Florida Carry, Inc., and Rebekah Hargrove v. John E. Thrasher, an individual

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D16-3423

_____________________________

FLORIDA CARRY, INC., and

REBEKAH HARGROVE,

Appellants,

v.

JOHN E. THRASHER, an

individual, FLORIDA STATE

UNIVERSITY, and DAVID L.

PERRY, an individual,

Appellees.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Charles W. Dodson, Judge.

May 25, 2018

BILBREY, J. 1

Appellants, Florida Carry, Inc., and Rebekah Hargrove,

challenge the trial court’s summary final judgment in favor of

Appellees John Thrasher, Florida State University (FSU), and

David Perry on all issues alleged in Appellants’ complaint. We

1 Judge Bilbrey was substituted for an original panel

member in this proceeding after oral argument. He has viewed

the digital video recording of oral argument.

affirm the summary final judgment for Appellees on the issue of

FSU’s Game Day Plan without further comment. We affirm, as

right for the wrong reason, the summary final judgment for

Appellees on the challenges to the FSU Student Conduct Code

provisions prohibiting certain concealed weapons license (CWL)

licensees from possessing certain defensive devices including stun

guns as defined by section 790.06(12)(a)13., Florida Statutes

(2015) (hereinafter “defensive devices”), on FSU’s campus. We

affirm the summary final judgment for President Thrasher and

Chief Perry individually regarding the FSU Student Conduct

Code’s prohibition of lawful possession of firearms in vehicles, as

being the correct result as to President Thrasher and Chief Perry,

although we disagree with the trial court’s reasoning. We reverse

the summary final judgment for FSU regarding the FSU Student

Conduct Code’s prohibition of lawful possession of firearms in

vehicles, and we remand for further proceedings as set forth

below. Finally, we affirm the trial court’s order denying

Appellants’ post judgment motion to disqualify the trial judge.

Background

Appellant Florida Carry is a Florida not for profit corporation

and its stated purpose is to protect the rights of its members to

keep and bear arms. Appellant Ms. Hargrove is a member of

Florida Carry, an FSU student, and a CWL licensee. See §

790.06, Fla. Stat. (2015) (allowing specified law-abiding persons

age 21 or older to apply for a license to carry concealed weapons

or firearms subject to restrictions). Appellee FSU is a public

university and part of the State University System of Florida.

Appellee President Thrasher is the president of FSU, and

Appellee Chief Perry is the chief of the FSU police department

and assistant vice president for public safety.

The FSU Student Conduct Code prohibits, in part:

6. Weapons

a. On-campus possession or use of firearms, antique

firearms, explosives, destructive devices, or other

weapons or dangerous articles or substances, including

but not limited to non-lethal weapons such as pellet

2

guns, bb guns, paintball markers, slingshots, crossbows,

stun guns, Tasers, metallic knuckles, archery

equipment, swords, sword canes, ornamental or

decorative swords/daggers/knives, or any dangerous

chemical or biological agent. Note: This section does

not apply to any law enforcement officer who is a

student or to any student ROTC member acting under

the supervision of an ROTC unit in a manner proscribed

(sic) by military regulations of the United States

Government, or any student whose possession of a

weapon as described above is approved by the FSU

Police Department for a bona fide educational purpose.

Appellants filed the complaint on September 8, 2015. The

complaint alleged the FSU Student Conduct Code violated

section 790.33, Florida Statutes (2015), which — with certain

exceptions not applicable here — preempts regulation of firearms

by entities other than the Florida Legislature. Appellants’

complaint cited our decision in Florida Carry, Inc. v. University of

North Florida, 133 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (en banc)

(UNF), in support of their contention that the promulgation of

certain portions of the Student Conduct Code violated Florida

law.

Appellants alleged in the complaint that Appellees knew or

should have known that they were “without authority to regulate

the possession of firearms on the FSU campus.” Appellants

further asserted that FSU improperly prohibited Ms. Hargrove

and certain other CWL licensees from carrying specified

defensive devices including stun guns while on FSU’s campus

and improperly prohibited lawful possession of firearms in

vehicles.

The parties entered into a stipulation one week after

Appellants filed suit. In the stipulation, Appellees agreed that

during the pendency of the litigation Appellees would not “detain,

arrest, or discipline” a student, FSU employee, or faculty member

who held a CWL and possessed a defensive device as described in

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section 790.06(12)(a)13., Florida Statutes (2015). 2 Appellees also

agreed that they would not “detain, arrest, or discipline any

person” for lawfully possessing a weapon or firearm in a private

vehicle or lawfully possessing a handgun securely encased in a

private vehicle.

The parties did not undertake any discovery but instead filed

motions for summary final judgment. Chief Perry submitted an

affidavit in support of Appellees’ motion where he attested that

prior to the UNF decision, “FSU, like other Florida colleges and

universities, believed they were authorized by Section

790.115(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes, to waive the requirement that

persons be permitted to keep guns in motor vehicles on school

property.” Chief Perry’s affidavit also stated that since he

became FSU’s police chief in 2006, “FSU has not arrested,

prosecuted, or disciplined, or threatened to take such action,

against anyone for violation of Florida laws relating to firearms

or other weapons.” President Thrasher also submitted an

affidavit in support of summary judgment. Appellants did not

submit any affidavits regarding the summary judgment motions.

After a hearing on the competing motions, the trial court

issued an order granting Appellees’ motion for summary

judgment on all issues. The trial court concluded that the

exceptions in section 790.115(2)(a), which permit certain weapons

on school property, did not include an exception for electronic

weapons or devices. The trial court therefore concluded that FSU

could ban defensive devices including stun guns as stated in the

Student Conduct Code. The trial court also concluded that the

claim regarding FSU’s prohibition on possession of firearms in

vehicles was moot because FSU “acted expeditiously” after the

2 Section 790.06(12)(a)13., Florida Statutes, provides that a

CWL does not authorize the licensee to carry a concealed weapon

into “[a]ny college or university facility unless the licensee is a

registered student, employee, or faculty member of such college

or university and the weapon is a stun gun or nonlethal electric

weapon or device designed solely for defensive purposes and the

weapon does not fire a dart or projectile.”

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UNF decision to “ensure that campus law enforcement personnel

were aware of the decision and complied with it.”

Appellants then moved to disqualify the trial judge and to

vacate the order granting summary final judgment for Appellees.

Those motions were denied, and Appellants brought this appeal.

Our Prior Caselaw Regarding

Firearms on University Campuses

The Florida Legislature has preempted the field of regulation

of firearms through the language in section 790.33, Florida

Statutes (2015), which reads, in pertinent part:

(1) Preemption.—Except as expressly provided by the

State Constitution or general law, the Legislature

hereby declares that it is occupying the whole field of

regulation of firearms and ammunition, including the

purchase, sale, transfer, taxation, manufacture,

ownership, possession, storage, and transportation

thereof, to the exclusion of all existing and future

county, city, town, or municipal ordinances or any

administrative regulations or rules adopted by local or

state government relating thereto. Any such existing

ordinances, rules, or regulations are hereby declared

null and void.

Further, section 790.33 more specifically defines the actions

prohibited by the statute and also creates potential causes of

action for affected parties, as follows:

(3) PROHIBITIONS; PENALTIES.—

(a) Any person, county, agency, municipality, district, or

other entity that violates the Legislature’s occupation of

the whole field of regulation of firearms and

ammunition, as declared in subsection (1), by enacting

or causing to be enforced any local ordinance or

administrative rule or regulation impinging upon such

exclusive occupation of the field shall be liable as set

forth herein.

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***

(c) If the court determines that a violation was

knowing and willful, the court shall assess a civil fine of

up to $5,000 against the elected or appointed local

government official or officials or administrative agency

head under whose jurisdiction the violation occurred.

***

(f) A person or an organization whose membership is

adversely affected by any ordinance, regulation,

measure, directive, rule, enactment, order, or policy

promulgated or caused to be enforced in violation of this

section may file suit against any county, agency,

municipality, district, or other entity in any court of this

state having jurisdiction over any defendant to the suit

for declaratory and injunctive relief and for actual

damages, as limited herein, caused by the violation. A

court shall award the prevailing plaintiff in any such

suit:

1. Reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in

accordance with the laws of this state, including a

contingency fee multiplier, as authorized by law;

and

2. The actual damages incurred, but not more

than $100,000.

This court, in UNF, held that the preemption of the

regulation of firearms and ammunition in section 790.33 applies

to state universities. UNF, 133 So. 3d at 973. We held that

public colleges and universities in Florida are not authorized to

adopt regulations regarding possession of firearms or

ammunition beyond what is provided by statute. Id. at 972. We

further held in UNF that a state university is not a “school

district” under the exception in section 790.115(2)(a)3., Florida

Statutes, which allows school districts to prohibit otherwise

lawful possession of firearms in vehicles. UNF, 133 So. 3d at

970-71. We also held that the University of North Florida’s

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Student Conduct Code firearm regulation “qualifies as an

administrative rule ‘adopted by local or state government,’ which

the legislature has expressly preempted.” Id. at 973 (citing §

790.33(1), Fla. Stat.).

In Florida Carry, Inc. v. University of Florida, 180 So. 3d

137, 148-49 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (UF), we held that officers,

employees, and agents of the State or its subdivisions were not

immune from suit under section 790.33 by operation of the

limitation in the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in

section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes. However, we agreed that

even though sovereign immunity did not apply, the plain

language of section 790.33(3)(f) precluded the award of damages

against individuals. UF, 180 So. 3d at 150-51. 3

In Florida Carry, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 212 So. 3d 452,

461-62 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), we determined that in order for a

local ordinance, administrative rule, or regulation to violate

section 790.33(a), Florida Statutes, the local ordinance,

administrative rule, or regulations had to be enacted or enforced.

Furthermore, to pursue the remedies under section 790.33(3)(f),

the “ordinance, regulation, measure, directive, rule, enactment,

order, or policy” had to be “promulgated or caused to be enforced

in violation of this section.” City of Tallahassee, 212 So. 3d at

462-63. We then went on to hold that mere re-publication of an

ordinance or rule is not sufficient to find a violation of section

790.33, Florida Statutes. City of Tallahassee, 212 So. 3d at 465.

CWL Licensees’ Possession of

Defensive Devices on Campus

Appellants sued each Appellee in separate counts claiming

violations of section 790.06. The trial court concluded that FSU

was correct in banning from campus all defensive devices as

3 Section 790.33(3)(c) does provide for a civil fine against the

“local government official or officials or administrative agency

head under whose jurisdiction the violation occurred” for

“knowing and willful” violations. This subsection is discussed

below.

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described by section 790.06(12)(a)13. The court relied on section

790.115(2)(a), which states in part:

A person shall not possess any firearm, electric

weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon as

defined in s. 790.001(13), including a razor blade or box

cutter, except as authorized in support of school-

sanctioned activities, at a school-sponsored event or on

the property of any school, school bus, or school bus

stop . . .

In relying solely on this section, the trial court did not give effect

to section 790.115(2)(e); overlooked section 790.06(12)(a)13.; and

did not follow the often-stated requirement, which we mentioned

in UF, that statutes should be read in such a way as to

harmonize and reconcile them so as to give effect to all provisions

of all statutes if possible. See UF, 180 So. 3d at 142.

Section 790.115(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2015), states, “[t]he

penalties of this subsection shall not apply to persons licensed

under s. 790.06,” the CWL statute. Section 790.06(12)(a) in turn

states:

A license issued under this section does not

authorize any person to openly carry a handgun or carry

a concealed weapon or firearm into:

***

13. Any college or university facility unless the

licensee is a registered student, employee, or faculty

member of such college or university and the weapon is

a stun gun or nonlethal electric weapon or device

designed solely for defensive purposes and the weapon

does not fire a dart or projectile . . .

Therefore, reading these statutes together, a registered

student, employee, or faculty member who possesses a CWL is

allowed by Florida law to carry a defined defensive device on

campus. The trial court erred in finding that section

790.115(2)(a) applied to Ms. Hargrove, a CWL licensee and FSU

8

student, so as to prohibit her from carrying a defensive device on

FSU’s campus.

However, the trial court was right for the wrong reason in

granting summary final judgment on the issue of the prohibition

of defensive devices on campus as set forth in the Student

Conduct Code. See Dade County School Bd. v. Radio Station

WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999) (allowing an appellate

court to affirm a trial court decision “if a trial court reaches the

right result, but for the wrong reasons” so long as “there is any

basis which would support the judgment in the record”).

The preemption in section 790.33(1) does not apply to

defensive devices; only the regulation of firearms and

ammunition is preempted. A firearm “will, is designed to, or may

readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an

explosive.” § 790.001(6), Fla. Stat. Ammunition must contain

“primer,” “[o]ne or more projectiles,” and “[g]unpowder.” §

790.001(19)(a)-(c), Fla. Stat. A defensive device by its definition

“does not fire a dart or projectile.” § 790.06(12)(a)13., Fla. Stat.

Firearms and ammunition, as defined in section 790.001(6) &

(19), Florida Statutes, are clearly distinct from defensive devices

as defined in section 790.06(12)(a)13. The prohibitions and

penalties for encroachment on preemption of firearms and

ammunition contained in section 790.33(3) do not apply to

defensive devices as defined by section 790.06(12)13. because

those devices are not firearms or ammunition.

While the Legislature in section 790.06(15) “finds it

necessary to occupy the field of regulation of the bearing of

concealed weapons or firearms for self-defense,” nothing in

section 790.06 creates a cause of action like section 790.33(3)

does. “In general, a statute that does not purport to establish

civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or

welfare of the public as an entity, will not be construed as

establishing civil liability.” Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d

983, 986 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Moyant v. Beattie, 561 So. 2d 1319,

1320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)). Therefore the trial court’s summary

final judgment in favor of Appellees was correct, although for the

wrong reason, as to the Appellees’ liability for prohibiting

defensive devices by CWL licensees in the Student Conduct Code.

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The affirmance on this issue does not preclude Appellants from

pursuing any cognizable action or challenge to the prohibition of

CWL licensees’ possession of defensive devices, including an

administrative challenge under chapter 120, Florida Statutes.

See Hart Properties v. Slack, 159 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1964); Mosley v.

American Med. Int’l., Inc., 712 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)

(affirming summary judgment but allowing additional

proceedings where unsuccessful parties may have valid claims). 4

The Individual Defendants

The trial court granted summary final judgment in favor of

President Thrasher and Chief Perry on all issues. The summary

final judgment on the issue of defensive devices by CWL licensees

was appropriate as to all Appellees as discussed above. As for

FSU’s prohibition in the Student Conduct Code on firearms in

vehicles, summary final judgment was also correct as to the

individuals, but we again disagree with the trial court’s

reasoning. “Even summary judgment can be affirmed, if right for

the wrong reason, where the right reason was adequately

presented to the trial court in support of the motion.” Samiian v.

First Professionals Ins. Co., 180 So. 3d 190, 194 (Fla. 1st DCA

2015).

In their motion for summary judgment, Appellees argued

that “[t]here is no provision for a fine, damages, or other penalty

against an individual in absence of evidence that a violation was

knowing and willful.” Although the trial court’s order granting

summary final judgment did not address this, Appellees are

correct.

In UF, we discussed whether the University of Florida’s

president could be liable for damages under section 790.33. UF,

180 So. 3d at 150-51. We concluded that the specific language in

section 790.33(3)(f) permitting suit against “any county, agency,

4 Our decision allows any other available remedy to address

this issue. If amendment of the complaint is available,

Appellants are free to seek it.

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municipality, district, or other entity” did not include a person.

UF, 180 So. 3d at 150-51. The complaint here also sought

injunctive and declaratory relief as allowed by section 790.33(3)(f)

against President Thrasher and Chief Perry, but our holding in

UF and a plain reading of section 790.33(3)(f) precludes those

remedies as to individuals as well.

The complaint also sought statutory fines against President

Thrasher and Chief Perry, presumably referring to the civil fine

of up to $5,000 as permitted in section 790.33(3)(c). However,

such fines can only be assessed against officials for knowing and

willful violations of the Legislature’s preemption of firearms and

ammunition regulation. As stated in Chief Perry’s affidavit, and

not challenged by any record evidence to the contrary from

Appellants, until our UNF decision FSU believed it was

permitted to regulate the possession of firearms in vehicles. As

further stated in Chief Perry’s affidavit, immediately after our

UNF decision, FSU undertook action to comply with the decision.

The undisputed facts are that any violation by President

Thrasher or Chief Perry of the preemption in section 790.33 was

not knowing and willful. Summary final judgment in their favor

on this issue was therefore correct.

Material Facts as to the Date of Promulgation

of the Student Conduct Code Remain as to FSU

The trial court granted summary final judgment in favor of

FSU on the issue of the Student Conduct Code’s prohibition on

possession of firearms in a vehicle. “At the summary judgment

stage, a trial court is to enter a judgment only when no issues of

fact remain.” Citizens Property Ins. Corp. v. Mallett, 7 So. 3d 552,

556 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “A trial court’s ruling on summary

judgment is subject to de novo review.” Acosta, Inc., v. Nat'l

Union Fire Ins. Co., 39 So. 3d 565, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing

Castleberry v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 810 So. 2d 1028,

1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)). The Code is a regulation per UNF.

Id. at 973. The prohibition on the lawful storage of firearms and

ammunition in vehicles directly violates UNF. Id. at 977; see also

§§ 790.06(12)(b), 790.115(2)(a)3., & 790.25(5), Fla. Stat (2015).

11

Appellees’ answer admitted the improper prohibition in the

FSU Student Code at least as to lawful possession of firearms in

vehicles. But Appellees’ answer also claimed that the statements

prohibiting lawful storage of firearms in vehicles “have been

reviewed by FSU’s general counsel and recommendations are

being made to FSU for revisions designed to ensure that the code

accurately reflects Florida law” per the UNF decision. The

answer continued, “FSU is not enforcing the code to the extent

that it is not consistent with Florida law as interpreted by the

UNF decision.” The trial court concluded that this made the

Student Conduct Code issue moot. We respectfully disagree.

“An issue is moot when the controversy has been so fully

resolved that a judicial determination can have no actual effect.”

Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1992). In UF, we upheld

the trial court’s finding of mootness because, shortly after our

UNF decision, the University of Florida added language to its

regulations that “UF would comply with Florida law governing

firearms in vehicles.” UF, 180 So. 3d at 139. Here, Appellants

brought suit over a year and a half after UNF, and the FSU

Student Conduct Code at the time the complaint was filed still

contained regulations contrary to the preemption in section

790.33(1). While FSU may not be enforcing the challenged

provisions of the Code, those provisions remain. Accordingly,

Appellants’ challenge to the Student Conduct Code was not moot.

The trial court did not have our City of Tallahassee decision

when it determined that the Student Conduct Code issues were

moot. Like this case, in City of Tallahassee the parties stipulated

that the ordinance in question had not been enforced for years

before suit was brought by Florida Carry. Id. at 456. Also like

here, the ordinance in City of Tallahassee remained “on the

books” as part of the Tallahassee City Code. Id. at 462. The

provisions of the FSU Student Conduct Code which attempt to

impose regulations beyond what is permitted by statute are

clearly void per section 790.33(1). Since the mere re-publication

of an ordinance, rule, or regulation is not sufficient to find a

violation of section 790.33, Florida Statutes, per City of

Tallahassee, the question which remains is when the FSU

Student Conduct Code was enacted or promulgated. Id. at 465.

The sparse record before us leaves us unable to answer that

12

question. Therefore our de novo review finds material facts

remain such that the summary final judgment on this issue was

error.

Under section 790.33(3)(a), liability exists for “enacting or

causing to be enforced any local ordinance or administrative rule

or regulation impinging upon such exclusive occupation of the

field.” Per Chief Perry’s affidavit, it is undisputed that the

applicable Student Conduct Code provisions have not been

enforced since he became chief in 2006. The stipulation entered

into by the parties meant the challenged provisions of the Code

were not being enforced during the litigation. Therefore the fact

question which remains is when was the Student Conduct Code

enacted or promulgated so as to permit proceeding per City of

Tallahassee. See Ch. 87-23, Laws of Fla. (creating the

preemption in § 790.33(1)); Ch. 2011-109, Law of Fla. (creating

the private cause of action under § 790.33(3)(f)). 5

During oral argument, Appellants’ counsel stated that FSU

contended that the Student Conduct Code was enacted in 1986,

but he could not find that in the record. We likewise cannot find

record support to establish a date when FSU prohibited

possession of firearms, which would include a prohibition of

possession of firearms in vehicles as otherwise allowed by

sections 790.115(2)(a) and 790.25(5). It is therefore necessary to

reverse and remand for further proceedings so the trial court can

determine when the FSU Student Conduct Code section

prohibiting firearms was enacted or promulgated as defined by

City of Tallahassee, and accordingly, whether to allow a recovery

under section 790.33(3).

5 We decline to determine whether the applicable date for

when an ordinance or regulation is enacted or promulgated is

enactment or promulgation after Legislative preemption in 1987,

or enactment or promulgation after creation of the private cause

of action in 2011. This issue is not yet before us, we have not had

the benefit of briefing or argument on the issue, and depending

on the date of enactment or promulgation of the section at issue

in the FSU Student Conduct Code, any difference between the

possible dates may be immaterial.

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Motion to Disqualify

After the order granting summary final judgment was

entered, Appellants moved to disqualify the trial judge and to

vacate the order granting summary final judgment. The motion

alleged that on the date that summary final judgment was

granted Appellants discovered from the FSU Foundation website

that the trial judge was a “regular and significant” donor to FSU.

Appellants also alleged in the motion that the trial judge has “a

vested interest in insuring that the funds he donated to the

Defendant are not used to pay damages, fines or attorney’s fees,”

and therefore claimed that the trial judge was biased against

Appellants. The trial judge rejected the motion to disqualify, and

Appellants raise that rejection as their last issue on appeal. We

do not address whether the allegations in the motion to disqualify

were sufficient because even assuming they were sufficient, the

allegations were clearly untimely.

An order denying a motion for disqualification is properly

reviewed using a de novo standard. Sume v. State, 773 So. 2d

600, 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). A motion to disqualify a trial judge

“is considered untimely when delayed until after the moving

party has suffered an adverse ruling unless good cause for delay

is shown.” Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 243 (Fla. 1986).

Appellants offer no explanation as to why they waited until after

the trial judge ruled on the competing motions for summary

judgment before discovering the public information regarding the

trial judge’s financial contributions to FSU.

As federal courts have held in considering motions based on

publicly available information:

For purposes of timeliness, the applicant is charged with

knowledge of all facts “known or knowable, if true, with

due diligence from the public record or otherwise.” Any

other rule would allow a member of a law firm aware of

facts that might lead to judicial disqualification to sit on

the information, wait to see which way the wind appears

to be blowing with the judge, and then come forward in

an effort to get rid of the judge if a colleague responsible

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for a case begins to perceive that the judge is

unreceptive to the client’s position or even simply wants

a delay.

Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Reimerdes, 104 F. Supp. 2d 334,

349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar

Ass’n, 406 F. Supp. 721, 724 (E.D. Va. 1975)); see also Huff v.

Standard Life Ins. Co., 643 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Fla. 1986).

We agree with these federal cases, and therefore agree that

the trial judge was correct to reject Appellants’ motion to

disqualify.

Conclusion

The summary final judgment in favor of all Appellees as to

the Game Day Plan is AFFIRMED. The summary final judgment

in favor of Appellees on the issue of the prohibition of possession

of certain defensive devices including stun guns on FSU’s campus

even by CWL licensees is AFFIRMED. Appellants may seek

whatever other remedies are available to address this issue. The

summary final judgment in favor of the individual defendants

John E. Thrasher and David L. Perry on the issues of the FSU

Student Conduct Code’s prohibition of firearms in vehicles is

AFFIRMED. The summary final judgment in favor of FSU on the

issue of the FSU Student Conduct Code’s prohibition of firearms

in vehicles is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

The trial judge’s denial of the motion to disqualify is AFFIRMED.

WINOKUR and JAY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

_____________________________

Eric J. Friday of Kingry & Friday, PLLC, Jacksonville, for

Appellants.

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Barry Richard of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tallahassee, for

Appellees.

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