Sause v. Bauer

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MARY ANNE SAUSE v. TIMOTHY J. BAUER, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–742. Decided June 28, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner Mary Ann Sause, proceeding pro se, filed this

action under Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, and

named as defendants past and present members of the

Louisburg, Kansas, police department, as well as the

current mayor and a former mayor of the town. The cen-

terpiece of her complaint was the allegation that two of

the town’s police officers visited her apartment in response

to a noise complaint, gained admittance to her apartment,

and then proceeded to engage in a course of strange and

abusive conduct, before citing her for disorderly conduct

and interfering with law enforcement. Among other

things, she alleged that at one point she knelt and began

to pray but one of the officers ordered her to stop. She

claimed that a third officer refused to investigate her

complaint that she had been assaulted by residents of her

apartment complex and had threatened to issue a citation

if she reported this to another police department. In

addition, she alleged that the police chief failed to follow

up on a promise to investigate the officers’ conduct and

that the present and former mayors were aware of unlaw-

ful conduct by the town’s police officers.

Petitioner’s complaint asserted a violation of her First

Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and her

Fourth Amendment right to be free of any unreasonable

search or seizure. The defendants moved to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may

be granted, arguing that the defendants were entitled to

qualified immunity. Petitioner then moved to amend her

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complaint, but the District Court denied that motion and

granted the motion to dismiss.

On appeal, petitioner, now represented by counsel,

argued only that her free exercise rights were violated by

the two officers who entered her home. The Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the

District Court, concluding that the officers were entitled to

qualified immunity. 859 F. 3d 1270 (2017). Chief Judge

Tymkovich filed a concurring opinion. While agreeing

with the majority regarding petitioner’s First Amendment

claim, he noted that petitioner’s “allegations fit more

neatly in the Fourth Amendment context.” Id., at 1279.

He also observed that if the allegations in the complaint

are true, the conduct of the officers “should be con-

demned,” and that if the allegations are untrue, petitioner

had “done the officers a grave injustice.” Ibid.

The petition filed in this Court contends that the Court

of Appeals erred in holding that the officers who visited

petitioner’s home are entitled to qualified immunity. The

petition argues that it was clearly established that law

enforcement agents violate a person’s right to the free

exercise of religion if they interfere, without any legiti-

mate law enforcement justification, when a person is at

prayer. The petition further maintains that the absence of

a prior case involving the unusual situation alleged to

have occurred here does not justify qualified immunity.

There can be no doubt that the First Amendment pro-

tects the right to pray. Prayer unquestionably constitutes

the “exercise” of religion. At the same time, there are

clearly circumstances in which a police officer may lawfully

prevent a person from praying at a particular time and

place. For example, if an officer places a suspect under

arrest and orders the suspect to enter a police vehicle for

transportation to jail, the suspect does not have a right to

delay that trip by insisting on first engaging in conduct

that, at another time, would be protected by the First

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

Per Curiam

Amendment. When an officer’s order to stop praying is

alleged to have occurred during the course of investigative

conduct that implicates Fourth Amendment rights, the

First and Fourth Amendment issues may be inextricable.

That is the situation here. As the case comes before us,

it is unclear whether the police officers were in petitioner’s

apartment at the time in question based on her consent,

whether they had some other ground consistent with the

Fourth Amendment for entering and remaining there, or

whether their entry or continued presence was unlawful.

Petitioner’s complaint contains no express allegations on

these matters. Nor does her complaint state what, if

anything, the officers wanted her to do at the time when

she was allegedly told to stop praying. Without knowing

the answers to these questions, it is impossible to analyze

petitioner’s free exercise claim.

In considering the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the

District Court was required to interpret the pro se com-

plaint liberally, and when the complaint is read that way,

it may be understood to state Fourth Amendment claims

that could not properly be dismissed for failure to state a

claim. We appreciate that petitioner elected on appeal to

raise only a First Amendment argument and not to pursue

an independent Fourth Amendment claim, but under the

circumstances, the First Amendment claim demanded

consideration of the ground on which the officers were

present in the apartment and the nature of any legitimate

law enforcement interests that might have justified an

order to stop praying at the specific time in question.

Without considering these matters, neither the free exer-

cise issue nor the officers’ entitlement to qualified immun-

ity can be resolved. Thus, petitioner’s choice to abandon

her Fourth Amendment claim on appeal did not obviate

the need to address these matters.

For these reasons, we grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari; we reverse the judgment of the Tenth Circuit;

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and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

It is so ordered.