Corey Bland v. City of Newark

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 17-2228, 17-2229

COREY BLAND; VIRGINIA BLAND

v.

CITY OF NEWARK; CITY OF NEWARK POLICE

DEPARTMENT; NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE

POLICE; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; SERGEANT JAMES

THOMPSON; SERGEANT BRIAN MURPHY; TROOPER

II THOMAS ESPINOZA; TROOPER II WILLIAM LEGG;

TROOPER MIGUEL HOLGUIN; TROOPER ANTHONY

SARDANOPOLI; TROOPER JOHN OLIVEIRA;

TROOPER STEPHEN RIEFLER; DETECTIVE THOMAS

DEL MAURO; DETECTIVE BRIAN COSTA; DETECTIVE

DAVID MARTINEZ; SERGEANT THOMAS ROE;

OFFICER DANNY COSTA; JOHN DOES (1–100); ABC

ENTITIES (1–100), A Series of Fictitious Names,

New Jersey State Police, State of New Jersey, Anthony

Sardanopoli, James Thompson, Brian Murphy, Thomas

Espinoza, William Legg, Miguel Holguin,

John Oliveira and Stephen Riefler

Appellants in No. 17-2228

Thomas Delmauro, David Martinez and Ruben Torres

Appellants in No. 17-2229

__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-02985)

District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden

Argued March 22, 2018

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and BIBAS,

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: August 15, 2018)

Pamela L. Brause

Peter Ventrice [Argued]

Brause Brause & Ventrice

276 Main Street, P.O. Box 232

Metuchen, NJ 08840

Lucas E. Phillips, Jr. [Argued]

134 Evergreen Place, Suite 301

P.O. Box 2487

East Orange, NJ 07019

Attorneys for Appellees

2

Michael C. Walters [Argued]

Office of Attorney General of New Jersey

Division of Law

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Street, P.O. Box 112

Trenton, NJ 08625

Attorney for All Appellants

Gary S. Lipshutz [Argued]

City of Newark Department of Law

920 Broad Street, Room 316

Newark, NJ 07102

Attorney for Appellants Thomas Del Mauro, David

Martinez, and Ruben Torres

Michael H. Freeman

Greenberg Dauber Epstein & Tucker

One Gateway Center, Suite 600

Newark, NJ 07102

Matthew J. Lynch

Office of Attorney General of New Jersey

Division of Law

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Street

Trenton, NJ 08625

Attorneys for Appellants State of New Jersey, New

Jersey State Police, James Thompson, Brian Murphy,

Thomas Espinoza, William Legg, Miguel Holguin,

Anthony Sardanopoli, John Oliveira and Stephen

Riefler

3

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

This interlocutory appeal was filed by several law

enforcement officers who were involved to varying degrees in

a prolonged pursuit of a fleeing motorist, Corey Bland. The

pursuit involved the use of lethal force against Bland, who

sustained severe injuries after he was shot between 16 and 18

times. The question presented is whether the District Court

committed legal error when it denied the officers summary

judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Because the

officers’ conduct was within the bounds of the Supreme

Court’s relevant decisions regarding the use of lethal force, we

will reverse.

I

A. Initial Pursuit

In the early evening of December 26, 2011, Newark

Police received a report that a black Audi bearing Pennsylvania

license plate number PZK821C had been carjacked at

gunpoint. Approximately three hours later, New Jersey State

Troopers James Thompson and Brian Murphy spotted the

carjacked vehicle in Newark. Appellee Corey Bland was

behind the wheel. The troopers activated their police lights, but

Bland failed to stop. Instead, he accelerated and began to drive

recklessly, running red lights and shutting off his headlights as

he went. The troopers lost sight of the Audi, but an officer from

the Summit Police Department began following it shortly

4

thereafter. Bland nearly struck that officer’s vehicle and

collided with an embankment, but he continued driving. He

reached speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour, weaving in and

out of light traffic.

State Trooper John Oliveira joined the chase in his

marked police car after receiving reports that units from the

State Police and Summit Police Departments were pursuing a

carjacked vehicle. State Trooper Miguel Holguin, 1 driving an

unmarked Chrysler 300 accompanied by State Troopers

Anthony Sardanopoli and Stephen Riefler, got involved after

hearing a radio broadcast by Thompson and Murphy

containing details about the carjacked vehicle. Bland continued

to drive recklessly, frequently changing lanes, disregarding

traffic lights, turning his lights off, accelerating to more than

80 miles an hour in an area with a 25-mile-per-hour speed limit,

and driving over a curb in an empty parking lot, which caused

the Audi to begin to smoke. Despite all this, the Audi was not

disabled, and Bland continued to evade police.

B. Lincoln Park Events

Eventually, Bland began driving the wrong way down

Lincoln Park, a one-way street. While doing so, he collided

both with Thompson and Murphy in their marked state police

car and an occupied Newark Police vehicle. When Bland hit

the Newark police car, he was travelling approximately 25 to

35 miles per hour, and the impact caused the police car to strike

an unoccupied parked car. As a result, the Audi, the police car,

and the unoccupied car became entangled. State Trooper

1

Discrepancies exist about the spelling of this trooper’s

name. We adopt the spelling provided by the trooper in his

deposition.

5

Thomas Espinoza, who had received a radio transmission

about an ongoing pursuit involving a vehicle carjacked at

gunpoint, arrived on the scene shortly after these collisions.

Numerous officers surrounded the Audi, including

Murphy, Thompson, Oliveira, Sardanopoli, Espinoza, and

State Trooper William Legg. 2 Many of the officers ordered

Bland to surrender, and one officer attempted to break the

Audi’s window by striking it. During this encounter, the six

state troopers fired a total of 28 shots, none of which hit Bland.

Newark Police Officer Thomas Del Mauro was present at

Lincoln Park, but he did not discharge his weapon.

There is no evidence in the record that Bland attempted

to surrender at this time. Instead, he revved the Audi’s engine,

spun its tires, and tried to get the vehicle to accelerate. Bland

ultimately freed the Audi from the Newark police car by

reversing and striking the now-unoccupied state police car a

second time. 3 He then drove over a curb and through a public

park.

Upon exiting the park, Bland continued to speed

through Newark with his lights off, at times on roads populated

with vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Officers and state

2

Bland does not identify any actions taken by Riefler or

Holguin at Lincoln Park.

3

Both the Newark officers and the state troopers

contend that Bland drove aggressively at the officers as he

attempted to flee, but Bland disputes this characterization. That

dispute is immaterial, however, because all parties agree that

officers were standing less than 10 feet from the Audi as Bland

extricated it from the two vehicles.

6

troopers continued to pursue Bland, but Thompson and

Murphy were no longer involved because their vehicle was

disabled when it was struck by the Audi at Lincoln Park.

During this portion of the chase, a state police car struck an

occupied civilian vehicle. Bland eventually drove to the

intersection of 18th Avenue and Livingston Street, where the

most vigorously disputed series of events took place.

C. The Terminus of the Chase

At the intersection of 18th and Livingston, the

unmarked Chrysler 300 driven by Holguin allegedly rammed

the Audi, sending the Audi into scaffolding that surrounded a

school. State Troopers Holguin, Sardanopoli, and Riefler

exited the Chrysler 300 and moved toward the Audi, which

remained entangled in the scaffolding. Holguin approached the

driver’s side with Riefler standing behind him, while

Sardanopoli moved to the Audi’s passenger side.

All three troopers began firing their weapons at the

Audi. Holguin and Riefler testified that they initially

discharged their weapons because Bland refused to comply

with their orders to show his hands and to stop moving and

because he repeatedly threatened to kill the officers.

Sardanopoli stated that he fired his weapon after he saw

Holguin firing. Legg—also on the scene—asserted that he fired

because he could see Bland moving around in the Audi as

Holguin and Riefler discharged their weapons. Bland, for his

part, denied that the troopers shouted any verbal commands or

that he made evasive movements, but he conceded that nothing

in the record contradicts the officers’ allegations that he

threatened to kill them.

7

After the first volley of shots, Riefler approached the

driver’s side of the Audi, whereupon Riefler testified that

Bland attempted to climb through the window while again

threatening to kill him. In response, Riefler fired his weapon

again. Espinoza also discharged his weapon, as did Newark

Officers Del Mauro, Reuben Torres, and David Martinez, who

had heard about the carjacking at roll call earlier that evening.

The Newark officers stated that they fired their weapons

because they saw the Audi moving or heard it revving,

indicating that it was still capable of flight. Bland disputed this

assertion, arguing instead that the Audi became inoperable

once it crashed into the scaffolding. Oliveira, though present,

did not discharge his weapon at the terminus.

The shooting finally ceased once Riefler observed

Bland slumped over, and a Newark sergeant called for the

officers to hold their fire. Bland was shot between 16 and 18

times, including in the face, chest, and abdomen. He suffered

numerous injuries, including a traumatic brain injury,

respiratory failure, vision loss, and multiple facial fractures. No

gun was recovered from the scene, and no officer observed

Bland with a weapon during the course of the pursuit.

II

Bland and his wife Virginia filed a complaint in the

Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division alleging (among

other things) that Defendants violated Bland’s Fourth

Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 10:6-2(c). Defendants removed the case to federal court and

sought summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity.

After oral argument, the District Court concluded that it

was “not in a position to grant or deny qualified immunity.”

8

App. 78. Instead, it held that a jury must first decide two issues

of material fact: (1) whether the Audi’s engine was revving

(and thus whether the car was capable of moving) after it

crashed into the scaffolding; and (2) whether the officers could

see Bland’s movements inside the vehicle. The District Court

opined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Plumhoff v.

Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014), issued three years after the

car chase, may decide the “central” question of “whether or not

Corey Bland was an active threat to the officers at the terminus

so as to justify their actions in using deadly force to end that

risk.” App. 73. Accordingly, it denied Defendants’ motion,

including with respect to the three officers who were neither

present nor discharged their weapons at the terminus of the

chase. Defendants moved for a stay of trial, which the District

Court denied. We entered an order staying the district court

proceedings pending the resolution of this timely interlocutory

appeal.

III

A

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Dougherty v.

Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted). Our jurisdiction lies “only to the extent that the order

turns on an issue of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks,

citation, and alteration omitted). We “possess jurisdiction to

review whether the set of facts identified by the district court

is sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly established

constitutional right,” but “we lack jurisdiction to consider

whether the district court correctly identified the set of facts

9

that the summary judgment record is sufficient to prove.” 4 Id.

(quoting Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d

Cir. 2002)). “To the extent we have jurisdiction, this Court

exercises plenary review.” Id.

Summary judgment is proper only when the record

“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “affect[s] the outcome

of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether

a genuine dispute of material fact exists, we view the

underlying facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

the party opposing the motion. Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 986.

B

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials

from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136

S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). In resolving questions of

qualified immunity, “courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry:

4

The Newark officers argue that the District Court erred

by considering Bland’s expert testimony, which purported to

establish that the Audi was incapable of moving once it crashed

into the scaffolding. We do not have jurisdiction to review this

ruling. See Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 409

(3d Cir. 2007) (noting that, in appeals from denials of qualified

immunity, “we lack jurisdiction to review questions of

‘evidence sufficiency’” and must instead confine ourselves to

“pure questions of law”).

10

(1) whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the violation of a

constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the official’s conduct.” L.R. v. Sch.

Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016). We may

tackle these steps “in the order we deem most appropriate for

the particular case before us.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410,

418 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

Just two terms ago, the Supreme Court reiterated the

“longstanding principle that clearly established law should not

be defined at a high level of generality,” but must instead “be

particularized to the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 137 S.

Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also L.R., 836 F.3d at 248. Moreover, at the time

the action is taken, the “legal principle [must] clearly prohibit

the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before

him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is clear

to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.

Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Thus, “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”

Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986)).

C

The District Court focused its analysis on the events that

occurred at the terminus of the reckless flight that ensued after

Bland failed to comply with the traffic stop initiated by the

New Jersey State Police. We begin by discussing the deadly

force used by six of the state troopers at Lincoln Park, and we

conclude that they are all entitled to qualified immunity.

11

The Supreme Court has consistently held that officers

either did not violate the Fourth Amendment or were entitled

to qualified immunity when they used deadly force during car

chases similar to the one at issue here. In Brosseau v. Haugen,

543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam), the Court held that an officer

was entitled to qualified immunity after she shot “a disturbed

felon, set on avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when

persons in the immediate area [were] at risk from that flight.”

Id. at 200. In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Court

concluded that an officer did not violate the Fourth

Amendment when he “terminate[d] the car chase by ramming

his bumper” into the car of a fugitive whose reckless driving

“posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any

pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian

motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.” Id. at 381,

384. This was so even though the officer ran the motorist off

the road instead of employing the standard “PIT maneuver” 5 to

get the fleeing vehicle to stop, and this decision caused the

vehicle to run down an embankment and overturn, rendering

the plaintiff a quadriplegic. Id. at 375.

In Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014), decided

after the events giving rise to this suit, the Court held that

officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment and

alternatively were entitled to qualified immunity when they

fatally shot a fugitive whom the officers reasonably believed

was “intent on resuming” a chase that “pose[d] a deadly threat

for others on the road.” Id. at 2022. A year later, in Mullenix v.

5

In a Pursuit Intervention Technique maneuver, the

pursuing vehicle applies pressure to the rear of the fleeing

vehicle, causing the fleeing vehicle to turn abruptly and come

to a stop.

12

Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015), the Court concluded that an

officer who shot and killed a motorist during a high-speed

pursuit in which the fugitive threatened to kill police officers

was entitled to qualified immunity, even though the officer’s

decision to shoot defied his supervisor’s orders. Id. at 306–07,

312.

Like the cases just mentioned, Bland’s behavior

threatened the safety of the officers, as well as the public at

large. Before shots were fired at Lincoln Park, Bland drove at

high speeds, disregarded traffic signals, drove the wrong way

down a one-way street, collided with two occupied police

vehicles, and failed to comply with orders to surrender. As the

gunfire erupted, he repeatedly attempted to flee from police

and state troopers, including by trying to drive with officers

standing in close proximity to the Audi. And he engaged in all

of this behavior in a vehicle that had been reportedly taken at

gunpoint a few hours earlier. Bland does not direct us to any

caselaw indicating that, especially in light of the precedent just

discussed, “only someone plainly incompetent or who

knowingly violates the law would have perceived a sufficient

threat and acted as [the state troopers] did” in this situation.

Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 310 (internal quotation marks and

alteration omitted); see also Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862

F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that clearly established

rights are derived either from binding Supreme Court and

Third Circuit precedent or from a “robust consensus of cases

of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals” (citation

omitted)). Given the troopers’ reasonable belief that Bland was

armed, and the mortal threat that his conduct posed to those

around him, the troopers who discharged their weapons at

Lincoln Park did not violate Bland’s clearly established

constitutional rights. And because Thompson, Murphy, and

13

Oliveira fired their weapons only at this location, they are

plainly entitled to qualified immunity.

D

The events at the terminus of the car chase present a

more complicated picture, but we reach the same conclusion

because Bland identifies no caselaw indicating that the officers

violated clearly established law extant in 2011. See Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). He instead states in

conclusory fashion that “every . . . reasonable member of law

enforcement should be aware that [the officers’] conduct

would constitute excessive force.” Bland Br. 36. In support,

Bland argues that the officers were not in a position to see

whether he made threatening movements inside the vehicle,

and that the Audi’s impact with the scaffolding rendered it

inoperable, bringing the car chase to an end. 6 As a result, Bland

contends that Brosseau and Scott no longer control, and we

should instead look to Tennessee v. Garner for guidance. In

6

After the parties submitted their summary judgment

papers, Bland received a report from an automotive expert

concerning whether the Audi could have moved after it

collided with the scaffolding. The report contained pictures

taken after the incident, including one that purportedly showed

the driver’s side tinted window in one piece on the ground. At

oral argument, Bland contended that this photograph

demonstrated that the window was up during the final moments

of the chase, meaning that the officers could neither have seen

what Bland was doing inside the Audi nor heard his death

threats. We need not decide whether the District Court properly

considered this evidence because, even assuming that its

decision to do so was correct, Bland has failed to show that the

officers violated clearly established law.

14

Garner, the Supreme Court held that “if the suspect threatens

the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe

that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or

threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force

may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where

feasible, some warning has been given.” Tennessee v. Garner,

471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985). Applying that standard, the Court

concluded that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment by

shooting an “unarmed, nondangerous” suspect in the back of

the head as he attempted to flee the scene of a burglary. Id. at

11.

Bland’s reliance on Garner is misplaced. The Supreme

Court has noted that Garner “lay[s] out excessive-force

principles at only a general level” and “do[es] not by [itself]

create clearly established law outside an obvious case.” White,

137 S. Ct. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Scott, 550 U.S. at 382 (noting that “Garner did not establish a

magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions

whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force’”).

The officers here confronted a scenario quite different

from the one presented in Garner, where the officer pursued

and shot a nondangerous suspect in the back of the head, even

though the officer was “reasonably sure” the suspect was

unarmed. 471 U.S. at 3–4; see also Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201

(noting that analysis of qualified immunity “depends very

much on the facts of each case”). This becomes especially clear

once we consider the officers’ actions “in light of the specific

context of the case,” as we are required to do. Fields, 862 F.3d

at 361. The state troopers and Officer Del Mauro—all of whom

were present at Lincoln Park—continued to pursue a fugitive

who once again disobeyed traffic lights, drove at excessive

speeds, and put pedestrians and motorists at great risk. Under

15

Bland’s version of events, at least one innocent civilian

suffered harm by his flight when a state police car struck an

occupied vehicle during the final leg of the pursuit. See Scott,

550 U.S. at 379–80 (noting that the police were “forced to

engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up” with

the plaintiff). After the crash, Bland threatened to kill the

officers, and the record provides no evidence that he attempted

to surrender at any time. Though the Audi remained pinned

against the scaffolding, the officers had previously seen Bland

successfully free the car and continue to flee after the crash at

Lincoln Park. And although the officers did not see a weapon,

the police reports of an armed carjacking gave them reason to

believe Bland was armed. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (noting

that qualified immunity “turns on the objective legal

reasonableness of the action” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)). This was the situation the officers

confronted at the terminus of the chase when they discharged

their weapons. Bland identifies no cases with similar facts that,

in 2011, would have “put every reasonable offic[er] on notice”

that using deadly force in such a situation violated clearly

established constitutional rights. Fields, 862 F.3d at 361

(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, accepting (as we

must) the truth of Bland’s assertions regarding the Audi’s

immobility and the officers’ ability to see Bland’s hands, our

conclusion remains the same: the actions taken by the State

Troopers and Officer Del Mauro are protected by qualified

immunity.

But what about Newark Officers Torres and Martinez,

who, according to Bland, “arrived on the scene[ and] joined in

the shooting without knowing whether Mr. Bland was firing at

them, and without ever first observing Mr. Bland to be in

possession of any firearm”? Bland Br. 5. The Newark officers

16

contend that video footage refutes this allegation, but we need

not resolve that dispute. 7 Here again, Bland has presented no

caselaw demonstrating that the officers, who reasonably

believed that Bland was armed, violated a clearly established

right by joining in the chaotic scene and discharging their

weapons.

A recent Supreme Court decision demonstrates that

Torres’s and Martinez’s actions did not violate clearly

established rights. In White v. Pauly, the Court granted

qualified immunity to an officer who arrived late to an armed

confrontation between multiple officers and individuals. 137 S.

Ct. at 549, 551. After seeing one of the civilians fire shots, the

defendant officer, without giving a warning, shot and killed

another individual who pointed a weapon at the officers

surrounding the house. Id. at 550. The plaintiffs argued that the

other officers had not adequately alerted the occupants to the

7

Though we need not look to the video for guidance,

we take this opportunity to remind district courts of their

obligation to do so when necessary to identify disputed issues

of material fact. At oral argument, the Newark officers

requested that the District Court consider video footage they

proffered to counter Bland’s version of events. The Court

declined this invitation, stating that it did not think it was

“particularly smart” to “hav[e] judges review individual tapes

and say, hey, I’m satisfied.” App. 27. Notwithstanding the

District Court’s independent assessment of the wisdom of this

approach, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to consider

video evidence in the record and to “view[] the facts in the light

depicted by the videotape,” especially when it “blatantly

contradict[s]” the nonmovant’s narrative. Scott, 550 U.S. at

380–81.

17

fact that they were officers, and that White, although late to the

scene, should have been aware that “corrective action was

necessary.” Id. at 552. In reversing the denial of qualified

immunity, the Court stated that “[c]learly established federal

law does not prohibit a reasonable officer who arrives late to

an ongoing police action in circumstances like this from

assuming that proper procedures . . . have already been

followed,” and that “[n]o settled Fourth Amendment principle

requires that officer to second-guess the earlier steps already

taken by his or her fellow officers.” Id. So too here. In the

absence of any controlling law to the contrary, Newark

Officers Martinez and Torres likewise are entitled to qualified

immunity. 8

IV

Because Defendants did not violate any of Bland’s

clearly established constitutional rights, we will reverse the

order of the District Court so summary judgment may be

entered for Defendants.

8

Because Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity, we need not reach the underlying Fourth

Amendment questions. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Nothing in

this opinion should be read to suggest that law enforcement

officers violate the Fourth Amendment where, as here, they

employ lethal force to neutralize a carjacking suspect

reasonably perceived to be armed, dangerous, and unwilling to

peacefully surrender.

18