Jonathan Hedgpeth v. Ammar Rahim

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 7, 2017 Decided June 26, 2018

No. 16-7146

JONATHAN HEDGPETH,

APPELLANT

v.

AMMAR RAHIM, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA POLICE OFFICER,

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND MATTHEW

RIDER, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA POLICE OFFICER,

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:15-cv-01228)

Joseph A. Scrofano argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of

the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Karl A. Racine,

Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren

L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General.

Before: KAVANAUGH, SRINIVASAN, and PILLARD, Circuit

Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: Jonathan Hedgpeth brought a

civil suit against two police officers, alleging that they violated

his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without

probable cause and using excessive force to subdue him. The

officers moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were

protected by qualified immunity from Hedgpeth’s claims. The

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

officers, and we affirm.

I.

For purposes of reviewing the court’s grant of summary

judgment against Hedgpeth, we view the facts giving rise to his

arrest in the light most favorable to him. Johnson v. District of

Columbia, 528 F.3d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2008). As we explain

below, however, we resolve one factual dispute against

Hedgpeth (concerning whether one of the officers intended to

injure Hedgpeth) based on the absence of evidentiary support

for Hedgpeth’s account. Hedgpeth does not himself recall the

events surrounding his arrest, but introduced the testimony of

Marcus Lee, a witness to the arrest.

On the evening of March 2, 2015, two officers of the

Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Ammar

Rahim and Matthew Rider, were coordinating medical

assistance for a homeless man when a disturbance down the

street caught their attention. The officers observed Hedgpeth

push a tall, African-American man, who returned the push, as

the pair walked towards the officers. According to the officers,

the man pushed by Hedgpeth approached them and said he did

not know Hedgpeth and asked whether they had seen Hedgpeth

push him.

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Some time later, the officers approached Hedgpeth outside

a bar. At the time, Hedgpeth was conversing with a former

colleague, the aforementioned Marcus Lee. The officers

explained that they had received reports of someone going up

and down the street hitting others. Initially, Lee attempted to

explain that he and Hedgpeth had greeted each other with a

benign “buddy punch,” but Lee quickly realized the officers

were investigating something that had happened before his

arrival. (Although there is a dispute between the parties on

whether Lee was the tall, African-American man whom the

officers had previously seen Hedgpeth push—Hedgpeth says

yes, the officers say no—we have no need to resolve that

dispute, as explained below.)

The officers began to question Hedgpeth, with little

success. Officer Rider asked Hedgpeth for his name and

inquired whether he had been drinking, but Hedgpeth did not

respond. When Hedgpeth did speak, he slurred his words and

avoided answering any questions. Officer Rider then asked

Hedgpeth for identification, which he reluctantly surrendered.

When Officer Rider attempted to photograph the identification

card, Hedgpeth continued to speak incoherently and swore at

the officers. At some point, the officers asked Lee if he would

be willing to take Hedgpeth home. Lee responded that

Hedgpeth was “hard to handle.” J.A. 69-70.

After warning Hedgpeth several times to calm down,

Officer Rahim told him he was under arrest. Hedgpeth began

to scream, shouting that he had done nothing wrong and

demanding to be let go. Officer Rahim ordered Hedgpeth to

put his arms behind his back, but Hedgpeth did not comply.

After Officer Rahim repeated his order multiple times, he

reached for Hedgpeth’s left arm. Officer Rahim also used his

knee to push the back of Hedgpeth’s leg and take him down to

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the ground. As Hedgpeth fell, his head struck the grid of the

paned window of the bar.

With Hedgpeth on the ground, Officer Rider grabbed his

arm and the officers handcuffed him. As a result of his head

hitting the window, Hedgpeth suffered a concussion,

headaches, vertigo, and other post-concussive symptoms. No

criminal charges were brought against Hedgpeth.

Several months later, Hedgpeth sued the two officers in

their individual capacities in the district court. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Hedgpeth alleged that his arrest was unlawful and that

Officer Rahim had used excessive force against him, both in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers moved for

summary judgment, contending that they had acted lawfully

and that, in any event, they were entitled to qualified immunity

against Hedgpeth’s suit.

The district court granted the officers’ motion for

summary judgment. The court concluded that the officers had

probable cause to arrest Hedgpeth for a number of offenses,

including public intoxication. The court also held that Officer

Rahim was entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-

force claim because no clearly established law prohibited the

takedown maneuver he allegedly used to effect the arrest.

Hedgpeth now appeals.

II.

On appeal, Hedgpeth renews his contentions that the

officers unlawfully arrested him without probable cause and

that Officer Rahim used excessive force against him. In order

to prevail on his claims, Hedgpeth needs to surmount the

officers’ claim of qualified immunity.

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“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from

civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136

S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 231 (2009)). The purpose of the doctrine is to protect

officials “from undue interference with their duties and from

potentially disabling threats of liability” in civil damages

actions. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). We

review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment

on the basis of qualified immunity. See Lash v. Lemke, 786

F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

To prevail against the officers’ claim of qualified

immunity, Hedgpeth must show that: (i) the officers violated

his Fourth Amendment rights; and (ii) his Fourth Amendment

rights were “clearly established . . . in light of the specific

context of the case.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007).

We can take up those questions in either order. E.g., Mullenix,

136 S. Ct. at 308. We thus have discretion to forgo assessing

whether the officers infringed Hedgpeth’s Fourth Amendment

rights and to resolve the claims on the ground that, regardless

of whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the

officers “did not violate clearly established law.” White v.

Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam). We follow that

course here.

Although the Supreme Court’s decisions do “not require a

case directly on point for a right to be clearly established” for

purposes of qualified immunity, “existing precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And the “clearly

established law should not be defined at a high level of

generality,” but “must be particularized to the facts of the

case.” Id. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court

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has observed that immunity thus “protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. at

551 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A.

We first address Hedgpeth’s claim that the officers

violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by arresting

him without probable cause. To demonstrate that their

warrantless arrest of Hedgpeth was lawful, the officers would

need to show they had probable cause to arrest him. See

Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1993). And

regardless of whether they in fact had probable cause, they are

entitled to qualified immunity if they “had an objectively

reasonable basis for believing that the facts and circumstances

surrounding the arrest were sufficient to establish probable

cause.” Id.; see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

The officers argue that they had probable cause to arrest

Hedgpeth for a number of offenses. They contend that they

had probable cause to arrest Hedgpeth for public intoxication

based on his belligerent behavior. They alternatively submit

that they had probable cause to arrest him for disorderly

conduct, simple assault, and affray, all based on their belief that

he had pushed a stranger on the street. The district court

accepted the officers’ assertion that Hedgpeth had pushed a

stranger, finding that the record foreclosed Hedgpeth’s position

that the person the officers saw him push in fact was Lee, not a

third person. Hedgpeth v. Rahim, 213 F. Supp. 3d 211, 223

(D.D.C. 2016). Although Hedgpeth contests the district court’s

finding on that score, we need not resolve his objection. The

officers had a reasonable basis for believing they had probable

cause to arrest Hedgpeth for public intoxication, which alone

entitles them to qualified immunity on the claim of an unlawful

arrest.

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Under D.C. law, it is a misdemeanor for a person to “be

intoxicated and endanger the safety of himself, herself, or any

other person or property.” D.C. Code § 25-1001(c). For

purposes of qualified immunity, then, Officers Rahim and

Rider must have reasonably believed that Hedgpeth was both

intoxicated and dangerous.

The record shows that the officers could have reasonably

believed Hedgpeth to be intoxicated. When they attempted to

question him, he appeared incapable of answering. Hedgpeth’s

key witness, Lee, testified that Hedgpeth acted drunk, slurring

his words and speaking incoherently to the officers. Hedgpeth

also was nonresponsive to the officers’ questions and

noncompliant with their orders. In those circumstances, a

reasonable officer could have believed that Hedgpeth was

intoxicated.

To prevail, the officers also must have had reasonable

grounds to believe that Hedgpeth presented a danger to himself

or others. Hedgpeth contends that he posed no danger to

himself or anyone else because he did not stagger or fall.

Rather, he argues, he was merely “verbally and passively

belligerent.” Appellant’s Br. 32.

Even if Hedgpeth remained able to stand without

staggering, the officers could have reasonably believed he

presented a danger to himself, the officers, or someone else he

might have encountered that night. Hedgpeth was visibly

intoxicated and uncooperative, and there is no genuine dispute

that the officers were at least under the impression that he had

just been hitting people on a busy sidewalk. And Lee demurred

at the officer’s suggestion that he take Hedgpeth home,

responding that Hedgpeth was “hard to handle.” J.A. 70. As

Hedgpeth’s behavior began to attract a crowd, the officers had

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reasonable grounds to conclude that Hedgpeth presented a risk

to himself and others.

Although there is a dearth of decisions interpreting D.C.’s

public intoxication law in relevant respects, decisions from

other courts applying comparable public-intoxication laws in

similar circumstances support the reasonableness of the

officers’ belief of probable cause. See Garcia v. Killingsworth,

425 F. App’x 831, 832 (11th Cir. 2011); O’Dwyer v. Nelson,

310 F. App’x 741, 746 (5th Cir. 2009); State v. Trane, 57 P.3d

1052, 1062 (Utah 2002). See generally Johnson, 528 F.3d at

976 (explaining that “cases from other courts exhibiting

consensus view” can inform “whether officers strayed beyond

clearly established bounds of lawfulness”). We therefore

conclude that the officers could have reasonably believed

Hedgpeth was intoxicated and posed a danger to himself or

others. As a result, the officers are entitled to qualified

immunity on Hedgpeth’s claim of an unlawful arrest.

B.

We now consider Hedgpeth’s claim that Officer Rahim

used excessive force when subduing Hedgpeth in connection

with his arrest. Hedgpeth presents two variations of an

argument that Officer Rahim used excessive force: first,

Hedgpeth asserts that the takedown maneuver involved a

gratuitous use of force intended to injure him; and second, he

submits that, regardless of any intent to injure him, the use of a

takedown maneuver was excessive in the circumstances.

Hedgpeth’s first argument is grounded in a contention that

Officer Rahim intended to slam Hedgpeth’s head into the bar

window when executing the takedown. That contention,

however, finds no support in the record. With regard to

Hedgpeth’s claim that the takedown maneuver amounted to

excessive force regardless of any intent to injure him, we

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conclude that Officer Rahim’s conduct did not violate clearly

established law. He is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

1.

Hedgpeth contends that Officer Rahim, in performing a

takedown maneuver, intended to slam Hedgpeth’s head into the

window of the bar. Ordinarily, when reviewing the district

court’s grant of summary judgment, we would accept as true

Hedgpeth’s version of the facts. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378.

We do so, however, only if the record gives rise to a genuine

issue of material fact. We “should not adopt [a] version of the

facts” that “is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no

reasonable jury could believe it.” Id. at 380.

Here, nothing in the record supports Hedgpeth’s allegation

that Officer Rahim intentionally slammed Hedgpeth’s head

into the window. To the contrary, the sole evidence Hedgpeth

cites in support of his account of the events is Lee’s testimony,

which affirmatively undercuts Hedgpeth’s claim. Lee testified

that, while he saw Officer Rahim use a type of takedown

maneuver, he did not believe the officer intended to slam

Hedgpeth’s head into the window. Lee explained: “I don’t

think [Officer Rahim] meant for Jonathan [Hedgpeth] to slam

his head [into] the side of the building. I think that’s just what

happened as [Hedgpeth] was falling to his left side.” Lee

Deposition, J.A. 76. The officers, for their part, deny that

Officer Rahim performed a takedown maneuver, and contend

that any impact to Hedgpeth’s head was incidental to

Hedgpeth’s attempting to step away.

That leaves Hedgpeth’s bare assertion (in his appellate

brief) that Officer Rahim intended to slam Hedgpeth’s head,

which is not enough to create a genuine dispute about the

officer’s intentions, particularly in view of the contrary

testimony of Hedgpeth’s sole witness. We therefore proceed

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to consider whether Officer Rahim’s takedown maneuver

amounted to excessive force without attributing to him any

intention to cause Hedgpeth’s head to strike the window.

2.

The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable

seizures extends to an officer’s use of excessive force to

conduct an arrest. See Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865

(2014). As the Supreme Court has explained, “the question

whether an officer has used excessive force ‘requires careful

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,

and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to

evade arrest by flight.’” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148,

1152 (2018) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396

(1989)). An officer may “use some degree of physical

coercion” or threat to arrest a suspect. Oberwetter v. Hilliard,

639 F.3d 545, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S.

at 396). And “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later

seem unnecessary,” violates the Fourth Amendment. Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court considered the reasonableness of

Officer Rahim’s use of a forcible takedown maneuver under

the assumed facts to be a close question, in light of, among

other things, the misdemeanor nature of the suspected offenses.

The court, though, did not decide that underlying Fourth

Amendment question, instead concluding that Officer Rahim is

entitled to qualified immunity. We agree.

Even if there is a genuine dispute about the reasonableness

of an officer’s use of force, he is protected by qualified

immunity unless his force violated clearly established law. See

Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152; Wardlaw, 1 F.3d at 1303. As the

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Supreme Court has recently emphasized, “[u]se of excessive

force is an area of the law ‘in which the result depends very

much on the facts of each case,’ and thus police officers are

entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent

‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue.” Kisela, 138 S.

Ct. at 1153 (quoting Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309). In that regard,

“[p]recedent involving similar facts can help move a case

beyond the otherwise ‘hazy border between excessive and

acceptable force.’” Id. (quoting Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 312).

The pertinent question here is whether “any competent

officer,” in light of “[p]recedent involving similar facts,” id.,

would consider it unlawful to use a takedown maneuver against

a suspect who was shouting repeatedly and belligerently at the

officers, who refused their orders to put his hands behind his

back, and who had been described by a person with him as

“hard to handle.” We conclude that this is not “an obvious case

in which any competent officer would have known that” the

use of a takedown maneuver in those circumstances “would

violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

In Wardlaw v. Pickett, for instance, Wardlaw rushed down

the stairs in a courthouse stairwell towards officers and a friend

who had been arrested by them, shouting to the officers:

“Don’t hurt him please. He is totally nonviolent.” 1 F.3d at

1300. One of the officers punched Wardlaw once in the jaw

and multiple times in the chest, and then arrested him.

Wardlaw, contending that he experienced significant pain in

his chest and jaw for months, brought suit alleging that the

officer had used excessive force in arresting him. We granted

the officer qualified immunity, noting that he was in a

vulnerable position facing an individual shouting at him as the

individual approached. Id. at 1304. We held that “no

reasonable jury could find that [the officer’s] use of force was

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so excessive that no reasonable officer could have believed it

to be lawful.” Id.

In Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748 (D.C. Cir.

1996), a person who had been pulled over on suspicion that he

was driving under the influence had acted belligerently and

erratically at the scene. He attempted to exit a police car while

it was at an intersection en route to the station, and an officer

grabbed him in an effort to prevent his escape. Upon seeing

other officers arrive, Scott offered to get back into the car. Id.

at 752. Officers refused to let him back into the car, one officer

struck him and knocked him off balance, and multiple officers

then slammed him to the ground before handcuffing him and

dragging him to a police transport vehicle. Id. at 759. We held

that the “degree of forced used to arrest [the suspect] was not

so excessive that no reasonable officer could have believed in

the lawfulness of his actions.” Id.

In Oberwetter v. Hilliard, a woman dancing at the

Jefferson Memorial ignored officers’ demands that she leave

the premises and questioned their authority to force her to do

so. 639 F.3d at 555-56. The arresting officer then forcefully

pulled her arm behind her back and shoved her against a stone

column, ripping apart the earbud on her headphones. Id. at 548.

We held that it was “not clearly unreasonable for [the officer]

to take decisive action to subdue [the suspect] quickly and

forcefully.” Id. at 555. In another case, we rejected an

excessive-force claim against an officer who “brutally

grabbed” a driver around the waist as he got out of the car while

attempting to produce his license and registration, threw the

driver back into his car, and then slammed the door on his leg.

Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 240, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1987);

see Scott, 101 F.3d at 760 (discussing Martin). See also Rogala

v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 45, 54-55 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (summarily affirming grant of qualified immunity to

13

officer who slammed person to the ground after person touched

officer on shoulder).

Against the backdrop of those decisions, we are unable to

conclude that Officer Rahim violated clearly established law in

using a takedown maneuver to subdue Hedgpeth in the

circumstances present here. It is true that this case differs from

our prior decisions in certain respects in that it does not involve

a person rushing in the direction of officers, albeit while

pleading for non-violence (compare Wardlaw), or a person

who exited a police car, although he then offered to reenter it

(compare Scott). But this case is comparable to our prior

decisions in that it involves a person who exhibited belligerent

and erratic behavior (and had been described as hard to handle),

who shouted at officers in an increasingly agitated fashion, and

who repeatedly refused the officers’ orders (here, to put his

hands behind his back). In that context, “existing precedent”

cannot be said to “have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

This does not mean an officer invariably has authority to

forcibly take down a suspect in the course of a routine arrest.

But here, in light of the circumstances of this case and the

applicable precedent, this case is not one in which “the right’s

contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official

in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was

violating it.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (internal quotation

marks omitted). That conclusion is fortified by decisions from

other courts sustaining an arresting officer’s use of an

analogous level of force against a noncomplying suspect. See

Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002, 1011 (8th Cir.

2017); Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 316 (5th Cir. 2016).

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In response, Hedgpeth relies on decisions barring the

gratuitous use of physical force when conducting an arrest. For

example, we have held that an officer acted unreasonably when

he kicked a suspect in the groin while the suspect lay on the

ground and posed no risk of flight. Johnson, 528 F.3d at 974-

77. Similarly, we denied qualify immunity to an officer who

punched, pistol-whipped, and beat a suspect who had already

been disarmed and placed in handcuffs. Arrington v. United

States, 473 F.3d 329, 331-33 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

There is no comparable use of gratuitous force in this case.

As we have explained, the record contradicts Hedgpeth’s

theory that Officer Rahim intentionally (and gratuitously)

slammed Hedgpeth’s head into the bar window. Without that

assertion, we are left with Officer Rahim’s use of a takedown

maneuver. The law in this court (and other courts) does not

clearly establish that the takedown amounted to excessive force

in the circumstances. We thus uphold the grant of qualified

immunity on Hedgpeth’s excessive-force claim.

* * * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

judgment.

So ordered.