219 Ct. CI. 285, 594 F.2d 804, 811 (1979))); Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl.

545, 560 (2008) (“The court will not consider materials that were not presented to a review

board.” (internal citations omitted)), aff’d, 591 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The

waiver doctrine has been applied to officers who fail to raise argument before a military

corrections board because “‘[s]imple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of

30

administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple

over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has

erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.’” See Metz v.

United States, 466 F.3d at 999 (quoting United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc.,

344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952)); see also Klingenschmitt v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. at 183

(stating that the policies promoted by “Metz and similar cases” is “allowing an agency to

correct its own errors and respecting the administrative process”); Pearl v. United States,

111 Fed. Cl. 301, 310 (2013) (“Although issues not raised before the administrative body

whose decision is being challenged are ordinarily deemed waived, the rationale for that

rule is that the agency whose actions are being challenged should have a chance to

correct any errors during its administrative adjudicatory process.” (citations omitted)). This

rule “ensures that agencies will have the opportunity to develop their positions and correct

their errors before an appeal.” Village of Barrington, III, v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d

650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S.

at 37).

Plaintiff, however, correctly notes that he did not challenge the Army’s decision to

eliminate plaintiff from the Army at a military corrections board.21 There is limited case

law analyzing the applicability of the waiver doctrine in the context of a Field Board of

Inquiry or similar tribunal. In Snakenberg v. United States, a Major in the United States

Marine Corps (Marine Corps) was arrested for secretly videotaping women who were

changing into bathing suits without their knowledge or consent. Snakenberg v. United

States, 15 Cl. Ct. at 811. The Marine Corps convened a Board of Inquiry to investigate

the Major’s conduct, and the Board of Inquiry concluded that the Major was “guilty” of

conduct unbecoming an officer and sexual perversion and recommended the Major be

discharged from the Marine Corps. See id. Subsequently, a Board of Review “adopted”

the Board of Inquiry’s findings and recommendation, and the Major was involuntarily

discharged. See id. at 812. The Major challenged the Board of Inquiry’s decision before

the Board for Correction of Naval Records, and the Board for Correction of Naval Records

affirmed the Board of Inquiry’s decision. See id. The Major then filed a complaint in the

United States Claims Court, arguing that the Board of Inquiry improperly relied on

evidence when reaching its conclusion that that the Major was “guilty” of conduct

unbecoming an officer and sexual perversion. See id. at 812-13. The United States

Claims Court determined that:

[P]laintiff’s argument that he was not aware that the BOI would rely on

additional evidence is of no moment. Plaintiff waived future objection to the

utilization of such evidence by failing to make a timely objection at the

discharge hearing. See Merson v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 48, 58, 401

F.2d 184, 189 (1968) (ruling that the government waived any possible

objection to evidence by failing to object at its introduction); Moylan v.

Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 524, 525 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff did not make a timely objection to the BOI’s consideration of this

evidence, although he had the opportunity to do so at the hearing.

21 During the July 2, 2018 oral argument, counsel of record for plaintiff stated that, “[m]y

client, on my advice, opted not to” go to a corrections board.

31

Id. at 813 (footnote omitted).

Similarly, in Frecht v. United States, an Army officer appeared before a Board of

Inquiry regarding possible elimination based on “misconduct, moral or professional

dereliction.” See Frecht v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 121, 124 (1992). The Board of Inquiry

recommended that the officer be discharged from the Army, and a Board of Review

“sustained the BOI’s recommendations.” Id. at 126. Subsequently, the Army discharged

the officer, and plaintiff sought review of the Army’s decision at the Army Board for

Correction of Military Records, which determined that the officer’s “elimination process

was conducted in accordance with applicable law and regulations.” Id. The officer then

challenged the Board of Inquiry’s recommendation in the United States Claims Court. See

id. at 128. In a footnote, the Claims Court stated:

The court also does not consider plaintiff’s argument that due to Col.

Keaveney’s participation in the BOI proceedings he was robbed of an

impartial and fair hearing. His challenge concerning Col. Keaveney was not

raised or argued before the BOI. Failure to timely raise objections and

issues to a board of inquiry constitutes a waiver of that right in subsequent

litigation. Snakenberg v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 809, 813 (1988).

Id. at 131 n.7.

Likewise, in Waller v. United States, “a career airman in the Air Force” was

discharged after a “board of officers” recommended that the career airman be discharged

from the Air Force after county police arrested the career airman for exposing himself to

two women. Waller v. United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 908, 910, 912, 461 F.2d 1273, 1274,

1276 (1972) (per curiam). In the United States Court of Claims, the career airman argued

that the board of officers improperly considered a written statement made by the career

airman while in the custody of the county police. Id. at 914, 461 F.2d at 1276. The United

States Court of Claims found that the career airman had waived his right to challenge the

admissibility of the written statement by failing to object to the admission of the written

statement when the written statement was introduced into evidence before the board of

officers. Id. at 914-15, 461 F.2d at 1276-77.

In the above-captioned case, in addition to challenging the merits of plaintiff’s

elimination proceedings in plaintiff’s complaint, in his April 4, 2018 cross-motion for

judgment on the administrative record, plaintiff also argues that it was improper for the

Field Board of Inquiry to consider the Polygraph Examiner’s Report concerning plaintiff’s

January 12, 2012 polygraph examination because “the raw polygraph data, such as the

charts, was not made available for review and analysis,” that the additional, third basis

for elimination regarding the revocation of plaintiff’s security clearance was facially

defective because the notice cited the wrong subsection in AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2,

and that the administrative record does not indicate that the Army revoked plaintiff’s

Secret security clearance. Plaintiff also asserts in his motion for judgment on the

administrative record that his elimination proceedings were tainted by unlawful command

influence because Major Frick’s email messages to plaintiff demonstrate that LTC

32

Cozzens was attempting to “pressure” Major Frick “to urge Exnicios to change his rebuttal

to the GOMOR and to virtually acknowledge the facts in the GOMOR.” Plaintiff also

contends unlawful command influence “permeated” plaintiff’s elimination proceedings

because Colonel Pick, the GOSCA, signed the additional, third basis for elimination

regarding the revocation of plaintiff’s security clearance and appointed the members of

the Field Board of Inquiry, which plaintiff asserts “had the effect of telegraphing the

Colonel’s desire to see Exnicios separated.” Additionally, plaintiff alleges that the Army

did not provide plaintiff with due process because plaintiff “was not provided with

adequate notice of what he was being charged with,” and plaintiff was not permitted to

confront the Polygraph Examiner or the individual that provided the anonymous tip to DIA

regarding plaintiff’s alleged unreported foreign contacts.

Nothing in the summarized transcript22 of plaintiff’s proceedings before the Field

Board of Inquiry, in plaintiff’s letter of appeal to the GOSCA, or in plaintiff’s appellate brief

to the Board of Review indicates that plaintiff objected to the introduction of the Polygraph

Examiner’s Report into the evidence before the Field Board of Inquiry. By failing to object

to the introduction of the Polygraph Examiner’s Report into the evidence received by the

Field Board of Inquiry, plaintiff waived his ability to assert that the Field Board of Inquiry

improperly consider the Polygraph Examiner’s Report. See Snakenberg v. United States,

15 Cl. Ct. at 811; see also Waller v. United States, 198 Ct. Cl. at 914-15.

Plaintiff also waived his unlawful command influence claims by not raising before

the Field of Inquiry, in plaintiff’s letter of appeal to the GOSCA, or in plaintiff’s appellate

brief to the Board of Review plaintiff’s allegations regarding Major Frick’s email messages

to plaintiff or Colonel Pick’s appointment of the members of the Field Board of Inquiry.

See (N G) v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 375, 388 (2010) (stating that a service member’s

failure to raise a command influence claim before an administrative discharge board was

“fatal” to the service member’s claim and precluded the court from considering the service

member’s command influence claim); see also Klingenschmitt v. United States, 119 Fed.

Cl. at 190 (finding that the service member’s “other objections based on allegedly

improper command influence were not raised [before the plaintiff’s court-martial] and are

therefore waived” (citing Martinez v. United States, 914 F.2d 1486, 1488 (Fed. Cir.

1990))); Spehr v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 69, 87-88 (2001) (concluding that a service

member waived his command influence allegation by not raising his allegation in his

administrative discharge proceedings or in his petition to a board for correction of military

records), aff’d, 49 F. App’x 303 (Fed. Cir. 2002). At the Field Board of Inquiry hearing, the

President of the Field Board of Inquiry informed plaintiff that Colonel Pick had appointed

the Board Members and informed plaintiff of his “right to challenge for cause any members

of the board.” Plaintiff, however, indicated that he “ha[d] no challenges” to the Board

22“The record of proceedings [before a Field Board of Inquiry] will be kept in summarized

form unless a verbatim record is required by the appointing authority after consultation

with the servicing judge advocate or legal advisor concerning the availability of verbatim

reporters.” AR 600-8-24, ¶ 4-15(c)(1). Nothing in the administrative record indicates that

plaintiff requested that the Army maintain a verbatim transcript of plaintiff’s proceedings

before the Field Board of Inquiry or that the Army determined a verbatim transcript was

required.

33

Members. Although the President of the Field Board of Inquiry stated that “the records in

this case disclose no grounds for challenging any member for cause. There are no

reasons why any members would not be able to hear the evidence submitted by the

respondent and make a fair and impartial determination in the case,” plaintiff could have

objected nonetheless. In this case, plaintiff’s failure to challenge a Board Member for

cause waived his right to subsequently challenge the alleged impartiality of a Member of

the Board in this court. See Frecht v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. at 131 n.7 (concluding that

a service member waived his right to challenge “Col. Keaveney’s participation in the BOI

proceedings” when the service member’s “concerning Col. Keaveney was not raised or

argued before the BOI”). Plaintiff also waived his unlawful command influence argument

concerning Major Frick’s email messages to plaintiff by failing to raise the issue during

his elimination proceeding. See (N G) v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. at 388.

Regarding plaintiff’s arguments that the notice of an additional, third basis for

elimination involving the revocation of plaintiff’s security clearance was “facially defective”

and that “[t]he record does not show that Exnicios lost his Secret clearance,” plaintiff did

not raise either challenge at the Field Board of Inquiry, in plaintiff’s letter of appeal to the

GOSCA, or in plaintiff’s appellate brief to the Board of Review. Although plaintiff submitted

evidence relevant to the revocation of his security clearance, plaintiff did not once assert

that he maintained a Secret security clearance, notwithstanding the fact that Angelica

Seivwright, a government witness, had testified that plaintiff’s security clearance had been

revoked at all levels. By failing to challenge the accuracy of the additional, third basis for

elimination or argue that plaintiff maintained a Secret security clearance at the Field Board

of Inquiry, in his letter of appeal to the GOSCA, or in his appellate brief to the Board of

Review, plaintiff deprived the Army of an opportunity to address the merits of plaintiff’s

arguments, and thereby waived his ability to raise those arguments for the first time in

this court. See Rock v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 113, 126-28 (2013) (concluding that a

serviceman waived his claims that a Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) used the wrong

standard of review and disability schedule and failed to consider evidence when the

serviceman did not raise his claims in his petition for relief from the PEB’s determination).

Additionally, nothing in the summarized transcript of plaintiff’s proceedings before

the Field Board of Inquiry indicates that plaintiff raised any specific due process claims

before the Field Board of Inquiry, in plaintiff’s letter of appeal to the GOSCA, or in plaintiff’s

appellate brief to the Board of Review. As discussed above, plaintiff argues that he did

not receive due process because plaintiff “was not provided with adequate notice of what

he was being charged with” and plaintiff was not permitted to confront the Polygraph

Examiner or the individual that provided the anonymous tip to DIA regarding plaintiff’s

alleged unreported foreign contacts. Plaintiff, however, did not raise those due process

claims before the Field Board of Inquiry, in plaintiff’s letter of appeal to the GOSCA, or in

plaintiff’s appellate brief to the Board of Review. By failing to assert a due process

argument related to the allegations described above during his elimination proceedings,

plaintiff deprived the Army of the opportunity to consider plaintiff’s due process

arguments, and, consequently, plaintiff’s failure to raise his due process arguments

waives his right to subsequent review in this court. See Frecht v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct.

at 131 n.7; see also Snakenberg v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. at 811.

34

Regarding plaintiff’s argument that the GOMOR was “factually and facially

defective” and should not have been presented to the BOI, based on the record before

the court, plaintiff did not object to the admission of the GOMOR into the evidence before

the Field Board of Inquiry during his proceeding at the Field Board of Inquiry, in plaintiff’s

letter of appeal to the GOSCA, or in plaintiff’s appellate brief to the Board of Review. By

failing to object to the admission of the GOMOR, plaintiff waived his argument that the

Field Board of Inquiry improperly considered the GOMOR. See Snakenberg v. United

States, 15 Cl. Ct. at 811; see also Waller v. United States, 198 Ct. Cl. at 914-15. Plaintiff,

however, did at least briefly argue in his letter of appeal to the GOSCA that “the GOMOR

was factually inaccurate” and in plaintiff’s appellate brief to the Board of Review that

“[r]ecent information shows that the GOMOR I was issued was flawed procedurally and

in its substance.” Therefore, plaintiff’s claim in his motion for judgment on the

administrative record that the “record demonstrates conclusively that the GOMOR was

inaccurate” was raised during plaintiff’s elimination proceeding and, therefore, arguably

has not been waived. Thus, after analyzing defendant’s arguments regarding justiciability

and waiver, plaintiff’s only claims that should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim

is plaintiff’s argument that the recommendation of the Field Board of Inquiry,

recommendation of the Board of Review, and decision of the Deputy Assistant Secretary

were not supported by substantial evidence and that the GOMOR was factually

inaccurate.23

In the alternative to defendant’s motion to dismiss, the parties have crossed-moved

for judgment on the administrative record regarding the recommendation of the Field

Board of Inquiry, recommendation of the Board of Review, and decision of the Deputy

Assistant Secretary. Pursuant to RCFC 52.1(c), which governs motions for judgment on

the administrative record, the court’s inquiry is directed to “whether, given all the disputed

and undisputed facts, a party has met its burden of proof based on the evidence in the

record.” Mgmt. & Training Corp. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 26, 40 (2014) (quoting A

& D Fire Prot., Inc. v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 126, 131 (2006) (citing Bannum, Inc. v.

United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2005))); see also Martin v. United

States, 133 Fed. Cl. 248, 253 (2017) (quoting A & D Fire Prot., Inc. v. United States, 72

Fed. Cl. 126, 131 (2006)); Vellanti v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 570, 578 (2015) (quoting

Sierra Nevada Corp. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 735, 751 (2012)) (“RCFC 52.1 governs

motions for judgment on the administrative record. . . . Unlike summary judgment, for

instance, ‘a genuine dispute of material fact does not preclude a judgment on the

administrative record.’”).

Plaintiff contends that the approval of the Board of Review’s recommendation to

eliminate plaintiff by the Deputy Assistant Secretary was arbitrary and capricious and not

23 In plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff alleges that the decision to discharge plaintiff from the

Army was arbitrary and capricious and “was subject to unlawful command influence,” but

plaintiff does not assert in his complaint that the Field Board of Inquiry improperly

considered the Polygraph Examiner’s Report, that the additional, third basis regarding the

revocation of plaintiff’s security clearance was “facially defective” and that plaintiff

retained a security clearance, that the Army did not provide plaintiff with due process, or

that the GOMOR was inaccurate and “should not have been presented to the BOI.”

35

supported by substantial evidence. “[T]he court may only ‘review the rationale underlying

the Secretary’s decision to determine if the decision was arbitrary, capricious,

unsupported by substantial evidence, or in violation of law.’” Cook v. United States, 123

Fed. Cl. 277, 306-07 (2015) (quoting Strickland v. United States, 423 F.3d 1335, 1339

(Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also West v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 55, 60 (2012) (analyzing

a service member’s claim that the Secretary of the Army wrongfully discharged the

service member and stating “the court asks whether the party seeking relief has shown

that the contested decision was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported

by substantial evidence”); Boyd v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 1, 8-9 (1975) (“The court, in

turn, may reject the decision of a Secretary only if he has exercised his discretion

arbitrarily, capriciously, in bad faith, contrary to substantial evidence, or where he has

gone outside the board record, or fails to explain his actions, or violates applicable law or

regulations.”). This standard of review is narrow. The court, however, does not sit as “a

super correction board.” Skinner v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. at 331, 594 F.2d at 830;

see also Voge v. United States, 844 F.2d 776, 782 (Fed. Cir.) (The “court does not

function as ‘a sort of super Correction Board.’” (quoting Reale v. United States, 208 Ct.

Cl. 1010, 1013, 529 F.2d 533, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 (1976))), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

941 (1988); Ward v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 418, 427 (2017) (quoting Stine v. United

States, 92 Fed. Cl. 776, 791 (2010)). Moreover, “military administrators are presumed to

act lawfully and in good faith like other public officers, and the military is entitled to

substantial deference in the governance of its affairs.” Dodson v. United States, 988 F.2d

at 1204; see also Pipes v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 380, 390 (2017) (quoting Porter v.

United States, 163 F.3d at 1316). “‘[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army.’”

Antonellis v. United States, 723 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Orloff v.

Willoughby, 345 U.S. at 93); see also Lippman v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. at 244

(citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court, however, also has stated:

Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency

has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely

failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation

for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so

implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product

of agency expertise. The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make

up for such deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned basis for the

agency’s action that the agency itself has not given. SEC v. Chenery Corp.,

332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) [reh’g denied and reh’g denied sub nom. SEC v.

Fed. Water & Gas Corp. (1947)]. We will, however, “uphold a decision of

less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”

Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas–Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S.

[281,] 286, 95 S. Ct. 438, 42 L. Ed. 2d 447 [(1974)]. See also Camp v. Pitts,

411 U.S. 138, 142–143, 93 S. Ct. 1241, 36 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1973) (per

curiam).

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-

44 (1983) (other citations omitted); see also SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 630 F.3d

1365, 1373 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).

36

Decisions of the Field Board of Inquiry, Board of Review, and Deputy Assistant

Secretary

Plaintiff alleges the actions of the Field Board of Inquiry, Board of Review, and

Deputy Assistant Secretary were arbitrary and capricious because: 1) plaintiff could have

been transferred to a field artillery position; 2) plaintiff was prematurely terminated before

he could reapply for his security clearance; 3) there was evidence that plaintiff had

“recovered from any lapse of judgment and was rehabilitated;” and 4) the third basis,

regarding the revocation of plaintiff’s security clearance, allegedly supporting elimination

was facially deficient. Plaintiff asserts that he should have been retained by the Army

because plaintiff “was a top artilleryman,” was only required to maintain a Secret security

clearance for an artillery position, and the Members of the Field Board of Inquiry “seemed

to base their decision on whether Exnicios should be eliminated as an FAO and not

whether he should be eliminated from the Army.” Plaintiff argues that the Field Board of

Inquiry only spent “8.78 seconds on each sheet of paper” and the Board of Review only

spent “an average of 2.4 seconds on each page” when reviewing the record before each

Board, which, according to plaintiff, is “clear evidence that neither board considered all

relevant factors.” Plaintiff also contends the Boards and Deputy Assistant Secretary failed

to articulate rational explanations connected to the facts. Additionally, plaintiff asserts that

the decision to eliminate plaintiff before he was eligible to reapply for his security

clearance was arbitrary and capricious, and the “fact that the DOHA AJ [administrative

judge] felt that the clearance should have been restored should have weighed heavily on

both the BOI and the BOR [Board of Review].” Plaintiff also asserts that the “record is rife

with praise for his performance both before and after the incidents.” Regarding the third

basis for elimination identified in the July 15, 2013 memorandum for “substandard

performance of duty, due to the permanent revocation of your security clearance,” plaintiff

argues that the third basis is facially deficient because the notice incorrectly cited to AR

600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(a)(10), which states that elimination proceedings will be initiated

when an officer consecutively fails APFTs, rather than AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-

2(b)(10), which states that elimination proceedings may be initiated against an officer after

the “final denial or revocation of an officer’s Secret security clearance.” According to

plaintiff, the administrative record “does not show that Exnicios lost his Secret clearance,”

and “even the presumed correct citation does not cover the loss of a TS (SCI) clearance.”

Defendant, however, argues that the Deputy Assistant Secretary’s approval of “the

unanimous board of review recommendation that Mr. Exnicios should be eliminated is the

antithesis of an arbitrary and capricious decision.” Defendant states that “by the time the

elimination proceedings reached the Secretary, each of the following had recommended

that Mr. Exnicios be eliminated from the Army: a unanimous board of inquiry, a GOSCA,

and a unanimous board of review.” Defendant also argues that the Deputy Assistant

Secretary appropriately gave the administrative judge’s decision “very little weight when

determining whether Mr. Exnicios should be eliminated” because the administrative

judge’s decision “addressed a different issue—Mr. Exnicios’s security clearance—than

the issue before the Secretary—whether Mr. Exnicios should be involuntarily discharged.”

Defendant contends that the United States Army Personnel Security Appeals Board

“rejected” the DOHA administrative judge’s reasoning “by overruling the AJ’s [DOHA

administrative judge’s] decision” and argues that the United States Army Personnel

37

Security Appeals Board’s rejection “should preclude” the court from finding that the

Deputy Assistant Secretary should have given any probative weight to the DOHA

administrative judge’s decision. Additionally, defendant asserts that there was substantial

evidence before the Field Board of Inquiry supporting the Field Board of Inquiry’s

conclusion that, at the time plaintiff initially was in contact with Yuliya, he thought, or was

not sure, she was a Ukrainian citizen, and there was evidence in the record that plaintiff

did not possess a security clearance.

The Field Board of Inquiry

The Field Board of Inquiry convened on March 7, 2014 to determine whether

plaintiff “should be eliminated from the Army prior to the expiration of the Soldier’s current

term of service, under the provisions of AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2, for misconduct,

moral or professional dereliction and for substandard performance of duty.” The Field

Board of Inquiry found in full:

FINDINGS

The board, having carefully considered the evidence before it, finds:

The allegation of misconduct under AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2b,

specifically that substantiated derogatory activity resulted in a General of

Memorandum of Reprimand dated 2 April 2012, being file [sic] in your

Official Military Personnel File, is supported by a preponderance of the

evidence and does warrant elimination.

The allegation of misconduct under AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2b,

specifically you engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer as related to the

above referenced event, in the notification of proposed separation, is

supported by a preponderance of the evidence and does warrant

elimination.

The allegation of substandard performance of duty under AR 600-8-24,

paragraph 4-2a, specifically, that action has been taken, and your final

appeal of that action denied, by appropriate authorities to permanently

revoke your security clearance, in the notification of proposed separation,

is supported by a preponderance of the evidence and does warrant

elimination.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the above findings, the board recommends that MAJ Adam L.

Exnicios, be:

Eliminated from the United States Army with a general (under honorable

conditions) characterization of service.

38

(capitalization in original).

The First and Second Bases for Elimination

Regarding the Field Board of Inquiry’s first two bases for elimination, the allegation

of misconduct “that substantiated derogatory activity” resulted in a GOMOR being filed in

plaintiff’s official military personnel file and that plaintiff “engaged in conduct unbecoming

an officer as related to the” GOMOR, the Field Board of Inquiry received the GOMOR and

the filing determination placing the GOMOR in plaintiff’s official military personnel file as

exhibits. The GOMOR stated that plaintiff had “failed to inform the investigating agent

about your close, personal relationships with two separate foreign national women,

neither of which are your wife.” The GOMOR also noted that plaintiff had maintained

contact with Yuliya through social media and indicated that plaintiff’s failure to notify the

“appropriate servicing security office” raised questions about plaintiff’s reliability,

trustworthiness, and ability to safeguard classified information.

The Field Board of Inquiry also received the DIA Agent’s Report regarding

plaintiff’s January 10, 2012 interview and the January 12, 2012 polygraph examination,

plaintiff’s Voluntary Sworn Statement, plaintiff’s Unofficial Foreign Contact Report, and

the DIA Polygraph Examiner’s Report. The DIA Agent’s Report dated January 17, 2012

detailed plaintiff’s interactions with the two women plaintiff seemed to believe were

Ukrainian, only one of whom plaintiff alleges to be a naturalized United States citizen,

which plaintiff had not reported during his original interview with DIA in June 7, 2011.

Regarding Yuliya, the Ukrainian woman plaintiff met at Columbia University, who plaintiff

alleges to be a naturalized United States citizen, but who was from Ukraine and identified

by plaintiff as Ukrainian during his January 2012 interviews, the DIA Agent’s Report dated

January 17, 2012 indicated that plaintiff stated during the January 10, 2012 interview that

plaintiff and Yuliya “had a long dinner and many drinks” and “shared personal

conversation.” In plaintiff’s Unofficial Foreign Contact Report regarding Yuliya, plaintiff

stated that their relationship “was continuous as of spring 2011 – could continue in future.”

The DIA Agent also testified before the Field Board of Inquiry that, during plaintiff’s

January 10, 2012 interview, plaintiff “documented” Yuliya as a Ukrainian citizen, not as a

United States citizen, and stated that “[c]ontinuing contact is two occasion [sic] and

maintaining that contact; it is ongoing, such as emailing or face booking.”

Regarding Okasana, the Ukrainian woman plaintiff met while in Germany in 2008,

the DIA’s Agent’s Report dated January 17, 2012 provided that plaintiff stated during his

January 10, 2012 interview that he had a “crush” on Okasana and had developed a

“strong emotional bond with HER.” (capitalization in original). Additionally, plaintiff

indicated in his January 10, 2012 interview that, “[w]hile in Washington, DC, SUBJECT

admitted that he and [Okasana] separated from the group to go on a shopping trip. On a

shopping trip to Tyson’s Corner Mall in Virginia, [Okasana] tried on dresses and other

clothes and modeled them for SUBJECT.” (capitalization in original). Plaintiff “denied any

intimate contact with [Okasana] on the trip to Washington, DC” during his January 10,

2012 interview, but stated that he and Okasana subsequently kissed at a seminar function

at the Community Club in Germany, while plaintiff’s wife was sick and unable to attend.

Plaintiff “advised that HE did not report HIS contact with [Okasana] during HIS security

39

interview with the DAC-4 Investigations Division in Jun 2011 because HE wanted to

‘disassociate’ HIMSELF from the situation. HE did not want it to affect HIS job and HIS

family.” (capitalization in original). In his Voluntary Sworn Statement provided by plaintiff

on January 10, 2012, plaintiff stated that he had “close contact with [Okasana] a Ukrainian

between September to November of 2008” and their contact “became at first

professionally and then personally close, at times the behavior was both provacitive [sic]

and flirtatious.”

Additionally, the DIA Agent’s Report indicated that, in plaintiff’s January 12, 2012

polygraph examination, plaintiff provided “the polygraph examiner with additional details

regarding the TDY to Washington, DC in Nov 2008 which HE did not provide to Reporting

Agent during HIS interview on 10 Jan 2012 and did not report on HIS Voluntary Sworn

Statement which he completed on 10 Jan 2012.” (capitalization in original). Although

plaintiff had “denied any intimate contact with [Okasana] on the trip to Washington, DC”

during his January 10, 2012 interview, plaintiff indicated during the January 12, 2012

polygraph examination that Okasana “modeled clothing for HIM in a provocative manner,”

and that he and Okasana had kissed at the dinner they went to while on the trip to

Washington, D.C., as well as during the cab ride back to their hotel following that dinner.

(capitalization in original). Plaintiff “admitted that HE was trying to keep the relationship

secret from HIS classmates and instructors. SUBJECT learned how HE was potentially

vulnerable and exploitable.” (capitalization in original). Additionally, the Polygraph

Examiner’s Report stated that plaintiff “did not complete” the specific issue polygraph

examination regarding sexual intercourse with Ukrainian women since plaintiff had been

married, and the Polygraph Examiner’s Report stated that “Deception was Indicated.”

(capitalization in original).

As discussed above, the Field Board of Inquiry “makes findings on each reason

for separation and recommends whether a respondent should be retained in military

service. . . . The Board of Inquiry’s findings must be supported by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Dep’t of Def. Instruction 1332.30, Encl. 3 ¶ 3(c); see also AR 600-8-24, ¶ 4-

15(b)(2) (“The [Field] Board [of Inquiry] will render findings of fact, supported by a

preponderance of the evidence, that describe specific relevant conduct by the

Respondent in sufficient detail to support the Board’s recommendation.”). Given the

evidence before the Field Board of Inquiry, it was not arbitrary and capricious for the

Board to conclude that the government had established, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that plaintiff had engaged in misconduct that resulted in the GOMOR being

placed in his official military personnel file and in conduct unbecoming of an officer as

indicated in the GOMOR. See United States v. C.H. Robinson Co., 760 F.3d 1376, 1383

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“‘Preponderance of the evidence’ means “‘“the greater weight of

evidence, evidence which is more convincing than the evidence which is offered in

opposition to it.”’” (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 763,

769 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Hale v. Dep’t of Transp., Fed. Aviation Admin., 772 F.2d

882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1985)))). Plaintiff failed to disclose his contacts and relationships with

the two women from the Ukraine, and, even when plaintiff disclosed the two foreign

contacts, plaintiff failed to disclose all of the relevant details involving Okasana during his

January 10, 2012 interview. Plaintiff did describe his relationship with Yuliya, who plaintiff

identified as a Ukrainian citizen, as “continuous” in the Unofficial Foreign Contact Report

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and stated that he had “close contact” with Okasana in his Voluntary Sworn Statement.

Plaintiff also indicated he attempted to keep his relationship with Okasana “secret” from

his classmates and instructors, and that plaintiff did not report his contact with Okasana

during his “security interview with the DAC-4 Investigations Division in Jun 2011” because

he wanted to “‘disassociate’ HIMSELF from the situation” and “did not want it to affect

HIS job and HIS family.” (capitalization in original).

Moreover, the court is not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that the two email

messages allegedly written by Yuliya, in which Yuliya claims to be a naturalized United

States citizen, “demonstrates conclusively that the GOMOR was inaccurate” and that her

Ukrainian status “should not have been used as a basis for elimination.” The GOMOR did

state that plaintiff “failed to inform the investigating agent about your close, personal

relationships with two separate foreign national women, neither of which are your wife,”

and the GOMOR asserted that plaintiff’s “failure to notify the appropriate servicing security

office of close, intimate, or continuous communication or connection with a foreign

national can raise questions about your reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect

classified information.” It is undisputed that Okasana, who, in his Voluntary Sworn

Statement, plaintiff stated he had “close contact” with, was a foreign national that plaintiff

did not disclose during his June 7, 2011 interview with DIA. The GOMOR also stated that

plaintiff had “failed to follow Army Regulations and failed to be forthcoming in relationships

that directly impact your ability to continue to serve in your current capacity” as a Foreign

Area Officer who was pending assignment to Russia. The DIA Agent’s Report, the

Polygraph Examiner’s Report, plaintiff’s Unofficial Foreign Contact Report, and plaintiff’s

Voluntary Sworn Statement all supported by a preponderance of the evidence the first

two bases for elimination of plaintiff from the Army, namely that plaintiff engaged in

misconduct resulting in the GOMOR being placed in his official military personnel file and

in conduct unbecoming of an officer.

The Third Basis for Elimination

As noted above, plaintiff argues that the third basis for elimination regarding the

revocation of plaintiff’s security clearance is facially deficient because the notice of

elimination cited to the wrong provision in AR 600-8-24, and that the administrative record

“does not show that Exnicios lost his Secret clearance.” The notice of plaintiff’s additional,

third basis for elimination provides that an “additional basis for elimination has arisen

under Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2 (a)(10), substandard performance

of duty. You are hereby notified to show cause for retention on active duty under AR 600-

8-24, paragraph 4-2(a)(10) substandard performance of duty, due to the permanent

revocation of your security clearance.” Plaintiff correctly notes the Army cited an

inapplicable section in the Army Regulations, AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(a)(10), which

indicates that the initiation of elimination proceedings for substandard performance of

duty is appropriate “[w]hen no medical problems exist, and an officer has two consecutive

failures of the APFT.” Revocation of plaintiff’s SCI security clearance and access

eligibility, which was at issue, was not impacted plaintiff’s ability, or inability, to pass the

APFT. None of the evidence submitted by plaintiff or the government to the Field Board

of Inquiry, however, involved plaintiff’s ability to pass the APFT, and plaintiff did not

address his ability to pass the APFT in his letter of appeal to the GOSCA or in his appellate

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brief to the Board of Review. Rather, both plaintiff and the government submitted

considerable evidence related to the status of plaintiff’s security clearance. Although AR

600-8-24, paragraph 4-2, does state that the reasons for elimination articulated in AR

600-8-24, paragraph 4-2, are “not all inclusive,” and that elimination may be initiated when

“when one of the following or similar conditions exist,” this does not appear to cure the

apparent citation error. The notice of plaintiff’s third basis for elimination, however,

explicitly informed plaintiff that he was being considered for elimination for substandard

performance of duty “due to the permanent revocation of your security clearance,” and

the Field Board of Inquiry found that a preponderance of the evidence supported the

“allegation of substandard performance of duty under AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2a,

specifically, that action has been taken, and your final appeal of that action denied, by

appropriate authorities to permanently revoke your security clearance.” The issues before

the Field Board of Inquiry, therefore, was whether plaintiff’s security clearance had been

revoked, and whether such a revocation constituted substandard performance of duty.

Although the Army is bound by its own regulations, “strict compliance with

procedural requirements is not required where the error is deemed harmless.” Wagner v.

United States, 365 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Gratehouse v. United States,

206 Ct. Cl. 288, 512 F.2d 1104, 1108 (1975)); see also Dolan v. United States, 91 Fed.

Cl. at 123 (“While government agencies must follow their own regulations, Wagner

reaffirmed the concept that strict compliance with procedural requirements is not

necessary when divergence from procedure is deemed harmless.” (citing Wagner v.

United States, 365 F.3d at 1361)). “[T]he military’s failure to comply with its procedures

for effecting a discharge does not render the discharge itself unlawful where the

procedural error is deemed ‘harmless’ because the regulatory violation did not

substantially affect the outcome of the matter.” Rogers v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 757,

767 (2016); see also Dolan v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. at 123 (“[N]o changes will be

made when the error or injustice is deemed harmless because harmless errors are not

sufficiently significant to change the outcome of a case.” (citations omitted)). In the above-

captioned case, AR 600-8-24 required that the Army officer initiating plaintiff’s elimination

action inform plaintiff, “in writing, that elimination action has been initiated and that he or

she is required to show cause for retention” and notify plaintiff “of the reasons supporting

the elimination action and the factual allegations supporting the reasons.” See AR 600-8-

24, Table 4-1. The citation in plaintiff’s notice to a subsection of AR 600-8-24, paragraph

4-2, regarding the APFT was harmless error because the notice stated that plaintiff was

being considered for elimination for substandard performance of duty “due to the

permanent revocation of your security clearance,” and plaintiff’s elimination proceedings

concerned the revocation of plaintiff’s security clearance, not plaintiff’s ability to pass the

APFT. Moreover, as discussed above, plaintiff never asserted during his elimination

proceedings that the notice of the additional, third basis for elimination did not adequately

provide plaintiff with notice of why the Army was initiating elimination proceedings and

plaintiff submitted evidence relating to his security clearance, which indicates that plaintiff

was aware of the reasons why the Army initiated and completed elimination proceedings.

Furthermore, despite the inapplicable citation in the notice of plaintiff’s additional,

third basis for elimination, the decision of the Field Board of Inquiry and the evidence

received into the record fully documents the basis for the Field Board of Inquiry’s decision.

42

The Field Board of Inquiry received as evidence the United States Army Personnel

Security Appeals Board’s June 26, 2013 memorandum to plaintiff, which had a subject

line of “Appeal of Security Clearance Revocation and Sensitive Compartmented

Information (SCI) Access Ineligibility.” In the June 26, 2013 memorandum, the United

States Army Personnel Security Appeals Board stated that it had denied plaintiff’s appeal

“based upon your failure to mitigate the following concerns addressed by the U.S. Army

Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF): Personal Conduct and Foreign

Influence.” The June 26, 2013 memorandum stated “[t]his decision is final and completes

your due process. In accordance with paragraph 8-201, AR 380-67, a request for

reconsideration of your case may be resubmitted one year from the date of this letter.”

The plain language of the June 26, 2013 memorandum in the record indicates that

plaintiff’s security clearance was being revoked, and that, in addition, plaintiff was

ineligible to access Sensitive Compartmented Information.

Additionally, several witnesses who appeared before the Field Board of Inquiry

testified that plaintiff did not possess any level of a security clearance. The second

government witness, Angelica Seivwright, who stated that “[m]y office manages

background investigations and security clearances,” testified that, “[a]s of today’s date,

his [plaintiff’s] security clearance is revoked,” and that plaintiff’s “security clearance was

revocated [sic] at all levels; he currently does not have any level of clearance.” Ms.

Seivwright also stated, “[b]ecause MAJ Exnicios does not have clearance, I can’t initiate

a re-investigation. My hands are tied because his clearance is revoked, unless we are at

that one year mark for reconsideration, then we can initiate it at that time.” Additionally,

plaintiff called as a witness LTC Ross V. Gagliano, who stated that he was plaintiff’s

“supervisor and have been for 11 months.” LTC Gagliano stated that “[w]e had a

challenge to place him [plaintiff] because he doesn’t have a security clearance,” and that

“it was determine[d] his clearance was permanently revoked.” Two additional witnesses

called by plaintiff, plaintiff’s father and plaintiff’s wife, both testified that plaintiff had lost

his security clearance.

The United States Army Personnel Security Appeals Board’s June 26, 2013

memorandum and the testimony provided by the witnesses before the Field Board of

Inquiry supports, by a preponderance of the evidence, the Field Board of Inquiry’s finding

of substandard performance of duty because “action has been taken, and your final

appeal of that action denied, by appropriate authorities to permanently revoke your

security clearance . . . and does warrant elimination.” The United States Army Personnel

Security Appeals Board’s June 26, 2013 memorandum indicated that it denied plaintiff’s

appeal of his security clearance revocation and Sensitive Compartmented Information

access ineligibility, and the testimony before the Field Board of Inquiry indicated that

plaintiff did not possess a security clearance. Nothing in the record before the Field Board

of Inquiry indicates that plaintiff had maintained any level of security clearance, and

nowhere in plaintiff’s testimony before the Field Board of Inquiry or in his appellate brief

to the Board of Review does plaintiff claim to have maintained any level of security

clearance. As an officer in the United States Army, plaintiff was required to “hold a security

clearance of at least secret.” See AR 600-8-24, ¶ 4-1(b). The evidence before the Field

Board of Inquiry indicated plaintiff did not maintain any level of security clearance, and at

the time indicated that plaintiff’s security clearance had been revoked. Therefore, the

43

Field Board of Inquiry rationally concluded that plaintiff’s lack of security clearance

constituted substandard performance of duty and warranted elimination.

Additionally, the Field Board of Inquiry did not act “prematurely” by recommending

elimination of plaintiff before plaintiff could reapply for his security clearance and Sensitive

Compartmented Information access eligibility, as plaintiff alleges. Moreover, nothing in

AR 600-8-24, which governs elimination proceedings of Army officers, required that the

Field Board of Inquiry stay elimination proceedings until plaintiff could reapply for his

security clearance and Sensitive Compartmented Information access eligibility in June

2014, nor was there any persuasive evidence in the record before the Field Board of

Inquiry that plaintiff would receive a security clearance when he reapplied. Rather, AR

600-8-24, paragraph 4-2, states that elimination proceedings “may be or will be initiated”

“when one of the following or similar conditions exist.” The Field Board of Inquiry,

therefore, did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it concluded that plaintiff’s third

basis for elimination was supported by a preponderance of the evidence and warranted

elimination.

Contrary to plaintiff’s position, for the reasons articulated above regarding all three

bases supporting elimination, “all evidence” did not point to retention of plaintiff as a Field

Artillery Officer, and the administrative record does provide a basis to conclude whether

“the Plaintiff had recovered from any lapse of judgment and was rehabilitated,” as alleged

by plaintiff. The Field Board of Inquiry did hear testimony from two witnesses called by

plaintiff who generally stated that plaintiff should be retained by the Army and from eight

witnesses called by plaintiff, including plaintiff, who alleged that plaintiff was a valuable

asset to the Army. The Field Board of Inquiry also received the Officer Evaluation Reports

in plaintiff’s official military personnel file, which had rated plaintiff’s performance as

outstanding. Elimination of an officer from the Army, however, may occur when one of the

conditions in AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2, are present or a similar condition exists. See

AR 600-8-24, ¶ 4-2. The Field Board of Inquiry was required to “describe specific relevant

conduct . . . in sufficient detail to support the Board’s recommendation” for each basis

supporting elimination and had the option of “recommend[ing] retention (with or without

reassignment) or involuntary separation.” AR 600-8-24, ¶ 4-2(b)(2); see also Dep’t of Def.

Instruction 1332.30, Encl. 3 ¶ 3(c)(2). The Field Board of Inquiry “may choose to address

mitigating, extenuating or aggravating factors in its findings where the Board believes that

such findings are necessary to support or explain the Board’s recommendation.” Id. ¶ 4-

15(b)(2). In the above-captioned case, the Field Board of Inquiry found that there were

three bases supporting the elimination of plaintiff from the Army – one basis under AR

600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(a), “[s]ubstandard performance of duty,” and two bases under

AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-2(b), “[m]isconduct, moral or professional dereliction, or in the

interests of national security.” Because each of the three bases for elimination was

supported by a preponderance of the evidence, it was within the discretion of the Field

Board of Inquiry to recommend elimination or retention of plaintiff. The evidence of

plaintiff’s service in the Army did not preclude the Field Board of Inquiry from rationally

recommending that plaintiff should be eliminated from the Army, given plaintiff’s

substandard performance of duty and misconduct, nor did the evidence of plaintiff’s

service in the Army require the Field Board of Inquiry to address alleged mitigating

circumstances under AR 600-8-24, paragraph 4-15(b)(2). The incorrect citation in

44

plaintiff’s notice of the additional, third basis for elimination cannot overcome the fully

developed record supporting the propriety of plaintiff’s elimination process, despite

previous good military service.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the decision of the Field Board of Inquiry was arbitrary

and capricious because the Field Board of Inquiry only spent “8.78 seconds on each sheet

of paper.” According to plaintiff:

The BOI convened at 9 am and closed for deliberations at 1:30 pm. They

heard from eleven witnesses and were presented with 205 pages of

documents including Exnicios military record. The board deliberated for only

30 minutes, reconvening at 2:00 pm. Assuming no time for discussions,

review of witness testimony completion of the forms and time required for

everyone to reassemble, the members spent an average of 8.78 seconds

on each sheet of paper.

(internal references omitted). When the President of the Field Board of Inquiry convened

the Field Board of Inquiry, the President stated that “the records in this case disclose no

grounds for challenging any member [of the Field Board of Inquiry] for cause” and

“inquired if any member desires a recess further study or review any matters. No

members desired to recess,” and plaintiff did not challenge any member of the Field Board

of Inquiry for cause, suggesting the expectation was that all parties and Board Members

should have reviewed and studied “the records in this case.” The Field Board of Inquiry

then held the hearing regarding plaintiff’s elimination for four and a half hours, during

which the Field Board of Inquiry heard the testimony of eleven witnesses. Moreover, in

plaintiff’s March 30, 2014 appellate brief to the Board of Review, plaintiff noted that “they

[the Field Board of Inquiry] had the documentation provided by the government to review

for several months.” Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, there is no evidence in the record

before the court that indicates the Members of Field Board of Inquiry failed to consider

evidence relevant to plaintiff’s elimination, or did not review the records that had been

made available to them several months before the hearing.

The Board of Review and the Deputy Assistant Secretary

Subsequent to plaintiff’s hearing before the Field Board of Inquiry, on July 10,

2014, a Board of Review “convened to review the action of the Board of Inquiry which

recommended elimination” of plaintiff from the Army.24 The Recorder of the Board of

24 Prior to the convening of the Board of Review, on March 30, 2014, plaintiff submitted a

letter of appeal to Colonel Pick, who was serving as the GOSCA, in which plaintiff

requested that Colonel Pick “thoroughly review the results of the Board of Inquiry both in

regard to the recommendation to eliminate me from the Army before being allowed to

request reconsideration of my security clearance in June of 2014, and in regard to the

character of discharge recommended.” On April 4, 2014, Colonel Pick recommended

approval of the Field Board of Inquiry’s recommendation of elimination, but recommended

that plaintiff’s discharge be characterized as honorable rather than general, as

recommended by the Field Board of Inquiry.

45

Review stated the GOMOR in plaintiff’s file reflects that plaintiff failed to inform the Agent

investigating his security clearance “of his close personal relationships with two separate

foreign national women, neither of whom was his wife. He also failed to inform his wife of

these relationships and continued to maintain the connections through social media and

to communicate his professional travel arrangements.” According to the Recorder,

plaintiff’s “failure to notify the appropriate servicing security office of these contacts raised

questions about h

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.