Opinion

Mady Schubarth v. Federal Republic of Germany

  • 891 F.3d 392
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jun 1, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Wilkins
On the bench
Griffith, Kavanaugh, Wilkins
Cited by
48 cases
Authority
More cited than 77.5%

noting that “[t]his 6 interpretation is supported by the FSIA’s plain text, which employs the present 7 tense”

How later courts described this case

  • noting that “[t]his 6 interpretation is supported by the FSIA’s plain text, which employs the present 7 tense”
  • explaining that personal jurisdiction exists where “subject matter jurisdiction has been satisfied” and “proper service has been effected” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b))
  • upholding dismissal of foreign state where there was “no dispute that the Estate or any property exchanged for it are located outside this country”
  • plaintiff waited "nineteen years" for a decision on her restitution application from a foreign nation

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 12, 2017 Decided June 1, 2018

No. 17-7004

MADY MARIELUISE SCHUBARTH,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND BVVG

BODENVERWERTUNGS- UND -VERWALTUNGS GMBH,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:14-cv-02140)

Mark N. Bravin argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Alexandra A.K. Meise.

Jeffrey Harris argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the brief was Walter E. Diercks.

Before: GRIFFITH, KAVANAUGH, and WILKINS, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: This action arises from Mady

Marieluise Schubarth’s pursuit of compensation for land (“the

2

Estate”) allegedly seized from her family at the beginning of

the Cold War. After achieving a partial award through

restitution processes in the Federal Republic of Germany

(“Germany”), where the Estate is located, Schubarth pressed

her claim here. Her complaint asserts that the denial of full

compensation for the Estate violated the bilateral Treaty of

Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United

States and the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, 7

U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (hereinafter the “FCN Treaty”),

both independently and as incorporated into German domestic

law.

The question before us is whether U.S. courts may

exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this case under the

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). The District

Court concluded Schubarth’s complaint did not sufficiently

plead that either defendant, Germany itself or the German state-

owned corporation that allegedly markets and manages the

Estate (“BVVG”), was engaged in “commercial activity in the

United States” under the FSIA’s expropriation exception. 28

U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). For the same reason, the District Court

held that Germany had not waived its sovereign immunity

when enacting the FCN Treaty.

We affirm as to Germany and reverse as to BVVG.

Following our holding in de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, a

foreign state is immune to claims for the expropriation of

property not present in the United States, and Schubarth does

not dispute that the Estate is located abroad or that Germany is

the foreign state itself. See 859 F.3d 1094, 1107 (D.C. Cir.

2017). Therefore, the District Court properly concluded U.S.

courts cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over

Schubarth’s claims against Germany pursuant to the FSIA’s

expropriation exception.

3

BVVG is a different matter. Although the question is

close, reading the complaint’s factual allegations together and

construing all reasonable inferences in Schubarth’s favor, it is

plausible that BVVG “is engaged in a commercial activity in

the United States,” including ongoing sales and marketing of

previously expropriated land such as the Estate. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605(a)(3). We need not reach whether, in a different case,

allegations of marketing alone would constitute “commercial

activity” under the FSIA. We leave for the District Court to

consider in the first instance whether BVVG is properly

considered an “agency or instrumentality” of Germany rather

than the state itself.

I.

A.

The following facts are taken from the complaint and

assumed true on review of Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d

82, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Schubarth is a U.S. citizen and

California resident who alleges she inherited over 500 acres of

German agricultural land from her parents in 1973. At that

time, the Estate was located in the German Democratic

Republic (“East Germany”), a satellite state of the Soviet

Union divided from the then-Federal Republic of Germany

(“West Germany”) at the end of World War II. Beginning in

1945, the Soviet occupying authorities and, subsequently, the

East German government expropriated or collectivized most

4

privately held real property in East Germany, including the

Estate.

In 1956, the United States and West Germany entered into

the FCN Treaty, which in relevant part provides:

Property of nationals and companies of either

Party shall receive the most constant protection

and security within the territories of the other

Party. . . . Property of nationals and companies

of either Party shall not be taken within the

territories of the other Party, except for the

public benefit and in accordance with due

process of law, nor shall it be taken without just

compensation. Such compensation shall

represent the equivalent of the property taken

and shall be made in an effectively realizable

form and without unnecessary delay. Adequate

provision shall have been made at latest by the

time of the taking for the determination and the

giving of the compensation.

FCN Treaty, art. V, ¶¶ 1, 4. According to the complaint, a 1957

German federal court decision held that the FCN Treaty was

incorporated into German domestic law and required a U.S.

national to be compensated with no less than fair market value

for property taken by the West German government. J.A. 6-7.

Schubarth became a U.S. citizen, and thereby lost her previous

German citizenship, in 1963.

Following the 1990 reunification of East and West

Germany, the German government faced the challenges of re-

privatizing East German property and of resolving competing

claims to expropriated property from prior owners and current

occupants. It established the Treuhandanstalt (the “Trust

5

Agency”) to oversee conversion of the former East German

communist system into a market economy, including by selling

state-owned enterprises and property. The Trust Agency

maintained an office in New York City to market and sell

expropriated properties, including the Estate, in the United

States and around the world. J.A. 5. Pursuant to its marketing

efforts, the Trust Agency made $1.65 billion in sales in the

United States. Id.

The Trust Agency closed in 1994. Its responsibilities were

transferred to three successor agencies, including defendant

BVVG, which took on the Trust Agency’s role of managing,

marketing, and selling expropriated agricultural and forest

lands. J.A. 2, 5. In addition, after the Trust Agency closed its

New York office, it “pursued marketing efforts over the

Internet.” J.A. 5. “Portions of the [] Estate were sold by the

Trust Agency, and later by the BVVG as successor to the Trust

Agency, to private investors in Germany and elsewhere.” Id.

The complaint describes BVVG’s role as successor to the Trust

Agency as follows:

The BVVG is a German state-owned entity

founded by statute in 1991. It is responsible,

inter alia, for the management, marketing and

sale of expropriated properties located in the

former [East Germany]. Specifically, the

BVVG manages and privatizes agricultural and

forest lands seized by East Germany in the

German state[] of . . . Thuringia. . . . The BVVG

provides information about the expropriated

properties it controls to potential buyers,

including lease and purchase prices, and other

commercial terms. Its predecessor, the Trust

Agency, carried out these commercial activities,

inter alia, with an office and staff in the United

6

States. Subsequently, the BVVG has continued

these activities by posting links to such

information on its website.

J.A. 2-3. According to the complaint, “[w]hen the BVVG

succeeded to the Trust Agency’s responsibilities concerning

agricultural and forest lands in the early to mid-1990s, it

adopted and continued the Trust Agency’s marketing efforts.

Those marketing efforts . . . continue to the present day.” J.A.

5. From 1992 through 2008, “BVVG and its predecessor, the

Trust Agency, collected at least €3.5 billion from successful

land marketing and sales.” J.A. 3.

In 1991, Schubarth applied to the German State Agency

for Open Property Issues in the State of Thuringia (the

“Thuringia State Agency”), where the Estate was located, for

restitution of the property. In 1992, the Thuringia State Agency

granted restitution of a house on the Estate and some

surrounding land, but denied Schubarth’s claim as to the

remainder of the Estate. The complaint claims this “constituted

an expropriation of her property by the new, unified Federal

Republic of Germany,” and that Schubarth’s American

citizenship entitled her to compensation “represent[ing] the

equivalent of the property taken” under the FCN Treaty. J.A.

5-6.

In 1994, Germany enacted the “Compensation Act,”

providing a process by which owners of expropriated property

whose restitution claims had been denied could apply for some

additional compensation. Schubarth so applied in 1995 and

claimed she was entitled to 100% of the Estate’s fair market

value as of the date of the alleged expropriation. Her

application argued the FCN Treaty had been adopted as

domestic German law and, therefore, entitled her to full

compensation for the entire value of the Estate. The

7

application remained pending before the Thuringia State

Agency, without a decision, for nineteen years.

Almost two decades after Schubarth submitted her

application, in February 2014, the Thuringia State Agency

issued a proposed decision under the Compensation Act

recognizing Schubarth as owner of at least some of the Estate,

acknowledging that the Estate had been expropriated, and

proposing a €35,279 compensation award. J.A. 7. Schubarth

believed this was far less than the amount to which she was

entitled. In November 2014, Schubarth requested that the

Thuringia State Agency apply to Germany’s Ministry of

Finance for an opinion on the applicability of the FCN Treaty

to her claim. Several days later, the Thuringia State Agency

issued a final administrative decision affirming its February

2014 proposed decision without discussing the FCN Treaty.

According to the complaint, this final decision “admits, among

other things, that Mrs. Schubarth was the owner of the [] Estate,

that the [] Estate was expropriated, and that Mrs. Schubarth is

entitled to compensation payable by Germany.” J.A. 8.

B.

Schubarth filed this action in December 2014,

approximately one month after the Thuringia State Agency

issued its final administrative decision. Defendants moved to

dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA

and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).1

1

Defendants also moved to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction. Under

the FSIA, personal jurisdiction exists where (1) subject matter jurisdiction

has been satisfied, and (2) proper service has been effected. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1330(b); I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Republic of Pakistan, 351 F.3d 1184,

1191 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Defendants concede they were properly served;

thus, personal jurisdiction turns on the satisfaction of an FSIA exception.

8

Defendants argued, among other things, that Schubarth had not

pleaded facts sufficient to show BVVG was engaged in

“commercial activity in the United States” under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605(a)(3).

The District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss

for want of subject matter jurisdiction without conducting

jurisdictional discovery.2 Schubarth v. Federal Republic of

Germany, 220 F. Supp. 3d 111 (D.D.C. 2016). The court found

Schubarth’s allegation that BVVG’s predecessor, the Trust

Agency, maintained an office in New York in the early 1990s

insufficient because courts “have looked for evidence of recent

or ongoing transactions” in the United States to support

jurisdiction under the FSIA. Id. at 115. The District Court then

considered Schubarth’s allegations that the Trust Agency

“‘pursued marketing efforts over the Internet,’” “that BVVG

later ‘adopted and continued those marketing efforts . . . to the

present day,’” and that “[t]hose efforts include ‘posting links to

. . . information [about expropriated properties available for

lease or sale] on its website.’” Id. (second alteration in

original). The District Court concluded these facts did not

sufficiently “link[] BVVG’s commercial activity to the United

States” because Schubarth had not alleged “at least one alleged

commercial transaction or solicitation that was indisputably

tied to the United States.” Id. at 115-16. Therefore, the District

Court held, it did not have jurisdiction because Schubarth had

2

Schubarth did not request jurisdictional discovery prior to the District

Court’s order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Schubarth included

a request for jurisdictional discovery in her motion for reconsideration,

which the District Court denied because “such discovery is warranted only

where a ‘defendant has . . . challenged the factual basis of the court’s

jurisdiction.’” Mem. Op. & Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration,

ECF No. 41, at 2-3 (quoting Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola,

216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (alterations omitted).

9

not pleaded sufficient facts to show “commercial activity”

under § 1605(a)(3).3 Schubarth timely appealed.

III.

A.

This Court reviews de novo a district court’s dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Princz v.

Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir.

1994). “When reviewing a plaintiff’s unchallenged factual

allegations to determine whether they are sufficient to deprive

a . . . defendant of sovereign immunity, we assume those

allegations to be true.” Price, 294 F.3d at 93. “Thus, where

the defendant contests only the legal sufficiency of plaintiff’s

jurisdictional claims, the standard is similar to that of Rule

12(b)(6), under which dismissal is warranted if no plausible

inferences can be drawn from the facts alleged that, if proven,

3

For the same reason, the opinion below concluded Schubarth did not meet

the requirements for the FSIA waiver exception, which Schubarth argued

was applicable under the FCN Treaty’s provision that no agency or

instrumentality of either country “engage[d] in commercial, industrial,

shipping or other business activities within the territories” of the other may

claim “immunity [from] suit, execution of judgment or other liability to

which privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein.” FCN

Treaty, art. XVIII, ¶ 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (withdrawing

sovereign immunity in any case “in which the foreign state has waived its

immunity either explicitly or by implication”). In addition, because the

District Court concluded the complaint did not sufficiently plead

commercial activity in the United States, it did not reach Defendants’

argument that BVVG also qualifies as a “foreign state” due to BVVG’s role

in privatizing property in post-communist East Germany. We leave both

issues to the District Court to consider in the first instance if necessary.

10

would provide grounds for relief.” Id. A “defendant bears the

burden of proving” sovereign immunity, including that “the

plaintiff’s allegations do not bring its case within a statutory

exemption to immunity.” Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40.

B.

Federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over claims

against a foreign state or its agencies and instrumentalities only

pursuant to the FSIA, which establishes a default rule of

foreign sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 1604; Princz, 26 F.3d

at 105. “The Supreme Court has consistently held that the

FSIA’s enumerated exceptions provide the only path to

jurisdiction over foreign states in U.S. courts.” Belhas v.

Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Schubarth asserts her claim falls within the FSIA’s

“expropriation exception,” which provides:

(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from

the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or

of the States in any case –

...

(3) in which rights in property taken in

violation of international law are in issue and

that property or any property exchanged for

such property is present in the United States in

connection with a commercial activity carried

on in the United States by the foreign state; or

that property or any property exchanged for

such property is owned or operated by an

agency or instrumentality of the foreign state

11

and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in

a commercial activity in the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). “For the exception to apply, therefore,

the court must find that: (1) rights in property are at issue; (2)

those rights were taken in violation of international law; and

(3) a jurisdictional nexus exists between the expropriation and

the United States.” Nemariam v. Federal Democratic Republic

of Ethiopia, 491 F.3d 470, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quotation

marks and alteration omitted). The FSIA defines “commercial

activity” as “either a regular course of commercial conduct or

a particular commercial transaction or act.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1603(d).

A plaintiff must make more than a nonfrivolous showing

that FSIA’s expropriation exception applies. Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co.,

137 S. Ct. 1312, 1316 (2017). However, “where jurisdictional

questions turn upon further factual development, the trial judge

may take evidence and resolve relevant factual disputes.” Id.

IV.

A.

We conclude Schubarth’s factual allegations of BVVG’s

commercial activity in the United States are sufficient to

survive a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage. The District

Court observed that “[c]ourts assessing the FSIA’s commercial

activity requirement [] have looked for evidence of recent or

ongoing transactions.” Schubarth, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 115

(citing Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Federation, 528

F.3d 934, 948 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti

Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 693 (7th Cir. 2012); Altmann v. Republic

of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 961, 969 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2002)). From

12

these precedents the District Court derived a requirement that

a defendant’s commercial activity must be ongoing, or must

have ceased only recently, at the time a complaint is filed.4 We

do not decide whether the FSIA’s expropriation exception

always requires contemporaneous or recent commercial

activity, nor do we delve into how recent such activity must be,

because we conclude Schubarth adequately pleaded ongoing

sales and marketing of expropriated land by BVVG in the

United States as of 2014, when she filed her complaint.

The District Court reached a different conclusion after

considering the allegation that the Trust Agency “maintained a

New York office ‘in the early 1990s’ to market and sell

properties, and that those marketing efforts resulted in a large

volume of sales.” Schubarth, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 115. This was

insufficient to plead ongoing commercial activity by BVVG,

the District Court reasoned, because “the activities of a

predecessor entity occurring roughly two decades prior to the

filing of the instant complaint do not reveal whether BVVG is

engaged presently – or has been engaged recently – in

commercial activity in the United States.” Id. (emphasis and

quotation marks omitted).

True, the Trust Agency closed its New York office

sometime before 1994, twenty years before the filing of this

action.5 But a plaintiff need not show sufficient “commercial

4

This interpretation is supported by the FSIA’s plain text, which employs

the present tense: Sovereign immunity may be abrogated if the “agency or

instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (emphasis added); see United States v. Wilson, 503

U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (“Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in

construing statutes.”).

5

We note that nineteen of those years passed while Schubarth awaited a

decision from the Thuringia State Agency on her restitution application.

13

activity in the United States” independently with each fact she

alleges. The Trust Agency’s operation of a New York office

in the early 1990s must be evaluated in the context of the

complaint’s other allegations, including that “[w]hen the

BVVG succeeded to the Trust Agency’s responsibilities

concerning agricultural and forest lands in the early to mid-

1990s, it adopted and continued the Trust Agency’s marketing

efforts,” which “continue to the present day.” J.A. 5. This must

also be read together with the allegation that the Trust Agency

made $1.65 billion in U.S. sales, which strengthens

Schubarth’s allegation that the Trust Agency’s successor

would continue these profitable land sales once it took over the

Trust Agency’s responsibilities. With all of these facts taken

as true at this stage, it is reasonable to infer that the successor

There is no indication that Schubarth did not diligently pursue and exhaust

her remedies in Germany, or that she bears any responsibility for the

agency’s delay that contributed to the two-decade temporal distance

between the New York office’s closure and the filing of this suit. Schubarth

therefore argues that the District Court’s interpretation of § 1605(a)(3) as

requiring commercial activity contemporaneous to the filing of suit in this

country, rather than contemporaneous with the alleged expropriation, would

work inequity and injustice in this case. Because Schubarth’s complaint

adequately alleges continuing commercial activity by BVVG in the United

States through the filing of her complaint, we need not consider whether a

foreign sovereign may successfully defeat jurisdiction under the

expropriation exception by delaying exhaustion of a plaintiff’s remedies

under its own laws. Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21

(2004) (Amicus curiae argues “that before asserting a claim in a foreign

forum, the claimant must have exhausted any remedies available in the

domestic legal system. . . . We would certainly consider [an exhaustion]

requirement in an appropriate case.”); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541

U.S. 677, 714 (2004) (“[A] plaintiff may have to show an absence of

remedies in the foreign country sufficient to compensate for any taking [to

invoke the FSIA’s expropriation exception].”) (Breyer, J., concurring).

14

to such a robust sales operation would continue marketing and

selling to U.S. buyers.

The complaint also alleges that “[b]etween 1992 and 2008,

BVVG and its predecessor, the Trust Agency, collected at least

€3.5 billion from successful land marketing and sales,” J.A. 3;

and that agencies or instrumentalities of Germany “have

engaged, and continue to engage, in . . . the sales marketing of

Mrs. Schubarth’s estate to potential buyers in the United

States,” J.A. 1. Because defendants chose not to dispute these

facts when moving to dismiss, they must be assumed true and

all reasonable inferences must be drawn in Schubarth’s favor.

Price, 294 F.3d at 93. If BVVG made billions in land sales

through 2008, and if BVVG’s efforts included “sales

marketing” of the Estate itself “in the United States,” J.A.1, it

is at least plausible that, as Schubarth alleges, Trust Agency’s

sales and marketing efforts in the United States “continue

through the present day” via its successor, BVVG. See Simon

v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 147 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (A

defendant is “entitled to a dismissal for failure to establish

jurisdiction only if ‘no plausible inferences can be drawn from

the facts alleged that, if proven,’ would satisfy the

expropriation exception’s nexus requirements.” (quoting Price,

294 F.3d at 93)). We therefore conclude that Schubarth has

adequately alleged ongoing commercial activity in the United

States on these undisputed facts.

Schubarth bolsters her argument in support of our

jurisdiction with allegations that “the Trust Agency pursued

marketing efforts over the Internet,” and that BVVG “adopted

and continued [those] marketing efforts . . . to the present day’”

by “posting links to . . . information [about expropriated

properties available for lease or sale] on its website.” J.A. 5, 3.

If we had to decide whether online marketing in English, alone,

constitutes commercial activity in the United States, we might

15

be inclined to agree with the District Court. But Schubarth’s

complaint does not present this question. Like the allegations

regarding the Trust Agency’s New York office, the allegations

of BVVG’s online marketing are pleaded in the context of the

rest of the complaint. Again, we must draw reasonable

inferences in Schubarth’s favor on this motion to dismiss,

where the complaint’s factual allegations – including that

BVVG was marketing and selling expropriated land in the

United States after it succeeded to the Trust Agency’s

responsibilities – are undisputed. Thus, the allegation that

BVVG continued the Trust Agency’s online marketing

reasonably explains how BVVG continued the Trust Agency’s

efforts to sell expropriated land in this country after closing the

New York office.

We emphasize that our decision applies the standard of

review on a motion to dismiss under the FSIA where

Defendants have not disputed any facts in the complaint. We

must assume the truth of Schubarth’s allegations, make all

reasonable inferences in her favor, and properly place the

ultimate burden of proof with the Defendants. See Price, 294

F.3d at 93. Under this standard, we conclude Schubarth has

alleged sufficient facts to make it plausible that BVVG

continues the profitable commercial operations of the Trust

Agency, including marketing and sales of expropriated

property in the United States. Further factual development may

reveal these allegations to be false or unsupportable, but for

now they must be presumed true and construed liberally. Id.;

see also Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. at

1316 (“[W]here jurisdictional questions turn upon further

factual development, the trial judge may take evidence and

resolve relevant factual disputes.”); Gibson v. Republic of

Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[D]ismissal

[is] at least premature in light of the dearth of fact-finding done

by the district court thus far. Further fact-finding by the district

16

court . . . may yet render dismissal proper.”). We therefore

conclude Schubarth’s claims against BVVG survive

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for want of subject matter

jurisdiction at this stage.6

B.

Schubarth also seeks to abrogate defendant Germany’s

sovereign immunity under the FSIA’s expropriation exception.

The District Court properly concluded that this action cannot

be maintained against Germany because, under the intervening

authority of our decision de Csepel, a foreign state itself does

not lose immunity under the expropriation exception unless the

allegedly expropriated property is located in the United States.

See 859 F.3d at 1107 (“A foreign state loses its immunity if the

claim against it satisfies the exception by way of the first clause

of the commercial-activity nexus requirement; by contrast, an

agency or instrumentality loses its immunity if the claim

against it satisfies the exception by way of the second clause.”);

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (Jurisdiction exists under clause one

when expropriated property “is present in the United States in

connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United

States by the foreign state[.]”). As there is no dispute that the

Estate or any property exchanged for it are located outside this

country, the expropriation exception does not apply to

Germany.7

6

In light of this conclusion, we need not reach Schubarth’s alternative

argument that Germany waived BVVG’s immunity in signing the FCN

Treaty.

7

Schubarth argues for the first time in her reply brief that she should have

the opportunity to show jurisdiction over Germany because, she asserts,

BVVG is its alter ego. Regardless of the merits of this argument, Schubarth

forfeited it by failing to present it to the District Court. See United States v.

17

***

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.8

Stover, 329 F.3d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (arguments not presented to the

district court “cannot be considered for the first time on appeal”).

8

After the District Court granted the motion to dismiss, Schubarth moved

to alter the judgment under Rule 59 and for relief from judgment under Rule

60. She also submitted “newly found” evidence of a contract between

BVVG and a U.S.-based company as well as a presentation by BVVG staff

at a conference in Washington, D.C. The District Court denied both

motions and refused to consider the new evidence because it could have

been raised previously. In light of our reversal of the District Court’s

holding as to BVVG’s commercial activity in the United States, we need

not address these additional motions.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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