Opinion

Com. v. Brown, M.

Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
May 21, 2018
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 4.4%

The opinion

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

MARCUS BROWN :

:

Appellant : No. 243 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 3, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004513-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and RANSOM, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 21, 2018

Marcus Brown appeals from the judgment of sentence of life

imprisonment imposed following his conviction of first-degree murder and

related firearms charges. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts underlying this appeal as

follows:

On September 20, 2014, the Twisters Motorcycle Club

hosted its annual anniversary ceremony at the Nifiji Event Hall at

1432 Chew Street in northern Philadelphia. Between 500 and

1,000 people affiliated with several Philadelphia motorcycle clubs

attended the event, including the decedent, Desmond “Little G”

Davis, a member of the Twisters, [Appellant], Marcus “Taz”

Brown, a member of the rival Byrd Riders Motorcycle Club, and

his co-defendant, Stanley “Stizz” Newell, another Byrd Rider.

At approximately midnight on September 21, 2014, an

argument between “Gun,” the chapter president of the Byrd

Riders, and the decedent commenced outside the event hall on

Chew Street, drawing the attention of [Appellant] and Newell.

As the argument continued, . . . Newell approached the decedent

* Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court.

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and argued with him about a gun. During this argument,

[Appellant] approached the decedent from behind, drew a Colt

.45 caliber pistol, and pointed it at his face.

Approximately ten feet away from [Appellant] and

decedent, Michael “Country” Baker, a member of the Twisters,

drew his pistol, raised it above his head, and fired one shot. The

gunfire caused the crowd of over seventy-five attendees

standing outside the event hall to panic and scatter. Several

armed attendees drew their weapons and proceeded to fire at

each other. The decedent . . . ran down Chew Street, turned on

Park Avenue, and ran away from the Event Hall. [Appellant]

gave chase, followed the decedent onto Park Avenue, aimed his

weapon toward the decedent’s back, and fired at least four

shots, killing him.

Deputy Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Albert Chu, an expert

in forensic pathology, reviewed [the decedent’s] autopsy report

and testified that [he] suffered four gunshot wounds, including

non-fatal, penetrating wounds to his left shoulder and left

buttock, and fatal, penetrating wounds to his lower back and

right buttock. The projectiles causing the decedent’s lower back

and right buttock wounds travelled through several vital organs,

including the heart, small intestine, and liver. The decedent

suffered additional abrasions to his right hip, face, elbow, and

left knee, consistent with terminal collapse injury. To a

reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Chu concluded that

the cause of death was homicide.

Officers of the Philadelphia police crime scene unit

investigated the area surrounding the Nifiji Event Center and

recovered twenty-five fired cartridge casings (FCCs), including

nine .45 caliber FCCs, seven projectiles or fragments, and four

handguns, including a .45 caliber Springfield XDS pistol. Of the

nine .45 caliber FCCs discovered at the crime scene, five

matched the recovered Springfield XDS pistol. The four

remaining .45 caliber FCCs matched each other but did not

match the recovered Springfield, and instead were fired from an

unidentified pistol. The four .45 caliber FCCs matching the

unidentified pistol were recovered from the intersection of Chew

Street and Park Avenue, approximately one-quarter of a block

from where the decedent’s body was discovered.

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Officer Ronald Weitman, an expert in firearms and

ballistics, reviewed all of the ballistics evidence recovered from

the crime scene and the decedent’s body. Officer Weitman

examined four projectiles recovered from the decedent and

determined that they were .45 caliber. After comparing the

projectiles, Officer Weitman concluded that they were fired from

the same firearm, but that they were not fired from the

Springfield XDS recovered from the crime scene.

In the aftermath of the shooting, Philadelphia Police

interviewed Tyrell Ginyard, a member of the Twisters motorcycle

club present at the shooting. Ginyard told police and later

testified that he was approximately a foot away from the

decedent . . . when [Appellant] drew his .45 caliber pistol and

pointed it at the decedent’s head. [Mr.] Ginyard further

observed [Appellant] chase [Mr. Ginyard] and the decedent

around the corner of Chew Street and Park Avenue, after which

[the decedent] was struck by gunfire and collapsed on the

sidewalk.

Police further interviewed Rodney Gregory, a Byrd Rider,

who told police and later testified that he observed [Appellant]

brandish a gun the night of the murder. Gregory identified both

[Appellant] and his co-defendant[, Newell,] via photo array, and

when shown surveillance video of the incident, Gregory identified

[Appellant] as holding a pistol in his right hand.

Detective Frank Mullen, an expert in video recovery,

obtained video surveillance footage from three angles at the

Nifiji Event Hall and a private residence at 5626 Park Avenue.

Video recovered from the Nifiji Event Hall showed [Appellant]

point a gun at the decedent[’s] head just under the building’s

awning on Chew Street. A different camera angle from this

location showed the decedent . . . attempt to escape the chaos

outside the event hall by running down Chew Street and turning

onto Park Avenue. That same camera showed [Appellant] fire at

the decedent.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/17, at 2-5 (citations, footnote, and some

capitalization omitted).

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Appellant and Newell were arrested and charged with murder and

related firearms offenses. On November 15, 2016, a jury rejected

Appellant’s claim of self-defense, and convicted him of first-degree murder

and related firearms offenses.1 On January 3, 2017, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole on the

murder charge, and a concurrent aggregate sentence of two to four years on

the firearms violations. The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence

motion raising challenges to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial

court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. This matter is now ready for our

review.

Appellant raises the following claims:

A. Was the evidence presented insufficient to sustain a verdict of

first[-]degree murder?

B. Was the weight of the evidence presented insufficient to

support the Appellant’s conviction?

Appellant’s brief at 6 (capitalization omitted).

In his first claim, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his conviction of first-degree murder. Our scope and standard of

review of a sufficiency claim is well-settled:

____________________________________________

1 The charges against Appellant and Newell were consolidated for trial. The

jury found Newell guilty of third-degree murder in Baker’s shooting death.

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[O]ur standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that

we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict

winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be

deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each

material element of the crime charged and the commission

thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a

mathematical certainty. [T]he facts and circumstances

established by the Commonwealth need not be absolutely

incompatible with the defendant’s innocence. Any doubt about

the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of

law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined

circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

In order to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the

Commonwealth must prove that: (1) a person was unlawfully killed; (2) the

accused is responsible for the killing; and (3) the accused acted with malice

and specific intent to kill. See Commonwealth v. Hitcho, 123 A.3d 731,

746 (Pa. 2015); 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a). Under the Crimes Code, murder in

the first degree requires an “intentional killing,” which is defined as a “willful,

deliberate and premeditated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d). The use of a

deadly weapon on a vital part of the body is sufficient to establish the

specific intent to kill. See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964

(Pa.Super. 2016).

When, as in this case, the defendant has raised a claim of self-

defense, “[t]he use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable

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when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the

purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other

person on the present occasion.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 505. If the defendant

properly raises self-defense under section 505, the Commonwealth must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s act was not justifiable

self-defense. See Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1229-

30 (Pa.Super. 2005). The Commonwealth sustains this burden if it

establishes at least one of the following: (1) the accused did not reasonably

believe that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury; or (2) the

accused provoked or continued the use of force; or (3) the accused had a

duty to retreat and the retreat was possible with complete safety. Id. at

1230.

Appellant maintains that evidence presented by the Commonwealth

demonstrated that as many as eight guns were involved in the incident,

members of both the Twisters and Byrd Riders were firing weapons at the

time of the shooting, and a number of people were shooting in the

decedent’s direction. Appellant highlights that the evidence established that

the decedent was shot by two different people, as the projectiles discovered

in his body consisted of both .45 caliber and .38/.357 caliber bullet

fragments. Appellant claims that there is no physical evidence linking him to

the shooting, nor any evidence that he owned a .45 caliber gun. Appellant’s

brief at 14-15.

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Appellant argues that Mr. Ginyard is the only individual who testified

that Appellant had a .45 caliber weapon and shot at the decedent, and posits

that Mr. Ginyard’s testimony should be discredited on the basis that, in his

initial statement to police, he did not identify Appellant as one of the

shooters at the scene. Appellant further contends that that this omission

establishes that he acted in self-defense. According to Appellant, a video

presented at trial is consistent with his claim that he shot his weapon in

response to fear of imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury caused

by the decedent firing his weapon. Appellant’s brief at 15.

The trial court rejected Appellant’s sufficiency claim, and explained its

determination as follows:

Video surveillance footage recovered from the Nifiji Event

Hall showed [Appellant] draw a .45 caliber pistol and point it at

the decedent’s head immediately prior to the shooting.

Additional footage recovered from the Nifiji Event Hall showed

[Appellant] fire his weapon down Park Street towards the

decedent. [Mr.] Ginyard testified that that he and [the

decedent] ran down Chew Street and turned onto Park Avenue

as [Appellant] gave chase. After running halfway down the city

block, [Mr.] Ginyard watched [the decedent] collapse after being

struck with gunfire. Dr. Chu testified that the decedent was

struck in the back with four bullets, two of which traveled

through his vital organs.

....

Although it is undisputed that multiple parties discharged

their weapons on the night of the murder, forensic evidence and

[Mr.] Ginyard’s testimony sufficiently disproved [Appellant’s]

self-defense argument. Dr. Chu’s uncontroverted testimony

showed that the decedent . . . suffered four wounds to his back

caused by .45 cal[iber] projectiles. [Mr.] Ginyard testified that

[Appellant] carried a .45 cal[iber] pistol and pointed it at the

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decedent. Video evidence showed [Appellant] fire at the

decedent as he ran away. [Mr.] Ginyard recounted how he

attempted to flee the shooting with the decedent, only to watch

him collapse after having been struck in the back during his

escape. Nothing on the record indicated that the decedent fired

a weapon or otherwise attacked [Appellant]. The evidence is

sufficient to disprove [Appellant’s] self-defense claim, as the

Commonwealth has shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

[Appellant] could not reasonably believe he was in danger of

death or serious bodily injury, and that he continued to use force

as the decedent attempted to flee.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/17, at 6-7 (citations to record omitted).

Based on the evidence of record, the jury could reasonably infer that

Appellant chased the decedent as he was fleeing, and fired the shots which

killed him. As noted above, the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of

the body is sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill. Tucker, supra.

Once the issue of self-defense had been raised by Appellant, the

Commonwealth sustained its burden of proof by demonstrating beyond a

reasonable doubt that Appellant did not reasonably believe that he was in

danger of death or serious bodily injury, since he fired the fatal shots as the

decedent was fleeing from him. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief on

his first claim.

In his second claim, Appellant contends that the verdict depended

primarily on Mr. Ginyard’s trial testimony, which was inconsistent with his

initial statement to police. Appellant claims that the physical evidence

contradicts Mr. Ginyard’s testimony, because the video recovered from the

scene does not show what caliber weapon Appellant was holding, or that he

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discharged it. Appellant posits that Mr. Ginyard’s testimony should be

discredited because he provided false information on gun applications, and

was on probation for fraud at the time of trial. On this basis, Appellant

claims that the jury had no basis for rendering a guilty verdict on the murder

charge other than Mr. Ginyard’s inherently unreliable testimony.

Our standard of review of a challenge to the weight of the evidence is

well-settled:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the

trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence

presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when

reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against

the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons

for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction

that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of

justice.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (internal

citations omitted).

As noted above, we assess only the trial court’s exercise of discretion

in evaluating whether the jury’s decision to give more weight to certain facts

constitutes a denial of justice. Here, the trial court determined there were

no grounds to disturb the jury’s credibility findings or reweigh the evidence

after examining all of the evidence, stating:

[Appellant’s] argument ignores the substantial video

evidence showing [Appellant] brandishing a weapon prior to the

shooting, threatening the decedent with his weapon, and firing

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the weapon towards the decedent. Eyewitnesses [Mr.] Ginyard

and Gregory identified [Appellant] as the shooter on the video

surveillance tape, while [Mr.] Ginyard testified that he stood one

foot away from the decedent when [Appellant] pointed a gun at

his face. Although trial counsel impeached [Mr.] Ginyard with

evidence of his prior crimen falsi convictions for fraud and

providing false information to obtain a firearm, the jury was free

to consider those convictions during their deliberations and

found [Appellant] guilty nonetheless.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/17, at 9-10 (citations to record omitted).

Additionally, our review discloses that Mr. Ginyard was subject to

extensive cross-examination before the jury regarding his failure to identify

Appellant in his initial statement, and that he presented an explanation for

the inconsistency.2 See N.T. Trial, 11/9/16, at 35-84. The jury had a full

opportunity to observe Mr. Ginyard and to assess the credibility of his

explanation. After reviewing all the evidence, the jury found that the

credible evidence identified Appellant as the shooter. As such, we conclude

the trial court properly exercised its discretion in finding the jury’s verdict

was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock the conscience.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

2 Our review discloses that Mr. Ginyard testified that he spent approximately

thirty-six hours at the police station following the incident. During that time,

he gave two statements to police. After providing his first statement, Mr.

Ginyard was shown surveillance video from an area near the shooting. After

viewing the videotape, Mr. Ginyard provided his second statement to police,

wherein he identified Appellant as an individual in the video holding a gun,

and stated that Appellant shot at the decedent. See N.T. Trial, 11/9/16, at

35-84.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/21/18

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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