Opinion

Ricky Brown v. Board of Cmsnr Fifth LA Levee, et a

Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Jun 7, 2018
Status
Unpublished
Nature of suit
Private Civil Federal
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 4.5%

The opinion

Case: 17-30808 Document: 00514502902 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/06/2018

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 17-30808 FILED

June 6, 2018

RICKY L. BROWN, Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FIFTH LOUISIANA LEVEE DISTRICT;

JAMES SHIVERS; REYNOLD MINSKY,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:12-CV-289

Before CLEMENT, HIGGINSON, and HO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Ricky Brown appeals from the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of defendants Reynold Minsky, James Shivers,

and the Fifth Louisiana Levee District. Brown alleges that the defendants

violated his right to equal protection by failing to grant the permits required

to develop his property, which is partially subject to Louisiana’s Bondurant

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

Case: 17-30808 Document: 00514502902 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/06/2018

No. 17-30808

Levee and Hydraulic Fill and to a right-of-way in favor of the Levee District.

He contends that other landowners were permitted to develop their property,

while he was unfairly prevented from doing so.

For Brown’s “class of one” equal protection claim to succeed, he must

establish “that [he] has been intentionally treated differently from others

similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in

treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). And when

considering a motion for summary judgment, “[a] genuine dispute of material

fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.’” Hefren v. McDermott, Inc., 820 F.3d 767, 771 (5th

Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

Here, the only evidence Brown adduced is a single affidavit and a batch of

supporting photographs depicting improvements by other landowners that,

according to Brown, “appear . . . to be within the Levee District’s alleged right

of way” and would thus have required permits to construct—the permits he

claims he was denied. None of this evidence establishes a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether an equal protection violation occurred: Brown has

not demonstrated that he was situated similarly to these landowners or that

the other landowners’ property is similar to his.

We note that “mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary

judgment evidence, and such allegations are insufficient, therefore, to defeat a

motion for summary judgment.” Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir.

1996). Accordingly, Brown has failed to carry his burden. Finally, Brown has

not shown that the district court abused its discretion in denying his late-

raised request for additional time to develop his position. See McKay v.

Novartis Pharm. Corp., 751 F.3d 694, 700–01 (5th Cir. 2014).

AFFIRMED.

2

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