Wanda Williams v. The Manitowoc Company, Inc.

Case: 17-60458 Document: 00514585989 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/03/2018

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 3, 2018

No. 17-60458

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

WANDA WILLIAMS, individually and as Conservator for John Robert

Williams, Jr., incapacitated,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

MANITOWOC CRANES, L.L.C.,

Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

Before JOLLY, SOUTHWICK, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:

A crane accident in Mississippi left John Williams Jr. physically and

mentally incapacitated. Wanda Williams, his wife, sued the crane

manufacturer, Manitowoc Cranes, under Mississippi’s products liability

statute. Following a lengthy trial, a jury found that Manitowoc failed to warn

Model 16000 Series crane operators that, if the crane tips over, large weights

stacked on the rear of the crane can slide forward and strike the operator’s cab.

We AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Accident

John Williams Jr. worked as a certified crane operator at VT Halter

Marine shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi. John typically operated a

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Manitowoc Model 16000 Series crawler crane. 1 Crawler cranes are so-named

because they crawl along tracks in order to move. They can typically lift

hundreds of tons of weight. The Model 16000 has a counterweight tray on its

rear; the tray holds a stack of large, steel counterweights. Each counterweight

is roughly seven-feet wide, eight-feet long, nine-and-a-half-inches tall, and

weighs 18,000 pounds.

On June 25, 2014, John participated in a “tandem lift,” which involved

multiple cranes moving a bow section of a ship. As usual, John operated a

Manitowoc Model 16000. Three total cranes participated at the start of the lift.

As planned, the lift caused the bow to rotate. Soon after, one crane

disconnected from the load, as planned.

Two cranes remained. John operated one, and David Smith operated the

other. The two remaining cranes continued the lift by moving the bow unit

forward toward the hull of the ship under construction. But, unexpectedly, the

cranes began to separate from one another. Smith’s crane pulled John’s crane

forward, causing the tracks on John’s crane to rise up. John, however, stayed

in the operator’s cab in a last-ditch attempt to control the load.

As John’s crane tipped, the nine-ton counterweights stacked in the rear

of the crane began to rain down. At least one slid forward, striking the operator

cab. The collision propelled John from the cab to the ground—an eight-foot,

head-first fall onto concrete.

John survived. But his physical and mental capacities were permanently

impaired.

1 A diagram of the crane is available in the Appendix.

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B. The Preceding Proceedings

In the wake of the accident, Wanda Williams sued Manitowoc. 2 Focusing

on the crane’s counterweight system, she raised failure-to-warn, defective-

design, and negligence claims under the Mississippi Products Liability Act. 3

She also brought a loss-of-consortium claim.

In September 2016, the district court granted partial summary judgment

for Manitowoc and dismissed Williams’s design-defect claims with prejudice.

The defective-warning and loss-of-consortium claims proceeded to a jury trial,

which took place the next month.

On October 17, after Williams presented her case-in-chief, Manitowoc

moved orally for judgment as a matter of law. Manitowoc claimed Williams

failed to prove her failure-to-warn claim as a matter of law; that is, she did not

show that the warnings were inadequate or that any inadequacy proximately

caused John’s injuries. The district court denied the motion.

The trial continued. Days later, the jury ruled for Williams, finding that

Manitowoc failed to warn John about the falling counterweights. 4 The jury

awarded $7 million in economic damages and $1 million in non-economic

damages. It also awarded $500,000 for the loss-of-consortium claim. But the

jury found that negligence contributed to the injuries, so it apportioned fault

as follows: 50% to VT Halter, 40% to Manitowoc, and 10% to John. So the

district court entered a final judgment against Manitowoc for $2.8 million in

actual economic damages and $600,000 in non-economic damages—resulting

in a total judgment of $3.4 million plus post-judgment interest.

2 Williams filed individually and as John’s Conservator.

3 MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63.

4 The jury found for Manitowoc with regard to Williams’s claim that the Model 16000

lacked adequate warnings about how to safely perform tandem lifts.

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Nearly a month later, Manitowoc filed a renewed motion for judgment

as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial. Manitowoc

asserted that it deserved judgment as a matter of law because Williams failed

to prove her failure-to-warn claim. Manitowoc claimed that (1) it adequately

warned about causing a tip-over, (2) John’s misuse of the crane caused the tip-

over, and (3) the proposed additional warning would not have prevented John’s

injuries. Manitowoc also asserted, in the alternative, that it deserved a new

trial because the district court improperly qualified Dr. William Singhose as

an expert, and the court erred in admitting evidence regarding prior accidents

involving other Manitowoc cranes and in excluding evidence about John’s

character. The district court denied Manitowoc’s motions, and Manitowoc

timely appealed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

“We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment

as a matter of law, applying the same standards as the district court.” 5

Judgment as a matter of law is proper if “a party has been fully heard on an

issue during a jury trial and . . . a reasonable jury would not have a legally

sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” 6

“We review all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party; we do not make credibility determinations or weigh the

evidence.” 7 Also, our court “cannot reverse a denial of a motion for judgment

as a matter of law unless the jury’s factual findings are not supported by

5 Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 620 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Ill. Cent.

R.R. Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2012)).

6 FED R. CIV. P. 50(a).

7 Homoki v. Conversion Servs., Inc., 717 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Poliner

v. Tex. Health Sys., 537 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2008)).

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substantial evidence, or if the legal conclusions implied from the jury’s verdict

cannot in law be supported by those findings.” 8 In other words, the party

moving for judgment as a matter of law can prevail only “if the facts and

inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party

that reasonable jurors could not have arrived at a contrary verdict.” 9 Although

our review is de novo, “[a]fter a jury trial, [the] standard of review is especially

deferential.” 10

B. Motion for a New Trial

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of

discretion. 11 “The district court abuses its discretion by denying a new trial

only when there is an absolute absence of evidence to support the jury’s

verdict.” 12 “If the evidence is legally sufficient, we must find that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for new trial.” 13

C. Expert Testimony

“Whether an individual is qualified to testify as an expert is a question

of law.” 14 “However, we review the admission or exclusion of expert testimony

for an abuse of discretion,” 15 and we afford the trial court “[w]ide latitude” in

8 OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. T. Wade Welch & Assocs., 841 F.3d 669, 676 (5th Cir. 2016)

(quoting Am. Home Assurance Co. v. United Space All., LLC, 378 F.3d 482, 488 (5th Cir.

2004)).

9 Homoki, 717 F.3d at 395 (citing Poliner, 537 F.3d at 376).

10 Abraham, 708 F.3d at 620 (second alteration in original) (quoting Brown v.

Sudduth, 675 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2012)).

11 Olibas v. Barclay, 838 F.3d 442, 448 (5th Cir. 2016).

12 OneBeacon Ins., 841 F.3d at 676 (cleaned up).

13 Id. (citations omitted). It is more difficult to satisfy the standard for reversing the

denial of a motion for a new trial than the standard for reversing the denial of judgment as

a matter of law. See Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 269 & n.2 (5th Cir.

1998).

14 Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302

F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2002)).

15 Id. (citation omitted).

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its determination. 16 Given the district court’s “broad discretion in deciding”

whether to admit expert testimony, this court “will not find error unless the

ruling is manifestly erroneous.” 17 “Manifest error is one that is plain and

indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling

law.” 18

D. Evidentiary Rulings

This court applies a “deferential abuse of discretion standard” when

reviewing a district court’s evidentiary rulings. 19 “A district court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly

erroneous assessment of the evidence.” 20 “The harmless error doctrine applies

to the review of evidentiary rulings, so even if a district court has abused its

discretion, [this court] will not reverse unless the error affected ‘the substantial

rights of the parties.’” 21 “The party asserting the error has the burden of

proving that the error was prejudicial.” 22

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Failure-to-Warn Claim

The Mississippi Products Liability Act (MPLA) codifies a failure-to-warn

cause of action. 23 To prevail, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that when the product left the manufacturer’s control:

16 Roman v. W. Mfg., Inc., 691 F.3d 686, 692 (5th Cir. 2012).

17 Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

18 Id. (cleaned up).

19 Heinsohn v. Carabin & Shaw, P.C., 832 F.3d 224, 233 (5th Cir. 2016); see

Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) (“In deference to a district

court’s familiarity with the details of the case and its greater experience in evidentiary

matters, courts of appeals afford broad discretion to a district court’s evidentiary rulings.”).

20 Heinsohn, 832 F.3d at 233 (quoting Nunez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 840, 844

(5th Cir. 2010)).

21 Id. (quoting Nunez, 604 F.3d at 844); see FED. R. EVID. 103.

22 Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 591 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).

23 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)–(iii) (2014). We are sitting in diversity, so we

apply Mississippi’s substantive law. See Krieser v. Hobbs, 166 F.3d 736, 739 (5th Cir. 1999).

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1. the product “failed to contain adequate warnings or

instructions” about a dangerous condition that the

manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known about;

2. “the ordinary user or consumer would not realize [the]

dangerous condition”;

3. the inadequate warning “rendered the product unreasonably

dangerous to the user or consumer”; and

4. the inadequate warning “proximately caused the damages for

which recovery is sought.” 24

Manitowoc claims Williams failed to prove her failure-to-warn claim as

a matter of law, thus the district court should have granted Manitowoc

judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, Manitowoc trains its sights on two

components 25 of Williams’s failure-to-warn claim: (1) the existing warning’s

adequacy; and (2) whether the allegedly inadequate warning proximately

caused John’s injuries.

1. Adequacy

Under Mississippi law,

An adequate product warning or instruction is one that a

reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances

would have provided with respect to the danger and that

communicates sufficient information on the dangers and safe use

of the product, taking into account the characteristics of, and the

ordinary knowledge common to an ordinary consumer who

purchases the product. 26

“In Mississippi, a warning may be held adequate as a matter of law where the

adverse effect was one that the manufacturer specifically warned against.” 27

24 Id. § 11-1-63(a), (c); see Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Fortenberry, 234 So. 3d 381, 390

(Miss. 2017), reh’g denied (Feb. 1, 2018); Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix, Jr., 142 So. 3d 374, 385

(Miss. 2014).

25 Manitowoc concedes that it knew about the hazards of falling counterweights and

that ordinary users would not have realized the dangerous condition.

26 MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(c)(ii).

27 Austin v. Will-Burt Co., 361 F.3d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

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But there is no bright-line rule for whether a warning is adequate. 28 Typically,

the jury resolves this fact question. 29

The (in)adequacy dispute here centers on whether Manitowoc needed to

warn operators about the specific hazard that counterweights could fall during

a tip-over.

Manitowoc asserts that warning about the general hazards of tipping

over (severe injury or death, for example)—combined with instructions about

how to avoid a tip-over—is adequate. In other words: no tip-over, no sliding

counterweights, no problems. 30 Separately, Manitowoc argues that its

warnings were adequate as a matter of law because they “complied with all

federally mandated OSHA requirements and industry standards.” If we agree

with either of Manitowoc’s arguments, then the district court erred by failing

to grant judgment as a matter of law. 31

Williams sees things differently. Manitowoc never warned operators that

unsecured counterweights could slide forward during a tip-over, striking the

cab and potentially injuring the operator. Manitowoc knew about this risk yet

said nothing. And multiple crane operators testified during trial that they were

unaware of the falling counterweight risk. Thus, Williams contends, the

warning was inadequate.

28 See Hankins v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:08-CV-639-CWR-FKB, 2011 WL 6291947, at

*5 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011).

29 See Fortenberry, 234 So. 3d at 391.

30 Manitowoc asserts it adequately warned operators about the risks of using the

Model 16000. The Model 16000 Operator’s Manual warns that unsafe operation “can result

in . . . death or injury.” The Manual describes various hazards that could result from unsafe

operation, including tipping over. And the Manual outlined the potential consequences of

tipping over; thus, the operators knew “a tip-over could result in serious injury or death.”

Also, Manitowoc warned operators about what may cause a tip-over—for example, by

overloading the crane or operating the crane on a slope.

31 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a); Homoki, 717 F.3d at 395.

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We hold that Manitowoc was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on the failure-to-warn claim. The jury had an adequate basis for finding

Manitowoc’s warning inadequate—that is, for finding that a reasonably

prudent person would have informed crane operators about the unique danger

posed by falling counterweights. 32

We are guided in part by our court’s decision in Austin v. Will-Burt

Company. 33 There, we found a warning adequate where “the adverse effect was

one that the manufacturer specifically warned against.” 34 Accordingly, we

affirmed summary judgment in favor of a telescoping mast manufacturer 35 in

a failure-to-warn case because the manufacturer adequately warned about the

hazards of raising the mast near electrical power lines. 36

Manitowoc, however, failed to warn about the specific “adverse effect” of

a counterweight falling, crushing the operator cab, and ejecting the operator

from the cab. The Model 16000 Operator’s Manual provided no guidance about

precautions for avoiding the falling counterweight hazard. Instead, it

discussed only in broad terms the harms that could result from a tip-over.

We cannot conclude as a matter of law that Manitowoc adequately

warned crane operators about the falling counterweight danger. Typically, the

jury is responsible for evaluating a warning’s adequacy. 37 Here, the jury had a

32 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(c)(ii).

33 361 F.3d 862 (5th Cir. 2004).

34 See id. at 868. This does not mean, however, that a warning must identify all known

hazards in order to be deemed adequate. Under Mississippi law, juries engage in a fact-

intensive analysis of a warning’s adequacy. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(c)(ii)

35 The telescoping mast, designed for mounting on top of a news van, helped to

facilitate news broadcasts. The mast was constructed of aluminum tubes “nestled inside each

other that could be extended by air pressure.” Id. at 864. On the day of the accident, “[w]hen

the mast was raised, it became entangled with the power lines, sending 8,000 volts through

the mast and electrifying the van and its appurtenances. When [the decedent] touched the

van, he received a fatal electric shock.” Id.

36 See id. at 868–69.

37 See Fortenberry, 234 So. 3d at 391.

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sufficient evidentiary basis for finding Manitowoc’s warning inadequate. 38

Manitowoc knew that counterweights could fall during a tip-over but failed to

mention it in the Manual. Also, crane operators were apparently unaware of

the falling counterweight hazard. Plus, the jury could have found Manitowoc’s

purported compliance with industry standards insufficient to render the

warning adequate. 39 We are unwilling to supplant the jury’s conclusion about

the warning’s adequacy with our own—especially when we are so far removed

from the witnesses and evidence. 40

2. Proximate Cause

Manitowoc contends that any failure to warn did not proximately cause

William’s injuries, so Williams’s claim fails as a matter of law. 41

The MPLA does not define proximate cause. The Mississippi Supreme

Court, however, has filled in the statutory gaps. 42 The plaintiff must show the

failure to warn was the “cause in fact” and the “legal cause” of the injuries. 43

To be the “cause in fact,” the plaintiff must show that “but for the defendant’s

38 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a); OneBeacon Ins., 841 F.3d at 676.

39 See Will-Burt, 361 F.3d at 868. Manitowoc cites no record evidence detailing the

practices of other crane manufacturers, nor does it cite evidence about industry standards.

This may be because, as Williams’s expert Dr. William Singhose testified, “this falling

counterweight phenomena is relatively new in cranes, so . . . it has [not] made its way through

the government process yet.” Also, the MPLA does not say that complying with industry

standards renders a warning adequate as a matter of law; the statute says that an adequate

warning “is one that a reasonably prudent person” would provide about the dangers and safe

uses of the product. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(c)(ii). Compliance, therefore, is one piece

of evidence for the jury to consider, but it is not dispositive in a failure-to-warn claim. Union

Carbide Corp., 142 So. 3d at 387. (“[C]ompliance with OSHA standards may be used as

evidence of the reasonableness of [the defendant’s] actions, but it is not dispositive.”).

40 See OneBeacon Ins., 841 F.3d at 676 (quoting Am. Home Assurance Co., 378 F.3d at

488); Homoki, 717 F.3d at 395.

41 See 3M Co. v. Johnson, 895 So. 2d 151, 166 (Miss. 2005) (“[T]he failure to warn must

be the proximate cause of the injuries suffered or it is irrelevant.”).

42 See, e.g., Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 968 So. 2d 1267, 1277 (Miss. 2007); 3M Co.,

895 So. 2d at 166.

43 See Berry v. E-Z Trench Mfg., Inc., 772 F.Supp.2d 757, 759–60 (S.D. Miss. 2011).

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negligence, the injury would not have occurred.” 44 To be the “legal cause,” the

plaintiff’s damages must have been a reasonably foreseeable result of the

failure to warn. 45 Generally, the jury decides the proximate cause component

of a products liability case. 46

As part of the proximate cause inquiry, the Mississippi Supreme Court

requires plaintiffs to prove that an alternative warning would have conveyed

the information necessary for the victim to avoid the accident. 47

Manitowoc raises two points for why its alleged failure to warn did not

proximately cause John’s injuries: (a) John’s misuse of the crane caused the

injuries, and (b) no alternative warning would have helped John avoid the

counterweights.

a. Misuse

Courts seek “to apportion fairly the costs of the harm arising out of the

use of a product.” 48 Thus, in products liability cases misuse is a defense 49 that

“will bar recovery when a jury finds the plaintiff’s unforeseeable misuse of the

product substantially changed the condition of the product, and that change,

and not the alleged defect, is the proximate cause of the alleged injury.” 50

44 Id. at 760 (quoting Glover, 968 So. 2d at 1277).

45 Id.

46 See Whittley v. City of Meridian, 530 So. 2d 1341, 1348 (Miss. 1988); see also Mine

Safety Appliance Co. v. Holmes, 171 So. 3d 442, 456 (Miss. 2015) (finding that the “misuse”

inquiry, which bears on proximate cause, is “generally” a jury question).

47 See 3M Co., 895 So. 2d at 166; Windham v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 607, 612

(S.D. Miss. 1992) (“[I]f a further warning would not have altered [the physician’s] conduct,

then any failure to warn would not be the proximate cause of [the plaintiff’s] injuries.”).

48 Mine Safety, 171 So. 3d at 454.

49 Id. (observing that if the “plaintiff’s injuries resulted from product misuse . . . then

the plaintiff is the proximate cause of the injuries and the manufacturer is not liable”).

50 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The plaintiff in Mine Safety raised both

failure-to-warn and design-defect claims. The court in Mine Safety performed the misuse

analysis only in the context of the design-defect claim—not the failure-to-warn claim. See id.

at 452–57. Nevertheless, Williams apparently accepts that misuse is a defense to a failure-

to-warn claim.

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Generally, the jury is responsible for determining “whether misuse of a product

caused the plaintiff’s injury.” 51

Manitowoc believes John misused the crane in three ways:

1. the crane was overloaded; 52

2. he operated the crane on a slope; 53 and

3. the crane’s operational aid was not working. 54

Absent misuse, Manitowoc argues, the crane would not have tipped over, and

the counterweight would not have struck the cab. According to Manitowoc,

holding it accountable for John’s misuse would undercut Mississippi’s products

liability laws, which seek to fairly apportion responsibility between

manufacturers and consumers.

Manitowoc cites Mine Safety Appliance Company v. Holmes 55 to support

its argument. In Mine Safety, the plaintiff sued a respirator manufacturer,

alleging design and failure-to-warn defects. The Mississippi Supreme Court

held the manufacturer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because

“the evidence regarding misuse and the altered condition of the product was of

such quality and weight that no reasonable and fair-minded juror could have”

blamed the manufacturer for the plaintiff’s injuries. 56 There, the plaintiff

51 Id. at 456.

52 John allegedly overloaded the crane, which Manitowoc warned against in the

Operator’s Manual. According to testimony offered at trial, the crane tips over only when the

load exceeds 133% of the crane’s load chart.

53 Manitowoc alleges that John’s crane was operating on a 2% slope—which

contravened the Manual’s clear instructions to avoid operation on a slope greater than 1%.

54 John failed to ensure that his digital operational aids—devices that help operators

avoid tip-overs—were functioning correctly before the lift. Indeed, according to testimony

elicited during trial, John’s “RCI/RCL capacity warning system” was not working on the day

of the tip-over, and the device had been malfunctioning for the five months preceding the

accident. Manitowoc contends that it advised operators to immediately repair malfunctioning

warning systems.

55 171 So. 3d 442 (Miss. 2015).

56 Id. at 457–58 (citations omitted).

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“unequivocally testified” that during the six years he used the product, 57 “he

never changed the filter in his respirator” 58—even though the respirator came

with replacement filters and with instructions to replace the filter when the

wearer “noticed resistance when breathing through the respirator.” 59 To the

Mississippi Supreme Court, the plaintiff misused the product to the point

where it was “not in the same condition as when it left [the manufacturer’s]

control.” 60 Manitowoc believes John’s similar “unequivocal violations of the

manufacturer’s instructions” entitles it to judgment as a matter of law.

Williams, in response, implores this court to preserve the jury’s fact-

finding role. The jury heard the competing testimony about misuse, evaluated

the credibility of the witnesses, received instruction on the failure-to-warn

cause of action, and then rendered a verdict. Namely, during cross-

examination, one of Manitowoc’s experts admitted that John was not

responsible for the tip-over. 61 Also, the jury received instruction on the misuse

issue. 62 Accordingly, Williams believes that the jury considered John’s alleged

misuse when deciding how to apportion fault for the accident. 63

Williams also refutes each specific misuse allegation. First, she asserts

that the crane was not overloaded six minutes prior to the tip-over. 64 Also, the

57 Id. at 454.

58 Id. at 456.

59 Id. at 455.

60 Id. at 456.

61 Q: Sir, my question is, is it your testimony to this jury that this tip-over was

Johnny Williams’ fault; yes or no?

[Mike Parnell]: No. No, it wasn’t.

62 Manitowoc does not challenge the instruction on appeal.

63 The jury disagreed with Manitowoc’s arguments that misuse should bar recovery,

the jury apparently found that John was, to an extent, contributorily negligent. Manitowoc

does not argue that finding any misuse absolutely bars recovery.

64 Manitowoc disputes the relevance of this timeframe, arguing that John’s crane

became overloaded when the cranes separated.

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load on John’s crane would have affected the other crane involved in tandem

lift—but that crane’s (functioning) computer did not signal it was overloaded.

Second, the tip-over did not occur while the crane was moving along a

slope. An eyewitness testified that John’s crane was stationary at the time of

the accident. And Manitowoc’s expert admitted that it was “very close to the

case” that John’s crane was stationary at the time of the tip-over.

Third, using the crane with a malfunctioning operator aid—and

neglecting to repair the aid before the incident—does not constitute misuse.

Manitowoc’s own witness admitted during cross-examination that the Manual

says it is “100 percent acceptable to operate the crane without the computer

and without that operator aid.”

Generally, the jury should answer the misuse question. 65 Our role is to

decide whether the jury had a sufficient evidentiary basis to find for Williams.

We view the record evidence in the light most favorable to her, drawing

reasonable inferences in her favor and remaining agnostic about the credibility

and weight of the evidence. 66 Nothing demonstrates “the facts and inferences

point so strongly and overwhelmingly” in Manitowoc’s favor that “reasonable

jurors could not have arrived at a contrary verdict.” 67

Contrary to Manitowoc’s suggestion, this situation is a far cry from Mine

Safety. There, the plaintiff conceded that he misused the product. Here,

Williams rebutted the misuse arguments by citing testimony and record

evidence that the jury heard before reaching a verdict. And, on top of that, this

record evidence supports finding that Manitowoc could reasonably foresee

John’s alleged misuse.

65 See Mine Safety, 171 So. 3d at 456.

66 See Homoki, 717 F.3d at 395.

67 See id.

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Manitowoc’s misuse allegations do not convince us that John’s alleged

misuse proximately caused his injuries. This means the district court did not

err in denying Manitowoc’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on this

point.

b. Alternative Warning

The Mississippi Supreme Court, interpreting the MPLA’s proximate

cause element for failure-to-warn claims, requires plaintiffs to “demonstrate

that some other warning would have given them additional information that

they did not already know and that they would have acted upon that new

information in a manner that would have avoided the injuries.” 68

683M Co., 895 So. 2d at 166. There is a distinction between absent warning and

inadequate warning cases. Plaintiffs alleging that a warning was entirely absent are not

required to prove that they saw and heeded the warnings that were present because “it would

be absurd to require a plaintiff to show reliance on a warning where no warnings were given.”

Mine Safety, 171 So. 3d at 452. Plaintiffs alleging that a warning was present but inadequate

must prove that they “read and relied upon the defective warning to complain of it.” Id.

(quoting Union Carbide Corp., 142 So. 3d at 390). This is an inadequate warning case:

Williams criticizes the existing warnings as inadequate because they failed to warn of the

specific falling counterweight hazard.

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During trial, Williams displayed the “Singhose warning” as a potential

alternative warning:

So we ask:

1. Does the warning provide operators new information?

2. Does that additional information instruct crane operators to

act differently, such that they would avoid injury?

Manitowoc answers each question in the negative. Manitowoc’s primary

objection is that the warning does not tell operators how to avoid falling

counterweights—even if it apprises them of the counterweight danger.

Because the warning is silent on how operators can safely escape the cab (and

avoid the counterweight danger), operators are left to “jump and run.” This is

dangerous: A fleeing operator could be struck by a falling counterweight, or the

operator may injure himself while exiting the cab. Given the shortcomings of

the Singhose warning, operators may be safer remaining in the cab during a

tip-over. Also, according to Manitowoc, John’s failure to follow the Manual’s

warnings about safe crane operation demonstrates he likely would not have

followed the Singhose warning, anyway. 69 Thus, according to Manitowoc,

69 See Part III(A)(2)(a) for the misuse discussion.

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John’s injuries were not proximately caused by problems with its own

warning. 70

According to Williams, however, the Singhose warning communicates

the specific danger that counterweights could fall during a tip-over, giving

operators unique, valuable, and potentially life-saving information.

Responding to Manitowoc’s derisive “jump and run” commentary, Williams

claims the warning “alerts the operator the counterweights will strike (and

crush) the rear of the cab.” So instead of remaining in the cab when the crane

starts to tip, any crane operator with “common sense” would swiftly exit.

Harold Abbott, a crane operator at VT Halter, testified that had he seen the

warning, he would know that he should flee the cab as quickly as possible

during a tip-over. Here, it took over three minutes for the crane to topple, which

likely would have given John adequate time to leave the cab, walk down the

catwalk, and descend the crane’s stairs. Williams concludes her argument on

this point by emphasizing that the jury saw the warning and heard the

accompanying testimony, so we should respect the jury’s conclusion on the

proximate cause element. 71

We conclude the jury had an adequate basis for finding that an

alternative warning could have communicated valuable additional information

about the falling counterweight danger, allowing John to avoid injury. Thus,

the district court correctly ruled on the motion for judgment as a matter of

law. 72

Williams bore the burden of persuading the jury that an alternative

warning would have given John “additional information that [he] did not

already know” and that he “would have acted upon that new information in a

70 See 3M Co., 895 So. 2d at 166; Windham, 786 F. Supp. at 612.

71 We note that there was no specific jury instruction discussing the Singhose warning.

72 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a); Homoki, 717 F.3d at 395.

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manner that would have avoided the injuries.” 73 We review the evidence in the

light most favorable to Williams, drawing all reasonable inferences in her

favor—while avoiding credibility determinations and evidence weighing. 74 We

cannot reverse the district court’s decision to deny the motion for judgment as

a matter of law unless “the facts and inferences point so strongly and

overwhelmingly in favor of [Manitowoc] that reasonable jurors could not have

arrived at a contrary verdict.” 75

Many questions surround an alternative warning’s efficacy. Where

would it have been placed? Would operators have noticed it? Did it adequately

advise operators how to avoid the falling counterweight hazard? And there is,

of course, speculation involved in predicting whether John would have followed

the warning and safely exited the operator’s cab.

We must trust, however, that the jury considered these issues in

evaluating whether an alternative warning would have reduced the likelihood

of John severely injuring himself during the tip-over. 76 Based on the testimony

of other crane operators and Dr. Singhose, the jury could have inferred that an

alternative warning would have prompted John to exit the operator’s cab

during a tip-over. In other words, given the potentially severe harm of

remaining in the cab, the jury could have predicted that—had he known of the

falling-counterweight danger—John would have followed his “common sense”

and swiftly exited before a counterweight struck the cab. Our reservations

73 See 3M Co., 895 So. 2d at 166.

74 Homoki, 717 F.3d at 395.

75 See id.

76 Generally, the proximate cause inquiry in a products liability case is reserved for

the jury. See Whittley, 530 So. 2d at 1348.

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about the warning notwithstanding, we are unwilling to hold as a matter of

law that an alternative warning would have been ineffective. 77

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion.

1. Qualifying Dr. Singhose as a Warnings Expert

Williams proffered Dr. William Singhose as an expert in mechanical

engineering, human factors, and warnings. Manitowoc claims the district court

abused its discretion by finding Dr. Singhose qualified to testify as a warnings

expert.

“Whether an individual is qualified to testify as an expert is a question

of law.” 78 Our court “review[s] the admission or exclusion of expert testimony

for an abuse of discretion.” 79 We afford the trial court “[w]ide latitude” in

deciding the admissibility of expert testimony. 80 Given the district court’s

“broad discretion,” we “will not find error unless the ruling is manifestly

erroneous.” 81 “Manifest error is one that is plain and indisputable, and that

amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.” 82

77 When a plaintiff claims that a warning is inadequate, the plaintiff must show

reliance on the actual warning to establish proximate cause. That is because “[i]nadequate

warnings cannot serve as the proximate cause of injuries where adequate warnings would

have resulted in the same injuries.” Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 904 So. 2d 1077, 1094

(Miss. 2005); see also Mine Safety, 171 So. 3d at 453 (finding an alternative warning

insufficient as a matter of law because “there was no evidence whatsoever this [alternative

warning] would have changed [the plaintiff’s] behavior” because the plaintiff failed to show

that he would have read the alternative warning); 3M Co., 895 So. 2d at 166 (finding the

inadequate warning did not proximately cause the plaintiffs’ injuries and reversing the

district court’s refusal to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because “[n]o plaintiff

testified that they ever read any warnings . . . placed on [the defendant’s] products,” so no

alternative warning could have been adequate).

78 Huss, 571 F.3d at 452 (citing Mathis, 302 F.3d at 459).

79 Id.

80 Roman, 691 F.3d at 692.

81 Guy, 394 F.3d at 325 (citations omitted) (emphasis removed).

82 Id. (cleaned up).

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Rule 702 controls the admissibility of Dr. Singhose’s testimony. 83

“Experts qualified by ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training or education’ may

present opinion testimony to the jury.” 84 An expert may testify as long as:

a. the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

b. the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

c. the testimony is the product of reliable principles and

methods; and

d. the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to

the facts of the case. 85

The district court has “broad latitude in weighing the reliability of expert

testimony for admissibility.” 86 The district court performs a “gate-keeping

function: the court must ensure the expert uses reliable methods to reach his

opinions; and those opinions must be relevant to the facts of the case.” 87

Crucially, however, the district court “does not judge the expert conclusions

themselves.” 88

“Rule 702 does not mandate that an expert be highly qualified in order

to testify about a given issue.” 89 Although an expert’s qualifications may be

less-than-sterling, she may still be certified. This is because “[d]ifferences in

expertise bear chiefly on the weight to be assigned to the testimony by the trier

of fact, not its admissibility.” 90 The Supreme Court in Daubert emphasized the

83 See Roman, 691 F.3d at 692 (“Before certifying an expert and admitting his

testimony, a district court must ensure that the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence

702 have been met.” (citing Mathis, 302 F.3d at 459)).

84 Huss, 571 F.3d at 452 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).

85 FED. R. EVID. 702.

86 Guy, 394 F.3d at 325 (citations omitted).

87 Id.

88 Id.

89 Huss, 571 F.3d at 452.

90 Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993)).

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“capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system generally” 91 as the

appropriate antidotes to “absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions.” 92

Chiefly, the “conventional devices” of “[v]igorous cross-examination,

presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of

proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but

admissible evidence.” 93

Manitowoc claims Dr. Singhose lacks the credentials necessary to be a

warnings expert. First, his curriculum vitae lacks any references to or

discussion of “the word ‘warning.’” Second, he does not sit on the American

National Standards Institute Z535 committee, which develops standards for

designing warnings (e.g., selecting colors and symbols). Third, Dr. Singhose

has experience with drafting warnings for particular components of cranes and

small-scale cranes—but not crawler-crane warnings.

Williams defends Dr. Singhose by reciting his formal qualifications: He

has worked as a full-time, tenured professor of mechanical engineering at

Georgia Tech for the past eighteen years. Before that, he received an

undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering from MIT, a Master’s degree

in mechanical engineering from Stanford University, and a Ph.D. in

mechanical engineering from MIT. According to Williams, Dr. Singhose also

has extensive practical experience. 94

91 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.

92 Id. at 595.

93 Id. at 596.

94 Dr. Singhose has: (1) researched and taught courses related to human–factors

analysis—that is, analyzing human–machine interactions; (2) published articles on hazard

analysis; (3) lectured about hazard analysis, risk assessment, and safe operation of machines;

(4) “worked with and researched cranes and crane controls for the past twenty years”; (5)

designed small-scale cranes and drafted safety warnings for components of those cranes; and

(6) researched warnings, generally, and read crane warnings, specifically, throughout his

career.

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Williams then invokes our decision in Roman v. Western Manufacturing.

There, the district court permitted two experts—one with a Ph.D. in

mechanical engineering and the other with a Ph.D. in material science—to

testify regarding a stucco pump’s design. 95 The appellant challenged the

district court’s decision to qualify those individuals as experts, arguing that

the two so-called experts could “not testify about a stucco pump because stucco

is not their trade.” 96 We concluded that “[t]he district court was within its wide

discretion to conclude that these offered witnesses had the qualifications to

state a reliable opinion on the subjects for which they were certified.” 97 We

firmly rejected the appellant’s “conception of expertise” in which the experts

“could not testify about a stucco pump because stucco is not their trade.” 98 Such

conception of expertise, we reasoned, “could make expert certification decisions

a battle of labels—label the needed expertise narrowly and the offered expert’s

field broadly.” 99 This would elevate labels over substance.

Williams also cites our decision in Huss v. Gayden for the proposition

that “the Daubert standards are flexible, and the most important question is

not whether one party’s expert is more qualified than the other’s, but rather,

whether an expert’s testimony is reliable.” 100 The Huss court found there were

“sufficient indicia” that a doctor “would provide a reliable opinion,” so the

district court abused its discretion by prohibiting the doctor from testifying

about an area related to his primary realm of expertise. 101

95 Roman, 691 F.3d at 692. A “stucco pump” is a mechanical device used for applying

stucco, a coating typically used to cover exterior walls.

96 Id. at 693.

97 Id. (emphasis added).

98 Id.

99 Id. (citing Huss, 571 F.3d at 455–56).

100 571 F.3d at 455.

101 Id. at 455–56.

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We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion to qualify

Dr. Singhose as a warnings expert. The district court has wide latitude when

navigating the expert-qualification process. 102 And we will reverse only

“manifestly erroneous” determinations. 103

Here, the district court’s decision was not “manifestly erroneous”;

sufficient evidence supports its ruling. Dr. Singhose is an experienced

mechanical engineering professor who has conducted research and taught

courses relating to hazard analysis and human–machine interactions. He has

worked with cranes and crane controls for the past two decades. He has also

designed small-scale cranes and drafted accompanying safety warnings. Over

his lengthy career, he has researched and read warnings about many types of

cranes. And he understands industry standards for warnings.

Manitowoc cites no Fifth Circuit case where we held that a district court

abused its discretion by qualifying someone as an expert on the basis of an

imprecise match between the expert’s qualifications and the issue she planned

to testify about. Manitowoc’s conception of expertise could turn the expert-

qualification process into a “battle of labels” where expertise is defined so

narrowly that qualified experts are irrationally excluded from testifying. 104

The absurdity of this approach is apparent here: Manitowoc seeks to exclude a

mechanical engineer with a background in warnings and small-crane design

from testifying as an expert about warnings for a crawler crane. We decline to

adopt this approach. As long as there are “sufficient indicia” that an individual

will “provide a reliable opinion” on a subject, a district court may qualify that

individual as an expert. 105

102 See Roman, 691 F.3d at 692; Huss, 571 F.3d at 452.

103 See Guy, 394, F.3d at 325 (citations omitted) (emphasis removed).

104 See id. at 693.

105 See Huss, 571 F.3d at 455–56.

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Manitowoc’s quibbles about qualifications are better characterized as

arguments about the weight of Dr. Singhose’s testimony—not about its

admissibility. 106 But this battle should be fought with the conventional

weapons of cross-examination and competing testimony—not the nuclear

option of exclusion. 107 Thus, the district court did not manifestly err by

qualifying Dr. Singhose as a warnings expert.

2. Admitting Evidence of 18000 Model Series Crane Accidents

Manitowoc claims the district court improperly admitted evidence of

Manitowoc 18000 Model Series crane accidents and compounded the error by

constraining Manitowoc’s ability to challenge this evidence.

“We afford the district court broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings

on relevance,” 108 so we review the court’s rulings for an abuse of discretion. 109

“A district court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous

view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” 110

Manitowoc also bears the burden of proving that the district court’s error

affected it substantial rights. 111

We have previously advised district courts that “[w]hen evidence of other

accidents or occurrences is offered for any purpose other than to show notice,

the proponent of that evidence must show that the facts and circumstances of

the other accidents or occurrences are ‘closely similar’ to the facts and

106See Huss, 571 F.3d at 452.

107See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.

108 Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cty., 860 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir.) (citing United States v.

Young, 655 F.2d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1981)).

109 See Heinsohn, 832 F.3d at 233.

110 Id. (quoting Nunez, 604 F.3d at 844).

111 See id.; Ball, 792 F.3d at 591.

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circumstances at issue.” 112 And “even when it is offered solely to show notice,

the proponent of such evidence must establish reasonable similarity.” 113

Manitowoc asserts that the district court erred in admitting evidence

about two accidents involving a different type of crane: the Manitowoc Model

18000 Series. To Manitowoc, the Model 18000 cranes and the circumstances

surrounding these accidents differ meaningfully from the crane and accident

in this case. For one, the Model 18000’s counterweight tray is designed

differently. Second, the accidents are dissimilar. Namely, “the counterweights

on the Model 18000 accidents did not hit the cab[,] and the individuals who

stayed in the cab during those accidents were uninjured.” These accidents, says

Manitowoc, are not relevant to Williams’s theory of the case, which focuses on

the danger of the counterweight hitting the cab and the corresponding injury

to the operator.

Manitowoc summarily asserts these rulings amount to manifest,

prejudicial error.

Williams raises both procedural and substantive responses to

Manitowoc’s position. Procedurally, Williams asserts Manitowoc waived these

evidentiary objections because it failed to raise them during trial.

Assuming that Manitowoc did not waive the objections, the district court

did not err by admitting evidence about the Model 18000 crane accidents. 114

Those accidents involved similar circumstances and a similarly designed

crane. Both models were equipped with identical counterweights that were

similarly positioned, and both accidents involved unsecured counterweights

falling toward the cab during a tip-over. As the district court recognized,

admitting evidence regarding the prior accidents was relevant to determining

112 Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 579 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

113 Id. at 580.

114 See Heinsohn, 832 F.3d at 233.

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what Manitowoc “knew, or in light of reasonably available information should

have known, about the alleged danger” that Williams asserts caused the

injuries. This is central to a failure-to-warn claim. Also, as the district court

acknowledged, the degree of similarity between the models (and the

circumstances surrounding the accidents) speaks to the weight of the

evidence—not the admissibility.

Even if the district court had abused its discretion, Manitowoc failed to

carry its burden of proving that the court’s error was prejudicial. The jury

heard evidence about a 2009 crane collapse involving a Model 16000 crane. The

crane in that collapse was equipped with similarly configured unsecured

counterweights. The 2009 collapse also involved a tip-over where “one or more

of the unsecured counterweights fell toward the crane cab, striking the rear of

the cab”—the same thing that happened here. This alone supports Williams’s

position that Manitowoc failed to warn operators about the falling-

counterweight risk, despite knowing about it. So any error regarding the

admission of the Model 18000 Series accidents was harmless: The similar

Model 16000 accident provided the jury sufficient evidence to find Manitowoc

liable for its failure to warn about the falling counterweights. 115

3. Excluding Evidence about Specific Instances of John’s Prior

Conduct

Manitowoc asserts that the district court abused its discretion by

denying Manitowoc the opportunity to introduce evidence about specific

instances of John’s prior conduct.

Williams put John’s character as a crane operator at issue during the

direct examination of her witness, Willie Horne. Mr. Horne described John as

a “by-the-book” operator. During cross-examination, Manitowoc asked whether

115 See Heinsohn, 832 F.3d at 233.

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Mr. Horne knew that John had regularly overloaded his crane in the months

leading to the accident. Mr. Horne said “No.” 116

Manitowoc was not satisfied with that response. Later, during a direct

examination, the company sought to elicit additional testimony about John’s

prior conduct. Specifically, Manitowoc wanted its witness to authenticate

evidence relevant to John’s “by-the-book” personality. Williams objected, and

the district court sustained the objection.

Manitowoc thinks the district court abused its discretion. And

Manitowoc believes it has Federal Rule of Evidence 405(a) on its side. The Rule

states:

When evidence of a person’s character or character trait is

admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the person’s

reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-

examination of the character witness, the court may allow an

inquiry into relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct. 117

Under the plain language of Rule 405(a), the district court may allow

Manitowoc to cross-examine Mr. Horne about specific instances of John’s

character as a by-the-book operator. Indeed, the district court permitted this

line of questioning. Rule 405(a) does not, however, mandate that the trial court

allow a party to use direct examination of one of its own witnesses to elicit

specific character evidence about an opposing party. Thus, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the objection to Manitowoc’s attempt

to elicit character evidence about John during the direct examination of one of

the company’s own witnesses.

More important, Manitowoc did not demonstrate any prejudicial impact

of the district court’s alleged error. Manitowoc presented evidence that John’s

crane was overloaded at the time of the accident and that he misused the crane

116 Williams admits she opened the door to that line of questioning.

117 FED. R. EVID. 405(a) (emphasis added).

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in other ways. 118 This evidence also speaks to John’s character as a crane

operator. Yet, the jury still concluded in John’s favor.

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court in full.

118 See supra Part III(A)(2)(a) for discussion of Manitowoc’s argument about “misuse.”

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APPENDIX

The Manitowoc Model 16000 Crane

This diagram is adapted from the Operator’s Manual. To aid

comprehension, we added color to the components relevant to this appeal:

counterweights and the operator’s cab.

This is a different view from the Manual. Again, we added color to one

counterweight and to the operator’s cab.

29