Opinion

Rotkiske v. Paul Klemm, Esq., Dba Nudelman, Klemm & Golub, P.C.

  • 890 F.3d 422
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
May 15, 2018
Status
Published
Author
Hardiman
On the bench
Smith, McKee, Ambro, Chagares, Jordan, Hardiman, Greenaway, Vanaskie, Shwartz, Krause, Restrepo, Bibas, Fisher
Cited by
105 cases
Authority
More cited than 91.8%

stating that statutes of limitations are intended to “fix[] an end point for civil liability,” thereby providing “certainty about a plaintiff's opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities” (citation omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • stating that statutes of limitations are intended to “fix[] an end point for civil liability,” thereby providing “certainty about a plaintiff's opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities” (citation omitted)
  • holding that the statute of limitations on FDCPA claims “begins to run when a would-be defendant violates the FDCPA, not when a potential plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the violation”
  • stating party opposing summary judgment “must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue”
  • finding that the discovery rule cannot apply to Title VII claims due to the statute’s use of the word “occurred”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 16-1668

___________

KEVIN C. ROTKISKE,

Appellant

v.

PAUL KLEMM, Esq., DBA Nudelman, Klemm &

Golub, P.C., DBA Nudelman, Nudelman & Ziering, P.C.,

Klemm & Associates; NUDELMAN, KLEMM & GOLUB,

P.C., DBA Nudelman, Nudelman & Ziering, P.C., DBA

Klemm & Associates; NUDELMAN, NUDELMAN &

ZIERING, P.C., DBA Nudelman, Klemm & Golub, P.C.,

Klemm & Associates; KLEMM & ASSOCIATES, DBA

Nudelman, Klemm & Golub, P.C., Nudelman, Nudelman &

Ziering, P.C.; JOHN DOES 1-10

__________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-03638)

District Judge: Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter

___________

Argued January 18, 2017

En Banc Rehearing Ordered September 7, 2017

Reargued En Banc February 21, 2018

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, AMBRO,

CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR.,

VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO,

BIBAS, and FISHER *, Circuit Judges

(Filed: May 15, 2018)

Matthew B. Weisberg [Argued]

Weisberg Law

7 South Morton Avenue

Morton, PA 19070

Adina H. Rosenbaum, Esq. [Argued]

Public Citizen Litigation Group

1600 20th Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20009

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

Carl E. Zapffe [Argued]

Fenton & McGarvey Law Firm

2401 Stanley Gault Parkway

Louisville, KY 40223

Counsel for Defendants-Appellees

*

Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit

Judge for the Third Circuit, assumed senior status on February

1, 2017.

2

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal requires us to determine when the statute of

limitations begins to run under the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (FDCPA or Act), 91 Stat. 874, 15 U.S.C. § 1692

et seq. The Act states that “[a]n action to enforce any liability

created by this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate

United States district court . . . within one year from the date

on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The

United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth

Circuits have held that the time begins to run not when the

violation occurs, but when it is discovered. See Lembach v.

Bierman, 528 F. App’x 297 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam);

Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d 935 (9th Cir.

2009). We respectfully disagree. In our view, the Act says what

it means and means what it says: the statute of limitations runs

from “the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692k(d).

I

The relevant facts of this case are undisputed. Appellant

Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003

and 2005, which his bank referred to Klemm & Associates

(Klemm) for collection. Klemm sued for payment in March

2008 and attempted service at an address where Rotkiske no

longer lived, but eventually withdrew its suit when it was

unable to locate him. Klemm tried again in January 2009,

3

refiling its suit and attempting service at the same address. 1

Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, somebody at that residence

accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default

judgment for around $1,500. Rotkiske discovered the judgment

when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014.

On June 29, 2015, Rotkiske sued Klemm and several

associated individuals and entities asserting, inter alia, that the

above-described collection efforts violated the FDCPA.

Defendants moved to dismiss Rotkiske’s FDCPA claim as

untimely and the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania agreed. The District Court rejected

Rotkiske’s argument that the Act’s statute of limitations

incorporates a discovery rule which “delays the beginning of a

limitations period until the plaintiff knew of or should have

known of his injury.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, No. 15-3638, 2016

WL 1021140, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2016). It found the

“actual statutory language” sufficiently clear that the clock

began to run on Defendants’ “last opportunity to comply with

the statute,” not upon Rotkiske’s discovery of the violation. Id.

at *4. The Court also rejected Rotkiske’s request for equitable

tolling as duplicative of his discovery rule argument. Id. at *5.

Rotkiske timely appealed the judgment of the District

Court and a panel of this Court heard oral argument on January

18, 2017. Prior to issuing an opinion and judgment, on

1

In a certification accompanying Defendants’ motion to

dismiss, Klemm’s managing partner stated that by the time of

the second suit he had moved to a new firm named Nudelman,

Nudelman & Ziering. Because Rotkiske has sued (among

others) both Klemm and Nudelman, and the complaint’s

allegations do not distinguish between them, for the sake of

simplicity we refer only to Klemm.

4

September 7, 2017, the Court sua sponte ordered rehearing en

banc, and argument was held on February 21, 2018.

II 2

“Statutory interpretation, as we always say, begins with

the text.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016). The text

at issue in this appeal reads:

An action to enforce any liability created by this

subchapter may be brought in any appropriate

United States district court . . . within one year

from the date on which the violation occurs.

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (emphasis added). In declining

Rotkiske’s request to read the statute to imply a discovery rule,

the District Court found that this language spoke clearly. We

agree, and will affirm its judgment dismissing Rotkiske’s

untimely FDCPA claim.

2

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our

review of an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a

claim is plenary, Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir.

2005), as is our review of questions of statutory interpretation,

United States v. Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2004). We

will affirm an order dismissing a complaint only when the

complaint fails to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

5

Statutes of limitation provide “security and stability to

human affairs” and are “vital to the welfare of society.” Gabelli

v. S.E.C., 568 U.S. 442, 448–49 (2013) (citations omitted). The

standard rule is that a statute of limitations “commences when

the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action.’” Bay

Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar

Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997) (quoting Rawlings v.

Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941)). By fixing an end point for civil

liability, Congress advances “the basic policies of all

limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and

certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a

defendant’s potential liabilities.” Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 447–48

(quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000)).

We recently summarized the two basic models that “a

legislature may choose” in fixing the start of a limitations

period. G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601,

613 (3d Cir. 2015). First, a statute can run from “the date the

injury actually occurred, an approach known as the ‘occurrence

rule.’” Id. Alternatively, Congress may delay the start of the

limitations period until “the date the aggrieved party knew or

should have known of the injury, that is, the ‘discovery rule.’”

Id.

Sometimes Congress clearly picks one model or

another. When a statute of limitations begins to run only when

“the plaintiff acquired or should have acquired actual

knowledge of the existence of such cause of action,” the

discovery rule plainly applies. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.

§ 1451(f)(2); Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 204 (interpreting

29 U.S.C. § 1451(f)(2) to impose a discovery rule); Merck &

Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010) (interpreting similar

language in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1)). Likewise, when Congress

specifies that the “date on which the violation occurs” starts the

6

limitations period, the occurrence rule plainly applies.

Accordingly, we hold that § 1692k(d)’s one-year limitations

period begins to run when a would-be defendant violates the

FDCPA, not when a potential plaintiff discovers or should

have discovered the violation.

Congress does not, of course, always express statutes of

limitations so directly. Instead of expressly enacting an

occurrence or a discovery rule, Congress often articulates

statutes of limitations in terms somewhere between those two

poles. Some statutes of limitations begin when a “claim first

accrue[s].” See, e.g., Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 447–48 (interpreting

28 U.S.C. § 2462). Others start when the “cause of action

arises” or when “liability arises.” See, e.g., McMahon v. United

States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951) (interpreting Suits in Admiralty

Act); Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 201 (interpreting 29

U.S.C. § 1451(f)(1)). And we have little doubt that an

exhaustive search would yield still other variations—some

subtle, some stark. This appeal does not implicate the less-

determinate language of those statutes, however.

III

Despite the “occurrence” language of the FDCPA,

Rotkiske insists that the discovery rule applies. His argument

relies on the text of the FDCPA, the policies underlying the

Act, decisions of two of our sister courts of appeals finding a

discovery rule in the FDCPA, and decisions of this Court

applying a discovery rule to other federal statutes. We consider

each point in turn.

7

A

For starters, we reject summarily Rotkiske’s assertion

that the text of the FDCPA is silent on the discovery rule. See

Rotkiske Supp. Br. 6. While it is true that the Act does not state

in haec verba that “the discovery rule shall not apply,” the

Supreme Court made clear in TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S.

19, 28 (2001), that Congress may “implicitly” provide as

much. In that Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) case, the

Court held that Congress had “implicitly excluded a general

discovery rule by explicitly including a more limited one.” 534

U.S. at 28. The same natural reading applies to the FDCPA in

this appeal: Congress’s explicit choice of an occurrence rule

implicitly excludes a discovery rule. A quotidian example

illustrates why this is so. When a bill states that payment is

timely if it is “received at the bank by 5:00,” it goes without

saying that a check arriving at 6:00 is late even if it was

postmarked a week earlier. Short of the express command that

TRW tells us is not required, it is hard to imagine how Congress

could have more clearly foreclosed the discovery rule.

B

Rotkiske also highlights the remedial purpose of the

FDCPA, which was enacted to combat the national problem of

abusive debt-collection practices. Rotkiske Supp. Br. 10–11.

Rotkiske emphasizes that those practices may involve fraud,

deception, or self-concealing behavior such that the failure to

apply the discovery rule would thwart the principal purpose of

the Act. Id. at 11–13. He warns that “[a]bsent the discovery

rule, vulnerable consumers will be left without redress if the

harm caused by debt collectors’ abusive or deceptive acts

remains concealed for over a year.” Id. at 16. We disagree for

two reasons.

8

First, to the extent Rotkiske contends that the collection

practices the FDCPA proscribes are inherently fraudulent,

deceptive, or self-concealing, the statute belies his argument.

Debtors are often vexed by overzealous or unscrupulous debt

collectors precisely because of repetitive contacts by phone or

mail. As the language of the FDCPA makes clear, many

violations will be apparent to consumers the moment they

occur. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) (proscribing

communication regarding debt collection “at any unusual time

or place”); id. § 1692d (proscribing various forms of

harassment in the service of debt collection, including “[t]he

use of obscene or profane language” and “[t]he publication of

a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts”); id.

§ 1692f(7) (proscribing “[c]ommunicating with a consumer

regarding a debt by post card”). The Act’s statute of limitations

applies to all of its provisions, so we decline Rotkiske’s

invitation to interpret the Act as if it contemplated only

concealed or fraudulent conduct. 3

3

The fact that the conduct proscribed by the FDCPA

will usually be obvious to its victims distinguishes this case

from our decision in Stephens v. Clash, 796 F.3d 281 (3d Cir.

2015). There, we considered a child sexual abuse claim

governed by a statute that required a filing “within six years

after the right of action first accrues.” 796 F.3d at 285 (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2012)). We reasoned that since “child

pornography is most often distributed in secret and without the

victim’s immediate knowledge,” the statute’s fundamental

objective of providing redress to exploited children would

most often “be thwarted without the discovery rule.” Id. at

285–86.

9

Second, to the extent that FDCPA claims do deal with

“false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s],” id. § 1692e,

nothing in the Act impairs the discretion district courts possess

to avoid patent unfairness in such cases. As we shall explain,

equitable tolling remains available in appropriate cases.

C

In addition to his textual and purposive arguments,

Rotkiske asks us to follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Mangum v. Action Collection Service, Inc., and the Fourth

Circuit’s decision in Lembach v. Bierman, both of which

implied a discovery rule in the Act’s statute of limitations. We

respectfully decline to do so.

Most fundamentally, neither opinion analyzed the

“violation occurs” language of the FDCPA. In Mangum, the

Ninth Circuit did not engage the text of the Act, relying instead

on its expansive holding in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence

Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998), that “the

discovery rule applies to statutes of limitations in federal

litigation.” Mangum, 575 F.3d at 940. The Ninth Circuit did

acknowledge that the Supreme Court had reversed its

application of the Norman-Bloodsaw rule to the FCRA in

TRW. Id. at 940–41. Nevertheless, after brushing aside TRW’s

analysis as “food for thought . . . worth musing on,” id. at 941,

the majority of the panel in Mangum concluded that TRW

neither overruled nor undermined that circuit’s prior precedent

regarding the general applicability of the discovery rule, id. 4

4

Judge O’Scannlain disagreed, relying on essentially

the same reading of the statutory text that we adopt here.

10

Like the Ninth Circuit in Mangum, the Fourth Circuit in

Lembach failed to engage the statutory text on its way to

determining that a discovery rule would vindicate the policies

underlying the FDCPA. Lembach, 528 F. App’x at 302. The

Court reasoned—without mentioning equitable tolling—that

because plaintiffs “had no way of discovering the alleged

violation,” the defendant “should not be allowed to profit from

the statute of limitations when its wrongful acts have been

concealed.” Id. For these reasons, we decline to join either the

Ninth or the Fourth Circuits in holding that the statute means

something other than what it plainly says.

D

In addition to the opinions of our sister courts in

Mangum and Lembach, Rotkiske places substantial weight on

our opinion in Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman,

38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994). In dictum in that case, we applied

the discovery rule to Title VII, even though the statutory

language required charges to be filed within 180 days “after the

alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e–5(e).

The problem with Rotkiske’s reliance on Oshiver is that

its dictum is in obvious tension with the Supreme Court’s

decision in TRW. Instead of focusing on the statutory text

(which we relegated to a footnote, 38 F.3d at 1385 n.3), we

described a “general rule” that “the statute of limitations begins

to run . . . [on] the date on which the plaintiff discovers” an

injury rather than “the date on which the wrong that injures the

plaintiff occurs,” id. at 1385 (emphasis in original). The

Mangum, 575 F.3d at 944 (O’Scannlain, J., specially

concurring).

11

Supreme Court’s approach in TRW counsels in favor of

reconsidering our earlier practice of presuming that federal

statutes of limitations include an implied discovery rule.

Indeed, to the extent that our decisions have relied on such a

general presumption in applying a discovery rule to statutes

that expressly begin to run when a violation “occurs,” they

cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s mandate that

when “the text [of a statute] and reasonable inferences from it

give a clear answer,” that is “the end of the matter.” Brown v.

Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994) (citations omitted). See

Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1385 (presuming applicability of discovery

rule); Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 590 (3d Cir.

2005) (same, following Oshiver).

Rather than imply a discovery rule by rote “in the

absence of a contrary directive from Congress,” see, e.g.,

Disabled in Action of Pa. v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d

199, 209 (3d Cir. 2008), we must parse each limitations period

using ordinary principles of statutory analysis—beginning

with the statutory text and then proceeding to consider its

structure and context. See, e.g., TRW, 534 U.S. at 28–33. As

part of that inquiry into context, it may sometimes prove

appropriate to consider whether there are “historical[] or

equitable reasons” to adopt either an occurrence or a discovery

rule. Gabelli, 568 U.S at 454. See, e.g., TRW, 534 U.S. at 27–

28 (noting that latent disease and medical malpractice, but not

the FCRA, are contexts that “cr[y] out for application of a

discovery rule”); Stephens v. Clash, 796 F.3d 281, 285–88 (3d

Cir. 2015) (noting the secretive nature of trade in child

pornography and the likelihood that an occurrence rule would

frustrate Congress’s objective to provide a remedy to

blameless minor victims). This is not such a case, however,

12

because the text of § 1692k(d) plainly incorporates an

occurrence rule.

IV

We conclude by emphasizing that our holding today

does nothing to undermine the doctrine of equitable tolling.

Indeed, we have already recognized the availability of

equitable tolling for civil suits alleging an FDCPA violation.

See Glover v. F.D.I.C., 698 F.3d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 2012)

(considering and rejecting an equitable tolling argument where

no extraordinary barrier existed to plaintiff’s suit). We do not

reach the question in this case only because Rotkiske failed to

raise it on appeal. Accordingly, our opinion should not be read

to foreclose the possibility that equitable tolling might apply to

FDCPA violations that involve fraudulent, misleading, or self-

concealing conduct. See, e.g., Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21

Wall.) 342, 348 (1874) (“[W]here the party injured by the fraud

remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of

diligence or care on his part, the bar . . . does not begin to run

until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special

circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the

fraud to conceal it . . . .”). 5

5

If Rotkiske had preserved reliance on equitable tolling

on appeal, then Judges McKee, Ambro, Vanaskie, and Shwartz

would have remanded to allow the District Court to consider

whether he would be entitled to rely on this doctrine because

our precedent had not previously recognized that a defendant’s

self-concealing conduct may be a basis for equitable tolling.

13

V

Civil actions alleging violations of the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act must be filed within one year from the

date of the violation. Because Rotkiske’s action was filed well

after that period expired, his action was untimely. We will

affirm the judgment of the District Court.

14

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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