M.A. Robinson v. Officer Fye

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mark Anthony Robinson, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1694 C.D. 2017

: Submitted: April 20, 2018

Officer Fye, Marirosa Lamas, :

Jeffrey Horton, Robert Marsh, :

Timothy Miller, Lynn Eaton, :

Lieutenant Sutton, Lieutenant :

Davis and David Kuhn :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: August 17, 2018

Mark Anthony Robinson (Robinson), pro se, appeals an Order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Centre County (common pleas) dismissing Robinson’s causes of

action, which he filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983)1 alleging that his

1

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or

omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be

granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable

constitutional rights were violated by a number of Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections’ (DOC) employees while he was an inmate at the State Correctional

Institution at Rockview (SCI-Rockview). Pursuant to Section 6602(e) of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 Pa. C.S. § 6602(e),2 common pleas dismissed

Robinson’s causes of action on the grounds that they were barred by the doctrines

of res judicata and collateral estoppel. This Court now affirms.

I. Background

Robinson commenced this action on March 8, 2013. Preliminary objections

to Robinson’s complaint were filed, as was a motion for leave to amend the

complaint, both of which common pleas granted. Robinson filed an Amended

exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the

District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2

Section 6602(e) of the PLRA states the following:

(e) Dismissal of litigation.--Notwithstanding any filing fee which has been paid,

the court shall dismiss prison conditions litigation at any time, including prior to

service on the defendant, if the court determines any of the following:

(1) The allegation of indigency is untrue.

(2) The prison conditions litigation is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted or the defendant is entitled to assert a valid

affirmative defense, including immunity, which, if asserted, would preclude the

relief.

The court may reinstate the prison conditions litigation where the dismissal is based

upon an untrue allegation of indigency and the prisoner establishes to the

satisfaction of the court that the untrue information was not known to the prisoner.

42 Pa. C.S. § 6602(e) (emphasis in original).

2

Complaint on July 5, 2013.3 In his Amended Complaint, Robinson named nine

employees of SCI-Rockview as defendants: Superintendent Marirosa Lamas;

Deputy Superintendents and Program Review Committee (PRC) members Jeffrey

Horton and Robert Marsh; Corrections Classification and Inmate Program Manager

and PRC member Timothy Miller; Security Captain and PRC member Lynn Eaton;

Lieutenants Davis and Sutton; Officer Fye; and Hearing Examiner David Kuhn

(collectively Defendants). Robinson alleged that Defendants violated his

constitutional rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution4 in retaliation for the grievances and lawsuits that he filed

against employees of SCI-Rockview. Specifically, Robinson alleged that he was

subjected to unwarranted misconduct charges for which he was found guilty by a

biased hearing examiner; an unwarranted transfer to the Special Management Unit

(SMU) at SCI-Camp Hill; an unjust placement into the restrictive housing unit

(RHU) at SCI-Rockview; and a denial of needed psychological care during his time

at SCI-Rockview from March 2009 to August 2011. Robinson also alleged that

Deputy Superintendent Marsh initiated a “champaign [sic] of retaliation, instructing,

ordering and approving SCI-Rockview’s staff and employees [sic] filing of

retaliatory misconduct reports against [Robinson] designed to cause [Robinson]

3

Preliminary objections were filed to the Amended Complaint, which were sustained in

part and overruled in part.

4

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall make

no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging

the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to

petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Eighth

Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor

cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Fourteenth Amendment

states, in relevant part, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

3

unjust and unwarranted time inside of the RHU . . . .” (Amended Complaint (Am.

Compl.) ¶ 9.)

On May 23, 2016, Defendants filed an Answer with New Matter, denying the

allegations. The New Matter asserted the defenses of lack of administrative

exhaustion, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and qualified

immunity. (Defendants’ Answer to Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47-51.) The New Matter did not

assert res judicata or collateral estoppel as bases for dismissing the claim.

Defendants subsequently filed a Motion for Dismissal Pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.

§ 6602(e) (Motion) on March 8, 2017. The Motion asserted that the doctrines of res

judicata and/or collateral estoppel applied to Robinson’s claims because they were

“nearly identical to the allegations and claims raised” in a federal court action that

Robinson previously filed in 2012, in which judgment was entered in Defendants’

favor (Federal Court Action). (Motion ¶¶ 12-15.) Robinson had filed his complaint

in federal court (Federal Complaint)5 under Section 1983, alleging that his

constitutional rights protected by the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments

were violated by employees of SCI-Rockview during his incarceration at that prison

from March 2009 to August 2011 and his subsequent transfer to the SMU at SCI-

Camp Hill. The Federal Complaint named five defendants, four of whom are also

named as defendants in the present action: Superintendent Lamas; Deputy

Superintendents Marsh and Horton; and PRC member Miller.6 The defendants had

moved for summary judgment, which the United States District Court for the Middle

5

Robinson subsequently filed an Amended Complaint in the Federal Court Action, which

will hereinafter be referred to as the “Federal Complaint” and abbreviated as “(Fed. Am. Compl.).”

The Federal Complaint, the docket in the Federal Court Action, and the federal courts’ decisions

were attached to the Motion.

6

The fifth defendant named in Robinson’s Federal Court Action was John Wetzel, who is

the Secretary of Corrections. Secretary Wetzel is not named as a defendant in the current action.

4

District of Pennsylvania (District Court) granted. The District Court found, as a

matter of law, that: (1) no First Amendment claim could lie for the misconduct

charges or placement into the SMU because these actions were not retaliatory; (2)

placement into the SMU program was not “cruel and unusual” in violation of the

Eighth Amendment; and (3) Robinson’s right to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment was not violated when he was placed into the SMU without a hearing.

Robinson v. Wetzel, No. 3:11-CV-2194, 2014 WL 11456082, at *7-11 (M.D. Pa.

June 25, 2014), recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 11456595 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29,

2014) (Robinson I). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third

Circuit), in an unreported, per curiam opinion, affirmed the District Court’s order

dismissing Robinson’s constitutional claims. Robinson v. Wetzel, 617 F. App’x 120,

122 (3d Cir. 2015).

In response to the Motion, Robinson argued that res judicata and collateral

estoppel were waived under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure because

Defendants did not assert these defenses in their New Matter.

On October 20, 2017, common pleas granted the Motion and dismissed the

action. Common pleas found that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel

applied to Robinson’s claim, “[i]n light of the thorough review and treatment of

[Robinson’s] causes of action in the Federal Court Action . . . .” (Common Pleas

Order, Oct. 20, 2017.) Finding that Robinson “is not prejudiced by the procedural

irregularity, [common pleas] conclude[d] that substantive justice and judicial

economy are best served by treating the allegations in Defendants’ Motion . . . as an

amendment of Defendants’ original New Matter by leave of court.” (Id.)

Robinson timely appealed common pleas’ Order, claiming that res judicata

and collateral estoppel do not apply. Robinson further argues that Defendants

5

waived the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel by failing to assert these

defenses in their New Matter, and that the trial court committed an error of law,

abused its discretion, and prejudiced him by sua sponte treating the Motion as an

addendum to Defendants’ New Matter.7 We address these issues in turn.

II. Analysis

1. Applicability of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

Common pleas found that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied and

barred Robinson’s action because the underlying issues in this action had already

been adjudicated with finality in the Federal Court Action he brought in 2012. The

entirety of Robinson’s argument that this was error is: “The standards for res

judicata and collateral estoppel simply do not apply in the [sic] case,” a statement

which Robinson follows up with two citations to case law. (Robinson’s Brief (Br.)

at 9.)8

Defendants contend that res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable and

bar this action because Robinson’s claims and allegations are the same as those he

asserted in the Federal Court Action, which the District Court dismissed after a

thorough review, and the Third Circuit upheld. Defendants concede that some

specifically named Defendants in the present action were not named as defendants

7

We have consolidated the waiver issue and the sua sponte addendum issue because the

analysis for both is inseparable and substantially similar. In addition, we have reordered the issues

on appeal to first examine the applicability of res judicata and collateral estoppel before we

determine whether Robinson’s action was properly dismissed.

8

In Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829, 838 (Pa. 2014), the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court found that “to the extent the appellant’s claims fail to contain developed argument or citation

to supporting authorities and the record, they are waived . . . .” Although Robinson’s argument on

this issue is neither developed nor contains citation to the record, it does cite case law. Thus, we

will not find that Robinson has waived this issue.

6

in the Federal Court Action. Nevertheless, Defendants contend that res judicata still

applies because the DOC administrators named as defendants in the Federal Court

Action sufficiently represented these new Defendants’ interests. Moreover,

Defendants claim that some of the newly named Defendants are, or were,

subordinates of defendants named in the Federal Court Action.

At the outset, we note that technical res judicata (claim preclusion) and

collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) are “related, yet distinct” components of the

doctrine known as res judicata. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 794 A.2d 936,

939 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (citation omitted). Res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies

only when there exists a “coalescence of four factors: (1) identity of the thing sued

upon or for; (2) identity of the causes of action; (3) identity of the persons or parties

to the action; and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or being

sued.” Id. When res judicata applies, “[a]ny final, valid judgment on the merits by

a court of competent jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties or

their privies on the same cause of action.” Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d

309, 313 (Pa. 1995). Beyond precluding just those claims that were “actually

litigated” in the first adjudication, res judicata also precludes those “claims which

could have been litigated during the first proceeding if they were part of the same

cause of action.” Id. (emphasis added). Relevant to this case, res judicata can apply

in such a way as to bar suits brought in state court that involve claims that were

litigated or should have been litigated in a previous federal suit. See London v. City

of Phila., 194 A.2d 901, 902-03 (Pa. 1963) (holding that claim that could have been

asserted in previous federal court action could not be litigated in subsequent state

court action). Moreover, where “the same evidence is required to support a final

determination in a former action and in a subsequent action, res judicata bars the

7

second action.” Commonwealth ex rel. Bloomsburg State Coll. v. Porter, 610 A.2d

516, 520 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).

Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion renders issues of fact or law, McNeil v.

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, 680 A.2d 1145, 1147-48 (Pa. 1996),

incapable of relitigation in a subsequent suit if, in a prior suit, these (1) same issues

were (2) “necessary to [a] final judgment on the merits . . . [and (3)] the party against

whom [issue preclusion] is asserted [was] . . . a party, or [was] . . . in privity with a

party[] to the prior action and . . . [(4)] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the

issue in question,” Balent, 669 A.2d at 313. Collateral estoppel is designed to

“protect[] litigants from assuming the burden of re-litigating the same issue with the

same party . . . and [to] promot[e] judicial economy through preventing needless

litigation.” McNeil, 680 A.2d at 1148.

In evaluating the effect of the decision in Robinson’s prior federal suit, we

must consider that “[a] judgment is deemed final for purposes of res judicata or

collateral estoppel unless or until it is reversed on appeal.” Shaffer v. Smith, 673

A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. 1996) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). In addition, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found that, with regard to collateral estoppel, a

“final judgment includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is

determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” Id. at 875

(citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (Am. Law Inst. 1980)) (quotation

omitted).

Under the first element of res judicata, we evaluate whether the things that

Robinson sued upon or for in both the present suit and the Federal Court Action are

identical. In the present suit, Robinson sued Defendants under Section 1983 alleging

certain of their actions violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights

8

during his incarceration at SCI-Rockview from March 2009 to August 2011.

Robinson seeks declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages for

mental and emotional harm. In the Federal Complaint, he similarly sought

declaratory judgment for constitutional violations based on the allegedly wrongful

acts of the defendants during Robinson’s incarceration at SCI-Rockview from March

2009 to August 2011, as well as compensatory and punitive damages for the mental

and emotional harm caused by the defendants’ actions. Because these are identical

in both this lawsuit and Robinson’s Federal Court Action, the first element of res

judicata is satisfied.

We next address the second element of res judicata, which involves an

evaluation of whether the present cause of action is identical to the Federal

Complaint. Identity of the causes of action under the second element of res judicata

exists “when the subject matter and the ultimate issues are the same in both the old

and new proceedings.” Cellucci v. Laurel Homeowners Ass’n, 142 A.3d 1032, 1049

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citation omitted). In Robinson’s amended complaints from

both his Federal Court Action and the present action, he claims that various

employees of SCI-Rockview violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights during his incarceration from March 2009 to August 2011. The Federal

Complaint focused on the constitutional violations that he claimed arose from the

circumstances surrounding his allegedly retaliatory transfer from SCI-Rockview to

the SMU at SCI-Camp Hill on August 23, 2011. In contrast, Robinson’s Amended

Complaint in the present action made little mention of this allegedly retaliatory

transfer into the SMU;9 instead, it focused on the alleged constitutional violations

arising from other actions carried out by Defendants during the same time period.

9

However, in the present suit, Robinson also alleges that his transfer to the SMU at SCI-

Camp Hill was retaliatory.

9

However, a closer inspection of the Federal Complaint reveals that Robinson

also alleged there the same conduct that forms the basis of his Amended Complaint

here. In particular, the Federal Complaint alleged that, during Robinson’s time at

SCI-Rockview, Deputy Superintendent Marsh masterminded an initiative to: subject

Robinson to unwarranted and false misconduct charges, which caused Robinson to

spend inordinate amounts of time in the RHU; to influence Hearing Examiner Kuhn

to ensure that Robinson was found guilty at misconduct hearings; and to deny

Robinson the psychological care he needed. (Fed. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15, 17.) The

Federal Complaint also claimed that Deputy Superintendent Marsh’s initiative

aimed to retaliate against Robinson for the lawsuits and grievances that Robinson

previously filed. (Id. ¶ 15.) Furthermore, the Federal Complaint generally alleged

that all of these actions were “constitutional violations” and that the PRC members,

superintendents, and Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel failed to remedy these

alleged violations when Robinson appealed to them. (Id. ¶¶ 18-20.)

Just as in the Federal Court Action, Robinson’s Amended Complaint here

alleges that, in retaliation for his filing of lawsuits and grievances against SCI-

Rockview employees, Deputy Superintendent Marsh launched an initiative to:

subject Robinson to constant, false misconduct charges, which led to Robinson’s

constant confinement in the RHU; ensure that Hearing Examiner Kuhn consistently

found him guilty of these charges; and ensure that Robinson did not receive the

psychological care he needed. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11, 14-16.) Similar to Robinson’s

Federal Court Action, here he also alleges that his appeals to members of the PRC

and the superintendents to remedy the constitutional violations were ignored. (Id.

¶¶ 13, 17, 20.)

10

Overall, Robinson’s constitutional claims in this case were set forth in his

Federal Court Action, which the District Court dismissed as a matter of law. In the

present suit, Robinson more specifically details the allegedly unlawful conduct. (Id.

¶¶ 24-32.) However, Robinson essentially made the same allegations in his Federal

Complaint when he generally claimed that these same actions violated his

constitutional rights. (Fed. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-19.) Robinson’s prior Federal Court

Action covered the same subject matter as the present action: his disciplinary record;

conditions of confinement; and his mental health while he was an inmate at SCI-

Rockview from March 2009 to August 2011. Furthermore, the ultimate issues in

this action were included in the Federal Court Action. These are whether, in

retaliation for his filing of lawsuits and grievances, Robinson was subjected to and

found guilty of false misconduct charges by a biased hearing examiner; unwarranted

disciplinary confinement resulting from those guilty findings; unwarranted denial of

proper psychological treatment; and an unwarranted failure on the part of the

administrators to remedy all of this wrongdoing. In granting the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, the District Court found Robinson’s claims meritless.

Robinson I, 2014 WL 11456082, at *7-11. Furthermore, since Robinson’s claims in

this action were also set forth in his Federal Court Action and such claims center on

his time at SCI-Rockview from March 2009 to August 2011, a decision in both

actions must essentially be made on the same set of facts. This includes Robinson’s

misconduct findings and his appeals of those findings during that time period. The

evidence relevant to a resolution of both actions is, thus, substantially the same.

Robinson’s cause of action here is the same as in his prior Federal Court Action,

thus satisfying the second element of res judicata (claim preclusion).

11

With regard to identity of the parties, the third element of res judicata, this

Court has held that privity between the parties to past and present suits under both

claim and issue preclusion can exist when the parties to such suits bear an agency

relationship. See Montella v. Berkheimer Assocs., 690 A.2d 802, 804 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1997) (“Generally, parties are in privity if one is vicariously responsible for the

conduct of another, such as principal and agent or master and servant.”) (citation

omitted). Overall, privity between parties lies when there exists “mutual or

successive relationships to the same right of property, or such an identification of

interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal right.” Id.

(quotation omitted).

Superintendent Lamas, Deputy Superintendents Marsh and Horton, and PRC

member Miller are Defendants named in the present suit who were also defendants

in Robinson’s Federal Court Action. The Amended Complaint here alleges that they

failed to remedy the wrongdoing of their “subordinate staff.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-

27.) Security Captain Eaton, a Defendant named in the present action but not the

Federal Complaint, is an administrative officer and PRC member who allegedly

failed to remedy the wrongdoing of subordinate employees at SCI-Rockview. (Id. ¶

28.) Therefore, Security Captain Eaton was in privity with the federal defendants

because they, as administrators, similarly were accused of failing to remedy the

wrongdoing of their subordinates. The other new Defendants named in this suit are

Lieutenants Davis and Sutton, Officer Fye, and Hearing Examiner Kuhn. (Id. ¶¶ 29-

32.) They were also in privity with the federal defendants because they are

subordinates of those defendants. Therefore, all of the new Defendants in the present

suit were in privity to the defendants in Robinson’s Federal Court Action, thus

satisfying the third element of res judicata.

12

Finally, the fourth element of res judicata, identity of the capacity in which

the parties are sued, is met. The defendants named in the Federal Court Action and

the present case are being sued in their official capacity as DOC employees.

Furthermore, the new Defendants that were in privity with the federal defendants are

also being sued in their official capacity. Therefore, all of the Defendants are being

sued in the same official capacity as the defendants in Robinson’s Federal Court

Action, thus satisfying the fourth element of res judicata.

Because we agree with common pleas that res judicata bars Robinson’s suit

in this action, we technically need not also examine the applicability of collateral

estoppel, or issue preclusion, to Robinson’s suit. However, we do so for the sake of

completion. As stated above, collateral estoppel renders issues of fact or law,

McNeil, 680 A.2d at 1147-48, incapable of relitigation in a subsequent suit if, in a

prior suit, these (1) same issues were (2) “necessary to [a] final judgment on the

merits . . . [and (3)] the party against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted [was] . . .

a party, or [was] . . . in privity with a party[] to the prior action and . . . [(4)] had a

full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question,” Balent, 669 A.2d at 313.

The first element of collateral estoppel is met because the issues in the Federal Court

Action are identical to the issues in this case. These issues are: whether Robinson

was subjected to false misconduct charges; subsequent disciplinary actions

stemming from those misconduct charges; and the denial of psychological treatment

at SCI-Rockview from March 2009 to August 2011, all in retaliation for Robinson’s

filing of lawsuits and grievances against DOC employees. Furthermore, the issues

were necessary to the final judgment in the Federal Court Action, satisfying the

second element of collateral estoppel. The third element of collateral estoppel is met

because Robinson was a party to the Federal Court Action and he is the party against

13

whom collateral estoppel is now being asserted. Lastly, Robinson had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate these issues in the Federal Court Action, and he was afforded

an opportunity to amend his complaint. Yet, the District Court found Robinson’s

claims were meritless. While Robinson more specifically details the lawsuits and

grievances that allegedly prompted the retaliation in his Amended Complaint here,

he is estopped from relitigating the issues regarding whether he was subjected to

retaliatory acts by Defendants.

The District Court reviewed the misconduct charges and subsequent

disciplinary sanctions that Robinson faced from March 2009 to August 2011 and

found these actions were neither false nor retaliatory. The District Court also found

that Robinson’s transfer to the SMU was not retaliatory and that the staff at SCI-

Rockview actually demonstrated considerable concern for his mental health as

indicated by their efforts to have him evaluated by mental health professionals so

that his needs could be met. Robinson I, 2014 WL 11456082, at *7-11. Because the

elements of collateral estoppel are also satisfied, Robinson is barred from relitigating

these issues here.

2. Waiver of the Affirmative Defenses

Having concluded that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply, we must

determine whether Defendants waived the defenses by not raising them in their New

Matter. Robinson claims they have, and in support of this argument, he cites

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1030 and 1032, Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 1030 and

1032, which require affirmative defenses to be raised as new matter to avoid waiver.

(Robinson’s Br. at 8.) Robinson also argues that it was an abuse of discretion, an

error of law, and prejudicial to him for common pleas to sua sponte treat the

14

affirmative defenses in Defendants’ Motion as an addendum to their New Matter.

He argues that Defendants should have instead sought leave of court to amend their

New Matter. (Id. at 9.)

Defendants argue that Section 6602(e) of the PLRA permits the dismissal of

Robinson’s claims because, under this statute, the affirmative defenses of res

judicata and collateral estoppel warrant dismissal at any time if these defenses could

validly be asserted during the course of prison conditions litigation.10 (Defendants’

Br. at 6-7.) Defendants argue that the PLRA’s goal is to promote judicial economy

by the swift dismissal of meritless claims. (Id. at 6.) Overall, Defendants contend

that Section 6602(e) of the PLRA provides them with the leeway they need to avoid

waiver despite their assertion of these defenses in a motion to dismiss, rather than as

new matter in a responsive pleading.

In order to determine whether Defendants waived their defenses of res

judicata and collateral estoppel, or whether the PLRA permits the trial court to

dismiss the case based on those defenses, we first examine Rules 1030 and 1032 of

the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6602(e) of the PLRA. Rule

1030(a) states:

(a) Except as provided by subdivision (b), all affirmative defenses

including but not limited to the defenses of accord and satisfaction,

arbitration and award, consent, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,

estoppel, failure of consideration, fair comment, fraud, illegality,

immunity from suit, impossibility of performance, justification, laches,

license, payment, privilege, release, res judicata, statute of frauds,

statute of limitations, truth and waiver shall be pleaded in a responsive

pleading under the heading “New Matter”. A party may set forth as

new matter any other material facts which are not merely denials of the

averments of the preceding pleading.

10

Robinson does not dispute that this suit qualifies as prison conditions litigation.

15

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1030(a) (emphasis added).

Rule 1032(a) provides:

(a) A party waives all defenses and objections which are not

presented either by preliminary objection, answer or reply, except

a defense which is not required to be pleaded under Rule 1030(b), the

defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the

defense of failure to join an indispensable party, the objection of failure

to state a legal defense to a claim, the defenses of failure to exercise or

exhaust a statutory remedy and an adequate remedy at law and any

other nonwaivable defense or objection.

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1032(a) (emphasis added).

Section 6602(e)(2) of the PLRA states:

(e) Dismissal of litigation.--Notwithstanding any filing fee which has

been paid, the court shall dismiss prison conditions litigation at any

time, including prior to service on the defendant, if the court

determines any of the following:

***

(2) The prison conditions litigation is frivolous or malicious or fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted or the defendant is

entitled to assert a valid affirmative defense, including immunity,

which, if asserted, would preclude the relief.

42 Pa. C.S. § 6602(e)(2) (first emphasis in original; subsequent emphasis added).

In the absence of the PLRA, res judicata and the related principle of collateral

estoppel would be defenses that must be pleaded under Rule 1030 as new matter in

a responsive pleading, lest the defenses be waived under Rule 1032. However,

Section 6602(e) of the PLRA permits a court to dismiss prison conditions litigation

at any time if the court finds that an affirmative defense, such as res judicata and

collateral estoppel, could be validly raised.

16

That the PLRA allows for dismissal of prison conditions litigation without

strict compliance with Rules 1030 and 1032 is supported by case law and the policy

behind the PLRA. In Payne v. Department of Corrections, a group of inmates

claimed that a number of PLRA provisions, including Section 6602(e), violated the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s “exclusive authority to prescribe rules of practice

and procedure pursuant to Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania

Constitution.” 871 A.2d 795, 799 (Pa. 2005). The Supreme Court rejected the

inmates’ claim, holding that, “[r]ather than establishing a method or procedure to

enforce a substantive right, Section 6602(e) regulates the substantive right to file

prison conditions litigation due to the Legislature’s belief that such claims are

particularly prone to being frivolous and therefore subject to summary dismissal.”

Id. at 802. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated that Section 6602(e) of

the PLRA provides grounds for the swift dismissal of often frivolous cases, despite

the strictures of the Court’s rules of procedure.

We have also previously held that a trial court could sua sponte dismiss prison

conditions litigation when a defense was not raised. Paluch v. Palakovich 84 A.3d

1109, 1110 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). In Paluch, an inmate sued to recover damages

against prison employees for property belonging to the inmate that was allegedly

lost or damaged during the inmate’s incarceration. The inmate challenged the trial

court’s sua sponte dismissal on the basis of the statute of limitations because the

defendants did not raise the statute of limitations as a defense. Id. at 1111-12. We

held that “Section 6602(e)(2) required the trial court to consider any valid

affirmative defenses that would preclude relief, and this includes the statute of

limitations.” Id. at 1112. Therefore, “the trial court did not err in raising the issue

sua sponte.” Id.

17

Similarly, in Shore v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, we granted

the DOC’s preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissed the

inmate’s First Amendment and procedural due process claims. 168 A.3d 374, 382,

386 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). We noted that, under Section 6602(e)(2) of the PLRA, we

could have sua sponte dismissed the inmate’s suit because the DOC was shielded by

the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity, despite the absence of any such

defense in the DOC’s preliminary objections. Id. at 386 n.8.

As demonstrated by our reasoning in Paluch and Shore, Section 6602(e)(2) of

the PLRA supports common pleas’ dismissal of Robinson’s Amended Complaint

based on the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel “which, if asserted,

would preclude the relief.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 6602(e)(2). The PLRA grants considerable

discretion to trial courts to dismiss suits based on applicable affirmative defenses,

such as those here, without strict compliance with Rules 1030 and 1032.

Accordingly, common pleas’ decision to treat the Motion and the defenses raised

therein as an amendment to Defendants’ New Matter, and not to find waiver, was an

exercise of common pleas’ discretion under the PLRA and was not an error of law.

As to Robinson’s assertion that he was prejudiced by common pleas’ decision

to treat the Motion and the defenses raised therein as an amendment to Defendants’

New Matter, it is first worth noting that “[t]he decision to allow an amendment to a

pleading is clearly within the discretion of the trial court.” City of Philadelphia v.

Spencer, 591 A.2d 5, 7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). In addition, with regard to amendments,

“[t]he possible prejudice . . . must stem from the fact that the new allegations are

offered late rather than in the original pleading, and not from the fact that the

opponent may lose his [or her] case on the merits if the [amendment] is allowed.”

Id. (quoting Bata v. Central-Penn Nat’l Bank of Phila., 293 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1972)

18

(emphasis in original) (quotation and citation omitted)). “To constitute prejudice,

the amendment must compromise [the opposing party’s] ability to present [its] case.”

Id. It cannot be said that the affirmative defenses were asserted so late as to prejudice

Robinson because Section 6602(e)(2) of the PLRA enables affirmative defenses to

be raised if the trial court, “at any time,” 42 Pa. C.S. § 6602(e)(2), deemed these

defenses valid. Overall, treating the Motion as an amendment to Defendants’ New

Matter did not limit Robinson’s ability to present this case because common pleas

afforded him the opportunity to amend his Complaint and the District Court had

already thoroughly evaluated the merits of this case. Therefore, this decision by

common pleas was not prejudicial to Robinson.

III. Conclusion

We hold that common pleas properly ruled that res judicata and collateral

estoppel bar Robinson from proceeding with this suit. We also hold that it was not

an abuse of discretion, not an error of law, and not prejudicial to Robinson for

common pleas to treat Defendants’ Motion as an amendment to their New Matter,

and, pursuant to the PLRA, not find that Defendants waived the defenses of res

judicata or collateral estoppel. Accordingly, we affirm the Order of common pleas

granting Defendants’ Motion and dismissing Robinson’s suit.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

19

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mark Anthony Robinson, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1694 C.D. 2017

:

Officer Fye, Marirosa Lamas, :

Jeffrey Horton, Robert Marsh, :

Timothy Miller, Lynn Eaton, :

Lieutenant Sutton, Lieutenant :

Davis and David Kuhn :

ORDER

NOW, August 17, 2018, the October 20, 2017 Order of the Court of Common

Pleas of Centre County is AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge