Pereira v. Sessions

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 17–459. Argued April 23, 2018—Decided June 21, 2018

Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility

Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), nonpermanent residents who are subject to re-

moval proceedings may be eligible for cancellation of removal if,

among other things, they have “been physically present in the United

States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately

preceding the date of [an] application” for cancellation. 8 U. S. C.

§1229(b)(1)(A). Under the stop-time rule, however, the period of con-

tinuous presence is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a no-

tice to appear under section 1229(a).” §1229(d)(1)(A). Section

1229(a), in turn, provides that the Government shall serve nonciti-

zens in removal proceedings with a written “ ‘notice to appear,’ ” spec-

ifying, among other things, “[t]he time and place at which the [re-

moval] proceedings will be held.” §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Per a 1997

regulation stating that a “notice to appear” served on a noncitizen

need only provide “the time, place and date of the initial removal

hearing, where practicable,” 62 Fed. Reg. 10332, the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS), at least in recent years, almost always

serves noncitizens with notices that fail to specify the time, place, or

date of initial removal hearings whenever the agency deems it im-

practicable to include such information. The Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) has held that such notices trigger the stop-time rule

even if they do not specify the time and date of the removal proceed-

ings.

Petitioner Wescley Fonseca Pereira is a native and citizen of Brazil

who came to the United States in 2000 and remained after his visa

expired. Following a 2006 arrest for operating a vehicle while under

the influence of alcohol, DHS served Pereira with a document titled

“notice to appear” that did not specify the date and time of his initial

2 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Syllabus

removal hearing, instead ordering him to appear at a time and date

to be set in the future. More than a year later, in 2007, the Immigra-

tion Court mailed Pereira a more specific notice setting the date and

time for his initial hearing, but the notice was sent to the wrong ad-

dress and was returned as undeliverable. As a result, Pereira failed

to appear, and the Immigration Court ordered him removed in absen-

tia.

In 2013, Pereira was arrested for a minor motor vehicle violation

and detained by DHS. The Immigration Court reopened the removal

proceedings after Pereira demonstrated that he never received the

2007 notice. Pereira then applied for cancellation of removal, argu-

ing that he had been continuously present in the United States for

more than 10 years and that the stop-time rule was not triggered by

DHS’ initial 2006 notice because the document lacked information

about the time and date of his removal hearing. The Immigration

Court disagreed and ordered Pereira removed. The BIA agreed with

the Immigration Court that the 2006 notice triggered the stop-time

rule, even though it failed to specify the time and date of Pereira’s in-

itial removal hearing. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit de-

nied Pereira’s petition for review of the BIA’s order. Applying the

framework set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, it held that the stop-time rule is

ambiguous and that the BIA’s interpretation of the rule was a per-

missible reading of the statute.

Held: A putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific

time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a “notice

to appear under §1229(a),” and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.

Pp. 7–20.

(a) The Court need not resort to Chevron deference, for the unam-

biguous statutory text alone is enough to resolve this case. Under the

stop-time rule, “any period of . . . continuous physical presence” is

“deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under

section 1229(a).” 8 U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1). By expressly referencing

§1229(a), the statute specifies where to look to find out what “notice

to appear” means. Section 1229(a), in turn, clarifies that the type of

notice “referred to as a ‘notice to appear’ ” throughout the statutory

section is a “written notice . . . specifying,” as relevant here, “[t]he

time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.”

§1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, to trigger the stop-time rule, the Govern-

ment must serve a notice to appear that, at the very least,

“specif[ies]” the “time and place” of the removal hearing.

The Government and dissent point out that the stop-time rule re-

fers broadly to a notice to appear under “§1229(a)”—which includes

paragraph (1), as well as paragraphs (2) and (3). But that does not

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

Syllabus

matter, because only paragraph (1) bears on the meaning of a “notice

to appear.” If anything, paragraph (2), which allows for a “change or

postponement” of the proceedings to a “new time and place,”

§1229(a)(2)(A)(i), bolsters the Court’s interpretation of the statute be-

cause the provision presumes that the Government has already

served a “notice to appear” that specified a time and place as required

by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Another neighboring provision, §1229(b)(1),

lends further support for the view that a “notice to appear” must

specify the time and place of removal proceedings to trigger the stop-

time rule. Section 1229(b)(1) gives a noncitizen “the opportunity to

secure counsel before the first [removal] hearing date” by mandating

that such “hearing date shall not be scheduled earlier than 10 days

after the service of the notice to appear.” For that provision to have

any meaning, the “notice to appear” must specify the time and place

that the noncitizen, and his counsel, must appear at the removal pro-

ceedings. Finally, common sense reinforces the conclusion that a no-

tice that does not specify when and where to appear for a removal

proceeding is not a “notice to appear” that triggers the stop-time rule.

After all, an essential function of a “notice to appear” is to provide

noncitizens “notice” of the information (i.e., the “time” and “place”)

that would enable them “to appear” at the removal hearing in the

first place. Without conveying such information, the Government

cannot reasonably expect noncitizens to appear for their removal pro-

ceedings. Pp. 7–13.

(b) The Government and the dissent advance a litany of counterar-

guments, all of which are unpersuasive. To begin, the Government

mistakenly argues that §1229(a) is not definitional. That is wrong.

Section 1229(a) speaks in definitional terms, requiring that a notice

to appear specify, among other things, the “time and place at which

the proceedings will be held.” As such, the dissent is misguided in

arguing that a defective notice to appear, which fails to specify time-

and-place information, is still a notice to appear for purposes of the

stop-time rule. Equally unavailing is the Government’s (and the dis-

sent’s) attempt to generate ambiguity in the statute based on the

word “under.” In light of the plain language and statutory context,

the word “under,” as used in the stop-time rule, clearly means “in ac-

cordance with” or “according to” because it connects the stop-time

trigger in §1229b(d)(1) to a “notice to appear” that specifies the enu-

merated time-and-place information. The Government fares no bet-

ter in arguing that surrounding statutory provisions reinforce its pre-

ferred reading of the stop-time rule, as none of those provisions

supports its atextual interpretation. Unable to root its reading in the

statutory text, the Government and dissent raise a number of practi-

cal concerns, but those concerns are meritless and do not justify de-

4 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Syllabus

parting from the statute’s clear text. In a final attempt to salvage its

atextual interpretation, the Government turns to the alleged statuto-

ry purpose and legislative history of the stop-time rule. Even for

those who consider statutory purpose and legislative history, howev-

er, neither supports the Government’s position. Requiring the Gov-

ernment to furnish time-and-place information in a notice to appear

is entirely consistent with Congress’ stated objective of preventing

noncitizens from exploiting administrative delays to accumulate

lengthier periods of continuous precedent. Pp. 13–20.

866 F. 3d 1, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH,

JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a

dissenting opinion.

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 1

Opinion of S

Opinion the Court, J.

ofOTOMAYOR

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–459

_________________

WESCLEY FONSECA PEREIRA, PETITIONER v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2018]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Nonpermanent residents, like petitioner here, who are

subject to removal proceedings and have accrued 10 years

of continuous physical presence in the United States, may

be eligible for a form of discretionary relief known as

cancellation of removal. 8 U. S. C. §1229b(b)(1). Under

the so-called “stop-time rule” set forth in §1229b(d)(1)(A),

however, that period of continuous physical presence is

“deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to

appear under section 1229(a).” Section 1229(a), in turn,

provides that the Government shall serve noncitizens in

removal proceedings with “written notice (in this section

referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) . . . specifying” several

required pieces of information, including “[t]he time and

place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.”

§1229(a)(1)(G)(i).1

The narrow question in this case lies at the intersection

——————

1 The Court uses the term “noncitizen” throughout this opinion to

refer to any person who is not a citizen or national of the United States.

See 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(3).

2 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

of those statutory provisions. If the Government serves a

noncitizen with a document that is labeled “notice to

appear,” but the document fails to specify either the time

or place of the removal proceedings, does it trigger the

stop-time rule? The answer is as obvious as it seems: No.

A notice that does not inform a noncitizen when and

where to appear for removal proceedings is not a “notice to

appear under section 1229(a)” and therefore does not

trigger the stop-time rule. The plain text, the statutory

context, and common sense all lead inescapably and un-

ambiguously to that conclusion.

I

A

Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546,

the Attorney General of the United States has discretion

to “cancel removal” and adjust the status of certain non-

permanent residents. §1229b(b). To be eligible for such

relief, a nonpermanent resident must meet certain enu-

merated criteria, the relevant one here being that the

noncitizen must have “been physically present in the

United States for a continuous period of not less than 10

years immediately preceding the date of [an] application”

for cancellation of removal. §1229b(b)(1)(A).2

IIRIRA also established the stop-time rule at issue in

this case. Under that rule, “any period of . . . continuous

physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to

end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under

section 1229(a) of this title.”3 §1229b(d)(1)(A). Section

——————

2 Lawful permanent residents also may be eligible for cancellation of

removal if, inter alia, they have continuously resided in the United

States for at least seven years. §1229b(a)(2).

3 The period of continuous physical presence also stops if and when

“the alien has committed” certain enumerated offenses that would

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

Opinion of the Court

1229(a), in turn, provides that “written notice (in this

section referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) shall be given

. . . to the alien . . . specifying”:

“(A) The nature of the proceedings against the alien.

“(B) The legal authority under which the proceed-

ings are conducted.

“(C) The acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of

law.

“(D) The charges against the alien and the statutory

provisions alleged to have been violated.

“(E) The alien may be represented by counsel and

the alien will be provided (i) a period of time to secure

counsel under subsection (b)(1) of this section and (ii)

a current list of counsel prepared under subsection

(b)(2) of this section.

“(F)(i) The requirement that the alien must imme-

diately provide (or have provided) the Attorney Gen-

eral with a written record of an address and telephone

number (if any) at which the alien may be contacted

respecting proceedings under section 1229a of this

title.

“(ii) The requirement that the alien must provide

the Attorney General immediately with a written rec-

ord of any change of the alien’s address or telephone

number.

“(iii) The consequences under section 1229a(b)(5) of

this title of failure to provide address and telephone

information pursuant to this subparagraph.

“(G)(i) The time and place at which the [re-

moval] proceedings will be held.

“(ii) The consequences under section 1229a(b)(5) of

this title of the failure, except under exceptional cir-

——————

constitute grounds for removal or inadmissibility. §1229b(d)(1)(B).

That provision is not at issue here.

4 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

cumstances, to appear at such proceedings.”

§1229(a)(1) (boldface added).

The statute also enables the Government to “change or

postpon[e] . . . the time and place of [the removal] proceed-

ings.” §1229(a)(2)(A). To do so, the Government must give

the noncitizen “a written notice . . . specifying . . . the new

time or place of the proceedings” and “the consequences

. . . of failing, except under exceptional circumstances, to

attend such proceedings.” Ibid. The Government is not

required to provide written notice of the change in time or

place of the proceedings if the noncitizen is “not in deten-

tion” and “has failed to provide [his] address” to the Gov-

ernment. §1229(a)(2)(B).

The consequences of a noncitizen’s failure to appear at a

removal proceeding can be quite severe. If a noncitizen

who has been properly served with the “written notice

required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)”

fails to appear at a removal proceeding, he “shall be or-

dered removed in absentia” if the Government “establishes

by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the

written notice was so provided and that the alien is re-

movable.” §1229a(b)(5)(A). Absent “exceptional circum-

stances,” a noncitizen subject to an in absentia removal

order is ineligible for some forms of discretionary relief for

10 years if, “at the time of the notice described in para-

graph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a),” he “was provided oral

notice . . . of the time and place of the proceedings and of

the consequences” of failing to appear. §1229a(b)(7). In

certain limited circumstances, however, a removal order

entered in absentia may be rescinded—e.g., when the

noncitizen “demonstrates that [he] did not receive notice

in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).”

§1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).

B

In 1997, shortly after Congress passed IIRIRA, the

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 5

Opinion of the Court

Attorney General promulgated a regulation stating that a

“notice to appear” served on a noncitizen need only provide

“the time, place and date of the initial removal hearing,

where practicable.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10332 (1997). Per that

regulation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),

at least in recent years, almost always serves noncitizens

with notices that fail to specify the time, place, or date of

initial removal hearings whenever the agency deems it

impracticable to include such information. See Brief for

Petitioner 14; Brief for Respondent 48–49; Tr. of Oral Arg.

52–53 (Government’s admission that “almost 100 percent”

of “notices to appear omit the time and date of the pro-

ceeding over the last three years”). Instead, these notices

state that the times, places, or dates of the initial hearings

are “to be determined.” Brief for Petitioner 14.

In Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (2011), the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) addressed whether

such notices trigger the stop-time rule even if they do not

specify the time and date of the removal proceedings. The

BIA concluded that they do. Id., at 651. It reasoned that

the statutory phrase “notice to appear ‘under section

[1229](a)’ ” in the stop-time rule “merely specifies the

document the DHS must serve on the alien to trigger the

‘stop-time’ rule,” but otherwise imposes no “substantive

requirements” as to what information that document must

include to trigger the stop-time rule. Id., at 647.

C

Petitioner Wescley Fonseca Pereira is a native and

citizen of Brazil. In 2000, at age 19, he was admitted to

the United States as a temporary “non-immigrant visitor.”

App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. After his visa expired, he re-

mained in the United States. Pereira is married and has

two young daughters, both of whom are United States

citizens. He works as a handyman and, according to

submissions before the Immigration Court, is a well-

6 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

respected member of his community.

In 2006, Pereira was arrested in Massachusetts for

operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

On May 31, 2006, while Pereira was detained, DHS served

him (in person) with a document labeled “Notice to Ap-

pear.” App. 7–13. That putative notice charged Pereira as

removable for overstaying his visa, informed him that

“removal proceedings” were being initiated against him,

and provided him with information about the “[c]onduct of

the hearing” and the consequences for failing to appear.

Id., at 7, 10–12. Critical here, the notice did not specify

the date and time of Pereira’s removal hearing. Instead, it

ordered him to appear before an Immigration Judge in

Boston “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” Id., at 9

(underlining in original).

More than a year later, on August 9, 2007, DHS filed

the 2006 notice with the Boston Immigration Court. The

Immigration Court thereafter attempted to mail Pereira a

more specific notice setting the date and time for his ini-

tial removal hearing for October 31, 2007, at 9:30 a.m.

But that second notice was sent to Pereira’s street address

rather than his post office box (which he had provided to

DHS), so it was returned as undeliverable. Because Pe-

reira never received notice of the time and date of his re-

moval hearing, he failed to appear, and the Immigration

Court ordered him removed in absentia. Unaware of that re-

moval order, Pereira remained in the United States.

In 2013, after Pereira had been in the country for more

than 10 years, he was arrested for a minor motor vehicle

violation (driving without his headlights on) and was

subsequently detained by DHS. The Immigration Court

reopened the removal proceedings after Pereira demon-

strated that he never received the Immigration Court’s

2007 notice setting out the specific date and time of his

hearing. Pereira then applied for cancellation of removal,

arguing that the stop-time rule was not triggered by DHS’

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 7

Opinion of the Court

initial 2006 notice because the document lacked infor-

mation about the time and date of his removal hearing.

The Immigration Court disagreed, finding the law “quite

settled that DHS need not put a date certain on the Notice

to Appear in order to make that document effective.” App.

to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The Immigration Court therefore

concluded that Pereira could not meet the 10-year physical-

presence requirement under §1229b(b), thereby render-

ing him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal,

and ordered Pereira removed from the country. The

BIA dismissed Pereira’s appeal. Adhering to its precedent

in Camarillo, the BIA agreed with the Immigration Court

that the 2006 notice triggered the stop-time rule and that

Pereira thus failed to satisfy the 10-year physical-presence

requirement and was ineligible for cancellation of removal.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied Perei-

ra’s petition for review of the BIA’s order. 866 F. 3d 1

(2017). Applying the framework set forth in Chevron

U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U. S. 837 (1984), the Court of Appeals first found that

the stop-time rule in §1229b(d)(1) is ambiguous because it

“does not explicitly state that the date and time of the

hearing must be included in a notice to appear in order to

cut off an alien’s period of continuous physical presence.”

866 F. 3d, at 5. Then, after reviewing the statutory text

and structure, the administrative context, and pertinent

legislative history, the Court of Appeals held that the

BIA’s interpretation of the stop-time rule was a permissi-

ble reading of the statute. Id., at 6–8.

II

A

The Court granted certiorari in this case, 583 U. S. ___

(2018), to resolve division among the Courts of Appeals on

a simple, but important, question of statutory interpreta-

tion: Does service of a document styled as a “notice to

8 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

appear” that fails to specify “the items listed” in

§1229(a)(1) trigger the stop-time rule?4 Pet. for Cert. i.

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the question

presented by Pereira, which focuses on all “items listed” in

§1229(a)(1), sweeps more broadly than necessary to re-

solve the particular case before us. Although the time-

and-place information in a notice to appear will vary from

case to case, the Government acknowledges that “[m]uch

of the information Section 1229(a)(1) calls for does not”

change and is therefore “included in standardized lan-

guage on the I–862 notice-to-appear form.” Brief for Re-

spondent 36 (referencing 8 U. S. C. §§1229(a)(1)(A)–(B),

(E)–(F), and (G)(ii)). In fact, the Government’s 2006 notice

to Pereira included all of the information required by

§1229(a)(1), except it failed to specify the date and time of

Pereira’s removal proceedings. See App. 10–12. Accord-

ingly, the dispositive question in this case is much nar-

rower, but no less vital: Does a “notice to appear” that does

not specify the “time and place at which the proceedings

will be held,” as required by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i), trigger the

stop-time rule?5

——————

4 Compare Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney General United States, 817

F. 3d 78, 83–84 (CA3 2016) (holding that the stop-time rule unambigu-

ously requires service of a “notice to appear” that meets §1229(a)(1)’s

requirements), with Moscoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1079, 1083

(CA9 2015) (finding the statute ambiguous and deferring to the BIA’s

interpretation); O’Garro v. United States Atty. Gen., 605 Fed. Appx.

951, 953 (CA11 2015) (per curiam) (same); Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch,

786 F. 3d 235, 239–240 (CA2 2015) (per curiam) (same); Gonzalez-

Garcia v. Holder, 770 F. 3d 431, 434–435 (CA6 2014) (same); Yi Di

Wang v. Holder, 759 F. 3d 670, 674–675 (CA7 2014) (same); Urbina v.

Holder, 745 F. 3d 736, 740 (CA4 2014) (same).

5 The Court leaves for another day whether a putative notice to ap-

pear that omits any of the other categories of information enumerated

in §1229(a)(1) triggers the stop-time rule. Contrary to the dissent’s

assertion, this exercise of judicial restraint is by no means “tantamount

to admitting” that the Government’s (and dissent’s) atextual interpre-

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 9

Opinion of the Court

In addressing that narrower question, the Court need

not resort to Chevron deference, as some lower courts have

done, for Congress has supplied a clear and unambiguous

answer to the interpretive question at hand. See 467

U. S., at 842–843 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that

is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,

must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent

of Congress”). A putative notice to appear that fails to

designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s

removal proceedings is not a “notice to appear under

section 1229(a),” and so does not trigger the stop-time

rule.

B

The statutory text alone is enough to resolve this case.

Under the stop-time rule, “any period of . . . continuous

physical presence” is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is

served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” 8

U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1). By expressly referencing §1229(a),

the statute specifies where to look to find out what “notice

to appear” means. Section 1229(a), in turn, clarifies that

the type of notice “referred to as a ‘notice to appear’ ”

throughout the statutory section is a “written notice . . .

specifying,” as relevant here, “[t]he time and place at

which the [removal] proceedings will be held.”

§1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, based on the plain text of the

statute, it is clear that to trigger the stop-time rule, the

Government must serve a notice to appear that, at the

very least, “specif[ies]” the “time and place” of the removal

proceedings.

It is true, as the Government and dissent point out, that

the stop-time rule makes broad reference to a notice to

——————

tation is a permissible construction of the statute. Post, at 10 (opinion

of ALITO, J.).

10 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

appear under “section 1229(a),” which includes para-

graph (1), as well as paragraphs (2) and (3). See Brief for

Respondent 27–28; post, at 5–6 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But

the broad reference to §1229(a) is of no consequence, be-

cause, as even the Government concedes, only paragraph

(1) bears on the meaning of a “notice to appear.” Brief for

Respondent 27. By contrast, paragraph (2) governs the

“[n]otice of change in time or place of proceedings,” and

paragraph (3) provides for a system to record noncitizens’

addresses and phone numbers. Nowhere else within

§1229(a) does the statute purport to delineate the re-

quirements of a “notice to appear.” In fact, the term “no-

tice to appear” appears only in paragraph (1) of §1229(a).

If anything, paragraph (2) of §1229(a) actually bolsters

the Court’s interpretation of the statute. Paragraph (2)

provides that, “in the case of any change or postponement

in the time and place of [removal] proceedings,” the Gov-

ernment shall give the noncitizen “written notice . . .

specifying . . . the new time or place of the proceedings.”

§1229(a)(2)(A)(i). By allowing for a “change or postpone-

ment” of the proceedings to a “new time or place,” para-

graph (2) presumes that the Government has already

served a “notice to appear under section 1229(a)” that

specified a time and place as required by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).

Otherwise, there would be no time or place to “change or

postpon[e ].” §1229(a)(2). Notably, the dissent concedes

that paragraph (2) confirms that a notice to appear must

“state the ‘time and place’ of the removal proceeding as

required by §1229(a)(1).’ ” Post, at 13. The dissent never-

theless retorts that this point is “entirely irrelevant.” Ibid.

Not so. Paragraph (2) clearly reinforces the conclusion

that “a notice to appear under section 1229(a),”

§1229b(d)(1), must include at least the time and place of

the removal proceedings to trigger the stop-time rule.

Another neighboring statutory provision lends further

contextual support for the view that a “notice to appear”

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 11

Opinion of the Court

must include the time and place of the removal proceed-

ings to trigger the stop-time rule. Section 1229(b)(1) gives

a noncitizen “the opportunity to secure counsel before the

first [removal] hearing date” by mandating that such

“hearing date shall not be scheduled earlier than 10 days

after the service of the notice to appear.” For §1229(b)(1)

to have any meaning, the “notice to appear” must specify

the time and place that the noncitizen, and his counsel,

must appear at the removal hearing. Otherwise, the

Government could serve a document labeled “notice to

appear” without listing the time and location of the hear-

ing and then, years down the line, provide that infor-

mation a day before the removal hearing when it becomes

available. Under that view of the statute, a noncitizen

theoretically would have had the “opportunity to secure

counsel,” but that opportunity will not be meaningful if,

given the absence of a specified time and place, the noncit-

izen has minimal time and incentive to plan accordingly,

and his counsel, in turn, receives limited notice and time

to prepare adequately. It therefore follows that, if a “no-

tice to appear” for purposes of §1229(b)(1) must include

the time-and-place information, a “notice to appear” for

purposes of the stop-time rule under §1229b(d)(1) must as

well. After all, “it is a normal rule of statutory construc-

tion that identical words used in different parts of the

same act are intended to have the same meaning.”

Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 571

(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).6

——————

6 The dissent argues that, if a notice to appear must furnish time-and-

place information, the Government “may be forced by the Court’s

interpretation to guess that the hearing will take place far in the

future, only to learn shortly afterwards that the hearing is in fact

imminent.” Post, at 14. In such a scenario, the dissent hypothesizes, a

noncitizen would be “lulled into a false sense of security” and thus

would have little meaningful opportunity to secure counsel and prepare

12 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

Finally, common sense compels the conclusion that a

notice that does not specify when and where to appear for

a removal proceeding is not a “notice to appear” that trig-

gers the stop-time rule. If the three words “notice to ap-

pear” mean anything in this context, they must mean that,

at a minimum, the Government has to provide noncitizens

“notice” of the information, i.e., the “time” and “place,” that

would enable them “to appear” at the removal hearing in

the first place. Conveying such time-and-place infor-

mation to a noncitizen is an essential function of a notice

to appear, for without it, the Government cannot reason-

ably expect the noncitizen to appear for his removal pro-

ceedings. To hold otherwise would empower the Govern-

ment to trigger the stop-time rule merely by sending

noncitizens a barebones document labeled “Notice to

Appear,” with no mention of the time and place of the

removal proceedings, even though such documents would

do little if anything to facilitate appearance at those pro-

ceedings.7 “ ‘We are not willing to impute to Congress . . .

——————

adequately. Ibid. But nothing in our interpretation of the statute

“force[s]” the Government to guess when and where a hearing will take

place, ibid., nor does our interpretation prevent DHS and the Immigra-

tion Courts from working together to streamline the scheduling of

removal proceedings, see infra, at 18–19. Far from “lull[ing]” nonciti-

zens into a false sense of security, post, at 14, our reading (unlike the

Government’s and the dissent’s) still gives meaning to a noncitizen’s

“opportunity to secure counsel before the first [removal] hearing date,”

§1229(b)(1), by informing the noncitizen that the Government is com-

mitted to moving forward with removal proceedings at a specific time

and place. Equipped with that knowledge, a noncitizen has an incen-

tive to obtain counsel and prepare for his hearing.

7 At oral argument, the Government conceded that a blank piece of

paper would not suffice to trigger the stop-time rule because (in its

view) such a hypothetical notice would fail to specify the charges

against the noncitizen. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39–40 (arguing that notice to

appear must “tell the alien what proceedings he must appear for and

why he must appear for them”). The dissent also endorses the view

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 13

Opinion of the Court

such [a] contradictory and absurd purpose,’ ” United States

v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 342 (1950), particularly where

doing so has no basis in the statutory text.

III

Straining to inject ambiguity into the statute, the Gov-

ernment and the dissent advance several overlapping

arguments. None is persuasive.

A

First, the Government posits that §1229(a) “is not worded

in the form of a definition” and thus cannot circum-

scribe what type of notice counts as a “notice to appear” for

purposes of the stop-time rule. Brief for Respondent 32.

Section 1229(a), however, does speak in definitional terms,

at least with respect to the “time and place at which the

proceedings will be held”: It specifically provides that the

notice described under paragraph (1) is “referred to as a

‘notice to appear,’ ” which in context is quintessential

definitional language.8 It then defines that term as a

——————

that a notice to appear “can also be understood to serve primarily as a

charging document.” Post, at 14–15. But neither the Government nor

the dissent offers any convincing basis, much less one rooted in the

statutory text, for treating time-and-place information as any less

crucial than charging information for purposes of triggering the stop-

time rule. Furthermore, there is no reason why a notice to appear

should have only one essential function. Even if a notice to appear

functions as a “charging document,” that is not mutually exclusive with

the conclusion that a notice to appear serves another equally integral

function: telling a noncitizen when and where to appear. At bottom,

the Government’s self-serving position that a notice to appear must

specify charging information, but not the time-and-place information,

reveals the arbitrariness inherent in its atextual approach to the stop-

time rule.

8 Congress has employed similar definitional language in other statu-

tory schemes. See, e.g., 21 U. S. C. §356(b)(1) (creating new class of

“fast track product[s]” by setting out drug requirements and providing:

“In this section, such a drug is referred to as a ‘fast track product’ ”);

14 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

“written notice” that, as relevant here, “specif[ies] . . . [t]he

time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be

held.” §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, when the term “notice to

appear” is used elsewhere in the statutory section, includ-

ing as the trigger for the stop-time rule, it carries with it

the substantive time-and-place criteria required by

§1229(a).

Resisting this straightforward understanding of the

text, the dissent posits that “§1229(a)(1)’s language can be

understood to define what makes a notice to appear com-

plete.” Post, at 10 (emphasis in original). In the dissent’s

view, a defective notice to appear is still a “notice to ap-

pear” even if it is incomplete—much like a three-wheeled

Chevy is still a car. Post, at 10–11. The statutory text

proves otherwise. Section 1229(a)(1) does not say a “notice

to appear” is “complete” when it specifies the time and

place of the removal proceedings. Rather, it defines a

“notice to appear” as a “written notice” that “specif[ies],” at

a minimum, the time and place of the removal proceed-

ings. §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Moreover, the omission of time-

and-place information is not, as the dissent asserts, some

trivial, ministerial defect, akin to an unsigned notice of

appeal. Cf. Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U. S. 757, 763, 768

(2001). Failing to specify integral information like the

time and place of removal proceedings unquestionably

would “deprive [the notice to appear] of its essential char-

acter.” Post, at 12, n. 5; see supra, at 12–13, n. 7.9

——————

§356(a)(1) (“In this section, such a drug is referred to as a ‘break-

through therapy’ ”); 38 U. S. C. §7451(a)(2) (“hereinafter in this section

referred to as ‘covered positions’ ”); 42 U. S. C. §285g–4(b) (“hereafter in

this section referred to as ‘medical rehabilitation’ ”).

9 The dissent maintains that Congress’ decision to make the stop-time

rule retroactive to certain pre-IIRIRA “orders to show cause” “sheds

considerable light on the question presented” because orders to show

cause did not necessarily include time-and-place information. Post, at

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 15

Opinion of the Court

B

The Government and the dissent next contend that

Congress’ use of the word “under” in the stop-time rule

renders the statute ambiguous. Brief for Respondent 22–

23; post, at 4–5. Recall that the stop-time rule provides

that “any period of . . . continuous physical presence” is

“deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to

appear under section 1229(a).” §1229b(d)(1)(A). According

to the Government, the word “under” in that provision

means “subject to,” “governed by,” or “issued under the

authority of.” Brief for Respondent 24. The dissent offers

yet another alternative, insisting that “under” can also

mean “authorized by.” Post, at 4. Those definitions, the

Government and dissent maintain, support the BIA’s view

that the stop-time rule applies so long as DHS serves a

notice that is “authorized by,” or “subject to or governed

by, or issued under the authority of ” §1229(a), even if the

notice bears none of the time-and-place information re-

quired by that provision. See Brief for Respondent 24;

post, at 4–5.

We disagree. It is, of course, true that “[t]he word ‘un-

der’ is [a] chameleon ” that “ ‘must draw its meaning from

its context.’ ” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 245 (2010)

(quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 135 (1991)). But

nothing in the text or context here supports either the

Government’s or the dissent’s preferred definition of “un-

der.” Based on the plain language and statutory context

discussed above, we think it obvious that the word “un-

——————

6–7. That argument compares apples to oranges. Even if the stop-time

rule sometimes applies retroactively to an order to show cause, that

provides scant support for the dissent’s view that, under the new post-

IIRIRA statutory regime, an entirely different document called a

“notice to appear,” which, by statute, must specify the time and place of

removal proceedings, see §1229(a)(1)(G)(i), need not include such

information to trigger the stop-time rule.

16 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

der,” as used in the stop-time rule, can only mean “in

accordance with” or “according to,” for it connects the stop-

time trigger in §1229b(d)(1) to a “notice to appear” that

contains the enumerated time-and-place information

described in §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). See 18 Oxford English

Dictionary 950 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “under” as “[i]n

accordance with”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1525 (6th ed.

1990) (defining “under” as “according to”). So construed,

the stop-time rule applies only if the Government serves a

“notice to appear” “[i]n accordance with” or “according to”

the substantive time-and-place requirements set forth in

§1229(a). See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568

U. S. 519, 530 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Far from generating any “degree of ambiguity,” post, at 4,

the word “under” provides the glue that bonds the stop-

time rule to the substantive time-and-place requirements

mandated by §1229(a).

C

The Government argues that surrounding statutory

provisions reinforce its preferred reading. See Brief for

Respondent 25–27. It points, for instance, to two separate

provisions relating to in absentia removal orders:

§1229a(b)(5)(A), which provides that a noncitizen may be

removed in absentia if the Government has provided

“written notice required under paragraph (1) or (2) of

section 1229(a)”; and §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), which provides

that, once an in absentia removal order has been entered,

the noncitizen may seek to reopen the proceeding if, inter

alia, he “demonstrates that [he] did not receive notice in

accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).”

According to the Government, those two provisions use the

distinct phrases “required under” and “in accordance with”

as shorthand for a notice that satisfies §1229(a)(1)’s re-

quirements, whereas the stop-time rule uses the phrase

“under section 1229(a)” to encompass a different type of

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 17

Opinion of the Court

notice that does not necessarily include the information

outlined in §1229(a)(1). See Brief for Respondent 25–26.

That logic is unsound. The Government essentially argues

that phrase 1 (“written notice required under paragraph

(1) . . . of section 1229(a)”) and phrase 2 (“notice in accord-

ance with paragraph (1) . . . of section 1229(a)”) can refer

to the same type of notice even though they use entirely

different words, but that phrase 3 (“notice to appear under

section 1229(a)”) cannot refer to that same type of notice

because it uses words different from phrases 1 and 2. But

the Government offers no convincing reason why that is

so. The far simpler explanation, and the one that com-

ports with the actual statutory language and context, is

that each of these three phrases refers to notice satisfying,

at a minimum, the time-and-place criteria defined in

§1229(a)(1).

Equally unavailing is the Government’s invocation of

§1229a(b)(7). Brief for Respondent 26–27. Under that

provision, a noncitizen who is ordered removed in absentia

is ineligible for various forms of discretionary relief for a

10-year period if the noncitizen, “at the time of the notice

described in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a) of [Title

8], was provided oral notice . . . of the time and place of the

proceedings” and “of the consequences . . . of failing, other

than because of exceptional circumstances,” to appear.

§1229a(b)(7). The Government argues that the express

reference to “the time and place of the proceedings” in

§1229a(b)(7) shows that, when Congress wants to attach

substantive significance to whether a noncitizen is given

information about the specific “time and place” of a re-

moval proceeding, it knows exactly how to do so. Brief for

Respondent 26–27. But even if §1229a(b)(7) may impose

harsher consequences on noncitizens who fail to appear at

removal proceedings after having specifically received oral

notice of the time and place of such proceedings, that

reveals nothing about the distinct question here—i.e.,

18 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

whether Congress intended the stop-time rule to apply

when the Government fails to provide written notice of the

time and place of removal proceedings. As to that ques-

tion, the statute makes clear that Congress fully intended

to attach substantive significance to the requirement that

noncitizens be given notice of at least the time and place of

their removal proceedings. A document that fails to in-

clude such information is not a “notice to appear under

section 1229(a)” and thus does not trigger the stop-time

rule.

D

Unable to find sure footing in the statutory text, the

Government and the dissent pivot away from the plain

language and raise a number of practical concerns. These

practical considerations are meritless and do not justify

departing from the statute’s clear text. See Burrage v.

United States, 571 U. S. 204, 218 (2014).

The Government, for its part, argues that the “adminis-

trative realities of removal proceedings” render it difficult

to guarantee each noncitizen a specific time, date, and

place for his removal proceedings. See Brief for Respond-

ent 48. That contention rests on the misguided premise

that the time-and-place information specified in the notice

to appear must be etched in stone. That is incorrect. As

noted above, §1229(a)(2) expressly vests the Government

with power to change the time or place of a noncitizen’s

removal proceedings so long as it provides “written notice

. . . specifying . . . the new time or place of the proceedings”

and the consequences of failing to appear. See §1229(a)(2);

Tr. of Oral Arg. 16–19. Nothing in our decision today

inhibits the Government’s ability to exercise that statu-

tory authority after it has served a notice to appear specify-

ing the time and place of the removal proceedings.

The dissent raises a similar practical concern, which is

similarly misplaced. The dissent worries that requiring

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 19

Opinion of the Court

the Government to specify the time and place of removal

proceedings, while allowing the Government to change

that information, might encourage DHS to provide “arbi-

trary dates and times that are likely to confuse and con-

found all who receive them.” Post, at 8. The dissent’s

argument wrongly assumes that the Government is ut-

terly incapable of specifying an accurate date and time on a

notice to appear and will instead engage in “arbitrary”

behavior. See ibid. The Court does not embrace those

unsupported assumptions. As the Government concedes,

“a scheduling system previously enabled DHS and the

immigration court to coordinate in setting hearing dates in

some cases.” Brief for Respondent 50, n. 15; Brief for

National Immigrant Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 30–

31. Given today’s advanced software capabilities, it is

hard to imagine why DHS and immigration courts could

not again work together to schedule hearings before send-

ing notices to appear.

Finally, the dissent’s related contention that including a

changeable date would “mislead” and “prejudice” nonciti-

zens is unfounded. Post, at 8. As already explained, if the

Government changes the date of the removal proceedings,

it must provide written notice to the noncitizen,

§1229(a)(2). This notice requirement mitigates any poten-

tial confusion that may arise from altering the hearing

date. In reality, it is the dissent’s interpretation of the

statute that would “confuse and confound” noncitizens,

post, at 8, by authorizing the Government to serve notices

that lack any information about the time and place of the

removal proceedings.

E

In a last ditch effort to salvage its atextual interpreta-

tion, the Government invokes the alleged purpose and

legislative history of the stop-time rule. Brief for Re-

spondent 37–40. Even for those who consider statutory

20 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

purpose and legislative history, however, neither supports

the Government’s atextual position that Congress intended

the stop-time rule to apply when a noncitizen has been

deprived notice of the time and place of his removal pro-

ceedings. By the Government’s own account, Congress

enacted the stop-time rule to prevent noncitizens from

exploiting administrative delays to “buy time” during

which they accumulate periods of continuous presence.

Id., at 37–38 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 104–469, pt. 1, p. 122

(1996)). Requiring the Government to furnish time-and-

place information in a notice to appear, however, is en-

tirely consistent with that objective because, once a proper

notice to appear is served, the stop-time rule is triggered,

and a noncitizen would be unable to manipulate or delay

removal proceedings to “buy time.” At the end of the day,

given the clarity of the plain language, we “apply the

statute as it is written.” Burrage, 571 U. S., at 218.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit is reversed, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 1

KENNEDY, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–459

_________________

WESCLEY FONSECA PEREIRA, PETITIONER v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2018]

JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring.

I agree with the Court’s opinion and join it in full.

This separate writing is to note my concern with the

way in which the Court’s opinion in Chevron U. S. A. Inc.

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837

(1984), has come to be understood and applied. The appli-

cation of that precedent to the question presented here by

various Courts of Appeals illustrates one aspect of the

problem.

The first Courts of Appeals to encounter the question

concluded or assumed that the notice necessary to trigger

the stop-time rule found in 8 U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1) was not

“perfected” until the immigrant received all the infor-

mation listed in §1229(a)(1). Guamanrrigra v. Holder, 670

F. 3d 404, 410 (CA2 2012) (per curiam); see also Dababneh

v. Gonzales, 471 F. 3d 806, 809 (CA7 2006); Garcia-

Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F. 3d 935, 937, n. 3 (CA9 2005)

(per curiam).

That emerging consensus abruptly dissolved not long

after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reached a

contrary interpretation of §1229b(d)(1) in Matter of Cama-

rillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (2011). After that administrative

ruling, in addition to the decision under review here, at

least six Courts of Appeals, citing Chevron, concluded that

§1229b(d)(1) was ambiguous and then held that the BIA’s

2 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

KENNEDY, J., concurring

interpretation was reasonable. See Moscoso-Castellanos v.

Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1079, 1083 (CA9 2015); O’Garro v. United

States Atty. Gen., 605 Fed. Appx. 951, 953 (CA11 2015)

(per curiam); Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch, 786 F. 3d 235, 239–

240 (CA2 2015) (per curiam); Gonzalez-Garcia v. Holder,

770 F. 3d 431, 434–435 (CA6 2014); Yi Di Wang v. Holder,

759 F. 3d 670, 674–675 (CA7 2014); Urbina v. Holder, 745

F. 3d 736, 740 (CA4 2014). But see Orozco-Velasquez v.

Attorney General United States, 817 F. 3d 78, 81–82 (CA3

2016). The Court correctly concludes today that those

holdings were wrong because the BIA’s interpretation

finds little support in the statute’s text.

In according Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpreta-

tion, some Courts of Appeals engaged in cursory analysis

of the questions whether, applying the ordinary tools of

statutory construction, Congress’ intent could be dis-

cerned, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 9, and whether the BIA’s

interpretation was reasonable, id., at 845. In Urbina v.

Holder, for example, the court stated, without any further

elaboration, that “we agree with the BIA that the relevant

statutory provision is ambiguous.” 745 F. 3d, at 740. It

then deemed reasonable the BIA’s interpretation of the

statute, “for the reasons the BIA gave in that case.” Ibid.

This analysis suggests an abdication of the Judiciary’s

proper role in interpreting federal statutes.

The type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of

these cases is troubling. And when deference is applied to

other questions of statutory interpretation, such as an

agency’s interpretation of the statutory provisions that

concern the scope of its own authority, it is more troubling

still. See Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 327 (2013)

(ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (“We do not leave it to the

agency to decide when it is in charge”). Given the con-

cerns raised by some Members of this Court, see, e.g., id.,

at 312–328; Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015)

(THOMAS, J., concurring); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

KENNEDY, J., concurring

F. 3d 1142, 1149–1158 (CA10 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concur-

ring), it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in

an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron

and how courts have implemented that decision. The

proper rules for interpreting statutes and determining

agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should

accord with constitutional separation-of-powers principles

and the function and province of the Judiciary. See, e.g.,

Arlington, supra, at 312–316 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting).

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–459

_________________

WESCLEY FONSECA PEREIRA, PETITIONER v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2018]

JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting.

Although this case presents a narrow and technical

issue of immigration law, the Court’s decision implicates

the status of an important, frequently invoked, once cele-

brated, and now increasingly maligned precedent, namely,

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-

cil, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Under that decision, if a

federal statute is ambiguous and the agency that is au-

thorized to implement it offers a reasonable interpreta-

tion, then a court is supposed to accept that interpreta-

tion. Here, a straightforward application of Chevron

requires us to accept the Government’s construction of the

provision at issue. But the Court rejects the Government’s

interpretation in favor of one that it regards as the best

reading of the statute. I can only conclude that the Court,

for whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron.

I

As amended, the Immigration and Nationality Act

generally requires the Government to remove nonperma-

nent resident aliens who overstay the terms of their ad-

mission into this country. See 8 U. S. C. §§1227(a)(1)(B)–

(C). But under certain circumstances, the Government

may decide to cancel their removal instead. See §1229b.

To be eligible for such relief, an alien must demonstrate

2 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

that he or she “has been physically present in the United

States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years.”

§1229b(b)(1)(A). “For purposes of ” that rule, however,

“any period of . . . continuous physical presence in the

United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is

served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this

title.” §1229b(d)(1). That language acts as a stop-time

rule, preventing the continuous-presence clock from con-

tinuing to run once an alien is served with a notice to

appear.

The question presented by this case is whether the stop-

time rule is triggered by service of a notice to appear that

is incomplete in some way. A provision of the amended

Immigration and Nationality Act requires that the Gov-

ernment serve an alien who it seeks to remove with a

notice to appear “specifying” a list of things, including

“[t]he nature of the proceedings against the alien,” “[t]he

legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted,”

“[t]he acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law,”

“[t]he charges against the alien and the statutory provi-

sions alleged to have been violated,” and (what is relevant

here) “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will

be held.” §§1229(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (G)(i).

Petitioner Wescley Pereira is a Brazilian citizen who

entered the United States lawfully in 2000 but then ille-

gally overstayed his nonimmigrant visa. In 2006, the

Government caused him to be served in person with a

document styled as a notice to appear for removal proceed-

ings. Pereira concedes that he overstayed his visa and is

thus removable, but he argues that he is nonetheless

eligible for cancellation of removal because he has now

been in the country continuously for more than 10 years.

He contends that the notice served on him in 2006 did not

qualify as a notice to appear because it lacked one piece of

information that such a notice is supposed to contain,

namely, the time at which his removal proceedings were to

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3

ALITO, J., dissenting

be held. Thus, Pereira contends, that notice did not trig-

ger the stop-time rule, and the clock continued to run.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has rejected

this interpretation of the stop-time rule in the past. It has

held that “[a]n equally plausible reading” is that the stop-

time rule “merely specifies the document the [Govern-

ment] must serve on the alien to trigger the ‘stop-time’

rule and does not impose substantive requirements for a

notice to appear to be effective in order for that trigger to

occur.” In re Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644, 647 (2011). It

therefore held in this case that Pereira is ineligible for

cancellation of removal.

II

A

Pereira, on one side, and the Government and the BIA,

on the other, have a quasi-metaphysical disagreement

about the meaning of the concept of a notice to appear. Is

a notice to appear a document that contains certain essen-

tial characteristics, namely, all the information required

by §1229(a)(1), so that any notice that omits any of that

information is not a “notice to appear” at all? Or is a

notice to appear a document that is conventionally called

by that name, so that a notice that omits some of the

information required by §1229(a)(1) may still be regarded

as a “notice to appear”?

Picking the better of these two interpretations might

have been a challenge in the first instance. But the Court

did not need to decide that question, for under Chevron we

are obligated to defer to a Government agency’s interpre-

tation of the statute that it administers so long as that

interpretation is a “ ‘permissible’ ” one. INS v. Aguirre-

Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415, 424 (1999). All that is required is

that the Government’s view be “reasonable”; it need not be

“the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpreta-

tion deemed most reasonable by the courts.” Entergy

4 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U. S. 208, 218 (2009).

Moreover, deference to the Government’s interpretation

“is especially appropriate in the immigration context”

because of the potential foreign-policy implications.

Aguirre-Aguirre, supra, at 425. In light of the relevant

text, context, statutory history, and statutory purpose,

there is no doubt that the Government’s interpretation of

the stop-time rule is indeed permissible under Chevron.

B

By its terms, the stop-time rule is consistent with the

Government’s interpretation. As noted, the stop-time rule

provides that “any period of . . . continuous physical pres-

ence in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when

the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)

of this title.” §1229b(d)(1). A degree of ambiguity arises

from Congress’s use of the word “under,” for as the Court

recognizes, “ ‘[t]he word “under” is [a] chameleon,’ ” ante, at

15, having “ ‘many dictionary definitions’ ” and no “uni-

form, consistent meaning,” Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &

Sons, Inc., 568 U. S. 519, 531 (2013). Everyone agrees,

however, that “under” is often used to mean “authorized

by.” See, e.g., Webster’s New World College Dictionary

1453 (3d ed. 1997) (“authorized . . . by”); American Herit-

age Dictionary 1945 (3d ed. 1992) (“With the authorization

of ”); see also Brief for Respondent 24 (agreeing that “un-

der” can mean “subject to,” “governed by,” or “issued under

the authority of”); Brief for Petitioner 28. And when the

term is used in this way, it does not necessarily mean that

the act done pursuant to that authorization was done in

strict compliance with the terms of the authorization. For

example, one might refer to a litigant’s disclosure “under”

Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even if

that disclosure did not comply with Rule 26(a) in every

respect. Or one might refer to regulations promulgated

“under” a statute even if a court later found those regula-

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 5

ALITO, J., dissenting

tions inconsistent with the statute’s text.

That use of the word “under” perfectly fits the Govern-

ment’s interpretation of the stop-time rule. The Govern-

ment served Pereira with a notice to appear “under”

§1229(a) in the sense that the notice was “authorized by”

that provision, which states that a notice to appear “shall

be given” to an alien in a removal proceeding and outlines

several rules governing such notices. On that reasonable

reading, the phrase “under section 1229(a)” acts as short-

hand for the type of document governed by §1229(a).

C

That interpretation is bolstered by the stop-time rule’s

cross-reference to “section 1229(a).” §1229b(d)(1). Pereira

interprets that cross-reference as picking up every sub-

stantive requirement that applies to notices to appear.

But those substantive requirements are found only in

§1229(a)(1). Thus, the cross-reference to “section 1229(a),”

as opposed to “section 1229(a)(1),” tends to undermine

Pereira’s interpretation, because if Congress had meant

for the stop-time rule to incorporate the substantive re-

quirements located in §1229(a)(1), it presumably would

have referred specifically to that provision and not more

generally to “section 1229(a).” We normally presume that

“[w]hen Congress want[s] to refer only to a particular

subsection or paragraph, it [says] so,” NLRB v. SW Gen-

eral, Inc., 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 9), and it is

instructive that neighboring statutory provisions in this

case are absolutely riddled with such specific cross-

references.1 In the stop-time rule, however, Congress

chose to insert a broader cross-reference, one that refers to

the general process of serving notices to appear as a

——————

1 See, e.g., §1229a(b)(5)(A) (“paragraph (1) . . . of section 1229(a)”);

§1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (same); §1229a(b)(7) (same); §1229a(b)(5)(B) (“ad-

dress required under section 1229(a)(1)(F)”); see also §1229a(b)(7)

(referring to §1229(a)(1)(G)(i)’s “time and place” requirement).

6 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

whole. See §1229(a). Thus, Pereira essentially “wants to

cherry pick from the material covered by the statutory

cross-reference. But if Congress had intended to refer to

the definition in [§1229(a)(1)] alone, it presumably would

have done so.” Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees

Retirement Fund, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 9).2

D

Statutory history also strongly supports the Govern-

ment’s argument that a notice to appear should trigger the

stop-time rule even if it fails to include the date and time

of the alien’s removal proceeding. When Congress enacted

the stop-time rule, it decreed that the rule should “apply

to notices to appear issued before, on, or after the date of

the enactment of this Act.” Illegal Immigration Reform

and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, §309(c)(5), 110

Stat. 3009–627. This created a problem: Up until that

point, there was no such thing as a “notice to appear,” so

the reference to “notices to appear issued before . . . this

Act” made little sense. When Congress became aware of

the problem, it responded by clarifying that the stop-time

rule should apply not only to notices to appear, but also “to

orders to show cause . . . issued before, on, or after the

date” of the clarifying amendment’s enactment. Nicara-

guan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act,

§203(1), 111 Stat. 2196, as amended 8 U. S. C. §1101 note.

That clarification sheds considerable light on the question

presented here because orders to show cause did not nec-

essarily include the date or location of proceedings (even if

——————

2 According to the Court, “the broad reference to §1229(a) is of no

consequence, because, as even the Government concedes, only para-

graph (1) bears on the meaning of a ‘notice to appear.’ ” Ante, at 10.

But that is precisely the point: If “only paragraph (1) bears on the

meaning of a ‘notice to appear,’ ” then Congress’s decision to refer to

§1229(a) more broadly indicates that it meant to do something other

than to pick up the substantive requirements of §1229(a)(1).

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 7

ALITO, J., dissenting

they otherwise served a function similar to that now

served by notices to appear). See 8 U. S. C.

§1252b(a)(2)(A) (1994 ed.).

That statutory history supports the Government’s inter-

pretation twice over. First, it demonstrates that when it

comes to triggering the stop-time rule, Congress attached

no particular significance to the presence (or absence) of

information about the date and time of a removal proceed-

ing. Congress was more than happy for the stop-time rule

to be activated either by notices to appear or by orders to

show cause, even though the latter often lacked any in-

formation about the date and time of proceedings.

Second, and even more important, the statutory history

also shows that Congress clearly thought of orders to show

cause as the functional equivalent of notices to appear for

purposes of the stop-time rule. After an initially confusing

reference to “notices to appear” issued before the creation

of the stop-time rule, Congress clarified that it had meant

to refer to “orders to show cause.” By equating orders to

show cause with notices to appear, Congress indicated

that when the stop-time rule refers to “a notice to appear,”

it is referring to a category of documents that do not nec-

essarily provide the date and time of a future removal

proceeding.3

E

Finally, Pereira’s contrary interpretation leads to conse-

quences that clash with any conceivable statutory pur-

pose. Pereira’s interpretation would require the Govern-

ment to include a date and time on every notice to appear

that it issues. But at the moment, the Government lacks

the ability to do that with any degree of accuracy. The

——————

3 Although the Court charges me with “compar[ing] apples to oranges,”

ante, at 15, n. 9, Congress was the one that equated orders to show

cause and notices to appear for purposes of the stop-time rule. By

ignoring that decision, the Court rewrites the statute to its taste.

8 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

Department of Homeland Security sends out the initial

notice to appear, but the removal proceedings themselves

are scheduled by the Immigration Court, which is part of

the Department of Justice. See 8 CFR §1003.18(a) (2018).

The Department of Homeland Security cannot dictate the

scheduling of a matter on the docket of the Immigration

Court, and at present, the Department of Homeland Secu-

rity generally cannot even access the Immigration Court’s

calendar. In re Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec., at 648; Tr. of

Oral Arg. 52–53. The Department of Homeland Security

may thus be hard pressed to include on initial notices to

appear a hearing date that is anything more than a rough

estimate subject to considerable change. See §1229(a)(2);

see also ante, at 18 (disclaiming any effect on the Govern-

ment’s ability to change initial hearing dates).

Including an estimated and changeable date, however,

may do much more harm than good. See Gonzalez-Garcia

v. Holder, 770 F. 3d 431, 434–435 (CA6 2014). It is likely

to mislead many recipients and to prejudice those who

make preparations on the assumption that the initial date

is firm. And it forces the Government to go through the

pointless exercise of first including a date that it knows

may very well be altered and then changing it once the

real date becomes clear. Such a system serves nobody’s

interests.

Statutory interpretation is meant to be “a holistic en-

deavor,” and sometimes language “that may seem ambig-

uous in isolation” becomes clear because “only one of the

permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is

compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of

Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S.

365, 371 (1988). The real-world effects produced by Perei-

ra’s interpretation—arbitrary dates and times that are

likely to confuse and confound all who receive them—

illustrate starkly the merits of the Government’s alterna-

tive construction.

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

ALITO, J., dissenting

III

Based on the relevant text, context, statutory history,

and statutory purpose, the Government makes a convinc-

ing case that the stop-time rule can be triggered even by a

notice to appear that omits the date and time of a removal

proceeding. But the Court holds instead that in order “to

trigger the stop-time rule, the Government must serve a

notice to appear that, at the very least, ‘specif[ies]’ the

‘time and place’ of the removal proceedings.” Ante, at 9.

According to the Court, that conclusion is compelled by the

statutory text, the statutory context, and “common sense.”

Ante, at 12. While the Court’s interpretation may be

reasonable, the Court goes much too far in saying that it is

the only reasonable construction.

A

Start with the text. As noted, the stop-time rule pro-

vides that “any period of . . . continuous physical presence

in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the

alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).”

§1229b(d)(1). The Court does not dispute that it is entirely

consistent with standard English usage to read this

language as the Government and I do. See ante, at 15. It

therefore follows that the stop-time rule itself does not

foreclose the Government’s interpretation.

That leaves only §1229(a)(1), which specifies the infor-

mation that a notice to appear must contain. The Court’s

treatment of this provision contradicts itself. On the one

hand, the Court insists that this provision is “definitional”

and that it sets out the essential characteristics without

which a notice is not a notice to appear. Ante, at 13. But

on the other hand, the Court states that it “leaves for

another day whether a putative notice to appear that

omits any of the other categories of information enumer-

ated in §1229(a)(1) triggers the stop-time rule.” Ante, at 8,

n. 5. The Court cannot have it both ways. If §1229(a)(1) is

10 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

definitional and sets out the essential characteristics of a

notice to appear, then the omission of any required item of

information makes a putative notice to appear a nullity.

So if the Court means what it says—that its interpretation

of §1229(a)(1)’s language leaves open the consequences of

omitting other categories of information—that is tanta-

mount to admitting that §1229(a)(1) itself cannot foreclose

the Government’s interpretation.4

In any event, the Government’s interpretation can

easily be squared with the text of §1229(a)(1). That provi-

sion states that a “written notice (in this section referred to

as a ‘notice to appear’) shall be given in person to the alien

. . . specifying” 10 categories of information, including the

“time and place” of the removal proceeding. §1229(a)(1)

(emphasis added). According to Pereira, that language

cinches the case against the Government’s interpretation:

By equating a “notice to appear” with a “written notice . . .

[that] specif[ies]” the relevant categories of information,

§1229(a)(1) establishes that a notice lacking any of those

10 pieces of information cannot qualify as a “notice to

appear” and thus cannot trigger the stop-time rule. In

Pereira’s eyes, §1229(a)(1) defines what a notice to appear

is, and most of the Court’s opinion is to the same effect.

This may be a plausible interpretation of §1229(a)(1)’s

language, but it is not the only one. It is at least as rea-

sonable to read that language as simply giving a name to

the new type of notice to which that provision refers. Or

to put the point another way, §1229(a)(1)’s language can

be understood to define what makes a notice to appear

complete. See In re Camarillo, supra, at 647. Under that

——————

4 Nor can the Court get away with labeling its self-contradictions as

“judicial restraint.” Ante, at 8, n. 5. Either §1229(a)(1) sets out the

essential characteristics of a notice to appear or it does not; the Court

cannot stop at a halfway point unsupported by either text or logic while

maintaining that its resting place is “clear” in light of the statutory

text. Ante, at 9.

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 11

ALITO, J., dissenting

interpretation, a notice that omits some of the information

required by §1229(a)(1) might still be a “notice to appear.”

We often use language in this way. In everyday life, a

person who sees an old Chevy with three wheels in a

junkyard would still call it a car. Language is often used

the same way in the law. Consider the example of a notice

of appeal. Much like a notice to appear, a notice of appeal

must meet several substantive requirements; all notices of

appeal, for example, “must be signed.” Fed. Rule Civ.

Proc. 11(a). So what happens if a notice of appeal is in-

complete in some way—say, because it is unsigned but

otherwise impeccable? If a court clerk wanted to point out

the lack of a signature to an attorney, the clerk is far more

likely to say, “there is a problem with your notice of ap-

peal,” than to say, “there is a problem with this document

you filed; it’s not signed and therefore I don’t know what

to call it, but I can’t call it a notice of appeal because it is

unsigned.”

Furthermore, just because a legal document is incom-

plete, it does not necessarily follow that it is without legal

effect. Consider again the notice of appeal. As a general

matter, an appeal “may be taken” in a civil case “only by

filing a notice of appeal” “within 30 days after entry of the

judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. Rules App. Proc.

3(a), 4(a)(1)(A). While an unsigned notice of appeal does

not meet the substantive requirements set out in Rule 11,

in Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U. S. 757, 763, 768 (2001),

this Court unanimously held that a litigant who filed a

timely but unsigned notice of appeal still beat the 30-day

clock for filing appeals. As we explained, “imperfections in

noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine

doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment,

to which appellate court.” Id., at 767.

If Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be

read in this way, it is not unreasonable to do the same

with §1229(a)(1). And in trying to distinguish an empty

12 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

signature line on a notice of appeal as a “trivial, ministe-

rial defect,” ante, at 14, the Court gives the game away by

once again assuming its own conclusion. Whether the

omission of the date and time certain on a notice to appear

is essential for present purposes is the central issue in this

case, and the Court gives no textually based reason to

think that it is. The Government could reasonably con-

clude that a notice to appear that omits the date and time

of a proceeding is still a notice to appear (albeit a defective

one), much in the same way that a complaint without the

e-mail address of the signer is still a complaint (albeit a

defective one, see Rule 11(a)), or a clock missing the num-

ber “8” is still a clock (albeit a defective one).

Pereira and the Court are right that §1229(a)(1) sets out

the substantive requirements for notices to appear, but

that fact alone does not control whether an incomplete

notice to appear triggers the stop-time rule.5

B

With the text of both the stop-time rule and §1229(a)(1)

irreducibly ambiguous, the Court must next look to two

neighboring provisions to support its conclusion that its

interpretation is the only reasonable one. Neither provi-

sion is sufficient.

The Court first observes that the second paragraph of

§1229(a) allows the Government to move or reschedule a

removal proceeding unilaterally and then to inform the

alien of “the new time or place of the proceedings.”

——————

5 Of course, courts should still demand that the Government justify

why whatever is left off a notice to appear does not deprive it of its

essential character as a “notice to appear.” As the Government rightly

concedes, for example, a blank sheet of paper would not constitute a

“notice to appear.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 39; see Brief for Respondent 35–36.

But for all the reasons the Government gives, omission of the date and

time of a future removal proceeding is not, by itself, enough to turn a

notice to appear into something else.

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 13

ALITO, J., dissenting

§1229(a)(2)(A)(i). “By allowing for a ‘change or postpone-

ment’ of the proceedings to a ‘new time or place,’ ” the

Court reasons, “paragraph (2) presumes that the Govern-

ment has already served a ‘notice to appear . . .’ that speci-

fied a time and place as required.” Ante, at 10.

That is entirely correct—and entirely irrelevant. No one

doubts that §1229(a)(1) requires that a notice to appear

include the “time and place” of the removal proceeding.

See §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Indeed, that is common ground

between the two parties. See Brief for Petitioner 10–11;

Brief for Respondent 3. Paragraph (2) undoubtedly as-

sumes that notices to appear will state the “time and

place” of the removal proceeding as required by

§1229(a)(1), but it has nothing to say about whether the

failure to include that information affects the operation of

the stop-time rule. By suggesting otherwise, the Court is

merely reasoning backwards from its conclusion.

The other provision cited by the Court, §1229(b)(1), is no

more helpful. As the Court explains, §1229(b)(1) generally

precludes the Government from scheduling a hearing date

“ ‘earlier than 10 days after the service of the notice to

appear’ ” in order to give the alien “ ‘the opportunity to

secure counsel.’ ” Ante, at 11. Unless a notice to appear

includes the time and place of the hearing, the Court frets,

“the Government could serve a document labeled ‘notice to

appear’ without listing the time and location of the hear-

ing and then, years down the line, provide that infor-

mation a day before the removal hearing when it becomes

available.” Ibid. But that remote and speculative possi-

bility depends entirely on the Immigration Court’s allow-

ing a removal proceeding to go forward only one day after

an alien (and the Government) receives word of a hearing

date. See 8 CFR §1003.18(a). Even assuming that such

an unlikely event were to come to pass, the court’s decision

would surely be subject to review on appeal. See generally

8 CFR §1003.1, 8 U. S. C. §1252. Regardless, the Court’s

14 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

interpretation of the stop-time rule would not prevent a

similar type of problem from arising. When the Govern-

ment sends an initial notice to appear from now on, it may

be forced by the Court’s interpretation to guess that the

hearing will take place far in the future, only to learn

shortly afterwards that the hearing is in fact imminent.

An alien lulled into a false sense of security by that initial

notice to appear will have as little meaningful “ ‘opportun-

ity to secure counsel’ ” and “time to prepare adequately,”

ante, at 11, as one who initially received a notice to appear

without any hearing date.

C

Finally, the Court turns to “common sense” to support

its preferred reading of the text. According to the Court, it

should be “obvious” to anyone that “a notice that does not

specify when and where to appear for a removal proceed-

ing is not a ‘notice to appear.’ ” Ante, at 2, 12. But what

the Court finds so obvious somehow managed to elude

every Court of Appeals to consider the question save one.

See Moscoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1079, 1083

(CA9 2015); O’Garro v. U. S. Attorney General, 605 Fed.

Appx. 951, 953 (CA11 2015) (per curiam); Guaman-Yuqui

v. Lynch, 786 F. 3d 235, 240 (CA2 2015) (per curiam);

Gonzalez-Garcia v. Holder, 770 F. 3d 431, 434–435 (CA6

2014); Yi Di Wang v. Holder, 759 F. 3d 670, 675 (CA7

2014); Urbina v. Holder, 745 F. 3d 736, 740 (CA4 2014).

That is likely because the Court’s “common sense” de-

pends on a very specific understanding of the purpose of a

notice to appear. In the Court’s eyes, notices to appear

serve primarily as a vehicle for communicating to aliens

when and where they should appear for their removal

hearings. That is certainly a reasonable interpretation

with some intuitive force behind it. But that is not the

only possible understanding or even necessarily the best

one. As the Government reasonably explains, a notice to

Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 15

ALITO, J., dissenting

appear can also be understood to serve primarily as a

charging document. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 39–45. Indeed,

much of §1229(a)(1) reinforces that view through the

informational requirements it imposes on notices to ap-

pear. See, e.g., §1229(a)(1)(A) (“nature of the proceed-

ings”); §1229(a)(1)(B) (“legal authority” for “the proceed-

ings”); §1229(a)(1)(C) (“acts or conduct alleged”);

§1229(a)(1)(D) (“charges against the alien”); ibid. (“statu-

tory provisions alleged to have been violated”). Interpreted

in this way, a notice to appear hardly runs afoul of

“common sense” by simply omitting the date and time of a

future removal proceeding.6

Today’s decision appears even less commonsensical once

its likely consequences are taken into account. As already

noted, going forward the Government will be forced to

include an arbitrary date and time on every notice to

appear that it issues. See supra, at 7–8. Such a system

will only serve to confuse everyone involved, and the Court

offers no explanation as to why it believes otherwise.

Although the Court expresses surprise at the idea that its

opinion will “ ‘forc[e] the Government’ to guess when and

where a hearing will take place,” ante, at 12, n. 6, it is

——————

6 The Court responds to this point in two ways. First, it faults me for

failing to offer a reason “rooted in the statutory tex[t] for treating time-

and-place information as any less crucial than charging information for

purposes of triggering the stop-time rule.” Ante, at 13, n. 7. But

exactly the same criticism can be leveled against the Court’s own

reading, which noticeably fails to offer any reason “rooted in the statu-

tory text” why time-and-place information should be treated as any

more crucial than charging information for purposes of triggering the

stop-time rule. Second, the Court also observes misleadingly that

“there is no reason why a notice to appear should have only one essen-

tial function,” and that a notice to appear might thus serve the dual

purpose of both presenting charges and informing an alien “when and

where to appear.” Ibid. Of course it might, but it is also equally

reasonable to interpret a notice to appear as serving only one of those

functions. Under Chevron, it was the Government—not this Court—

that was supposed to make that interpretive call.

16 PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

undisputed that the Government currently lacks the

capability to do anything other than speculate about the

likely date and time of future removal proceedings. See

Tr. of Oral Arg. 47–49, 52–53. At most, we can hope that

the Government develops a system in the coming years

that allows it to determine likely dates and times before it

sends out initial notices to appear. But nothing in either

today’s decision or the statute can guarantee such an

outcome, so the Court is left crossing its fingers and hop-

ing for the best. Ante, at 12, n. 6, 18–19.

* * *

Once the errors and false leads are stripped away, the

most that remains of the Court’s argument is a textually

permissible interpretation consistent with the Court’s

view of “common sense.” That is not enough to show that

the Government’s contrary interpretation is unreasonable.

Choosing between these competing interpretations might

have been difficult in the first instance. But under Chev-

ron, that choice was not ours to make. Under Chevron,

this Court was obliged to defer to the Government’s

interpretation.

In recent years, several Members of this Court have

questioned Chevron’s foundations. See, e.g., ante, at 2–3

(KENNEDY, J., concurring); Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S.

___, ___–___ (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at

1–5); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F. 3d 1142, 1149

(CA10 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But unless the

Court has overruled Chevron in a secret decision that has

somehow escaped my attention, it remains good law.

I respectfully dissent.