Opinion

Fredrick Walker v. Timothy Price

  • 900 F.3d 933
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Aug 20, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Barrett
On the bench
Manion, Barrett, Gettleman
Nature of suit
prisoner
Cited by
240 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.7%

finding that a case in which the main argument was whether “prison officers refused to respond to [the plaintiff’s] requests for medical care, not that the care he received was substandard…is not categorically beyond the capacity of a pro se plaintiff”

How later courts described this case

  • finding that a case in which the main argument was whether “prison officers refused to respond to [the plaintiff’s] requests for medical care, not that the care he received was substandard…is not categorically beyond the capacity of a pro se plaintiff”
  • finding that medical claims are not per se complex and that the prisoner's medical claims were simpler than most, as they focused on which party-the prisoner or the guard-was to be believed
  • noting that plaintiff’s “task was to highlight the strength of his own account and im- peach the credibility of the defendants” and “the presence of counsel would have ensured a fair presentation of Walker’s case to the jury”
  • finding abuse of discretion in denying counsel to prisoner who could not ably litigate without jailhouse lawyer, who had been transferred, and faced a jury trial by videoconference

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 17-1345

FREDRICK WALKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TIMOTHY PRICE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:14–cv–01343–HAB — Harold A. Baker, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 24, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2018

____________________

Before MANION and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and

GETTLEMAN, District Judge.*

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. A litigant in a civil case has neither

a statutory nor a constitutional right to counsel. He can, how-

ever, ask the court to recruit counsel to represent him on a pro

bono basis. When the court receives such a request from an

* Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

2 No. 17-1345

indigent plaintiff, it must determine whether the plaintiff has

made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel on his own and

whether, given the difficulty of the case, the plaintiff is com-

petent to litigate it himself. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649

(7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). If the answer to the first question is

yes and the answer to the second is no, then the court must

seek counsel to represent the plaintiff.

This case involves the district court’s assessment of the

second question. Fredrick Walker, an inmate, brought a civil-

rights suit against several prison officers. Over the course of

the litigation, Walker asked the court six times to recruit a vol-

unteer lawyer to represent him. The court acted within its dis-

cretion when it denied his initial motions. But it abused its

discretion when it denied the sixth. At that point, Walker was

facing not only a jury trial, but a jury trial by videoconference.

That substantially increased the difficulty of his case, despite

the simplicity of his claims. Moreover, the basic competence

that Walker had demonstrated during the pretrial phase did

not necessarily reflect his ability to handle a video trial en-

tirely on his own. Trying a case requires additional skills, and

Walker had managed the pretrial phase with the help of a jail-

house lawyer who had since been transferred to another

prison. Because the landscape had changed at this late stage

of the litigation, the court should have granted Walker’s mo-

tion to recruit counsel.

I.

Fredrick Walker is a prisoner at the Pontiac Correctional

Center, a maximum-security prison in Pontiac, Illinois. On

August 21, 2013, Timothy Price, the prison officer in charge of

delivering the inmates’ breakfast, brought Walker his meal.

The parties dispute what happened next.

No. 17-1345 3

By Walker’s account, Price tried to give him a breakfast

tray that had fallen on the floor. When Walker requested a

fresh meal, Price refused. Walker complained loudly, and in

response, two other prison officers, Jeffrey Stahl and Glendal

French, moved him from his cell to a more restrictive floor.

Walker claims that Stahl and French brutally assaulted him

during the move, seriously injuring his face and foot. John

Hudson and Marlon Minter, two of his fellow inmates, testi-

fied that they could see Walker’s swollen face as he was es-

corted to his new cell. According to Walker, his repeated re-

quests for medical care went unanswered until Mark Spencer,

a paralegal at Pontiac, finally relayed his request to the medi-

cal unit. Walker was prescribed Motrin for his injuries.

The prison officers give a different account. Price does not

remember the alleged breakfast tray incident. And Stahl and

French claim they moved Walker to a more restrictive cell be-

cause he began kicking his cell door. They say that the transfer

was uneventful, and prison officers present at the time of the

alleged assault testified that neither Stahl nor French used ex-

cessive force. All three defendants deny knowing that Walker

had asked for medical care.

A year later, with the help of Marlon Minter—a fellow in-

mate who acted as his “jailhouse lawyer”—Walker filed a pro

se complaint in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

He alleged that Officers Price, French, and Stahl violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force, failing to

intervene to stop the use of excessive force, and exhibiting de-

liberate indifference to Walker’s need for medical attention.

When he filed his complaint, Walker asked the court to recruit

a volunteer lawyer to represent him. Walker stated that his

own attempts to recruit pro bono counsel had failed and that

4 No. 17-1345

he needed volunteer counsel because he had “numerous men-

tal health issues,” limited access to the law library, and no

money to hire counsel. He also claimed that his reliance on

Minter demonstrated his need for representation. The magis-

trate judge assigned to the case denied Walker’s motion be-

cause the case was simple and Walker had personal

knowledge of the events. In addition, Walker had prior litiga-

tion experience, and his complaint reflected both competent

writing skills and knowledge of the relevant law and proce-

dure.

After the defendants had answered the complaint, Walker

filed a second motion to recruit counsel. Like the first, it was

drafted with Minter’s help. Walker repeated the reasons iden-

tified in his first motion: his limited mental capacity, lack of

access to legal resources, and reliance on Minter. He added

that his case was legally and factually complex, that it pre-

sented nuanced credibility issues, and that his deliberate in-

difference claim might require expert medical testimony.

Walker’s motion also included evidence of his cognitive limi-

tations—he noted that he had an IQ of 76 and a grade-school

level of comprehension. In response to this new information,

the magistrate judge ordered the defendants to file Walker’s

Adult Basic Education scores. They never did.

A little over two months later, Walker filed his third re-

quest for recruited counsel. He complained that the defend-

ants had not responded to his discovery requests. Their fail-

ure to comply, he argued, was yet another reason why he

needed the court to help him find a lawyer. The magistrate

judge denied Walker’s second and third motions on the same

day. He recognized Walker’s “cognitive deficits,” but they did

No. 17-1345 5

not change his conclusion that Walker was competent to con-

tinue pro se. He reiterated that Walker’s claims were simple

and that his filings had been “relatively well written, demon-

strating knowledge of the law and the relevant facts.” And

while he acknowledged Walker’s reliance on Minter’s help in

drafting his filings, he concluded: “that alone does not neces-

sarily mean Plaintiff is unable to proceed pro se.” The magis-

trate judge directed the defendants to respond to Walker’s

discovery requests, which they finally did.

Walker filed his fourth request to recruit counsel several

months later. He asked the district judge to reconsider the ear-

lier motions that the magistrate judge had denied. He restated

his earlier points and added more emphasis to the claim that

his dependence on Minter showed his inability to litigate

without assistance. Two days after the motion was filed, the

district judge denied his motion for reconsideration “for the

reasons stated” in the magistrate judge’s earlier order deny-

ing Walker’s second and third motions to recruit counsel. To

these reasons, the district judge added a list of six earlier pro

se cases filed by Walker as examples of his competence to lit-

igate pro se.

A month later, Walker filed his fifth motion to recruit

counsel. In this one, Walker complained that his earlier argu-

ments were being “overlooked by the court.” He underscored

his cognitive limitations and the complexity of his case. In her

response, the judge again agreed with the magistrate judge’s

assessment of Walker’s ability. She noted that Walker “ap-

pear[ed] competent to proceed pro se” because he had per-

formed well so far, had some prior federal civil litigation ex-

perience, and was litigating straightforward claims. But be-

cause the case was going to trial, the judge said that she would

6 No. 17-1345

nonetheless “attempt to recruit pro bono counsel to represent

Plaintiff at trial.” She warned him, however, that searching for

pro bono counsel was “becoming increasingly difficult.”

In the summer of 2016, Walker—through his own efforts—

found a lawyer willing to represent him pro bono. That rep-

resentation, however, didn’t last long. Citing irreconcilable

differences, his lawyer withdrew within minutes of his ap-

pointment.

Walker’s case was now approaching trial, and the court or-

dered the parties to submit briefs discussing whether the trial

should be held over videoconference. All of the defendants

supported holding the trial by videoconference because trans-

porting Walker to the courthouse would be costly and a po-

tential security risk. They noted that Walker was serving a life

sentence for murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault with

a weapon, and home invasion; on top of that, he had racked

up an extensive prison disciplinary record during his incar-

ceration at Pontiac. Walker objected that trying the case by

video would impede his access to the court. But given the se-

curity risks posed by Walker’s “classification as a high escape

risk, high aggression, and maximum security level,” the court

decided to hold the trial by video. The court opined that the

simplicity of Walker’s claims and the presence of a large video

screen would minimize any prejudice to Walker.

A month later, Walker filed his sixth and final motion to

recruit counsel. Walker was now preparing his filings on his

own, because Minter, his jailhouse lawyer, had been trans-

ferred to another prison. As a result, this motion is noticeably

less articulate. In support of his request, Walker complained

that he was unable to prepare his final pretrial filings because

he lacked access to legal materials. According to Walker, “The

No. 17-1345 7

plaintiff’s legal material’s that he was using to draft his pre-

trial material’s was stolen from the plaintiff by pontiac correc-

tional center official’s to prevent the plaintiff from proceeding

in his case against the Defendants.”

In December 2016, the court denied Walker’s final motion

to recruit counsel. In a text order, it stated:

Plaintiff’s motion to continue and motion to ap-

point counsel is denied. Plaintiff has significant

litigation experience. His pleadings demon-

strate that he is competent to proceed pro se, as

did the Court’s observations of him when he ap-

peared by video conference at several status

hearings. The claims (excessive force and failure

to obtain medical treatment) are relatively sim-

ple. Plaintiff already has personal knowledge of

many of the facts underlying his claim. On this

record, Plaintiff appears competent to proceed

pro se in light of the straightforward nature of

his claim.

At that same time, in another procedural twist, Walker’s case

was transferred to a different judge for trial due to scheduling

conflicts. The record does not reflect whether the new court-

room would also have the benefit of a large video screen for

trial.

The trial began in February of 2017. Walker, the defend-

ants, and the witnesses appeared by video and, in one in-

stance, Minter gave follow-up testimony by phone. The de-

fendants’ counsel was with them at the prison. The video trial

suffered from some predictable limitations. At times, the par-

ticipants had difficulty hearing or seeing each other. There

8 No. 17-1345

were also occasional hiccups in presenting exhibits and coor-

dinating the examination of witnesses. At the end of the two-

day trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants on all

claims.

Walker, who is represented by recruited counsel on ap-

peal, claims the district court made three errors. First, he ar-

gues that the district court’s denial of his motions to recruit

counsel was an abuse of discretion that prejudiced him. Sec-

ond, Walker argues the district court abused its discretion in

allowing his trial to proceed by videoconference. Finally,

Walker argues that the cumulative effect of the court’s errors

requires that we grant him a new trial.

II.

Litigants in federal civil cases do not have a constitutional

or statutory right to court-appointed counsel. Pruitt v. Mote,

503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). An indigent litigant,

however, may ask the court to recruit a volunteer attorney to

provide pro bono representation. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Two

questions guide a court’s discretionary decision whether to

recruit counsel: (1) “has the indigent plaintiff made a reason-

able attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded

from doing so,” and (2) “given the difficulty of the case, does

the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Id. at 654.

Walker claims the district court erred when it answered

“no” to the second Pruitt question, because it underestimated

the difficulty of his case and overestimated his ability to liti-

gate it. We think that the court acted within its discretion

when it denied Walker’s initial requests for recruited counsel.

But when Walker made his sixth request, he was facing not

only a jury trial—rare enough for a pro se litigant—but a trial

No. 17-1345 9

by videoconference. And he had also recently lost the assis-

tance of his jailhouse lawyer, which meant that his prior fil-

ings were not necessarily reflective of his competence to pro-

ceed alone. These factors changed the calculus, and we agree

with Walker that the district court should have granted his

last motion to recruit counsel.1

We review the district court’s denial of a pro se plaintiff’s

motion to recruit counsel for abuse of discretion. Id. at 658. A

district court abuses its discretion when “(1) the record con-

tains no evidence upon which the court could have rationally

based its decision; (2) the decision is based on an erroneous

conclusion of law; (3) the decision is based on clearly errone-

ous factual findings; or (4) the decision clearly appears arbi-

trary.” Id. To this end, we ask “not whether we would have

recruited a volunteer lawyer in the circumstances, but

whether the district court applied the correct legal standard

and reached a reasonable decision based on facts supported

by the record.” Id.

A.

When it denied Walker’s sixth motion to recruit counsel,

the district court considered the simplicity of Walker’s sub-

stantive claims, but not the difficulty of trying them before a

1

We stress that the district court did not have a responsibility to sua

sponte re-evaluate whether it should try to recruit counsel for Walker.

Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 658 (“[T]here is neither a statutory nor a constitutional

duty to monitor whether an indigent litigant is competently litigating his

claims after a § 1915(e)(1) request has been denied.”). The court’s duty to

revisit the § 1915(e)(1) calculus arose only because Walker filed a motion

renewing his request.

10 No. 17-1345

jury. The Pruitt standard, however, requires the court to ac-

count for both, because both affect “the difficulty of the case.”

Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655 (“The question is whether the plaintiff

appears competent to litigate his own claims, given their de-

gree of difficulty, and this includes the tasks that normally at-

tend litigation.”). And while Walker’s claims were straightfor-

ward, conducting a trial by videoconference was not.

We have emphasized that the assistance of counsel be-

comes increasingly important as litigation enters its later

stages. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 785 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Tak-

ing depositions, conducting witness examinations, applying

the rules of evidence, and making opening statements are be-

yond the ability of most pro se litigants to successfully carry

out.”); see also Miller v. Campanella, 794 F.3d 878, 880 (7th Cir.

2015); James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 2018). And when

Walker filed his sixth motion to recruit counsel, he was facing

an event that most civil litigants do not: a jury trial. Even if his

earlier filings had passed muster, trying a case is more diffi-

cult than drafting minimally coherent documents. Perez, 792

F.3d at 785 (“District courts abuse their discretion where they

fail to consider the complexities of advanced-stage litigation

activities and whether a litigant is capable of handling

them.”). Trial involves conducting voir dire, delivering open-

ing and closing statements, examining witnesses, and follow-

ing the rules of evidence. These are all complicated tasks.

And Walker faced an additional hurdle: his case didn’t

simply go to trial; it went to trial over videoconference. When

the court denied Walker’s sixth motion, it had already de-

cided to hold the trial by video. That meant that the judge and

jury would be together in one room, and the parties, lawyers,

and witnesses would appear on screen. Walker would have to

No. 17-1345 11

stay on track despite inevitable technological hiccups. More-

over, a video trial would make it harder to effectively try a

case that rested almost exclusively on credibility issues, be-

cause Walker would have to compensate for the loss of the

physical presence of the parties, the witnesses, the jurors, and

the judge. Among other things, he would have to convince the

jurors to believe him, and not the defendants, even though

screens would limit their ability to observe body language.

In evaluating the difficulty of the case, the court repeatedly

stressed the simplicity of Walker’s claims. To be sure,

Walker’s claims were uncomplicated, but two factors com-

bined to make the case difficult: it went to trial and he had to

try it from behind a camera. By failing to adequately account

for these factors, the district court abused its discretion. See

James, 889 F.3d at 327 (“[W]e have recognized that certain cir-

cumstances demand particular judicial consideration.”).

We pause to add one final note regarding the complexity

of Walker’s case as it relates to the Pruitt analysis. In Walker’s

view, the court should have recruited counsel for him after his

first motion, largely because his claims involve medical exper-

tise and state-of-mind issues. Both of these arguments find

some support in our case law. Perez, 792 F.3d at 784 (observing

that it may be best to recruit counsel when the plaintiff “al-

leges an objectively serious medical condition”); Bracey v.

Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir. 2013) (observing that

state-of-mind claims heighten the complexity of a case); San-

tiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 761 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that

state-of-mind claims are often difficult for pro se plaintiffs).

But “we have resisted laying down categorical rules regard-

ing recruitment of counsel in particular types of cases.” Pruitt,

503 F.3d at 656. Doing so risks “finding, as a practical matter,

12 No. 17-1345

a presumptive right to counsel in some categories of cases”

even though we have “consistently denied that such a right,

or even a presumption, exists.” McCaa v Hamilton, 893 F.3d

1027, 1037 (7th Cir. 2018) (Hamilton, J., concurring).

Accepting Walker’s argument would mean accepting “as

a practical matter, a presumptive right to counsel in some cat-

egories of cases.” And while our precedent requires generos-

ity in considering requests for recruited counsel, it does not

go as far as Walker proposes. The district court correctly noted

that none of his claims was particularly complex; each turned

simply on which witnesses were to be believed. And while it

is true that medical claims often require nuanced expert testi-

mony about the standard of care, Walker’s claim did not. He

argued that prison officers refused to respond to his requests

for medical care, not that the care he received was substand-

ard. See Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2014).

Such a claim is not categorically beyond the capacity of a pro

se plaintiff. The difficulty in Walker’s case flowed not from the

substance of his claims, but from its procedural posture: the

video trial introduced complexity that had not been there be-

fore. That is the factor on which our decision turns.

B.

The second question from Pruitt directs the district court

to examine not only the difficulty of the case, but the pro se

plaintiff’s competency to litigate that particular case himself.

Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654. Because this inquiry is “intertwined”

with analyzing the difficulty of the case, id., the district court’s

flawed application of the proper legal standard to that aspect

of the inquiry spills over to the analysis of Walker’s capacity

to litigate his videoconference trial. There are “no fixed re-

quirements” for determining Walker’s capability to litigate

No. 17-1345 13

his own case, but we consider his “literacy, communication

skills, education level, and litigation experience” as well as

any available evidence of his “intellectual capacity and psy-

chological history” as these relate to litigating his case. Id. at

655.

The court acknowledged Walker’s mental and psycholog-

ical limitations, but it did not consider how they would hand-

icap his performance during the trial, as opposed to the pre-

trial phase. Walker has an elementary-level education and an

IQ of only 76. On top of this, Walker has a history of mental

and psychological health issues. And although the court

asked the defendants to submit Walker’s Adult Basic Educa-

tion scores to the court after Walker’s second request to recruit

counsel, the defendants never complied. Not every cognitive

limitation will require the district court to recruit a lawyer,

but the court should have considered how Walker’s mental

health history would affect his ability to think on his feet at

trial. Walker may have been capable of writing intelligible

documents, but those do not require a quick, oral response in

front of a jury.

Walker’s prior litigation experience, while relevant, did

not include the performance of the tasks most relevant here:

examination of witnesses, introduction of evidence, and the

delivery of opening and closing arguments to a jury. To be

sure, this case is not Walker’s first trip to federal court, and

the district court was right to account for the fact that Walker

had previously filed six other pro se civil cases. But that liti-

gation experience bears on his ability to identify relevant legal

arguments and facts, and much more is required of a litigant

who must fully develop and present his case in (or virtually

in) a courtroom.

14 No. 17-1345

In finding Walker competent to litigate this case on his

own, the court relied on his performance during the pretrial

phase of the litigation. Like Walker’s prior litigation experi-

ence, his pretrial performance did not necessarily reflect his

ability to handle a trial. More importantly, however, it did not

reflect what he could do on his own. From the beginning,

Walker relied heavily on Minter to operate as his jailhouse

lawyer. In fact, in the course of denying one of Walker’s earlier

motions, the court rejected Walker’s argument that his de-

pendence on Minter demonstrated his need for recruited

counsel. By the time Walker filed his sixth motion to recruit

counsel, however, his case was headed to trial and Minter had

been transferred to another prison. At this point, the court

needed to evaluate Walker’s capacity independent of any un-

official or jailhouse assistance he may have received. See

McCaa, 893 F.3d at 1033 (When a litigant’s “competency may

not have been entirely his own … courts must ‘specifically ex-

amine[]’ a plaintiff’s ‘personal ability to litigate the case, ver-

sus the ability of the “jailhouse lawyer”’ who assisted the

plaintiff.” (quoting Dewitt v. Corizon, Inc., 760 F.3d 654, 658

(7th Cir. 2014)). Yet in denying Walker’s sixth motion to re-

cruit counsel, the court cited the quality of the filings Walker

had submitted with Minter’s help. It is noteworthy that

Walker’s sixth motion for recruited counsel—the first submit-

ted without Minter’s help—was substantially less articulate

than the prior filings on which the court relied. That itself in-

dicated that the earlier work in the case was an imperfect

measure of Walker’s capacity.

Finally, the court took Walker’s appearance by video at

pretrial status hearings as evidence that Walker could handle

a trial by videoconference. The pretrial status hearings, how-

ever, differed significantly from a trial. They involved only a

No. 17-1345 15

few people: the judge, the defendants’ lawyers, and Walker.

They did not require Walker to prepare opening and closing

statements, develop any direct lines of questioning, or cross-

examine witnesses. And they dealt largely with administra-

tive matters rather than substance. While Walker’s perfor-

mance at these hearings was relevant data about his ability to

handle himself, the court placed too much weight on it.

C.

The district court erred when it denied Walker’s sixth re-

quest that it recruit counsel, but Walker is only entitled to re-

lief if that error prejudiced him. To show prejudice, a litigant

need only show that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the

presence of counsel would have made a difference in the out-

come of the litigation.” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659.

In Pruitt, we found that the pro se plaintiff’s “inept trial

performance” showed that counsel would have helped him

make his case to the jury. Id. at 661. We held that “[a]t the very

least, counsel could have helped Pruitt present his story to the

jury in a more organized and coherent manner.” Id. While

Walker’s opening statement and his own testimony were

fairly easy to follow, he ran into difficulty when he examined

and cross-examined witnesses. The other participants period-

ically had difficulty hearing him. The questions he asked of-

ten made little sense; he had trouble laying foundations for

exhibits he wanted to enter into evidence; and he struggled to

draw out inconsistencies in the testimony of the defendants

and their witnesses. At one point, Walker objected that one

witness was coaching another. The judge replied, “I can’t see

or hear that, so I don’t know what’s going on.” The witness

denied being coached, and Walker had no lawyer to press the

point.

16 No. 17-1345

Like the case in Pruitt, Walker’s case was a swearing con-

test. Id. at 660–61. His task was to highlight the strength of his

own account and impeach the credibility of the defendants.

His effort was incoherent, and at the very least, the presence

of counsel would have ensured a fair presentation of Walker’s

case to the jury. We therefore conclude that Walker was prej-

udiced by the district court’s refusal to try to recruit counsel

for him.2

III.

Because it might arise on remand, we briefly address

Walker’s argument that the district court erred by requiring

him to proceed by video rather than in open court. In Thornton

v. Snyder, we held that a district court has discretion to hold a

video trial when a plaintiff presents serious security concerns.

428 F.3d 690, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2005). Given our conclusion that

the court should have recruited counsel for Walker, we need

not decide whether it abused its discretion in proceeding by

videoconference. But we do not want to leave the impression

that we are second-guessing the court’s decision to do so. The

error here was the court’s failure to account for Walker’s ca-

pacity to conduct a video trial in considering his sixth motion

2

We need not address what would have happened if the district court

had tried and failed to recruit counsel for Walker. The district court’s error

was that it abused its discretion when it denied Walker’s sixth motion to

recruit counsel. Walker was entitled to the district court’s assistance in

finding a lawyer, but he had no constitutional or statutory right to have

representation in his civil case. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 649; see also Wilborn v.

Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that § 1915(e)(1) does not

“mean that the court has an indefinite commitment to search until a vol-

unteer is found”).

No. 17-1345 17

to recruit counsel. On remand, the court should not under-

stand our opinion to dictate whether it conducts any new trial

live or by videoconference.

***

We VACATE the judgment and REMAND this case for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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